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---

### I. Introduction and research focus
- Research question: Do outward FDI outflows from developing and transition economies affect domestic investment in the home country?
- Sample and method:
  - Panel data for 121 developing home countries over the period 1990–2010.
  - Econometric model: modified flexible accelerator model.
  - Estimation method: system-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to address possible endogeneity of outward FDI.
- Motivation: Domestic investment determines physical capital accumulation and economic growth; effects of outward FDI may differ between developed and developing/transition economies because of differences in capital abundance and financial market conditions.

### II. Stylized facts on outward FDI from developing and transition economies
- Aggregate shares and trends:
  - Between 1980 and 2011, the share of developing and transition economies in world outward FDI rose from 6.2 percent to 26.9 percent and peaked in 2010 at 31.8 percent.
  - In the 1980s, the developing and transitional countries' share peaked at 9.6 percent in 1982; it reached 16.7 percent in 1994; it declined between 1998 and 2001 and then grew to 31.8 percent in 2010.
- Regional distribution of developing and transition outflows (2011):
  - Asia and Oceania: 61.4 percent of total FDI outflows from developing and transition economies.
  - Latin America and the Caribbean: 21.8 percent.
  - Transition economies: 16 percent.
- Selected FDI outflow values (Billions of current U.S. dollars):
  - World: 93.5 (1980s), 418.8 (1990s), 814.6 (2000–05*), 1415.1 (2006), 2198.0 (2007), 1969.3 (2008), 1175.1 (2009), 1451.4 (2010), 1694.4 (2011).
  - Advanced Countries: 87.6 (1980s), 372.7 (1990s), 711.7 (2000–05*), 1152.0 (2006), 1829.6 (2007), 1580.8 (2008), 857.8 (2009), 989.6 (2010), 1237.5 (2011).
  - Developing Economies: 5.9 (1980s), 44.9 (1990s), 94.6 (2000–05*), 239.3 (2006), 316.9 (2007), 328.1 (2008), 268.5 (2009), 400.1 (2010), 383.8 (2011).
  - Asia and Oceania (developing subregion): 4.3 (1980s), 33.1 (1990s), 61.6 (2000–05*), 151.4 (2006), 228.2 (2007), 223.2 (2008), 211.0 (2009), 273.2 (2010), 280.6 (2011).
  - Transition Economies: 0.0 (1980s), 1.2 (1990s), 8.3 (2000–05*), 23.7 (2006), 51.6 (2007), 60.5 (2008), 48.8 (2009), 61.6 (2010), 73.1 (2011).
  - Note: *Annual Average, Source: UNCTAD.

### III. Theoretical channels and motives linking outward FDI to domestic investment
- Two main transmission channels:
  - Financial market channel:
    - Capital transfers abroad can shift part of private domestic savings out of the home country.
    - Under imperfect financial markets and scarcity of financial resources, liquidity available for domestic investment falls and domestic firms face higher difficulty raising funds → outward FDI can discourage domestic investment.
  - Product market channel:
    - Shifts of production abroad can displace domestic production and exports (substitution), or complement domestic production through backward/forward linkages (complementarity).
- Motives for outward FDI (efficiency-seeking, market-seeking, strategic asset–seeking):
  - Efficiency-seeking (vertical FDI): relocating parts of production to cheaper-input countries; may complement trade and stimulate domestic investment via exports of capital and intermediate goods.
  - Market-seeking: serving host-country markets; effects ambiguous and depend on whether outward FDI displaces exports.
  - Strategic asset–seeking: acquiring assets or technologies unavailable at home; may raise domestic productivity and stimulate domestic investment.
- Net expected effect: outward FDI may have positive, negative, or neutral effects on home-country domestic investment depending on motives and country characteristics.

### IV. Empirical literature (macro- and firm-level studies)
- Mixed evidence from developed-country studies:
  - Feldstein (1995): Using OECD data (1970s–1980s), finds each dollar of outward FDI reduces domestic investment by about one dollar.
  - Andersen and Hainaut (1998): For United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom (1960s–1990s), outward FDI reduces domestic investment (not necessarily dollar-for-dollar).
  - Herzer and Schrooten (2007): For Germany, outward FDI has a negative long-run effect and positive short-run effect on domestic investment; for the United States, outward FDI has a positive long-run effect.
  - Desai et al. (2005): Macro OECD sample shows outward FDI reduces domestic investment; firm-level evidence for U.S. MNEs shows foreign and domestic capital expenditures are complements.
  - Firm- and industry-level studies produce mixed results (Stevens and Lipsey, 1992; Hejazi and Pauly, 2003).

### V. Econometric challenges and strategy
- Main empirical problem: endogeneity of outward FDI (two-way relationship between domestic investment rate and outward FDI).
- Remedies used in study:
  - System-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) employing internal instruments (lagged levels and lagged differences).
  - Panel data to control for unobserved country-specific factors.
  - Tests for instrument validity via Sargan/Hansen and checks for serial correlation (first- and second-order tests).

