## _wp13204

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---

### I. Introduction
- China has entered a period of more moderate expansion after years of double-digit growth and rapid convergence toward middle-income economies.
- Key observed shifts and metrics:
  - Credit as a share of GDP: jumped from "a little under 130 percent of GDP" in the last quarter of 2008 to "slightly less than 200 percent of GDP" in the first quarter of 2013.
  - Investment as a share of the economy: rose to "47 percent over 2008-2012" (from "41 percent over 2002-2007").
- Interpretation:
  - The combination of slower growth, higher investment, and rapid expansion of credit suggests diminishing returns to the extensive growth model (physical capital accumulation and absorption of surplus labor).
  - Attempting to push this extensive model further raises the risk of widening vulnerabilities and increases the probability that China’s convergence toward a high-income economy stalls.
- Reform priorities identified as necessary to shift the growth model toward higher total factor productivity (TFP):
  - Greater contestability of markets
  - Financial and service sector reform
  - Hukou reform
- Paper structure (as described): section II — risks from delaying reforms; section III — benefits of reforms; section IV — provincial development trends and reform prospects; section V — conclusion.

### II. Reform Delays or Inaction: Risks of Stalled Convergence
- Macro trend:
  - Current account surplus: retreated from "over 10 percent of GDP in 2007" to "about 2¼ percent of GDP in 2012".
  - Investment share rose markedly, reaching one of the highest levels in the world.

A. Stocks versus Flows
- Debate:
  - Some analysts estimate overinvestment "as high as 10 percent of GDP".
  - Counterargument: China’s capital stock per capita is relatively low versus advanced economies (about "12 percent of that in the United States and Japan").
- Concern:
  - Rapid investment growth has put substantial capacity in place ahead of demand.
  - Capacity utilization in key sectors has been running below pre-crisis average.
  - Estimates show substantial slack in the economy.

B. Risks Associated with High Investment
- Demand absorption risk:
  - If domestic and external demand fail to absorb capacity, falling prices for manufacturing goods and lower returns on investment could follow, implying lower profits, rising bankruptcies, and large financial losses with spillovers internationally.
- Amplification channels and costs:
  - Adverse feedbacks between domestic demand, bank lending, real estate, and local government finances could amplify losses.
  - Crises are costly beyond direct bank recapitalizations due to subsequent deleveraging, diminished fiscal space, slower growth, rising unemployment, and foregone investment.
- Historical crisis-cost evidence (based on 65 crisis episodes from Laeven and Valencia (2012)):
  - Example: China’s banking crisis of the late 1990s cost "as much as 18 percent of GDP" and was associated with:
    - GDP growth decline of "around 2 percentage points below previous trend"
    - Credit growth declining by "10 percentage points"
    - Unemployment rate rose slightly by "¼ percentage points"
- Specific risk channels elaborated:
  - Bank lending:
    - Large portion of investment financed through debt held by banks; financial losses could impair banks’ balance sheets and lending capacity.
    - China’s domestic bank assets (excluding interbank loans) expanded by "close to USD seven trillion over 2008-2012", equivalent to "60 percent of the stock of assets aggregated across all domestically-chartered commercial banks in the United States as of December 2012" (and "20 percent of the euro area—17 commercial bank assets as of June 2012").
    - Other credit instruments (including trust-company-originated instruments) have also expanded rapidly.
  - Growth:
    - Historical double-digit growth helped restore bank balance sheets; with more moderate growth, this mitigating factor is no longer assured.

C. Implications of Delaying the Transformation of the Economy
- Progress under the 12th Five-Year Plan noted in areas such as tertiary employment share, private consumption share of GDP, financial sector reform (more flexibility of interest and exchange rates), and targeting higher R&D expenditure.
  - Under the 12-Five-Year Plan, the target for R&D expenditure is "2.2 percent of GDP in 2015".
- Illustration of an adverse scenario from delaying rebalancing:
  - Assumptions:
    - Continued reliance on investment through 2018 and delays in implementing reforms leading to further excess capacity and resource misallocation.
    - Demographic changes with labor force declining after 2015 and China’s surplus labor vanishing around 2020 (following Das and N’Diaye (2013)).
    - Investment-to-GDP ratio corrects sharply downward "by about 10 percentage points" in line with Lee and Syed (2012) estimate of excess investment in China.
  - Projected outcomes under this scenario:
    - Convergence process stalls; economy grows at "no more than 4 percent".
    - GDP per capita remains "about a quarter of that of the United States through 2030".
    - Average TFP growth would be "less than 3 percent per year", "around 1 percentage point below the historical average for China".

