## 2. European Advanced and Emerging Market Countries: Current Account

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### I. Background: The boom and the bust
- Adoption of the euro coincided with widening current account (CA) deficits in EZ periphery countries (EZ periphery = Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain).
- During 1999-2007, CA balances worsened for all EZ periphery countries except Portugal (where the CA deficit remained at an elevated level reached in early 2000).
- Many emerging Europe countries with fixed exchange rate regimes experienced similar CA deficits that “ballooned reaching as high as 25 percent of GDP in the run-up to the financial crisis.”
- Mechanism summary:
  - Bank-intermediated large-scale foreign capital inflows fueled domestic demand booms → higher imports → wider CA deficits.
  - For EZ periphery: rapid decline in borrowing costs and abundant global liquidity.
  - For emerging Europe: EU accession and prospects of income convergence generated capital flows.
  - Non-tradable sectors (construction, retail) and large wage/price increases eroded tradable sectors.
  - Result: excessive foreign-owed debt, deteriorated competitiveness, limited policy space.

### II. Stylized cross-region differences (pre-crisis and post-crisis)
- Sectoral drivers pre-crisis:
  - Emerging Europe: large pre-crisis CA deficits predominantly private-sector driven (households and non-financial corporates (NFCs)); public sector recorded a small surplus everywhere except Lithuania.
  - EZ periphery: public sector imbalances were a major contributor in Greece and Portugal; household imbalances large in Greece and Ireland; NFC negative imbalances important in Portugal and Spain.
- Savings vs. investment, 1999–2007:
  - Emerging Europe: CA widening mostly reflected increasing private investment (NFC-driven), with household savings declines in places like Estonia.
  - EZ periphery: CA widening mostly reflected declining private sector savings; NFC savings declined everywhere; household savings declined in Portugal.
- Public sector:
  - EZ periphery: public savings declined everywhere but Spain (pro-cyclical fiscal widening).
  - Emerging Europe: increased public investment and improved public savings (windfall revenues) but fiscal stance often still pro-cyclical.
- Pace and composition of adjustment after the crisis:
  - Emerging Europe: sharp and quick CA adjustment; “on average, the four emerging European countries showed an adjustment of 4.6 percentage points per year relative to its trough CA/GDP ratio,” with most reversing pre-crisis widening by 2011. Baltic household sector even returned to deficit in 2012.
  - EZ periphery: slower adjustment, pickup only recently in 2012; CA deficits in Greece and Portugal adjusted slowly; Ireland and Spain saw private sector balance by 2009–2010 but large public deficits emerged post-crisis.
- Mechanisms of post-crisis adjustment:
  - Emerging Europe: both import compression (sudden stop in financing) and export recovery (wage adjustment, trading-partner growth).
  - EZ periphery: imports contracted less, exports provided insufficient support; availability of financing (TARGET 2) helped finance deficits and dampened import contraction.
  - TARGET 2 financing: “CA deficits of Greece and Portugal were almost entirely financed by TARGET 2 credits; TARGET 2 support for Ireland accommodated a major capital flight in excess to fully covering CA deficits.”

### III. Empirical methodology and data
- Model aims to capture three dimensions:
  - Cyclical position: capital inflows, real private credit growth, unemployment rate, general government balance (percent of GDP).
  - External competitiveness: relative manufacturing wages, ULC-based real effective exchange rate (REER-ULC), nominal effective exchange rates, price indices, floating exchange rate dummy.
  - External environment: trade-weighted partners’ real GDP or import growth, VIX (market sentiment).
- Additional controls: household indebtedness, crisis-driven nonlinearities via interaction terms with a crisis dummy.
- Crisis dummy defined: equal to one in 2008–11 and zero otherwise; (note: crisis year begins in 2008 for BGR, HRV, CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, POL, ROM, SVK, and SVN; crisis year begins in 2010 for all others).
- Estimation strategy:
  - Reduced-form CA deficit equation estimated by OLS on annual data for 2000–12 for a panel of 28 European countries (current EU members plus Croatia).
  - Variables expressed as deviations from their 2000 levels (changes from 2000 benchmark).
  - Country-specific unobservable effects captured as fixed effects (residual CA movements not explained by regressors).
- Key sample and model numeric particulars:
  - Sample period: 2000–12 (annual data).
  - Panel: 28 European countries (current EU members plus Croatia).
  - Crisis dummy: equals one in 2008–11 for many countries (see definition above).
  - Average post-crisis adjustment for four emerging European countries: 4.6 percentage points per year relative to trough CA/GDP.

