## _wp14100

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---

### Overview and scope
- Part of a study examining economic impacts of selected war episodes in the Middle East and spillovers to neighboring countries.
- Selected war episodes analyzed: Lebanese civil war (April 13, 1975–October 13, 1990); Gulf War—Kuwait’s Invasion by Iraq (August 2, 1990–February 28, 1991); 2003 invasion of Iraq (March 19–May 1, 2003).
- Neighboring countries examined included Jordan and Syria because their economies were the most affected by large inflows of war refugees.
- Empirical materials noted: Table 1; Table 2; Figure 1 ("Cumulative Real GDP Loss During the War"); Appendix with country case studies (Lebanon, Kuwait, Iraq) and Appendix Figures (Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, Iraq).

### Channels of spillover impact (relevant to Syria)
- Balance of payments: trade, tourism, transportation, foreign investment/aid flows.
- Migration flows: labor market, capital investment.
- Fiscal pressures: social services (education/health), military (security).
- Prices: increased rental and housing prices.
- Growth: heightened regional uncertainty.
- Net impact on neighboring countries varied according to:
  - initial economic conditions,
  - number and income level of refugees,
  - degree of economic integration with the conflict country and with the rest of the world,
  - extent of external assistance received.

### Spillover effects on Syria from the 2003 invasion of Iraq
- Adverse drivers:
  - Negative impact on exports and investment.
  - A large number of Iraqi refugees hosted by Syria relative to other neighbors.
- Refugee counts reported:
  - Government estimates: 450,000 in Jordan; 50,000 in Lebanon; 1.1 million in Syria.
  - UNHCR registered: around 52,000 in Jordan; 10,000 in Lebanon; 206,000 in Syria.
- Measurement caveat: “Because the Iraq-Syria border remained largely open, and because there was considerable movement across that border, it is difficult to determine exactly how many Iraqis resided in Syria.”
- Refugee characteristics: “many of the Iraqi refugees were well educated, had good jobs, and lived a reasonably comfortable lifestyle (UNHCR, 2009).”
- External assistance: Syria “did not receive foreign grants—despite the serious refugee situation—due to its relative international isolation back then.”

### Pre-war and early spillover indicators for Syria
- Even prior to the Iraq war, regional political uncertainty affected macroeconomic variables.
  - Example: “in mid-2002 in Syria, prior to the war in Iraq, the free market exchange rate came under pressure mainly reflecting political uncertainties in the region.”

### Comparative outcomes: Jordan versus Syria (post-2003)
- Jordan:
  - Net spillover effects were largely positive overall — benefited from higher demand from refugees (1990 Gulf War) and from external assistance (2003 invasion of Iraq).
  - 2003 recovery drivers for Jordan included: strong rebound in export growth (particularly from exports to the United States from the Qualified Industrial Zones); a fiscal stimulus funded through grants; fiscal deficit in 2003 was almost in balance due to higher foreign grants.
  - External current account in 2003: registered a large surplus reflecting a surge in grant receipts.
  - Refugee pressures: strained water sector and increased demand for fuel; pressures on health, transport, sanitation and security services.
- Syria:
  - Net spillovers were adverse — larger refugee burden, negative effects on exports and investment, and lack of foreign grants.
  - Refugees hosted in Syria were on average more disadvantaged economically compared to Iraqis who went to Jordan.
  - Macroeconomic outcomes in Syria in 2003:
    - Real GDP contracted by about 2 percent in 2003, from a growth of about 6 percent in 2002.
    - CPI inflation rose to close to 6 percent.
    - External current account posted a large deficit of about 8 percent of GDP in 2003 because of the large drop in exports.