### VI. Model specification and controls
- Desired investment equation and partial adjustment:
  - I*_{i,t} = x′_{i,t} β + ε_{i,t}
  - I_{i,t} – I_{i,t-1} = θ(I*_{i,t} – I_{i,t-1}), with θ in (0,1] and γ = (1 – θ).
  - Estimated dynamic specification: I_{i,t} = γ I_{i,t-1} + x′_{i,t} λ + ν_{i,t}, where λ = θβ and ν_{i,t} = θ ε_{i,t}.
- Benchmark estimated short-run equation:
  - DI_{i,t} = α_0 + α_1 DI_{i,t-1} + α_2 OFDI_{i,t} + α_3 IFDI_{i,t} + x′_{i,t} β + ε_{i,t}
  - DI = domestic investment as a share of GDP; OFDI = outward FDI; IFDI = inward FDI.
- Control variables and expected signs:
  - DI_{i,t-1}: positive.
  - RGDPG: positive.
  - INF: negative.
  - Saving: positive.
  - Financial development (M2, Credit): positive.
  - Openness: ambiguous.

### VII. Data and sample
- Unbalanced panel: 121 countries, period 1990–2010 (full descriptive sample listed in source totals 142 countries for some tables).
- Data sources:
  - IMF World Economic Outlook database (2012) for dependent and macro variables.
  - World Bank WDI (2012) for trade, schooling, credit, M2, REER.
  - International Country Risk Guide and Political Risk Groups for institutional quality.
  - UNCTAD World Investment Report (2012) for FDI in current U.S. dollars.
- Variable definitions (selected):
  - DI: Gross capital formation — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
  - OFDI: Foreign direct investment Outflows — UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012.
  - IFDI: Foreign direct investment inflows — UNCTAD World Investment Report 2012.
  - RGDPG: Real GDP growth — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
  - M2: Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP — World Bank WDI.
  - Openness: Exports and Imports as a % of GDP — World Bank WDI.
  - Note: With the exception of RGDPG, inflation rate, political risk, law and order, and corruption, all variables are as a percent of GDP.

### VIII. Main empirical findings from this study
- System-GMM panel estimates (121 developing countries, 1990–2010):
  - Outward FDI:
    - Representative system-GMM estimates for developing countries: -0.29 (z-statistics e.g., -2.50, -2.65) on OFDI/GDP.
    - Short-run interpretation: a one percentage point increase in FDI outflows from the home country leads to a 29 percent decrease in domestic investment as a percentage of GDP (example specification).
    - Long-run interpretation: the effect is about 73 percent (example specification).
    - Dollar interpretation (examples reported): $10 of outward FDI reduces domestic investment by $2.9 in the short run and $7.8 (or $7.3 in some columns) in the long run.
  - Inward FDI:
    - Representative system-GMM estimates for developing countries: 0.55 (z-statistics e.g., 3.63, 3.51, 3.98) on IFDI/GDP.
    - Short-run interpretation: a one percentage point increase in FDI inflows stimulates domestic investment by about 55 percent.
- Cross-sectional OLS (1990–2010 averages):
  - Estimated coefficient on FDI outflow: negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
  - A one percentage point increase in FDI outflows reduces domestic investment by about 97 percent (reported -0.97 in column 2; -0.92 in column 1).
  - Dollar terms: $10 outflows reduce domestic investment by about $9.7.
- Sign and significance of other variables (representative findings):
  - Lagged dependent variable coefficients: 0.60–0.63 (statistically significant at 1 percent).
  - Openness: negative and significant (e.g., -0.04* with z = -3.50).
  - RGDPG: positive and significant (e.g., 0.13* (z = 3.05)).
  - Saving/GDP: positive and significant (e.g., 0.17* (z = 4.57)).
  - M2/GDP and Inflation: generally small or marginally significant (inflation negative at 10 percent level in some specifications).

### IX. Robustness checks and extensions
- Excluding oil-exporting countries and China:
  - Impact of FDI outflows on domestic investment remains negative and significant at 1 percent; coefficient somewhat smaller than Table 3.
- Controlling for institutional and political factors:
  - Negative relationship between outward FDI and domestic investment persists when adding political risk, institutional quality, and corruption controls.
- Nonlinearity in FDI outflows:
  - Dummy specification: dummy = 1 if outflow ratios > 1 percent.
    - Outward FDI ≤ 1 percent: no significant effect on domestic investment (coefficients 0.04 (0.23); 0.01 (0.04) for the dummy interactions).
    - Outward FDI > 1 percent: significant negative effect (e.g., -0.34* (-2.53); -0.33* (-2.68) for the dummy interactions).
  - Conclusion: domestic investment responds nonlinearly to FDI outflows.
- Interaction with financial development (OFDI × M2):
  - Interaction term negative but insignificant (e.g., -0.0004 (-0.52); -0.0004 (-0.46)) — negative OFDI effect not conditional on financial development level.
- Alternative estimators (POLS, Within Groups, first-differenced GMM):
  - Negative impact of FDI outflows on domestic investment remains significant across methods (e.g., POLS: -0.13* (-2.67); WG: -0.14** (-1.98); DGMM: -0.14 (-1.42) to -0.21** (-1.93)).