### IV. Empirical results — main findings
- Cyclical financing variables mattered strongly during the boom:
  - Lower unemployment, higher annual credit growth, and larger gross capital inflows pushed CA balances further negative (coefficients statistically significant with expected signs).
  - Gross capital inflows and credit growth had significant impacts “over and above” cyclical real economy variables, emphasizing the role of financing.
- Fiscal balance:
  - Not statistically significant during the boom for the whole sample or the EM sub-sample.
  - For advanced Europe, headline fiscal balances affected CA developments significantly during the boom.
- Competitiveness:
  - REER-ULC statistically significant for the whole sample and EM Europe during the boom; not significant for advanced Europe during boom but gains significance in post-crisis adjustment for advanced Europe.
- Crisis interactions:
  - Credit growth interaction with crisis dummy shows reinforced role post-crisis (larger and more significant coefficients).
  - Interaction of gross capital flows and crisis dummy: statistically insignificant for whole sample but highly significant for emerging Europe.
  - Fiscal balance and REER-ULC gained significance in explaining post-crisis CA adjustment.
- Other findings:
  - Impact of unemployment on CA adjustment declined during crisis years.
  - Floating exchange rate dummy appeared to help CA adjustment but results not statistically significant.
  - Partner country import demand significant in some regressions but sometimes with unexpected sign.
- Summary by group:
  - EM Europe — Pre-crisis CA drivers: Capital flows, REER-ULC. Post-crisis CA drivers: Capital flows.
  - Advanced Europe — Pre-crisis CA drivers: Fiscal balance, real private credit growth, exchange rate regime, unemployment, capital flows. Post-crisis CA drivers: Real credit growth, REER-ULC, partner country import growth.

### V. Empirical decompositions — country-specific highlights
- Method: country decompositions constructed using each country’s change-from-2000 values multiplied by estimated coefficients from Regression 4 (R4) using the whole sample; interaction with crisis dummy applied where appropriate.
- EZ periphery examples:
  - Ireland:
    - CA widened 2004–8; sharply improved 2009–10 closing the gap.
    - Pre-crisis widening linked to capital inflows and household sector via wages and real credit growth.
    - Sharp post-crisis adjustment driven by credit contraction, capital flow reversal, rising unemployment, and partner import demand.
  - Greece:
    - Modest, slow adjustment.
    - Pre-crisis widening driven by lower unemployment and capital inflows; REER-ULC contributed to widening until 2009.
    - Post-crisis aided by credit contraction and rising unemployment; fiscal position and slow private adjustment financed by deposit outflows keep CA imbalances wide.
  - Portugal:
    - Large CA imbalances already in early 2000.
    - Uniquely, unemployment contributed to CA adjustment pre-crisis.
    - Large fiscal deficits have hindered CA adjustment; REER-ULC contribution increased in 2012.
  - Spain:
    - Pre-crisis widening driven mostly by declining unemployment.
    - Post-crisis adjustment via unemployment increases and credit contraction.
    - Large fiscal deficits act as a drag on CA adjustment.
- Emerging Europe examples:
  - Bulgaria:
    - Pre-crisis CA imbalances from falling unemployment and credit growth; capital flows significant in 2006–8.
    - Post-crisis adjustment (largest in Europe) helped by slowdown in credit growth.
    - Model leaves significant CA movement unexplained in Bulgaria.
  - Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania):
    - Pre-crisis: similar drivers via declining unemployment.
    - Post-crisis: adjustment driven by credit crunch, capital outflows, and wage adjustment improving competitiveness (wage adjustment most visible in Latvia, least in Estonia).
- Residuals and model fit:
  - Unexplained residuals larger at crisis peak (2008–09), suggesting nonlinear effects beyond modeled variables.
  - Negative residuals in post-crisis EZ periphery: model predicts larger CA adjustments than observed — possibly due to households maintaining spending financed by drawing down savings.
  - Positive residuals in post-crisis EM Europe: model predicts smaller CA adjustments than observed — possibly due to postponed consumption/investment amid uncertainty.