### III. Medium-term Growth Prospects with Reforms
- Opening statement indicates that implementing reforms could:
  - Accelerate and sustain TFP growth from within-sector productivity gains
  - Enhance the efficiency of credit allocation
  - Reduce dependence on factor accumulation
- (Detailed reform benefits and quantitative projections begin in the following text of the source; this section in the provided content cuts off at the introductory sentence.)

### Growth scenarios and macro projections
- "1.8 percent of GDP in 2012." (documented figure)
- Upside reform scenario (Korea 1981–1997 convergence path):
  - Financial sector and resource pricing reform slow capital accumulation gradually and eliminate excess investment by 2030.
  - Share of investment to GDP declines from over 45 percent in 2012 to around 35 percent in 2030.
  - Labor input is dictated by demographics.
  - Assuming U.S. medium-term growth of 2½ percent and demographic trends, China’s output growth implied is about 7 percent on average during 2013-30.
  - The TFP growth underlying this path would be 4¼ percent (about 10 percent above China’s historical average TFP growth).
- Alternative (typical convergence) scenario:
  - Average TFP growth falls to 3¼ percent (below pre-crisis level and consistent with typical slowdown during transition from middle- to high-income).
  - With a declining labor force and gradual unwinding of excess investment, average GDP growth could fall to 6 percent during 2013–30 (down from a pre-crisis average GDP growth rate of 10 percent).
  - At this pace, China’s per capita GDP would be about 40 percent of that of the United States by 2030 and 45 percent by 2035.
- Policy tradeoffs and timing:
  - Continuing the current path may sustain relatively higher growth short-term, but the reform paths yield permanently higher living standards over the medium- to long-run.
  - Reforms may entail slower short-run growth relative to the status quo baseline, with benefits realized later through higher TFP-driven growth.

### Province-level development trends (2000–2010)
- Methodology:
  - Development accounting decomposes output per worker into physical capital input, human capital input, and TFP (residual), using an aggregate production function and capital-output ratio to separate technology from capital accumulation.
  - Shanghai is taken as the most productive province for gap calculations over 2000–2010.
- Key empirical findings:
  - Physical capital input:
    - In 2000 almost all provinces operated with less than 60 percent of Shanghai’s physical capital input.
    - By 2010, nearly all provinces had narrowed the gap in physical capital input; several provinces achieved or exceeded Shanghai’s level by 2010.
  - Human capital input:
    - Most provinces were relatively close to Shanghai’s level in 2000 and grew closer by 2010.
  - TFP (residual):
    - In 2000 most provinces had TFP levels between 50 to 140 percent of Shanghai’s.
    - By 2010 relative TFP levels declined to between 15 and 80 percent of Shanghai’s.
    - Result: mild convergence in output per worker over 2000–2010 because rapid convergence in physical capital was largely offset by widening gaps in TFP.
  - Return to capital:
    - The return on capital has declined across most provinces over the decade, indicating diminishing marginal returns and possible misallocation of investment.
- Implication:
  - Lifting output per worker closer to prosperous areas requires greater reliance on TFP growth and less reliance on factor accumulation.

