## _wp13154

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [_wp13154](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp13154.pdf)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp13154.pdf.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp13154.pdf.json)

---

### Key findings and risks
- High corporate debt overhang in the Euro area periphery poses multiple risks:
  - Drag on corporate profitability and investment growth.
  - Threat to banks’ balance sheets and financial stability through increasing NPLs and corporate bankruptcies.
  - Abrupt corporate balance-sheet adjustment can migrate substantial losses from the private sector to the sovereign balance sheet.
- Deleveraging is necessary but should be gradual and orderly to allow resources to be redirected to productive and innovative segments and secure long-term viability.
- Empirical results (aggregated firm-level data) show a negative relationship between firms’ investment-to-capital ratio and their debt burden in selected Euro area countries over the 2000-11 period, with significant asymmetric effects beyond certain threshold levels of indebtedness.
- The deleveraging process is expected to be protracted and entail sizable macro-financial costs upfront; migration of losses to public balance sheets has been contained in most cases but risks can increase going forward.
- Policy mix needs to support an orderly and efficient adjustment aimed at restoring corporate productivity and growth.
- Note: Throughout the paper, the Euro area periphery group comprises Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.
- 8.8 percent for Italy and 9.9 percent for Portugal.

### Testing the relationship between corporate debt overhang and investment — theory, data, and methods
- Theory and mechanisms:
  - In perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller (1985)) market value and investment are independent of capital structure; with market frictions (asymmetric information), leverage matters for investment decisions (pecking-order behavior).
  - Financial deepening can boost productivity, but excess leverage raises corporate vulnerabilities and amplifies sensitivity to income and interest shocks (financial accelerator effect; Bernanke and Gertler (1989)).
  - Pre-crisis leveraging in the periphery reflected greater reliance on bank credit after EMU and channeling of resources into less-productive non-tradable sectors (construction, real estate).
- Flow-of-funds identity:
  - ΔD = (I + ΔFA – IF) – ΔE = Corporate Gap – ΔE
  - Firms’ net borrowing in the periphery increased on average 3 percent of GDP per year over the pre-crisis period 2002-2008.
  - The surge in corporate indebtedness reflected sustained declines in gross savings rather than an increase in investment.
- Data, specification, and estimation:
  - Data: BACH database; post-Euro adoption period 2000–2010; aggregated firm-level data for 21 sectors and eight Euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).
  - Representative firm framework; baseline dynamic panel specification with dependent variable IK_it = investment-to-capital ratio.
  - Debt overhang proxied by debt-to-equity (DE) and interest coverage ratio (ICR = EBITDA / interest payments).
  - Lagged sales-to-capital ratio SK and lagged dependent variable included; estimation by GMM two-step system estimator (Blundell and Bond (1998)); non-linearities tested via threshold specification with D_it-1 x 1{D_it-1 ≥ τ} and D_it-1 x 1{D_it-1 < τ}.

### Summary statistics (BACH database; staff own estimates)
- IK: Investment to capital ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 15.48, Std. Dev. 12.28, 25th Perc. 8.70, Median 14.64, 75th Perc. 22.08
  - Italy: Mean 14.16, Std. Dev. 8.26, 25th Perc. 8.55, Median 13.72, 75th Perc. 18.33
  - Portugal: Mean 8.83, Std. Dev. 13.04, 25th Perc. 5.17, Median 9.27, 75th Perc. 13.46
  - Spain: Mean 10.10, Std. Dev. 6.67, 25th Perc. 3.64, Median 10.01, 75th Perc. 13.74
- SK: Sales to capital ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 3.45, Std. Dev. 3.74, 25th Perc. 1.14, Median 2.32, 75th Perc. 3.96
  - Italy: Mean 4.01, Std. Dev. 3.76, 25th Perc. 1.46, Median 2.71, 75th Perc. 4.79
  - Portugal: Mean 2.25, Std. Dev. 2.34, 25th Perc. 0.71, Median 1.22, 75th Perc. 2.88
  - Spain: Mean 2.24, Std. Dev. 1.66, 25th Perc. 1.10, Median 1.62, 75th Perc. 2.99
- DE: Debt to equity ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 2.08, Std. Dev. 2.70, 25th Perc. 1.24, Median 1.74, 75th Perc. 2.39
  - Italy: Mean 2.34, Std. Dev. 1.04, 25th Perc. 1.64, Median 2.11, 75th Perc. 3.15
  - Portugal: Mean 2.45, Std. Dev. 4.71, 25th Perc. 1.11, Median 1.63, 75th Perc. 2.54
  - Spain: Mean 1.43, Std. Dev. 0.52, 25th Perc. 1.08, Median 1.36, 75th Perc. 1.77
- ICR: Interest coverage ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 5.20, Std. Dev. 5.42, 25th Perc. 2.73, Median 4.34, 75th Perc. 6.44
  - Italy: Mean 6.07, Std. Dev. 3.57, 25th Perc. 3.77, Median 5.49, 75th Perc. 7.52
  - Portugal: Mean 4.21, Std. Dev. 8.26, 25th Perc. 1.88, Median 2.86, 75th Perc. 4.34
  - Spain: Mean 4.76, Std. Dev. 2.17, 25th Perc. 3.66, Median 4.79, 75th Perc. 5.97