### VI. Policy implications and recommendations
- Common diagnosis:
  - Both regions experienced pre-crisis private-sector led domestic demand booms creating large CA imbalances.
  - Emerging Europe: rising investment played a stronger role; EZ periphery: declining private sector savings were the main driver.
  - Absence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy during boom years failed to dampen overheating and did not create necessary fiscal space for the downturn.
- Why emerging Europe adjusted faster:
  - Sudden capital outflows forced rapid adjustment.
  - Wage adjustment enabled by more flexible labor markets.
  - Faster public sector adjustment in many cases due to financing constraints and market pressure.
  - Lower household indebtedness aided quicker return of private consumption.
- For growth-friendly adjustment in the EZ periphery:
  - Exports need to contribute more — relying solely on import compression is contractionary.
  - Constraints: low weight of tradable sector, competitiveness/labor market problems, high intra-European trade shares, tepid global growth.
  - Export recovery will be slow but is necessary for sustainable reversal of CA imbalances.
- Policy mix lessons:
  - Exchange rate flexibility helps but is not essential if supportive policies enable wage and price adjustment.
  - Flexible labor markets reduce burden on unemployment and facilitate wage adjustment.
  - Counter-cyclical fiscal policy during booms is crucial to dampen overheating and build policy space — especially important for relatively closed economies where fiscal policy has larger cyclical impact.
- Country-specific policy approach:
  - Pace and composition of CA adjustment depend on the source of the pre-crisis boom (sectoral concentration matters).
  - Policies must account for country-specific circumstances (labor market, fiscal strength, openness, export demand) to ensure CA adjustment supports, rather than hinders, growth.

*Source — IMF staff chapter “2. European Advanced and Emerging Market Countries: Current Account,” based on the referenced empirical analysis and figures covering 2000–12.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp1374 - References

### References
- References ................................................................................................................................27

### Tables
- 1. European Advanced and Emerging Market Countries: Data Appendix ..............................17

*Source: _wp1374 - References*

### 2. European Advanced and Emerging Market Countries: Current Account

### 2. European Advanced and Emerging Market Countries: Current Account

### I. Background: The boom and the bust
- Adoption of the euro coincided with widening current account (CA) deficits in EZ periphery countries (EZ periphery = Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain).  
- During 1999-2007, CA balances worsened for all EZ periphery countries except Portugal (where the CA deficit remained at an elevated level reached in early 2000).  
- Many emerging Europe countries with fixed exchange rate regimes experienced similar CA deficits that “ballooned reaching as high as 25 percent of GDP in the run-up to the financial crisis.”  
- Short summary of mechanism:
  - Bank-intermediated large-scale foreign capital inflows fueled domestic demand booms → higher imports → wider CA deficits.
  - For EZ periphery: rapid decline in borrowing costs and abundant global liquidity.
  - For emerging Europe: EU accession and prospects of income convergence generated capital flows.
  - Non-tradable sectors (construction, retail) and large wage/price increases eroded tradable sectors.
  - Result: excessive foreign-owed debt, deteriorated competitiveness, limited policy space.

### II. Stylized cross-region differences (pre-crisis and post-crisis)
- Sectoral drivers pre-crisis:
  - Emerging Europe: large pre-crisis CA deficits were predominantly private-sector driven (households and non-financial corporates (NFCs)); public sector recorded a small surplus everywhere except Lithuania.
  - EZ periphery: public sector imbalances were a major contributor in Greece and Portugal; household imbalances large in Greece and Ireland; NFC negative imbalances important in Portugal and Spain.
- Savings vs. investment, 1999–2007:
  - Emerging Europe: CA widening mostly reflected increasing private investment (NFC-driven), with household savings declines in places like Estonia.
  - EZ periphery: CA widening mostly reflected declining private sector savings; NFC savings declined everywhere; household savings declined in Portugal.
- Public sector:
  - EZ periphery: public savings declined everywhere but Spain (pro-cyclical fiscal widening).
  - Emerging Europe: increased public investment and improved public savings (windfall revenues) but fiscal stance often still pro-cyclical.
- Pace and composition of adjustment after the crisis:
  - Emerging Europe: sharp and quick CA adjustment; “on average, the four emerging European countries showed an adjustment of 4.6 percentage points per year relative to its trough CA/GDP ratio,” with most reversing pre-crisis widening by 2011. Baltic household sector even returned to deficit in 2012.
  - EZ periphery: slower adjustment, pickup only recently in 2012; CA deficits in Greece and Portugal adjusted slowly; Ireland and Spain saw private sector balance by 2009–2010 but large public deficits emerged post-crisis.
- Mechanisms of post-crisis adjustment:
  - Emerging Europe: both import compression (sudden stop in financing) and export recovery (wage adjustment, trading-partner growth).
  - EZ periphery: imports contracted less, exports provided insufficient support; availability of financing (TARGET 2) helped finance deficits and dampened import contraction.
  - TARGET 2 financing: “CA deficits of Greece and Portugal were almost entirely financed by TARGET 2 credits; TARGET 2 support for Ireland accommodated a major capital flight in excess to fully covering CA deficits.”