### Reforms to boost province-level TFP growth (empirical evidence and policy levers)
- Reforms identified:
  - Improve contestability of markets (measured as FDI share of province-level fixed asset investment).
  - Service sector reform (deregulation and easing entry; measured by service employment share).
  - Hukou reform to boost non-agricultural hukou share of population and urbanization.
  - Eliminate other factor market distortions (energy, water, and land) to reduce misallocation.
- Regression evidence (OLS, provincial annual data 1998–2010; dependent variable: TFP growth):
  - For every 1 percentage point increase in the FDI share of fixed asset investment, TFP growth increases by 0.06 percentage points (0.0564*** in Column 1; effect remains positive across specifications).
  - A percentage point increase in the service sector employment share is associated with an increase of around 0.05 percentage points in the growth rate of TFP (0.0475* in Column 3).
  - Hukou reform: estimated effect on TFP growth is 0.0186* in one specification; magnitude is between one-third and two-fifths of the estimated effect of contestability.
  - Change in SOE share of employment: coefficient -0.0261 (not statistically significant in table).
  - R-Squared values around 0.2 across specifications; sample includes 30 provinces/regions/municipalities, observations 359–390 depending on specification.
- Economic significance and scenario linkage:
  - Closing provincial gaps (lifting national averages of service sector employment share, FDI share of FAI, and non-agricultural hukou share to Shanghai’s 2010 levels) would accelerate average TFP growth.
  - The required TFP acceleration for China to achieve the international benchmark growth path is about ¾ percentage points relative to the baseline.
  - Regression results indicate China can achieve the needed TFP increase with a combination of service sector deregulation, improved contestability, and hukou reform (likely self-reinforcing).

### Sectoral and historical performance indicators
- Sectoral contributions and employment:
  - 2002–07: economy expanded at an average rate of 11.2 percent while investment averaged 41 percent share of the overall economy.
  - 2008–11: growth averaged 9.7 percent, while investment as a share of the economy rose to 47 percent.
  - China: tertiary sector contribution to overall growth still falls short of secondary sector’s contribution; employment share in tertiary sector has only just inched past primary sector employment share.
- Charts and data notes highlighted:
  - GDP growth contributions by sector (2000–2012) show shifts across Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary sectors.
  - Employment shares by sector (2000–2012) presented in percent of total employment.

### Summary conclusions
- The current capital accumulation-based growth strategy has delivered high headline growth but is increasingly reliant on credit and investment and experiencing diminishing returns and declining TFP growth.
- Delaying reforms raises the probability of stalled convergence and growing vulnerabilities.
- With reforms that accelerate TFP growth and shift reliance away from capital accumulation, China can sustain healthy growth and continue convergence toward high-income economies.
- Scenario outcomes:
  - No reform: China may achieve at most around one-fourth of U.S. GDP per capita (PPP) by 2030.
  - Reform path: after a near-term moderate slowdown, convergence continues faster than baseline and income per capita approaches 40 percent of U.S. level by 2030.

### Appendix: data and measurement notes
- Data sources: CEIC and NBS unless stated otherwise.
- Real GDP:
  - Province-level nominal GDP is deflated using province-specific GDP deflators. The base year is 1990.
- Physical capital stock:
  - Calculated using the perpetual inventory method applied to real investment and assuming a depreciation rate of 10 percent.
  - Real investment is calculated by applying the share of province-level nominal investment in nominal GDP to province level real GDP.
- Human capital:
  - Calculated using province-level educational attainment shares from NBS data and returns to education in China as calculated by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) and Heckman (2000).
- Capital share of income:
  - Calculated as the residual after labor income is subtracted from gross provincial income.

*Source: _wp13204 - References (PDF chapter/section).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### References

### I. INTRODUCTION
- China has entered a period of more moderate expansion after years of double-digit growth and rapid convergence toward middle-income economies.
- Key observed shifts and metrics:
  - Credit as a share of GDP: jumped from "a little under 130 percent of GDP" in the last quarter of 2008 to "slightly less than 200 percent of GDP" in the first quarter of 2013.
  - Investment as a share of the economy: rose to "47 percent over 2008-2012" (from "41 percent over 2002-2007").
- Interpretation:
  - The combination of slower growth, higher investment, and rapid expansion of credit suggests diminishing returns to the extensive growth model (physical capital accumulation and absorption of surplus labor).
  - Attempting to push this extensive model further raises the risk of widening vulnerabilities and increases the probability that China’s convergence toward a high-income economy stalls.
- Reform priorities identified as necessary to shift the growth model toward higher total factor productivity (TFP):
  - Greater contestability of markets
  - Financial and service sector reform
  - Hukou reform
- Paper structure (as described): section II — risks from delaying reforms; section III — benefits of reforms; section IV — provincial development trends and reform prospects; section V — conclusion.

### II. REFORM DELAYS OR INACTION: RISKS OF STALLED CONVERGENCE
- Macro trend:
  - Current account surplus: retreated from "over 10 percent of GDP in 2007" to "about 2¼ percent of GDP in 2012".
  - Investment share rose markedly, reaching one of the highest levels in the world.