### Empirical results — main findings and non-linearities
- Main estimates:
  - Investment-to-capital ratio is negatively sensitive to debt overhang after controlling for sales performance and lagged investment.
  - Higher debt-to-equity reduces investment; lower ICR reduces investment.
  - Perfect capital markets hypothesis (δ = 0) is rejected.
  - Negative leverage–investment relationship largely driven by firms in periphery countries.
  - Dynamic panel diagnostics: IK_it-1 coefficient ≈ 0.05–0.06***; SK_it-1 coefficient ≈ 1.83***–2.11***; AR(1) test ≈ -2.43**; AR(2) test ≈ 0.44–0.61; Hansen test values reported (e.g., 53.54, 65.38, 58.43, 62.59). (obs. 965)
- Asymmetric effects and thresholds:
  - Significant non-linearities once debt-to-equity exceeds the 25th percentile of representative Euro area firms in the sample.
  - For relatively low leverage levels (below Euro area first-quartile levels, around 125 percent of equity) higher borrowing can support investment (positive coefficient).
  - For ICR, relationship turns negative for ICR levels below a threshold of 1.

### Corporate deleveraging in perspective — event study of past crises (1990–2011)
- Leverage levels and recent deterioration:
  - Average corporate debt leverage in the Euro area periphery stands at about 134 percent of equity (as of end-2011) on a consolidated national-accounts basis.
  - Weak tail (25th percentile) of firms in Italy, Spain, and Portugal had an ICR equal or less than 0.25 in 2011, compared to 1.35 in 2007 (BACH database).
  - Firms in over-leveraged real estate and construction sectors face much tighter financial conditions than manufacturing and tradable sectors.
  - Micro firms and SMEs in Italy account for over 95 percent of the total number of firms and 60 percent of corporate value added.
  - Liquid financial assets to meet debt obligations are limited in some countries, e.g., 7.4 percent of total financial liabilities for Ireland.
- Comparison with past crises:
  - Event study covers ten past crisis episodes: Brazil (1998), Czech Rep. (1997), Finland (1990), Indonesia (2000), Japan (1997), Korea (1998), Mexico (1995), Sweden (1990), Thailand (1997), and Turkey (2001).
  - Typical adjustment patterns: deleveraging episodes tended to last for a protracted period of 7–8 years; median adjustment in the leverage ratio about 8 percent of assets for the median country.
  - The contraction in private credit growth for the median country was about 20 percent from peak to trough over 6 years, normally with a 2 year lead with respect to the corporate deleveraging episode.
  - Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) estimate a decline in private sector credit of about 38 percent of GDP over a 6 to 8 years period in a broader crisis sample.
- Corporate defaults, NPLs, and fiscal spillovers:
  - By 1998, 35 percent of companies in East Asia had an interest coverage ratio below one (Claessens, 2005).
  - NPLs for Indonesia and Thailand reached over 40 percent in past crises.
  - NPLs in the Euro area periphery (latest available 2012 data where noted): median NPL ratio of about 13 percent in the periphery; Spain: 7.1 percent (as of June 2012); Greece: 20.7 percent (as of September 2012); Portugal: for some non-tradable sectors, NPL share reaches up to 25 percent.
  - Almost all corporate adjustment cases in the sample were associated with or preceded by a banking crisis, with sizable migration of losses from private to public balance sheets and a delay of at least 2–3 years in public sector deleveraging.
  - Portugal and Spain: banking sector fiscal costs incurred to date (net of recovery) remain significantly lower than in past crisis episodes.
- Macro outcomes:
  - Firms’ ability to liquidate assets under depressed market conditions and to raise equity has been limited historically, shifting the burden onto increased internal funds and/or reduced corporate investment.
  - Past crises: firms achieved operating cost savings (notably reductions in compensation of employees) and boosted foreign sales where external demand and exchange-rate adjustments were available.
  - In the current Euro area periphery episode: firms have made sizable operational balance adjustments, including reductions in wage costs; export growth has been sustained for some firms but scope is constrained by weak external demand and the constraints of the currency union; the cumulative decline in firms’ fixed investment has been sizable—comparable in Ireland, Spain, and Greece to some of the most severe adjustment episodes of the past—translating into sharp contraction in domestic demand and historically-high unemployment rates.