### X. Validity, diagnostics, and descriptive statistics
- System-GMM diagnostics:
  - First-order serial correlation in differenced errors: significant (p-value = 0.00 in most specifications).
  - Second-order serial correlation: generally not significant in many specifications (example p-values: 0.207, 0.272, 0.19, 0.2451, 0.198, 0.286; other tables report second-order p-values such as 0.18, 0.23, 0.20, 0.25).
  - Sargan/Hansen tests: do not reject validity of instruments in reported examples (example p-values: 0.644, 0.4874, 0.644, 0.929; other tables report 0.65, 0.95, 0.65, 0.94).
- Descriptive statistics (selected means and ranges, sample 142 countries, 1990–2010):
  - DI: Obs 2555, Mean 22.94, Std. Dev 8.66, Min 1.37, Max 115.1.
  - OFDI: Obs 2555, Mean 1.17, Std. Dev 3.61, Min -24.9, Max 49.86.
  - IFDI: Obs 2555, Mean 3.72, Std. Dev 5.67, Min -15.6, Max 90.46.
  - RGDPG: Obs 2555, Mean 4.06, Std. Dev 5.68, Min -27.1, Max 149.97.
  - Inflation: Obs 2555, Mean 22.51, Std. Dev 207.94, Min -11.6, Max 7481.6.
  - Saving: Obs 2555, Mean 20.24, Std. Dev 11.41, Min -78.9, Max 75.45.
  - Openness: Obs 2555, Mean 84.5, Std. Dev 51.8, Min 0.00, Max 460.4.

### XI. Interpretation and policy implications
- Main empirical conclusion:
  - Robust negative relationship between outward FDI and the rate of domestic investment in developing and transition economies in the sample.
  - Representative magnitudes: short-run reduction ~29 percent per one percentage point increase in OFDI/GDP; long-run reduction ~73 percent (example specification).
- Asymmetry with inward FDI:
  - Inward FDI tends to crowd in domestic investment (representative short-run increase ~55 percent per one percentage point increase in IFDI/GDP).
- Possible mechanisms:
  - Negative effects likely driven by distortions and domestic bottlenecks such as scarcity of capital and imperfect financial markets that make capital transferred abroad reduce domestic investment capacity.
- Policy directions suggested implicitly by study:
  - Address domestic distortions and bottlenecks (e.g., improve financial markets, mitigate capital scarcity) to reduce the negative impact of outward FDI.
  - Policies that boost domestic saving and investment could mitigate or reverse negative effects of outward FDI.

*Source: _wp1352 - References (PDF chapter/section).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp1352 - References

### I. Introduction and research focus
- Research question: Do outward FDI outflows from developing and transition economies affect domestic investment in the home country?
- Sample and method:
  - Panel data for 121 developing home countries over the period 1990–2010.
  - Econometric model: modified flexible accelerator model.
  - Estimation method: system-Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) to address possible endogeneity of outward FDI.
- Motivation: Domestic investment determines physical capital accumulation and economic growth; effects of outward FDI may differ between developed and developing/transition economies because of differences in capital abundance and financial market conditions.

### II. Stylized facts on outward FDI from developing and transition economies
- Aggregate shares and trends:
  - Between 1980 and 2011, the share of developing and transition economies in world outward FDI rose from 6.2 percent to 26.9 percent and peaked in 2010 at 31.8 percent.
  - In the 1980s, the developing and transitional countries' share peaked at 9.6 percent in 1982; it reached 16.7 percent in 1994; it declined between 1998 and 2001 and then grew to 31.8 percent in 2010.
- Regional distribution of developing and transition outflows (2011):
  - Asia and Oceania: 61.4 percent of total FDI outflows from developing and transition economies.
  - Latin America and the Caribbean: 21.8 percent.
  - Transition economies: 16 percent.
- Table 1 (selected values, Billions of current U.S. dollars):
  - World: 93.5 (1980s), 418.8 (1990s), 814.6 (2000–05*), 1415.1 (2006), 2198.0 (2007), 1969.3 (2008), 1175.1 (2009), 1451.4 (2010), 1694.4 (2011).
  - Advanced Countries: 87.6 (1980s), 372.7 (1990s), 711.7 (2000–05*), 1152.0 (2006), 1829.6 (2007), 1580.8 (2008), 857.8 (2009), 989.6 (2010), 1237.5 (2011).
  - Developing Economies: 5.9 (1980s), 44.9 (1990s), 94.6 (2000–05*), 239.3 (2006), 316.9 (2007), 328.1 (2008), 268.5 (2009), 400.1 (2010), 383.8 (2011).
  - Developing subregions (selected): Asia and Oceania: 4.3 (1980s), 33.1 (1990s), 61.6 (2000–05*), 151.4 (2006), 228.2 (2007), 223.2 (2008), 211.0 (2009), 273.2 (2010), 280.6 (2011).
  - Transition Economies: 0.0 (1980s), 1.2 (1990s), 8.3 (2000–05*), 23.7 (2006), 51.6 (2007), 60.5 (2008), 48.8 (2009), 61.6 (2010), 73.1 (2011).
  - Note: *Annual Average, Source: UNCTAD.