### General conclusions on macroeconomic effects of conflicts
- Typical macroeconomic effects of conflicts:
  - Sharp contraction in output.
  - A spike in inflation.
  - Large fiscal and current account deficits.
  - A drop in foreign reserves, and pressures on the exchange rate—if the country does not have enough reserves to support its exchange rate—and the conflict is long lasting.
  - Depending on the financing of the fiscal deficit, inflation could spiral or total debt could increase sharply (example cited: Lebanon).
  - The financial system is expected to weaken significantly.
  - A longer lasting conflict would have a more negative economic impact and a more prolonged recovery period.
- Recovery speed and extent depend on economic structure:
  - Aggregate output recovered more quickly in oil-rich countries (Kuwait and Iraq).
  - In Lebanon, aggregate supply took longer to catch up with growing aggregate demand; continuing excess demand reflected large fiscal and current account deficits.
  - In Iraq and Kuwait, oil production represented a significant part of aggregate supply; recovery was faster because oilfields were reactivated relatively quickly; with most oil production exported, they achieved current account surpluses in a relatively short period and recovered foreign reserves.
- Typical requirements for post-war recovery:
  - Large amounts of external assistance, particularly for reconstruction of damaged or destroyed physical, industrial, and socio-economic infrastructure.
  - A post-war policy and institutional set up conducive to a more dynamic economic development model when those are not in place.
  - Insertion in regional and global trade and foreign direct investment flows.
  - Restructuring of the financial sector.
  - Stable security and political conditions.
- Channels for spillovers from conflict countries to neighbors:
  - Flows associated with regional and global integration, including trade, tourism, transportation, and foreign investment.
  - Price effects at the micro level, particularly in real estate markets.
  - Migration of labor and capital.
  - Fiscal pressures from increased social services, such as education and health, and higher military and security spending.
  - Heightened regional uncertainty.
- Factors determining impact and recovery in neighboring countries:
  - Their starting economic conditions.
  - Number and economic status of the refugees they host.
  - How strong their trade, tourism and transportation links are with the country in war.
  - External assistance.
- Suggested directions for further research:
  - Enlarging the sample of countries within and beyond the MENA region to allow economies to be grouped according to more disaggregated characteristic.
  - Assessing the impact of war on socio-economic indicators.

### Appendix highlights — selected country experiences (excerpted)
- Lebanese Civil War (April 13, 1975–October 13, 1990):
  - Pre-1975 Lebanon: low inflation, high growth, large balance of payments surpluses, small fiscal deficits, floating stable and fully convertible currency; strong services sector (banking and finance, tourism, insurance, trade-related services).
  - War impact: destruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities; mass emigration and flight of capital; deterioration of public finances; large fiscal deficits financed primarily through the banking system leading to rapid growth in liquidity, inflationary pressures, high currency substitution; weakened banking system; loss of Lebanon’s role as regional intermediary.
  - Post-conflict recovery:
    - Taif Accord (1989) provided basis for settlement; hostilities ended in 1990.
    - Confidence restored in last quarter of 1992 after parliamentary elections.
    - Government reconstruction programs: National Emergency Reconstruction Program and Horizon 2000 Program.
    - Real GDP recovered gradually reaching its pre-war level in 2010 while real GDP per capita still remains well below its pre-war level.
    - Exchange-rate-based nominal anchor policy adopted starting at the end of 1992, implemented by means of a supportive interest rate policy; high interest rates helped attract large capital inflows and finance reconstruction.
    - Dollarization declined but remained well above its pre-war level.
    - Banking sector consolidation occurred (1990–93 and 1997–98); a 1993 law (expired 1998) encouraged consolidation via limited concessional central bank loans related to goodwill value.
    - Fiscal imbalances: deficit fell from 16 percent of GDP in 1991 to 8 percent in 1993 but rose and remained high thereafter; deficits financed mostly through government papers denominated in Lebanese pounds held primarily by the domestic banking system; public debt increased rapidly.
    - Constraints to recovery: lack of adequate infrastructure, weak institutional framework, shortages of human capital.
  - Spillovers from Lebanese civil war into neighboring countries considered limited due to migration to Gulf and Western countries.
- Gulf War — Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq (August 2, 1990–February 28, 1991):
  - Pre-invasion: growth in second half of 1980s averaged 5.5 percent per year; prices increased by an average of 1.5 percent per year; oil sector about 60 percent of GDP; expatriates about 70 percent of total population and 85 percent of labor force.
  - War impact: widespread physical damage; large budgetary and balance of payments deficits; halted foreign trade; paralysis of labor market; over 60 percent of oil wells set on fire; damage to oil infrastructure and environmental hazards; communications and electricity-generating plants damaged; production of goods and services virtually halted.
  - Financial impact: disrupted financial contracts; looting of bank assets including Central Bank of Kuwait’s gold holdings and unissued currency; decline in real estate and financial asset values.
  - Demographic impact: large-scale exodus of Kuwaitis and expatriates, sharp contraction of population by end-1991.
  - Post-conflict recovery:
    - Recovery and reconstruction program initiated March 1991 largely complete by mid-1994.
    - Real GDP per capita was well above its pre-invasion level by end-1993.
    - Oil sector infrastructure quickly restored; financial system rapidly resumed operations; restoration of economic and social infrastructure and services virtually complete by end-1992.
    - Domestic price increases reversed by late 1991; inflation after 1992 was small.
    - Current account resumed surplus position in 1993.
    - Authorities restored bank balances of nationals to pre-war levels and canceled their consumer debt as banks reopened.
    - Debt settlement program (approved May 1992): buy-out of government bonds of “problem” loans extended to Kuwaiti nationals, effectively shifting private nonperforming debt to public sector obligations.