### Policy implications and recommended policy mix
- Overarching objective: support an orderly and efficient deleveraging process aimed at restoring corporate productivity and growth while mitigating migration of losses to financial and public sector balance sheets.
- Recommended policy areas and measures:
  - Corporate restructuring:
    - Re-organization of financial and operational structures for distressed but viable firms; liquidation of non-viable ones.
    - Recent reforms: insolvency laws amended in Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain to better support early rescue; Italy introduced pre-packaged out-of-court procedures providing for expeditious court approval that bind minority creditors.
    - Out-of-court restructuring: Portugal adopted specific guidelines and a government agency can act as mediator for SMEs.
    - Past crisis practice (Thailand): simplified SME process, identification and monitoring of large numbers of cases, and bank targets for monthly SME resolution—mechanisms suggested as useful given rising portfolio deterioration.
  - Alternative funding sources:
    - Secure adequate liquidity for viable and productive firms to avoid abrupt adjustment.
    - Government initiatives: incentives for access to capital markets, promotion of corporate bond issuance, venture capital, pooled instruments (e.g., pooled issuance of commercial paper by SMEs in Italy).
    - Government guarantees on special bank credit lines can alleviate high risk premia and collateral requirements but should be limited to avoid contingent fiscal liabilities and perverse incentives (experience from Korea).
  - Measures to promote firms’ long-term viability and financial sector policies:
    - Intense supervision (regular stress tests and on-site inspections) to secure banks’ recognition of losses and promote prompt recourse to debt restructuring.
    - Macro-prudential tools (sectoral capital requirements or variable risk weights) beyond forthcoming Basel III requirements to avoid new build-up of risks in specific sectors.
    - Transparency and information sharing: expand public and private credit bureaus; example coverage disparity—Portugal’s private credit bureau covers 23 percent, Ireland 100 percent—important given SMEs’ predominance.
  - Targeted tax measures:
    - Time-bound tax incentives—over 2–3 years—have been used to accelerate corporate debt restructuring in past episodes (examples: Thailand, Iceland, Latvia).
    - Provisions for tax-free mergers have been used to promote balance-sheet consolidation.
    - Tax incentives should be conditional on completion of the restructuring to avoid misuse (example: Turkey’s experience).
    - Thin capitalization rules to limit interest deduction bias and allowances for new corporate equity (ACE) to enhance tax neutrality; ACE experiences cited for Latvia and Italy.
- As market conditions stabilize, establish a self-reinforcing institutional framework to prevent the build-up of new imbalances and aim for a capital structure more conducive to growth through governance, transparency, macro-prudential tools, and targeted tax policy.