### III. Theoretical channels and motives linking outward FDI to domestic investment
- Two main transmission channels (Stevens and Lipsey, 1992):
  - Financial market channel:
    - Capital transfers abroad can shift part of private domestic savings out of the home country.
    - Under imperfect financial markets and scarcity of financial resources, liquidity available for domestic investment falls and domestic firms face higher difficulty raising funds → outward FDI can discourage domestic investment.
  - Product market channel:
    - Shifts of production abroad can displace domestic production and exports (substitution), or complement domestic production through backward/forward linkages (complementarity).
- Motives for outward FDI (Dunning, 1993; discussed as efficiency-seeking, market-seeking, strategic asset–seeking):
  - Efficiency-seeking (vertical FDI): relocating parts of production to cheaper-input countries; may complement trade and stimulate domestic investment via exports of capital and intermediate goods.
  - Market-seeking: serving host-country markets; effects ambiguous and depend on whether outward FDI displaces exports.
  - Strategic asset–seeking: acquiring assets or technologies unavailable at home; may raise domestic productivity and stimulate domestic investment.
- Net expected effect: outward FDI may have positive, negative, or neutral effects on home-country domestic investment depending on motives and country characteristics.

### IV. Empirical literature (macro- and firm-level studies)
- Mixed evidence from developed-country studies:
  - Feldstein (1995): Using OECD data (1970s–1980s), finds each dollar of outward FDI reduces domestic investment by about one dollar.
  - Andersen and Hainaut (1998): For United States, Japan, Germany, and the United Kingdom (1960s–1990s), outward FDI reduces domestic investment (not necessarily dollar-for-dollar).
  - Herzer and Schrooten (2007): For Germany, outward FDI has a negative long-run effect and positive short-run effect on domestic investment; for the United States, outward FDI has a positive long-run effect.
  - Desai et al. (2005): Two approaches yield different results — macro OECD sample shows outward FDI reduces domestic investment; firm-level evidence for U.S. MNEs shows foreign and domestic capital expenditures are complements.
  - Overall: evidence is inconclusive; both substitution and complementarity documented.

### V. Main empirical findings from this study
- Estimated effect (panel of 121 developing countries, 1990–2010, system-GMM):
  - Outward FDI:
    - A one percentage point increase in FDI outflows from the home country leads to a 29 percent decrease in domestic investment as a percentage of GDP.
    - Monetary interpretation: $10 of outward FDI reduces domestic investment by $2.9 in the short run and $7.8 in the long run.
  - Inward FDI:
    - A one percentage point increase in FDI inflows stimulates domestic investment by about 55 percent.
- Interpretation: Outward and inward FDI have asymmetric effects on domestic investment in developing and transition economies in the sample; outward FDI is associated with crowding out of domestic investment while inward FDI is associated with crowding in.

*Source: _wp1352 - References (PDF chapter/section).*

### 2006. He finds that outward FDI decreases the domestic investment rate by a one-to-one ratio.

### _wp1352 - 2006. He finds that outward FDI decreases the domestic investment rate by a one-to-one ratio.

### Literature evidence on outward FDI and domestic investment
- Stevens and Lipsey (1992): firm-level data for seven U.S. MNEs (16 to 20 years) show a strong positive correlation between FDI outflows and domestic investment.
- Hejazi and Pauly (2003): industry-level data for Canada (1984–95) — outward FDI to the United States increases Canadian domestic investment; outward FDI to the rest of the world reduces Canadian domestic investment; outward FDI to the United Kingdom has a neutral effect.
- Feldstein (1995: p. 55) emphasizes endogeneity concerns: “a country that offers a „good environment‟ for domestic investment is also likely to attract more inbound FDI and may also experience less outbound FDI.”

### Econometric challenges and strategy
- Main empirical problem: endogeneity of outward FDI (two-way relationship between domestic investment rate and outward FDI).
- Study remedies:
  - Uses the system-GMM estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) to address simultaneity and endogeneity by employing internal instruments (lagged levels and lagged differences).
  - Employs panel data analysis to control for unobserved country-specific factors and increase sample size and efficiency (Baltagi, 1995, p. 3).
  - Tests validity of instruments via Sargan/Hansen test and checks for serial correlation (first- and second-order tests).

### The model (partial adjustment dynamic panel)
- Desired investment equation:
  - I*_{i,t} = x′_{i,t} β + ε_{i,t}
- Partial adjustment behavior:
  - I_{i,t} – I_{i,t-1} = θ(I*_{i,t} – I_{i,t-1}), with θ in (0,1] and γ = (1 – θ).
- Estimated dynamic specification:
  - I_{i,t} = γ I_{i,t-1} + x′_{i,t} λ + ν_{i,t}, where λ = θβ and ν_{i,t} = θ ε_{i,t}.
- Benchmark investment equation estimated (short-run):
  - DI_{i,t} = α_0 + α_1 DI_{i,t-1} + α_2 OFDI_{i,t} + α_3 IFDI_{i,t} + x′_{i,t} β + ε_{i,t}
  - DI = domestic investment as a share of GDP; OFDI = outward FDI; IFDI = inward FDI.
- Long-run effects derived from short-run coefficients and estimated γ.