### III. Empirical methodology and data
- Model aims to capture three dimensions:
  - Cyclical position: capital inflows, real private credit growth, unemployment rate, general government balance (percent of GDP).
  - External competitiveness: relative manufacturing wages, ULC-based real effective exchange rate (REER-ULC), nominal effective exchange rates, price indices, floating exchange rate dummy.
  - External environment: trade-weighted partners’ real GDP or import growth, VIX (market sentiment).
- Additional controls: household indebtedness, crisis-driven nonlinearities via interaction terms with a crisis dummy.
- Crisis dummy defined: equal to one in 2008–11 and zero otherwise; (note: crisis year begins in 2008 for BGR, HRV, CZE, EST, HUN, LVA, LTU, POL, ROM, SVK, and SVN; crisis year begins in 2010 for all others).
- Estimation strategy:
  - Reduced-form CA deficit equation estimated by OLS on annual data for 2000–12 for a panel of 28 European countries (current EU members plus Croatia).
  - Variables expressed as deviations from their 2000 levels (changes from 2000 benchmark).
  - Country-specific unobservable effects captured as fixed effects (residual CA movements not explained by regressors).

### IV. Empirical results — main findings
- Cyclical financing variables mattered strongly during the boom:
  - Lower unemployment, higher annual credit growth, and larger gross capital inflows pushed CA balances further negative (coefficients statistically significant with expected signs).
  - Gross capital inflows and credit growth had significant impacts “over and above” cyclical real economy variables, emphasizing the role of financing.
- Fiscal balance:
  - Not statistically significant during the boom for the whole sample or the EM sub-sample (possible reasons: low variation or correlation with other variables).
  - For advanced Europe, headline fiscal balances affected CA developments significantly during the boom (greater fiscal variability/impact).
- Competitiveness:
  - REER-ULC statistically significant for the whole sample and EM Europe during the boom; not significant for advanced Europe during boom but gains significance in post-crisis adjustment for advanced Europe.
- Crisis interactions:
  - Credit growth interaction with crisis dummy shows reinforced role post-crisis (larger and more significant coefficients) — highlights credit crunch role in private sector adjustment.
  - Interaction of gross capital flows and crisis dummy: statistically insignificant for whole sample but highly significant for emerging Europe — reflects sudden stop importance in EM Europe.
  - Fiscal balance and REER-ULC gained significance in explaining post-crisis CA adjustment.
- Other findings:
  - Impact of unemployment on CA adjustment declined during crisis years (less direct effect in recessions, possibly due to cash-constrained households).
  - Floating exchange rate dummy appeared to help CA adjustment but results not statistically significant.
  - Partner country import demand significant in some regressions but sometimes with unexpected sign (rising partner demand sometimes associated with worse CA balances).
- Summary by group (from text table):
  - EM Europe — Pre-crisis CA: Capital flows, REER-ULC. Post-crisis CA: Capital flows.
  - Advanced Europe — Pre-crisis CA: Fiscal balance, real private credit growth, exchange rate regime, unemployment, capital flows. Post-crisis CA: Real credit growth, REER-ULC, partner country import growth.

Key sample and model numeric particulars:
- Sample period: 2000–12 (annual data).
- Panel: 28 European countries (current EU members plus Croatia).
- Crisis dummy: equals one in 2008–11 for many countries (see definition above).
- Average post-crisis adjustment for four emerging European countries: 4.6 percentage points per year relative to trough CA/GDP.