*Italic source: _wp13154 - References (excerpts) — BACH database; IMF staff estimates; figures and tables as presented in the source content.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### I. INTRODUCTION

### Key findings and risks
- High corporate debt overhang in the Euro area periphery poses multiple risks:
  - Drag on corporate profitability and investment growth.
  - Threat to banks’ balance sheets and financial stability through increasing NPLs and corporate bankruptcies.
  - Abrupt corporate balance-sheet adjustment can migrate substantial losses from the private sector to the sovereign balance sheet.
- Deleveraging is necessary but should be gradual and orderly to allow resources to be redirected to productive and innovative segments and secure long-term viability.
- Empirical results (aggregated firm-level data) show a negative relationship between firms’ investment-to-capital ratio and their debt burden in selected Euro area countries over the 2000-11 period, with significant asymmetric effects beyond certain threshold levels of indebtedness.
- The deleveraging process is expected to be protracted and entail sizable macro-financial costs upfront; migration of losses to public balance sheets has been contained in most cases but risks can increase going forward.
- Policy mix needs to support an orderly and efficient adjustment aimed at restoring corporate productivity and growth.

*Throughout the paper, the Euro area periphery group comprises Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain.*

---

### II. TESTING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN CORPORATE DEBT OVERHANG AND INVESTMENT

### Theory and mechanisms
- In perfect capital markets (Modigliani and Miller (1985)) market value and investment are independent of capital structure; with market frictions (asymmetric information), leverage matters for investment decisions (pecking-order behavior).
- Financial deepening can boost productivity, but excess leverage raises corporate vulnerabilities and amplifies sensitivity to income and interest shocks (financial accelerator effect; Bernanke and Gertler (1989)).
- Pre-crisis leveraging in the periphery reflected greater reliance on bank credit after EMU and channeling of resources into less-productive non-tradable sectors (construction, real estate).

### Flow-of-funds identity and empirical context
- Flow-of-funds identity used to understand corporate debt build up:
  - ΔD = (I + ΔFA – IF) – ΔE = Corporate Gap – ΔE
- Firms’ net borrowing in the periphery increased on average 3 percent of GDP per year over the pre-crisis period 2002-2008.
- The surge in corporate indebtedness reflected sustained declines in gross savings rather than an increase in investment.
- Net property expenses and rising compensation of employees contributed to deteriorating internal funds in Portugal and Spain.
- High indebtedness generated high interest burdens despite record-low interest rates, eroding profitability and dragging on investment and growth.

### Data, specification, and estimation
- Data: BACH database; post-Euro adoption period 2000–2010; aggregated firm-level data for 21 sectors and eight Euro area countries (Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain).
- Representative firm framework: each country-sector pair corresponds to a representative firm; caution noted due to aggregation.
- Baseline dynamic panel specification (representative notation preserved):
  - Dependent variable IK_it = investment-to-capital ratio.
  - Debt overhang D proxied by debt-to-equity and interest coverage ratio (ICR = EBITDA / interest payments).
  - Lagged sales-to-capital ratio SK included for sales-accelerator effects.
  - Specification includes lagged dependent variable; estimation by GMM two-step system estimator (Blundell and Bond (1998); STATA module by Roodman (2003)); first-differencing and lags used as instruments.
- Non-linearities tested via threshold specification [2]:
  - Inclusion of D_it-1 x 1{D_it-1 ≥ τ} and D_it-1 x 1{D_it-1 < τ} to identify asymmetric effects beyond threshold τ.