### Control variables and expected signs
- Past domestic investment (DI_{i,t-1}): positive (feedback effect).
- Real GDP growth rate (RGDPG): positive.
- Inflation rate (INF): negative (macroeconomic instability).
- Gross national saving (Saving): positive (financing role).
- Financial development proxies: Broad money supply (M2) and credit to private sector (Credit): expected positive.
- Trade openness (Openness): ambiguous (technology spillovers positive; import substitution negative).

### Data
- Unbalanced panel: 121 countries, period 1990–2010.
- Dependent and macro variables: IMF World Economic Outlook database (2012).
- Trade, schooling, credit, M2, REER: World Bank WDI (2012).
- Institutional quality: International Country Risk Guide, Political Risk Groups.
- Political risk: Gibney, Cornett, and Wood (2012).
- FDI data in current U.S. dollars: UNCTAD World Investment Report (2012).
- Except RGDPG and INF, all variables deflated by GDP in current U.S. dollars.

### Key empirical findings (cross-sectional and system-GMM)
- Cross-sectional OLS (1990–2010 averages):
  - Estimated coefficient on FDI outflow: negative and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
  - A one percentage point increase in FDI outflows reduces domestic investment by about 97 percent (reported -0.97 in column 2; -0.92 in column 1).
  - In dollar terms: $10 outflows reduce domestic investment by about $9.7.
- System-GMM (panel estimations, 1990–2010):
  - Lagged dependent variable coefficients: 0.60–0.63 (statistically significant at 1 percent).
  - FDI outflows/GDP: negative and statistically significant across specifications. Representative estimates:
    - Whole sample: -0.23* (z = -3.25), -0.22* (z = -3.32)
    - Developing countries: -0.29* (z = -2.50), -0.29* (z = -2.65), -0.27* (z = -2.34)
  - FDI inflows/GDP: positive and statistically significant. Representative estimates:
    - Whole sample: 0.49* (z = 3.39), 0.49* (z = 3.41)
    - Developing countries: 0.55* (z = 3.63), 0.54* (z = 3.51), 0.53* (z = 3.98)
  - Openness: negative and significant (e.g., -0.04* with z = -3.50).
  - RGDPG: positive and significant (e.g., 0.13* (z = 3.05)).
  - Saving/GDP: positive and significant (e.g., 0.17* (z = 4.57)).
  - M2/GDP and Inflation: generally small or marginally significant (inflation negative at 10 percent level in some specs).
- Short-run vs long-run effects (example from column 4):
  - Short run: a one percentage point increase in outward FDI as a percentage of GDP causes a reduction of about 29 percent in domestic investment as a percentage of GDP.
  - Long run: the effect is about 73 percent.
  - Dollar interpretation: $10 of outward FDI reduces domestic investment by about $2.9 in the short run and by about $7.3 in the long run.
- FDI inflows crowd in domestic investment:
  - A one percentage point increase in inward FDI as a percentage of GDP increases domestic investment by about 55 percent in the short run (column 4).

### Validity and diagnostics
- System-GMM diagnostics:
  - First-order serial correlation in differenced errors: significant (p-value = 0.00).
  - Second-order serial correlation: not significant (p-values reported e.g., 0.207, 0.272, 0.19, 0.2451, 0.198, 0.286).
  - Sargan/Hansen tests: do not reject validity of instruments (example p-values: 0.644, 0.4874, 0.644, 0.929).
- Robust z-values and statistical significance reported; *, **, *** denote 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent significance levels.

### Robustness checks and extensions
- Excluding oil-exporting countries and China:
  - Impact of FDI outflows on domestic investment remains negative and significant at 1 percent; coefficient somewhat smaller than Table 3.
- Controlling for institutional and political factors (political risk, institutional quality, corruption):
  - Negative relationship between outward FDI and domestic investment persists.
- Nonlinearity in FDI outflows:
  - Dummy = 1 if outflow ratios > 1 percent; interaction results:
    - Outward FDI ≤ 1 percent: no significant effect on domestic investment.
    - Outward FDI > 1 percent: significant negative effect.
  - Conclusion: domestic investment responds nonlinearly to FDI outflows.
- Interaction with financial development (OFDI × M2):
  - Interaction term negative but insignificant — negative OFDI effect not conditional on financial development level.
- Alternative estimators (POLS, Within Groups, first-differenced GMM):
  - Negative impact of FDI outflows on domestic investment remains significant across methods.

### Interpretation and policy implications
- Main empirical conclusion:
  - Robust negative relationship between outward FDI and the rate of domestic investment in developing and transition economies.
  - Representative magnitudes: short-run reduction ~29 percent per one percentage point increase in OFDI/GDP; long-run reduction ~73 percent (example specification).
- Possible mechanisms:
  - Driven by distortions and domestic bottlenecks such as scarcity of capital and imperfect financial markets.
- Policy directions suggested implicitly by study:
  - Address domestic distortions and bottlenecks (e.g., improve financial markets, mitigate capital scarcity) to reduce the negative impact of outward FDI.
  - Policies that boost domestic saving and investment could mitigate or reverse negative effects of outward FDI.