### Appendix Figure 2 — Kuwait: Macroeconomic Indicators (figure components and axis ranges)
- Real GDP (1987–2000):
  - Series: "Real GDP per capita index (1989=100)"; "Real GDP index (1989=100)"; "Real GDP growth, rhs".
  - Left axis range: 0 to 180 (ticks at 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180).
  - Right axis (growth, rhs) range: -60 to 80 (ticks at -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80).
- External Sector (1987–2000, in percent of GDP unless otherwise indicated):
  - Series: "Gross international reserves, rhs (in billions of $)"; "Current account balance"; "Exports of goods and services"; "Imports of goods and services".
  - Left axis range (percent of GDP): -300 to 200 (ticks at -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200).
  - Right axis for reserves (in billions of $): 0 to 200 (ticks at 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200).
- Inflation and Exchange Rate (Percentage change, 1987–2000):
  - Series: "Inflation"; "E x c h a n g e  r a t e  (+  d e pr e c ia ti on)".
  - Axis range (percent change): -5 to 20 (ticks at -5 0 5 10 15 20).
- Total Investment (In percent of GDP, 1987–2000):
  - Axis range: 0 to 45 (ticks at 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45).
- Fiscal Sector (1990–2000, In percent of GDP):
  - Series: "Total public debt"; "Revenue"; "Expenditure"; "Fiscal balance".
  - Left axis range (percent of GDP for revenue/expenditure/fiscal balance): -200 to 250 (ticks at -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250).
  - Right axis for total public debt: 0 to 30 (ticks at 0 5 10 15 20 25 30).
- Monetary Sector (1987–2000, In percent of GDP):
  - Series: "Broad money"; "Private sector credit"; "Deposit dollarization (in percent of total), rhs".
  - Left axis range (percent of GDP for broad money and private sector credit): 0 to 250 (ticks at 0 50 100 150 200 250).
  - Right axis for deposit dollarization (percent of total): 0 to 30 (ticks at 0 5 10 15 20 25 30).
- Data sources noted in figure: IMF World Economic Outlook; and Regional Economic Outlook.

*Source: _wp14100 (IMF PDF excerpt).*

### Introduction ...........................................................................................................

### _wp14100 - Introduction

### Overview
- Table of contents indicates the chapter is titled "Introduction" and spans page "3".
- The document includes the following main sections and subsections with exact labels and page references where provided:
  - A. Literature Review — page "7"
  - B. Economic Impact of the Conflicts and Trends in Post-Conflict Recovery — page "7"
    - Includes Figure 1. "Cumulative Real GDP Loss During the War" — referenced as part of section B
  - C. Regional Spillovers — page "12"
  - D. Conclusions: What Can We Learn from the Past? — page "15"
- References section begins on page "30".