### Summary statistics (BACH database; staff own estimates)
- IK: Investment to capital ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 15.48, Std. Dev. 12.28, 25th Perc. 8.70, Median 14.64, 75th Perc. 22.08
  - Italy: Mean 14.16, Std. Dev. 8.26, 25th Perc. 8.55, Median 13.72, 75th Perc. 18.33
  - Portugal: Mean 8.83, Std. Dev. 13.04, 25th Perc. 5.17, Median 9.27, 75th Perc. 13.46
  - Spain: Mean 10.10, Std. Dev. 6.67, 25th Perc. 3.64, Median 10.01, 75th Perc. 13.74
- SK: Sales to capital ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 3.45, Std. Dev. 3.74, 25th Perc. 1.14, Median 2.32, 75th Perc. 3.96
  - Italy: Mean 4.01, Std. Dev. 3.76, 25th Perc. 1.46, Median 2.71, 75th Perc. 4.79
  - Portugal: Mean 2.25, Std. Dev. 2.34, 25th Perc. 0.71, Median 1.22, 75th Perc. 2.88
  - Spain: Mean 2.24, Std. Dev. 1.66, 25th Perc. 1.10, Median 1.62, 75th Perc. 2.99
- DE: Debt to equity ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 2.08, Std. Dev. 2.70, 25th Perc. 1.24, Median 1.74, 75th Perc. 2.39
  - Italy: Mean 2.34, Std. Dev. 1.04, 25th Perc. 1.64, Median 2.11, 75th Perc. 3.15
  - Portugal: Mean 2.45, Std. Dev. 4.71, 25th Perc. 1.11, Median 1.63, 75th Perc. 2.54
  - Spain: Mean 1.43, Std. Dev. 0.52, 25th Perc. 1.08, Median 1.36, 75th Perc. 1.77
- ICR: Interest coverage ratio
  - Euro area: Mean 5.20, Std. Dev. 5.42, 25th Perc. 2.73, Median 4.34, 75th Perc. 6.44
  - Italy: Mean 6.07, Std. Dev. 3.57, 25th Perc. 3.77, Median 5.49, 75th Perc. 7.52
  - Portugal: Mean 4.21, Std. Dev. 8.26, 25th Perc. 1.88, Median 2.86, 75th Perc. 4.34
  - Spain: Mean 4.76, Std. Dev. 2.17, 25th Perc. 3.66, Median 4.79, 75th Perc. 5.97

---

### Empirical Results

### Main estimates
- Investment-to-capital ratio is negatively sensitive to debt overhang after controlling for sales performance and lagged investment.
- Estimated coefficients on balance sheet variables are significant and have expected signs:
  - Higher debt-to-equity reduces investment.
  - Lower ICR (weaker capacity to repay) reduces investment.
- Perfect capital markets hypothesis (δ = 0) is rejected.
- Robustness: negative leverage–investment relationship largely driven by firms in periphery countries.
- No evidence of second-order serial correlation in first-differenced residuals (Arellano-Bond test); regressions pass Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions.

### Asymmetric effects and thresholds
- Significant non-linearities found once debt-to-equity exceeds the 25th percentile of representative Euro area firms in the sample.
- Results indicate:
  - For relatively low leverage levels (below Euro area first-quartile levels, around 125 percent of equity) higher borrowing can support investment (positive coefficient).
  - For ICR, relationship turns negative for ICR levels below a threshold of 1 (the break-even point where earnings equal debt service needs).
- Table excerpt (dynamic panel GMM two-step; obs. 965):
  - IK_it-1 coefficient ≈ 0.05–0.06*** across specifications.
  - SK_it-1 coefficient ≈ 1.83***–2.11***.
  - DE or ICR effects show significance and sign changes across threshold specifications.
  - AR(1) test ≈ -2.43**; AR(2) test ≈ 0.44–0.61; Hansen test values reported (e.g., 53.54, 65.38, 58.43, 62.59).

---

### III. CORPORATE DELEVERAGING IN PERSPECTIVE: AN EVENT STUDY OF PAST CRISIS CASES

### Leverage levels and recent deterioration
- Average corporate debt leverage in the Euro area periphery stands at about 134 percent of equity (as of end-2011) on a consolidated national-accounts basis.
- Large share of firms are well above high-debt thresholds identified in empirical analysis.
- Weak tail (25th percentile) of firms in Italy, Spain, and Portugal had an ICR equal or less than 0.25 in 2011, compared to 1.35 in 2007 (BACH database).
- Firms in over-leveraged real estate and construction sectors face much tighter financial conditions than manufacturing and tradable sectors.
- Corporate profitability is significantly lower for smaller firms; micro firms and SMEs in Italy account for over 95 percent of the total number of firms and 60 percent of corporate value added.
- Liquid financial assets to meet debt obligations are limited in some countries, e.g., 7.4 percent of total financial liabilities for Ireland.