*Source: _wp1352 - 2006. He finds that outward FDI decreases the domestic investment rate by a one-to-one ratio.*

### References

### _wp1352 - References

### References (bibliography)
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- Al-Sadig, A., (2012), “the Effects of Foreign Direct Investment on Private Domestic Investment: Evidence From Developing Countries”, Empirical Economics, pp. 1–9 doi:10.1007/s00181-012-0569-1.
- Andersen, P.S. and P. Hainaut (1998), “Foreign Direct Investment and Employment in the Industrial Countries”, BIS Working Papers No. 61.
- Arellano, M. and O. Bover (1995), “Another Look at the Instrumental Variable Estimation of Error-Components Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68: pp. 29–52.
- Arellano, M. and S. Bond (1991), “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”, The Review of Economic Studies, 58(2): pp. 277–297.
- Baltagi, B., (2005), Econometric Analysis of Panel Data, 3rd edition.
- Blejer, M., and M. Khan, (1984), “Government Policy and Private Investment in Developing Countries” IMF Staff Papers, 31(2): pp.379–403.
- Blundell, R. and S. Bond, (1998), “Initial Conditions and Moment Restrictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 87: pp. 115–143.
- Bosworth, B. and S. Collins (1999), “Capital Flows to Developing Economies: Implications for Saving and Investment”, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1999(1): 143–180.
- Desai, M.A., C. F. Foley, and J. R. Hines, Jr., (2005), “Foreign Direct Investment and the Domestic Capital Stock”, American Economic Review: 95 (2) pp. 33---38.
- Dunning, J., (1993), Multinational Enterprises and the Global Economy.
- Feldstein, M., (1995), “The Effects of Outbound Foreign Direct Investment on the Domestic Capital Stock”, In: Feldstein, M., J.R. Hines Jr., and R.G. Hubbard (eds.). The Effects of Taxation on Multinational Corporations, pp. 43–63.
- Feldstein, M., and C. Horioka, (1980), “Domestic Savings and International Capital flows”, Economic Journal 90: pp. 314–329.
- Gibney, M., Cornett, L., & Wood, R., (2012), Political Terror Scale 1976-2011: http://www.politicalterrorscale.org/.
- Greene, J., and D. Villanueva, (1991), “Private Investment in Developing Countries”, IMF Staff Papers, 38(1): pp. 33–58.
- Hejazi, W., and P. Pauly, (2003), “Motivations for FDI and Domestic Capital Formation”, Journal of International Business Studies 34: pp. 282–289.
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### Appendix — Key regression results (tables reproduced as in source)

- Table 4. Domestic Investment and Capital Flows: Political Environment
  - Dependent variable: Domestic investment/GDP 1990–2010.
  - Lagged (Dependent variable):
    - 0.56* (5.47); 0.54* (4.80); 0.62* (6.24); 0.59* (5.40); 0.78* (18.9); 0.80* (17.6); 0.78* (18.9); 0.80* (17.2).
  - FDI outflows/GDP:
    - -0.30* (-2.25); -0.28* (-2.22); -0.25* (-1.82); -0.24* (-1.69); -0.10*** (-1.65); -0.13*** (-1.87); -0.10*** (-1.67); -0.13*** (-1.87).
  - FDI inflows/GDP:
    - 0.62* (3.72); 0.61* (3.69); 0.57* (3.75); 0.57* (3.84); 0.29* (4.72); 0.29* (4.50); 0.28* (4.74); 0.29* (4.53).
  - Openness:
    - -0.04* (-2.88); -0.03*** (-1.93); -0.05* (-3.06); -0.04* (-2.51); -0.04* (-3.37); -0.04* (-3.25); -0.04* (-3.41); -0.04* (-3.33).
  - RGDPG:
    - 0.11* (3.24); 0.12* (3.47); 0.11* (3.16); 0.12* (4.21); 0.05 (1.39); 0.07 (0.98); 0.05 (1.40); 0.07 (1.00).
  - M2/GDP:
    - -0.003 (-0.19); -0.02 (-1.27); 0.03*** (1.66); 0.02 (0.87); 0.02*** (1.69); 0.02 (1.35); 0.02*** (1.77); 0.02 (1.28).
  - Inflation:
    - -0.002 (-1.48); -0.002*** (-1.69); -0.002 (-1.58); -0.002*** (-1.75); -0.001 (-1.53); -0.002 (-1.63); -0.001 (-1.50); -0.002 (-1.65).
  - Saving/GDP:
    - 0.26* (4.22); 0.25* (3.95); 0.18* (4.28); 0.18* (3.85); 0.16* (3.46); 0.15* (2.80); 0.16* (3.43); 0.15* (2.86).
  - Political risk: -0.48** (-2.05); -0.50* (-2.34) (included in some specifications).
  - Law and order: -0.28 (-0.71); -0.15 (-0.42) (included in some specifications).
  - Corruption: -0.02 (-0.08); 0.11 (0.44) (included in some specifications).
  - Time dummies: no / yes across columns.
  - No. of Observations: 1803, 1803, 2071, 2071, 1835, 1835, 1835, 1835.
  - No. of Groups: 100, 100, 118, 118, 101, 101, 101, 101.
  - First order (p-value)1: 0.00 in all columns.
  - Second order (p-value)2: 0.59, 0.64, 0.13, 0.16, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01, 0.01.
  - Sargan test (p-value): 0.97, 1.00, 0.50, 0.82, 0.96, 1.00, 0.97, 0.97.
  - Notes: All regressions include a constant term and are estimated by one-step system. Robust z-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
    - 1. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the errors.
    - 2. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference are not serially correlated of second order.