A. Stocks versus Flows
- Debate:
  - Some analysts estimate overinvestment "as high as 10 percent of GDP".
  - Counterargument: China’s capital stock per capita is relatively low versus advanced economies (about "12 percent of that in the United States and Japan").
- Concern:
  - Rapid investment growth has put substantial capacity in place ahead of demand.
  - Capacity utilization in key sectors has been running below pre-crisis average.
  - Estimates show substantial slack in the economy.

B. Risks Associated with High Investment
- Demand absorption risk:
  - If domestic and external demand fail to absorb capacity, falling prices for manufacturing goods and lower returns on investment could follow, implying lower profits, rising bankruptcies, and large financial losses with spillovers internationally.
- Amplification channels and costs:
  - Adverse feedbacks between domestic demand, bank lending, real estate, and local government finances could amplify losses.
  - Crises are costly beyond direct bank recapitalizations due to subsequent deleveraging, diminished fiscal space, slower growth, rising unemployment, and foregone investment.
- Historical crisis-cost evidence (based on 65 crisis episodes from Laeven and Valencia (2012)):
  - Example: China’s banking crisis of the late 1990s cost "as much as 18 percent of GDP" and was associated with:
    - GDP growth decline of "around 2 percentage points below previous trend"
    - Credit growth declining by "10 percentage points"
    - Unemployment rate rose slightly by "¼ percentage points"
- Specific risk channels elaborated:
  - Bank lending:
    - Large portion of investment financed through debt held by banks; financial losses could impair banks’ balance sheets and lending capacity.
    - China’s domestic bank assets (excluding interbank loans) expanded by "close to USD seven trillion over 2008-2012", equivalent to "60 percent of the stock of assets aggregated across all domestically-chartered commercial banks in the United States as of December 2012" (and "20 percent of the euro area—17 commercial bank assets as of June 2012").
    - Other credit instruments (including trust-company-originated instruments) have also expanded rapidly.
  - Growth:
    - Historical double-digit growth helped restore bank balance sheets; with more moderate growth, this mitigating factor is no longer assured.

C. Implications of Delaying the Transformation of the Economy
- Progress under the 12th Five-Year Plan noted in areas such as tertiary employment share, private consumption share of GDP, financial sector reform (more flexibility of interest and exchange rates), and targeting higher R&D expenditure.
  - Under the 12-Five-Year Plan, the target for R&D expenditure is "2.2 percent of GDP in 2015".
- Illustration of an adverse scenario from delaying rebalancing:
  - Assumptions:
    - Continued reliance on investment through 2018 and delays in implementing reforms leading to further excess capacity and resource misallocation.
    - Demographic changes with labor force declining after 2015 and China’s surplus labor vanishing around 2020 (following Das and N’Diaye (2013)).
    - Investment-to-GDP ratio corrects sharply downward "by about 10 percentage points" in line with Lee and Syed (2012) estimate of excess investment in China.
  - Projected outcomes under this scenario:
    - Convergence process stalls; economy grows at "no more than 4 percent".
    - GDP per capita remains "about a quarter of that of the United States through 2030".
    - Average TFP growth would be "less than 3 percent per year", "around 1 percentage point below the historical average for China".

### III. MEDIUM-TERM GROWTH PROSPECTS WITH REFORMS
- Opening statement indicates that implementing reforms could:
  - Accelerate and sustain TFP growth from within-sector productivity gains
  - Enhance the efficiency of credit allocation
  - Reduce dependence on factor accumulation
- (Detailed reform benefits and quantitative projections begin in the following text of the source; this section in the provided content cuts off at the introductory sentence.)