---

*Italic source: _wp13154 - References (excerpts) — BACH database; IMF staff estimates; figures and tables as presented in the source content.*

### 8.8 percent for Italy and 9.9 percent for Portugal.

### _wp13154 - 8.8 percent for Italy and 9.9 percent for Portugal.

### Deleveraging dynamics and recent evidence
- The credit contraction and recession triggered by the Euro area crisis are forcing rapid balance sheet adjustment, but the pace and size vary across countries depending on pre-crisis and current conditions.
- Firms are rapidly bringing their financial position back to balance, yet the deleveraging process (i.e., the reduction in the corporate debt stock) is proceeding only gradually in countries with highly indebted corporate sectors.
- Deleveraging tends to be faster for smaller firms, consistent with their higher indebtedness levels and more limited access to funding (BACH data for Portugal, Spain, and other Euro area countries).
- Country-specific examples and magnitudes:
  - Ireland: the credit reduction has already reached about 20 percent of the pre-crisis expansion since 2003.
  - Corporate debt stress indicators cited for the periphery include: "8.8 percent for Italy and 9.9 percent for Portugal."

### Comparison with past crises (event study findings)
- The event study covers ten past crisis episodes over 1990–2011 (data availability permitting), all preceded or coincided with a banking crisis and mostly associated with deleveraging of the total economy (except Japan).
- Crisis countries in the sample include: Brazil (1998), Czech Rep. (1997), Finland (1990), Indonesia (2000), Japan (1997), Korea (1998), Mexico (1995), Sweden (1990), Thailand (1997), and Turkey (2001).
- Starting conditions:
  - Corporate leverage in Portugal and Spain (and more recently Greece) is only lower than Turkey and the East-Asian countries among the ten crisis countries covered.
- Typical adjustment patterns from past episodes:
  - Deleveraging episodes tended to last for a protracted period of 7–8 years.
  - Median adjustment in the leverage ratio was about 8 percent of assets for the median country.
  - Shorter deleveraging episodes were normally associated with deeper crises and sharp exchange rate corrections.
  - The contraction in private credit growth for the median country was about 20 percent from peak to trough over 6 years, normally with a 2 year lead with respect to the corporate deleveraging episode.
  - Reinhart and Reinhart (2010) estimate a decline in private sector credit of about 38 percent of GDP over a 6 to 8 years period in a broader crisis sample.

### Corporate defaults, NPLs, and fiscal spillovers
- Past cases showed large corporate default rates and NPL surges, with major implications for financial and public sector balance sheets.
  - By 1998, 35 percent of companies in East Asia had an interest coverage ratio below one (Claessens, 2005).
  - NPLs for Indonesia and Thailand reached over 40 percent in past crises.
- NPLs in the Euro area periphery (latest available 2012 data where noted):
  - Median NPL ratio of about 13 percent in the periphery.
  - Spain: 7.1 percent (as of June 2012).
  - Greece: 20.7 percent (as of September 2012).
  - Portugal: for some non-tradable sectors, NPL share reaches up to 25 percent.
  - Comparators from past crises: Indonesia 37 percent; Korea 24 percent.
- Fiscal implications:
  - Almost all corporate adjustment cases in the sample were associated with or preceded by a banking crisis, with a sizable migration of losses from private to public sector balance sheets and a delay of at least 2–3 years in public sector deleveraging.
  - In the periphery, fiscal costs arising from the banking sector have been sizable and were amplified by the sovereign debt crisis (notably in Greece).
  - Portugal and Spain: banking sector fiscal costs incurred to date (net of recovery) remain significantly lower than in past crisis episodes, despite comparable levels of corporate indebtedness—indicating the need for continued vigilance.