### V. Empirical decompositions — country-specific highlights
- Method: country decompositions constructed using each country’s change-from-2000 values multiplied by estimated coefficients from Regression 4 (R4) using the whole sample; interaction with crisis dummy applied where appropriate.
- EZ periphery:
  - Ireland: CA widened 2004–8; sharply improved 2009–10 closing the gap. Pre-crisis widening linked to capital inflows and household sector via wages and real credit growth. Sharp post-crisis adjustment driven by credit contraction, capital flow reversal, rising unemployment, and partner import demand.
  - Greece: modest, slow adjustment. Pre-crisis widening driven by lower unemployment and capital inflows; REER-ULC contributed to widening until 2009. Post-crisis aided by credit contraction and rising unemployment; fiscal position and slow private adjustment financed by deposit outflows keep CA imbalances wide.
  - Portugal: large CA imbalances already in early 2000. Uniquely, unemployment contributed to CA adjustment pre-crisis (household consumption constrained by unemployment). Large fiscal deficits have hindered CA adjustment; REER-ULC contribution increased in 2012.
  - Spain: pre-crisis widening driven mostly by declining unemployment. Post-crisis adjustment via unemployment increases and credit contraction. Large fiscal deficits act as a drag on CA adjustment.
- Emerging Europe:
  - Bulgaria: pre-crisis CA imbalances from falling unemployment and credit growth; capital flows significant in 2006–8. Post-crisis adjustment (largest in Europe) helped by slowdown in credit growth. Model leaves significant CA movement unexplained in Bulgaria.
  - Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania): pre-crisis similar via declining unemployment; post-crisis adjustment driven by credit crunch, capital outflows, and wage adjustment improving competitiveness (wage adjustment most visible in Latvia, least in Estonia).
- Note on residuals:
  - Unexplained residuals larger at crisis peak (2008–09), suggesting nonlinear effects beyond modeled variables.
  - Negative residuals in post-crisis EZ periphery: model predicts larger CA adjustments than observed — possibly due to households maintaining spending financed by drawing down savings.
  - Positive residuals in post-crisis EM Europe: model predicts smaller CA adjustments than observed — possibly due to postponed consumption/investment amid uncertainty.

### VI. Policy implications and recommendations
- Common diagnosis:
  - Both regions experienced pre-crisis private-sector led domestic demand booms creating large CA imbalances.
  - Emerging Europe: rising investment played a stronger role; EZ periphery: declining private sector savings were the main driver.
  - Absence of counter-cyclical fiscal policy during boom years failed to dampen overheating and did not create necessary fiscal space for the downturn.
- Why emerging Europe adjusted faster:
  - Sudden capital outflows forced rapid adjustment.
  - Wage adjustment enabled by more flexible labor markets.
  - Faster public sector adjustment in many cases due to financing constraints and market pressure.
  - Lower household indebtedness aided quicker return of private consumption.
- For growth-friendly adjustment in the EZ periphery:
  - Exports need to contribute more — relying solely on import compression is contractionary.
  - Constraints: low weight of tradable sector, competitiveness/labor market problems, high intra-European trade shares, tepid global growth.
  - Export recovery will be slow but is necessary for sustainable reversal of CA imbalances.
- Policy mix lessons:
  - Exchange rate flexibility helps but is not essential if supportive policies enable wage and price adjustment.
  - Flexible labor markets reduce burden on unemployment and facilitate wage adjustment.
  - Counter-cyclical fiscal policy during booms is crucial to dampen overheating and build policy space — especially important for relatively closed economies where fiscal policy has larger cyclical impact.
- Country-specific policy approach:
  - The pace and composition of CA adjustment depend on the source of the pre-crisis boom (sectoral concentration matters — e.g., construction in Spain).
  - Policies must account for country-specific circumstances (labor market, fiscal strength, openness, export demand) to ensure CA adjustment supports, rather than hinders, growth.