- Table 5. Domestic Investment and Capital Flows: Non-linearity Relations
  - Dependent variable: Domestic Investment/GDP: 1990–2010.
  - Lagged dependent variable: 0.62* (5.88); 0.60* (5.38); 0.62* (5.87); 0.60* (5.38).
  - (FDI outflows/GDP)* dummy = 1 if FDI outflows <= 1%: 0.04 (0.23); 0.01 (0.04).
  - (FDI outflows/GDP)* dummy = 1 if FDI outflows > 1%: -0.34* (-2.53); -0.33* (-2.68).
  - FDI outflows/GDP: -0.23 (-1.44); -0.24 (-1.50).
  - (FDI outflows/GDP)*(M2/GDP): -0.0004 (-0.52); -0.0004 (-0.46).
  - FDI inflows/GDP: 0.55* (3.67); 0.55* (3.86); 0.55* (3.64); 0.55* (3.82).
  - Openness: -0.04* (-3.05); -0.03* (-2.31); -0.04* (-3.12); -0.03* (-2.33).
  - Real GDP growth rate: 0.11* (2.68); 0.13* (4.19); 0.11* (2.73); 0.13* (4.24).
  - M2/GDP: 0.01 (0.93); 0.00 (0.16); 0.01 (0.92); 0.00 (0.11).
  - Inflation: 0.0001 (-1.61); 0.0001*** (-1.80); 0.0001 (-1.60); 0.0001*** (-1.79).
  - Saving/GDP: 0.18* (4.57); 0.18* (4.00); 0.18* (4.52); 0.18* (3.95).
  - Time dummies: no / yes across columns.
  - No. of Observations: 2185 in all columns.
  - No. of Groups: 121 in all columns.
  - First order (p-value)1: 0.00 in all columns.
  - Second order (p-value)2: 0.18, 0.23, 0.20, 0.25.
  - Sargan test (p-value): 0.65, 0.95, 0.65, 0.94.
  - Notes: All regressions include a constant term and are estimated by one-step system GMM. Robust z-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.
    - 1. The null hypothesis is that the instruments are not correlated with the errors.
    - 2. The null hypothesis is that the errors in the first difference are not serially correlated of second order.

- Table 6. Domestic Investment and Capital Flows: Alternative Estimation Methods
  - Dependent variable: Domestic Investment/GDP: 1990–2010.
  - Estimators: POLS, POLS (with time dummies), WG, WG (with time dummies), DGMM, DGMM.
  - Lagged (Dependent variable):
    - POLS: 0.75* (22.0); POLS (yes): 0.75* (21.5).
    - WG: 0.62* (12.6); WG (yes): 0.62* (12.4).
    - DGMM: 0.55* (3.76); DGMM (yes): 0.61* (4.55).
  - FDI outflows/GDP:
    - POLS: -0.13* (-2.67); POLS (yes): -0.14* (-2.92).
    - WG: -0.14** (-1.98); WG (yes): -0.16* (-2.15).
    - DGMM: -0.14 (-1.42); DGMM (yes): -0.21** (-1.93).
  - FDI inflows/GDP:
    - POLS: 0.34* (6.73); POLS (yes): 0.36* (6.89).
    - WG: 0.41* (3.91); WG (yes): 0.42* (4.04).
    - DGMM: 0.48* (3.31); DGMM (yes): 0.53* (3.73).
  - Openness:
    - POLS: -0.01* (-5.00); POLS (yes): -0.01* (-4.75).
    - WG: -0.04* (-4.16); WG (yes): -0.03* (-3.77).
    - DGMM: -0.11* (-2.49); DGMM (yes): -0.03 (-0.61).
  - RGDPG:
    - POLS: 0.04 (0.80); POLS (yes): 0.05 (0.83).
    - WG: 0.07* (3.43); WG (yes): 0.07* (3.490).
    - DGMM: 0.11 (1.59); DGMM (yes): 0.1*** (1.67).
  - M2/GDP:
    - POLS: 0.001 (0.37); POLS (yes): 0.002 (0.56).
    - WG: 0.001 (-0.04); WG (yes): 0.006 (0.410).
    - DGMM: 0.03 (1.20); DGMM (yes): 0.04 (1.30).
  - Inflation:
    - POLS: -0.001*** (-1.74); POLS (yes): -0.001** (-2.14).
    - WG: -0.001*** (-1.84); WG (yes): -0.001** (-2.40).
    - DGMM: -0.002 (-1.59); DGMM (yes): -0.003*** (-1.77).
  - Saving/GDP:
    - POLS: 0.10* (5.50); POLS (yes): 0.10* (5.40).
    - WG: 0.12* (3.63); WG (yes): 0.12* (3.39).
    - DGMM: 0.20* (3.32); DGMM (yes): 0.21* (3.34).
  - Constant:
    - POLS: 3.5* (6.45); POLS (yes): 3.4* (4.40).
    - WG: 8.1* (6.12); WG (yes): 7.8* (4.77).
    - DGMM: 12.3* (3.36); DGMM (yes): 5.4* (0.94).
  - Time dummies: no / yes across columns.
  - R-sq: Within: 0.58, 0.59 (WG columns); Between: 0.89, 0.91 (WG columns); Overall: 0.78, 0.78, 0.75, 0.77.
  - No. of Observations: 2185, 2185, 2185, 2185, 2056, 2056.
  - No. of Groups: 121, 121, 121, 119, 119, 119.
  - Notes: POLS: Pool OLS, WG: within Group estimator, DGMM: First-differenced GMM. Robust t-values in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at 1 percent, 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively.