### Macro outcomes of corporate deleveraging
- Firms’ ability to liquidate assets under depressed market conditions and to raise equity has been limited in past episodes, shifting the burden of adjustment onto increased internal funds and/or reduced corporate investment.
- Past crises feature notable firm responses:
  - Most firms achieved savings in operating costs—notably through reductions in compensation of employees.
  - A main driver of improved gross savings in past crises was firms’ ability to boost profits by diversifying abroad; sizable increases in foreign sales were supported by strong external demand and upfront gains in competitiveness via nominal exchange rate adjustments.
- In the current Euro area periphery episode:
  - Firms have made sizable operational balance adjustments, including reductions in wage costs.
  - Export growth has been sustained for some firms, but the scope to boost foreign sales as in past cases has been constrained by weak external demand in the Euro area and the need for more gradual internal devaluation.
  - The cumulative decline in firms’ fixed investment has been sizable—comparable in Ireland, Spain, and Greece to some of the most severe adjustment episodes of the past—translating at the macro-level into sharp contraction in domestic demand and historically-high unemployment rates.

### Policy implications and recommended policy mix
- The policy mix should support an orderly and efficient deleveraging process aimed at restoring corporate productivity and growth, while mitigating migration of losses to financial and public sector balance sheets.
- Policy areas and measures discussed:
  - Corporate restructuring
  - Alternative funding sources
  - Measures to promote firms’ long-term viability, including supervision, macro-prudential tools, and information sharing

### Corporate restructuring (approaches and recent reforms)
- Corporate restructuring is essential for sustainable recovery and long-term viability; it includes re-organization of financial and operational structures of distressed but viable firms and liquidation of non-viable ones.
- Past approaches have ranged from government-directed models (centralized Asset Management Companies) to government-sponsored market-based models (guidelines for out-of-court debt workouts, e.g., the London Approach).
- Recent reforms in several Euro area periphery countries:
  - In-court restructuring: Insolvency laws amended in Greece, Portugal, Italy and Spain to better support early rescue of viable firms, including “fast track” court approval procedures.
    - Example: Italy introduced pre-packaged out-of-court procedures providing for expeditious court approval of pre-negotiated restructuring plans that bind minority creditors.
  - Out-of-court restructuring: Portugal adopted specific guidelines to facilitate voluntary out-of-court workouts and avoid overwhelming the judicial system; a government agency focused on SMEs can act as mediator to facilitate out-of-court workouts.
- Past crisis practices for SMEs:
  - Thailand: Corporate Debt Restructuring Advisory Committee introduced a simplified process for SMEs (accounting for 40 percent of NPLs); identified more than 12,000 cases for monitoring and follow-up; by 2001, 73 percent were completed or in process, with 27 percent subject to legal action.
  - Bank of Thailand set targets for financial institutions to resolve a certain number of SME cases each month.
  - Such monitoring and targeted progress mechanisms may be useful in the Euro area context given rising portfolio deterioration and related bank risks.

### Alternative funding sources and constraints
- Policies should secure adequate liquidity for viable and productive firms to avoid abrupt adjustment and ensure conditions to restore productivity and growth.
- Mitigating factors in the periphery include continued Eurosystem liquidity support and resources released by national governments for capital augmentation, but credit segmentation remains worrisome.
- Government initiatives to develop funding alternatives to bank credit, especially for SMEs, include:
  - Incentives for access to capital markets, promotion of corporate bond issuance, venture capital, and pooled instruments (e.g., pooled issuance of commercial paper by SMEs in Italy).
  - Government guarantees attached to special bank credit lines to alleviate high credit risk premia and collateral requirements.
- Fiscal and moral hazard considerations:
  - Past experiences with guaranteed lines in Korea (1998 and 2004) suggest limiting the scope of these programs because of contingent fiscal liabilities and the risk of perverse incentives for banks not to restructure corporate debt when burden sharing is inadequate.

### Measures to promote firms’ long-term viability and financial sector policies
- Intense supervision (regular stress tests and on-site inspections) is crucial to secure banks’ recognition of losses and promote prompt recourse to debt restructuring.
- Macro-prudential measures, beyond standard balance sheet tools and forthcoming Basel III requirements on leverage and net stable funding ratios, can be considered to avoid new build-up of risks in specific sectors:
  - Examples include sectoral capital requirements or variable risk weights to target exuberant sectors (e.g., higher risk weights on commercial real estate loans in Australia in 2004; higher risk weights on corporate lending in India in 2005–06).
- Transparency and information sharing:
  - Public and private credit bureaus can improve assessment of firms’ credit standing and facilitate links between creditors and borrowers.
  - Portugal: Banco de Portugal is stepping up efforts to broaden information sharing on credit and firms’ balance sheet indicators, leveraging comprehensive public databases.
  - Coverage example: Portugal’s private credit bureau covers only 23 percent, compared with 100 percent coverage in Ireland—highlighting the relevance of broader information coverage given SMEs’ predominance.