*Italic: Source — IMF staff chapter “2. European Advanced and Emerging Market Countries: Current Account,” based on the referenced empirical analysis and figures covering 2000–12.*

### REFERENCES

### _wp1374 - REFERENCES

### References

- Abiad, A., D. Leigh, and A. Mody (2007), “International Finance and Income Convergence: Europe is Different,” IMF Working Paper 07/64, International Monetary Fund.
- Ahearne, A., B. Schmitz, and J. von Hagen (2007), “Internal and External Current Account Balance in the Euro Area,” Joint Bruegel, Korea Institute for International Economic Policy, and Peterson Institute for International Economics Workshop on “Policy to Reduce Global Imbalances.”
- Alcidi, C. and D. Gros (2011), “Adjustment Difficulties and Debt Overhangs in the Eurozone Periphery,” CEPS Working Document 347, Centre for European Policy Studies.
- Atoyan, R., A. Jaeger, and D. Smith (2012), “The Pre-Crisis Capital Flow Surge to Emerging Europe: Did Countercyclical Fiscal Policy Make a Difference?” IMF Working Paper 12/222, International Monetary Fund.
- Baum, A., M. Poplawski-Ribeiro, and A. Weber (2012), “Fiscal Multipliers and the State of the Economy,” IMF Working Paper 12/286, International Monetary Fund.
- Belke, A., G. Schnable, and H. Zemanek (2009), “Current Account Imbalances and Structural Adjustment in the Euro Area: How to Rebalance Competitiveness,” CESifo Working Paper 2639, CESifo Group Munich.
- Berger, H., and V. Nitsch (2010), “The Euro’s Effect on Trade Imbalances,” IMF Working Paper 10/226, International Monetary Fund.
- Chen, R., G. Milesi-Ferretti, and T. Thierry (2012), “External Imbalances in the Euro Area,” IMF Working Paper 12/236, International Monetary Fund.
- Fernandez-Arias, Eduardo, 1996, “The New Wave of Private Capital Inflows: Push or Pull?” Journal of Development Economics, Vol. 48, pp. 389–418.
- Filho, I. 2013, “How Did China’s Rise Affect Competitiveness Across Advanced Economies?” IMF Working Paper forthcoming, International Monetary Fund.
- Herrmann, S. and A. Winkler (2009), “Real Convergence, Financial Markets and the Current Account: Emerging Europe versus Emerging Asia,” Economic Papers 362, Directorate-General for Economic and Financial Affairs, European Commission.
- Holinski, K., C. Kool, and J. Muysken (2012), “Persistent Macroeconomic Imbalances in the Euro Area: Causes and Consequences,” Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, Vol. 94, No. 1, 1–20.
- Jaumotte, F. and P. Sodsriwiboon (2010), “Current Account Imbalances in the Southern Euro Area,” IMF Working Paper 10/139, International Monetary Fund.
- Kentsch, S. (2010), “The Current Account Imbalance between the North and the South of the EU,” Maastricht University.
- Kinoshita, Y. (2011), “Sectoral Composition of Foreign Direct Investment and External Vulnerability in Eastern Europe,” IMF Working Paper 11/123, International Monetary Fund.
- Merler, S. and J. Pisani-Ferry (2012), “Sudden Stops in the Euro Area,” Bruegel Policy Contribution, Issue 2012/06, Bruegel.
- Purfield, C. and C. B. Rosenberg (2010), “Adjustment under a Currency Peg: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania during the Global Financial Crisis 2008–09,” IMF Working Paper 10/213, International Monetary Fund.
- Rahman, J. (2008), “Current Account Developments in New Member States of the European Union: Equilibrium, Excess, and EU-Phoria,” IMF Working Paper 08/92, International Monetary Fund.
- Rahman, J. (2010), “Absorption Boom and Fiscal Stance: What Lies Ahead in Eastern Europe,” IMF Working Paper 10/97, International Monetary Fund.
- Schmitz, B. and J. von Hagen (2010), “Current Account Imbalances and Financial Integration in the Euro Area,” CEPR Discussion Paper DP7262, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
- Sinn, H. and T. Wollmershaeuser (2011), “Target Loans, Current Account Balances and Capital Flows: The ECB’s Rescue Facility,” NBER Working Paper 17626, National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Vamvakidis, A. (2009), “Convergence in Emerging Europe: Sustainability and Vulnerabilities,” Eastern European Economics, Vol. 47, No. 3, 5–57.

*Source: _wp1374 - REFERENCES*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2013/_wp1374.pdf_