### Descriptive statistics (Table B)
- Sample: 142 countries: 1990–2010.
- Variables (Obs, Mean, Std. Dev, Min, Max):
  - DI: 2555, 22.94, 8.66, 1.37, 115.1.
  - OFDI: 2555, 1.17, 3.61, -24.9, 49.86.
  - IFDI: 2555, 3.72, 5.67, -15.6, 90.46.
  - RGDPG: 2555, 4.06, 5.68, -27.1, 149.97.
  - M2: 2555, 52.43, 41.84, 4.22, 323.58.
  - Inflation: 2555, 22.51, 207.94, -11.6, 7481.6.
  - Saving: 2555, 20.24, 11.41, -78.9, 75.45.
  - Openness: 2555, 84.5, 51.8, 0.00, 460.4.
  - Political risk: 2214, 2.67, 1.02, 1.00, 5.00.
  - Law and order: 1945, 3.39, 1.20, 0.00, 6.00.
  - Corruption: 1945, 2.54, 0.95, 0.00, 5.00.
  - Schooling: 2494, 69.1, 32.7, 4.5, 162.3.
  - REER: 2734, 106.6, 36.1, 37.5, 1025.3.
- Notes: DI: Domestic investment, OFDI: outward FDI, IFDI: inward FDI, RGDPG: real GDP growth rate, M2: Broad money supply, REER: real effective exchange rate. With the exception of RGDPG, inflation rate political risk, law and order, and corruption, all variables are as a percent of GDP.

### Correlation matrix (Table A)
- Pairwise correlations:
  - DI with OFDI: 0.02; IFDI: 0.37; RGDPG: 0.33; M2: 0.08; Inflation: -0.01; Saving: 0.43; Openness: 0.22.
  - OFDI with IFDI: 0.39; RGDPG: 0.01; M2: 0.41; Inflation: -0.03; Saving: 0.15; Openness: 0.39.
  - IFDI with RGDPG: 0.24; M2: 0.14; Inflation: -0.04; Saving: 0.02; Openness: 0.47.
  - RGDPG with M2: -0.09; Inflation: -0.14; Saving: 0.17; Openness: 0.14.
  - M2 with Inflation: -0.07; Saving: 0.22; Openness: 0.34.
  - Inflation with Saving: -0.01; Openness: -0.06.
  - Saving with Openness: 0.25.

### Definitions of variables and data sources
- DI: Gross capital formation — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
- RGDPG: Real GDP growth — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
- Inflation: Annual inflation rate — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
- Saving: Gross national saving — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
- Debts: General government gross debt as % of GDP — World Economic Outlook database, 2012.
- M2: Money and quasi money (M2) as % of GDP — The World Bank‟s World development Indicators.
- Openness: Exports and Imports as a % of GDP — The World Bank‟s World development Indicators.
- Credit: Domestic credit to private sector % of GDP — The World Bank‟s World development Indicators.
- Schooling: Secondary school enrollment % of total — The World Bank‟s World development Indicators.
- REER: Real effective exchange rate (2005=100) — The World Bank‟s World development Indicators.
- FDI inflows: Foreign direct investment inflows — UNCTAD‟s World Investment Report 2012.
- FDI outflows: Foreign direct investment Outflows — UNCTAD‟s World Investment Report 2012.
- Political Risk: Political Terror Scale-US State Department, 1 (very low), and 5 (very high) — http://politicalterrorscale.org/.
- Quality of Institutions: Index measuring law and order ranging from 0 (very low) to 6 (very high) — International Country Risk Guide, the Political Risk Groups.
- Corruption level: Corruption level 0 (very low) to 6 (very high) — International Country Risk Guide, the Political Risk Groups.
- Note: With the exception of RGDPG, inflation rate political risk, law and order, and corruption, all variables are as a percent of GDP.

### Country sample (142 countries, 1990–2010)
- Full list includes: Albania, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Australia*, Austria*, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium*, Bolivia, Belize, Benin, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada*, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Rep., Congo, Dem. Rep., Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark*, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland*, France*, Gabon, Georgia, Hong Kong, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Germany*, Ghana, Greece*, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Hungary, Iceland*, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland*, Italy*, Jamaica, Japan*, Jordan, Kenya, Korea, Rep. of, Kuwait, Lebanon, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Netherlands*, New Zealand*, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway*, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal*, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain*, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden*, Switzerland*, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Ukraine, United Kingdom*, United States*, Uruguay, Vanuatu, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
  - * denotes Developed countries.

*Source: _wp1352 - References (PDF).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp1352.pdf_