*Source: _wp13204 - References (PDF chapter/section).*

### 1.8 percent of GDP in 2012.

### _wp13204 - 1.8 percent of GDP in 2012.

### Growth scenarios and macro projections
- Upside reform scenario (Korea 1981–1997 convergence path):
  - Financial sector and resource pricing reform slow capital accumulation gradually and eliminate excess investment by 2030.
  - Share of investment to GDP declines from over 45 percent in 2012 to around 35 percent in 2030.
  - Labor input is dictated by demographics.
  - Assuming U.S. medium-term growth of 2½ percent and demographic trends, China’s output growth implied is about 7 percent on average during 2013-30.
  - The TFP growth underlying this path would be 4¼ percent (about 10 percent above China’s historical average TFP growth).
- Alternative (typical convergence) scenario:
  - Average TFP growth falls to 3¼ percent (below pre-crisis level and consistent with typical slowdown during transition from middle- to high-income).
  - With a declining labor force and gradual unwinding of excess investment, average GDP growth could fall to 6 percent during 2013–30 (down from a pre-crisis average GDP growth rate of 10 percent).
  - At this pace, China’s per capita GDP would be about 40 percent of that of the United States by 2030 and 45 percent by 2035.
- Policy tradeoffs and timing:
  - Continuing the current path may sustain relatively higher growth short-term, but the reform paths yield permanently higher living standards over the medium- to long-run.
  - Reforms may entail slower short-run growth relative to the status quo baseline, with benefits realized later through higher TFP-driven growth.

### Province-level development trends (2000–2010)
- Methodology:
  - Development accounting decomposes output per worker into physical capital input, human capital input, and TFP (residual), using an aggregate production function and capital-output ratio to separate technology from capital accumulation.
  - Shanghai is taken as the most productive province for gap calculations over 2000–2010.
- Key empirical findings:
  - Physical capital input:
    - In 2000 almost all provinces operated with less than 60 percent of Shanghai’s physical capital input.
    - By 2010, nearly all provinces had narrowed the gap in physical capital input; several provinces achieved or exceeded Shanghai’s level by 2010.
  - Human capital input:
    - Most provinces were relatively close to Shanghai’s level in 2000 and grew closer by 2010.
  - TFP (residual):
    - In 2000 most provinces had TFP levels between 50 to 140 percent of Shanghai’s.
    - By 2010 relative TFP levels declined to between 15 and 80 percent of Shanghai’s.
    - Result: mild convergence in output per worker over 2000–2010 because rapid convergence in physical capital was largely offset by widening gaps in TFP.
  - Return to capital:
    - The return on capital has declined across most provinces over the decade, indicating diminishing marginal returns and possible misallocation of investment.
- Implication:
  - Lifting output per worker closer to prosperous areas requires greater reliance on TFP growth and less reliance on factor accumulation.

### Reforms to boost province-level TFP growth (empirical evidence and policy levers)
- Reforms identified:
  - Improve contestability of markets (measured as FDI share of province-level fixed asset investment).
  - Service sector reform (deregulation and easing entry; measured by service employment share).
  - Hukou reform to boost non-agricultural hukou share of population and urbanization.
  - Eliminate other factor market distortions (energy, water, and land) to reduce misallocation.
- Regression evidence (OLS, provincial annual data 1998–2010; dependent variable: TFP growth):
  - For every 1 percentage point increase in the FDI share of fixed asset investment, TFP growth increases by 0.06 percentage points (0.0564*** in Column 1; effect remains positive across specifications).
  - A percentage point increase in the service sector employment share is associated with an increase of around 0.05 percentage points in the growth rate of TFP (0.0475* in Column 3).
  - Hukou reform: estimated effect on TFP growth is 0.0186* in one specification; magnitude is between one-third and two-fifths of the estimated effect of contestability.
  - Change in SOE share of employment: coefficient -0.0261 (not statistically significant in table).
  - R-Squared values around 0.2 across specifications; sample includes 30 provinces/regions/municipalities, observations 359–390 depending on specification.
- Economic significance and scenario linkage:
  - Closing provincial gaps (lifting national averages of service sector employment share, FDI share of FAI, and non-agricultural hukou share to Shanghai’s 2010 levels) would accelerate average TFP growth.
  - The required TFP acceleration for China to achieve the international benchmark growth path is about ¾ percentage points relative to the baseline.
  - Regression results indicate China can achieve the needed TFP increase with a combination of service sector deregulation, improved contestability, and hukou reform (likely self-reinforcing).