### Empirical materials and quantitative exhibits listed
- Tables:
  - Table 1. "Macroeconomic Indicators for War Episodes for Lebanon, Kuwait, and Iraq" — referenced on page "5"
  - Table 2. "Selected War Episodes in MENA: Years Required for Selected Macro Variables to Return to Their Pre-War Levels"
- Figures:
  - Figure 1. "Cumulative Real GDP Loss During the War" — referenced within the main sections
- Appendix and Appendix Figures:
  - Appendix: "Impact of Wars on Selected Countries" — begins on page "17"
    - A. Lebanon Civil War (April 13, 1975–October 13, 1990) — page "17"
    - B. Gulf War–Kuwait’s Invasion by Iraq (August 2, 1990–February 28, 1991) — page "20"
    - C. 2003 Invasion of Iraq (March 19–May 1, 2003) — page "25"
  - Appendix Figures:
    - 1. Lebanon: Macroeconomic Indicators — page "19"
    - 2. Kuwait: Macroeconomic Indicators — page "23"
    - 3. Jordan: Macroeconomic Indicators — page "24"
    - 4. Iraq: Macroeconomic Indicators — page "28"

### Key thematic focus implied by section headings
- Literature review of existing studies relevant to conflicts and post-conflict recovery.
- Quantitative assessment of economic impacts of conflicts and the trajectories of post-conflict recovery, including cumulative real GDP losses.
- Analysis of regional spillovers stemming from conflicts.
- Drawing lessons and conclusions from historical war episodes for policy implications and recovery strategies.
- Country-level appendices providing detailed impact assessments for Lebanon, Kuwait, Jordan, and Iraq with supporting macroeconomic indicator figures.

*Source: _wp14100 - Introduction (IMF PDF) — table of contents and section headings as provided in the source content.*

### 5.   Syria: Macroeconomic Indicators ...................................................................................

### 5.   Syria: Macroeconomic Indicators

### Introduction and scope
- This section is part of a study examining economic impacts of selected war episodes in the Middle East and spillovers to neighboring countries.  
- Selected war episodes: Lebanese civil war (April 13, 1975–October 13, 1990), Gulf War–Kuwait’s Invasion by Iraq (August 2, 1990–February 28, 1991), and the 2003 invasion of Iraq (March 19–May 1, 2003).  
- Neighboring countries examined included Jordan and Syria because their economies were the most affected by large inflows of war refugees.

### Channels of spillover impact relevant to Syria
- Potential channels affecting neighboring countries (Organigram 2) included:
  - Balance of payments: trade, tourism, transportation, foreign investment/aid flows.
  - Migration flows: labor market, capital investment.
  - Fiscal pressures: social services (education/health), military (security).
  - Prices: increased rental and housing prices.
  - Growth: heightened regional uncertainty.
- Net impact on neighboring countries varied according to:
  - initial economic conditions,
  - number and income level of refugees,
  - degree of economic integration with the conflict country and with the rest of the world,
  - extent of external assistance received.

### Spillover effects on Syria from the 2003 invasion of Iraq
- Syrian economy was adversely affected by the 2003 invasion of Iraq due to:
  - negative impact on exports and investment, and
  - a large number of Iraqi refugees hosted by Syria relative to other neighbors.  
- Refugee counts reported (government estimates vs. UNHCR registrations at end-March 2009):
  - Government estimates: 450,000 in Jordan; 50,000 in Lebanon; 1.1 million in Syria.
  - UNHCR registered: around 52,000 in Jordan; 10,000 in Lebanon; 206,000 in Syria.
- The text notes difficulties in precise measurement: “Because the Iraq-Syria border remained largely open, and because there was considerable movement across that border, it is difficult to determine exactly how many Iraqis resided in Syria.”
- Characteristics of many Iraqi refugees in Syria: “many of the Iraqi refugees were well educated, had good jobs, and lived a reasonably comfortable lifestyle (UNHCR, 2009).”
- External assistance: Syria “did not receive foreign grants—despite the serious refugee situation—due to its relative international isolation back then.”

### Pre-war and early spillover indicators for Syria
- Even prior to the Iraq war, neighboring countries’ macroeconomic variables were affected by regional political uncertainty.
  - Example: “in mid-2002 in Syria, prior to the war in Iraq, the free market exchange rate came under pressure mainly reflecting political uncertainties in the region.”

### Comparative context (selected findings from neighboring-country analysis relevant to Syria)
- Jordan vs. Syria outcomes after Gulf War and 2003 Iraq invasion:
  - Jordan: net spillover effects were largely positive overall — benefited from higher demand from refugees (1990 Gulf War) and from external assistance (2003 invasion of Iraq).
  - Syria: net spillovers were adverse — larger refugee burden, negative effects on exports and investment, and lack of foreign grants.
- Determinants emphasized for spillover severity included:
  - number and economic characteristics (income level) of refugees,
  - degree of economic integration,
  - receipt of external assistance.