*Source: IMF staff chapter excerpt (file: _wp13154 - 8.8 percent for Italy and 9.9 percent for Portugal.).*

### 45.      Finally, evidence from past episodes suggests that targeted tax measures, with limited

### 45.      Finally, evidence from past episodes suggests that targeted tax measures, with limited

### Targeted tax measures to support corporate balance sheets
- Time-bound tax incentives—over 2–3 years—have been introduced by governments (examples cited: Thailand, Iceland, Latvia) to accelerate corporate debt restructuring.
- Provisions for tax-free mergers have been used in past episodes to promote balance-sheet consolidation.
- Tax incentives should be conditional on completion of the restructuring to avoid misuse (example: in Turkey, commencement of legal proceedings to recover the debt was sufficient to qualify for tax incentives, creating perverse incentives).

### Fiscal/tax measures to reduce debt bias and distortions
- Introduce “thin capitalization rules” to limit the amount of interest expenditure deductions allowed for over-leveraged firms, while minimizing undesired impact on capital investment.
- Allowances for new corporate equity (the so-called ACE) can enhance tax neutrality while avoiding pro-cyclicality; recent experiences cited for ACE include Latvia and Italy.

### Empirical findings on corporate debt overhang and investment
- The paper assesses the drag on investment and growth engendered by corporate sector debt overhang in many periphery countries in the run-up to the crisis.
- Empirical results—based on aggregated firm-level data—confirm a negative relationship between firms’ investment-to-capital ratio and their debt burden in selected Euro area countries over the sample period 2000-11.
- Evidence of significant asymmetric effects beyond certain threshold levels of indebtedness is found.

### Nature and costs of corporate deleveraging
- Deleveraging in the most indebted periphery countries is expected to be protracted and entail sizable upfront macro-financial costs, based on an event study of past crisis episodes characterized by sizable corporate adjustment.
- The impact on the Euro area periphery is already visible and could deepen further, especially given:
  - limited fiscal space,
  - the constraints of the currency union,
  - weak external conditions, compared to past crisis cases.

### Policy mix to mitigate deleveraging costs and restore growth
- Necessary elements of a supportive policy mix:
  - An efficient corporate debt restructuring framework.
  - Promotion of funding alternatives to bank credit for viable and productive companies at affordable and competitive conditions.
  - As market conditions stabilize, establish a self-reinforcing institutional framework to prevent the build-up of new imbalances and aim for a capital structure more conducive to growth.
  - Initiatives to enhance governance and transparency.
  - Targeted macro-prudential tools.
  - Tax policy measures to limit debt bias and other distortions in the corporate sector.

### Figures and indicators referenced
- Empirical figures and indicators referenced include:
  - EA Periphery: Evolution of Non-Financial Corporations Balance Sheets (In percent of GDP).
  - Contributions to the Change in NFCs Gross Saving and Net Lending (EA Periphery average) for periods 2002-2008 and 2008-2012Q3.
  - Corporate Vulnerability Indicators: Debt-to-Assets (Percent), ROA (Percent), ICR (Number of times) with comparisons to past crises and Europe: 2011.
  - Corporate Balance Sheet Adjustment in Past Crisis Episodes: Debt (Percent of assets), Gross Savings (Percent of GDP), Compensation of Employees (Constant prices, year-on-year percent change), Gross Fixed Capital Formation (Year-on-year percent change), Foreign Sales (Percent of total sales), Debt (Percent of equity).
  - Macro-Economic Developments in Past Crisis Episodes (Year-on-year percent change): Real GDP Growth, Real Domestic Demand Growth, Unemployment Rate, Export Volume Growth, External Demand (World Import Volume Growth), REER (t-5=100).

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp13154.pdf*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp13154.pdf_