### Sectoral and historical performance indicators
- Sectoral contributions and employment:
  - 2002–07: economy expanded at an average rate of 11.2 percent while investment averaged 41 percent share of the overall economy.
  - 2008–11: growth averaged 9.7 percent, while investment as a share of the economy rose to 47 percent.
  - China: tertiary sector contribution to overall growth still falls short of secondary sector’s contribution; employment share in tertiary sector has only just inched past primary sector employment share.
- Charts and data notes highlighted:
  - GDP growth contributions by sector (2000–2012) show shifts across Primary, Secondary, and Tertiary sectors.
  - Employment shares by sector (2000–2012) presented in percent of total employment.

### Summary conclusions
- The current capital accumulation-based growth strategy has delivered high headline growth but is increasingly reliant on credit and investment and experiencing diminishing returns and declining TFP growth.
- Delaying reforms raises the probability of stalled convergence and growing vulnerabilities.
- With reforms that accelerate TFP growth and shift reliance away from capital accumulation, China can sustain healthy growth and continue convergence toward high-income economies.
- Scenario outcomes:
  - No reform: China may achieve at most around one-fourth of U.S. GDP per capita (PPP) by 2030.
  - Reform path: after a near-term moderate slowdown, convergence continues faster than baseline and income per capita approaches 40 percent of U.S. level by 2030.

### Appendix: data and measurement notes
- Data sources: CEIC and NBS unless stated otherwise.
- Real GDP:
  - Province-level nominal GDP is deflated using province-specific GDP deflators. The base year is 1990.
- Physical capital stock:
  - Calculated using the perpetual inventory method applied to real investment and assuming a depreciation rate of 10 percent.
  - Real investment is calculated by applying the share of province-level nominal investment in nominal GDP to province level real GDP.
- Human capital:
  - Calculated using province-level educational attainment shares from NBS data and returns to education in China as calculated by Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) and Heckman (2000).
- Capital share of income:
  - Calculated as the residual after labor income is subtracted from gross provincial income.

*Source: IMF staff estimates and analysis (document _wp13204 - 1.8 percent of GDP in 2012.).*

### REFERENCES

### _wp13204 - REFERENCES

### Working Papers and NBER Papers
- Ahuja, A., 2012, “De-Monopolization Toward Long-Term Prosperity in China,” IMF Working Paper 12/75 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Bai, C., C. Hsieh, and Y. Qian, 2006, “The Return to Capital in China,” NBER Working Paper No. 12775 (Cambridge Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Das, M., and P. N’Diaye, 2013, “Chronicle of a Decline Foretold: Has China Reached the Lewis Turning Point?” IMF Working Paper 13/26 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Heckman, J. and X. Li, 2003, “Selection Bias, Comparative Advantage and Heterogeneous Returns to Education: Evidence from China in 2000.” NBER Working Paper, 9877 (Cambridge Massachusetts: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- Laeven, L. and F. Valencia, 2012, “Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update,” IMF Working Paper 12/163 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Lee, I., M. Syed, and X. Liu, 2012, “Is China Over-Investing and Does it Matter?” IMF Working Paper 12/277 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- N’Diaye, P., 2010, “Transforming China: Insights from the Japanese Experience of the 1980s,” IMF Working Paper 10/284 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Journal Articles and American Economic Review / QJE Papers
- Hall, R., and C. Jones, 1999, “Why do Some Countries Produce so Much More Output Per Worker than Others?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 114, No. 1, pp. 83–116.
- Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and P. Klenow, 2009, “Misallocation and Manufacturing TFP in China and India,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 124, No. 4, pp. 1403–48.
- Hsieh, Chang-Tai, and P. Klenow, 2010, “Development Accounting,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 207–23.
- Psacharopoulos, G. and H. Patrinos, 2004, “Returns to Investment in Education: An Update,” Education Economics, Vol. 12:2, pp. 111–133.
- Song, Z., K. Storesleten, and F. Zilibotti, 2011, “Growing Like China,” American Economic Review, Vol. 101 (February), pp. 202–41.

### IMF Country Reports and Spillover Reports
- International Monetary Fund, 2011, “People’s Republic of China Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,” IMF Country Report 11/192 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- International Monetary Fund, 2011, “People's Republic of China: Spillover Report for the 2011 Article IV Consultation and Selected Issues,” IMF Country Report No. 11/193 (Washington).
- International Monetary Fund, 2012, “People’s Republic of China Article IV Consultation—Staff Report,” IMF Country Report 12/195 (Washington).

*Source: _wp13204 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp13204.pdf_