*Source: IMF staff paper section “5.   Syria: Macroeconomic Indicators” (excerpted content provided).*

### 2003. Recovery was supported by a strong rebound in export growth, particularly

### _wp14100 - 2003. Recovery was supported by a strong rebound in export growth, particularly

### 2003 — Jordan: recovery drivers and fiscal/external positions
- Recovery was supported by a strong rebound in export growth, particularly from exports to the United States from the Qualified Industrial Zones.
- A fiscal stimulus funded through grants contributed to the recovery in domestic demand.
- The fiscal deficit in 2003 was almost in balance, as spending overruns in the areas of defense and security and accelerated capital spending were offset by higher foreign grants associated with the Iraqi conflict.
- The external current account registered a large surplus in 2003, reflecting a surge in grant receipts and the underlying strength of the balance of payments.
- Refugees in Jordan strained the Jordanian water sector and increased demand for fuel, leading to increased prices.
- Refugees put pressures on health, transport, sanitation and security services.

### 2003 — Syria in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion of Iraq
- Compared to Jordan, Syria did not receive foreign grants, and it hosted a larger number of Iraqi refugees who were more disadvantaged economically compared to Iraqis who went to Jordan.
- The large number of refugees had a significant negative effect on Syria, particularly on infrastructure, inflation, property prices and rentals, as well as services, including education, health, and water, leading to a higher fiscal cost.
- Macroeconomic outcomes in Syria in 2003:
  - Real GDP contracted by about 2 percent in 2003, from a growth of about 6 percent in 2002.
  - CPI inflation rose to close to 6 percent, mainly due to the euro appreciation, increases in administered prices, shortages of agricultural goods during the war in Iraq, and increasingly expansionary fiscal policy.
  - The external current account posted a large deficit of about 8 percent of GDP in 2003 because of the large drop in exports, reflecting the disruption in trade with Iraq.

### D. Conclusions: What Can We Learn from the Past?
- Typical macroeconomic effects of conflicts (general expectations):
  - Sharp contraction in output.
  - A spike in inflation.
  - Large fiscal and current account deficits.
  - A drop in foreign reserves, and pressures on the exchange rate—if the country does not have enough reserves to support its exchange rate—and the conflict is long lasting.
  - Depending on the financing of the fiscal deficit, inflation could spiral or total debt could increase sharply (example cited: Lebanon).
  - The financial system is expected to weaken significantly.
  - A longer lasting conflict would have a more negative economic impact and a more prolonged recovery period.

- Recovery speed and extent depend on economic structure:
  - Aggregate output recovered more quickly in oil-rich countries (Kuwait and Iraq).
  - In Lebanon, aggregate supply took longer to catch up with growing aggregate demand; continuing excess demand reflected large fiscal and current account deficits.
  - In Iraq and Kuwait, oil production represented a significant part of aggregate supply; recovery was faster because oilfields were reactivated relatively quickly; with most oil production exported, they achieved current account surpluses in a relatively short period and recovered foreign reserves.

- Typical requirements for post-war recovery based on reviewed conflicts:
  - Large amounts of external assistance, particularly for reconstruction of damaged or destroyed physical, industrial, and socio-economic infrastructure.
  - A post-war policy and institutional set up conducive to a more dynamic economic development model going forward when those are not in place.
  - Insertion in regional and global trade and foreign direct investment flows.
  - Restructuring of the financial sector.
  - Stable security and political conditions.

- Channels for spillovers from conflict countries to neighbors:
  - Flows associated with regional and global integration, including trade, tourism, transportation, and foreign investment.
  - Price effects at the micro level, particularly in real estate markets.
  - Migration of labor and capital.
  - Fiscal pressures from increased social services, such as education and health, and higher military and security spending.
  - Heightened regional uncertainty.

- Factors determining impact and recovery in neighboring countries:
  - Their starting economic conditions.
  - Number and economic status of the refugees they host.
  - How strong their trade, tourism and transportation links are with the country in war.
  - External assistance.

- Suggested directions for further research:
  - Enlarging the sample of countries within and beyond the MENA region to allow economies to be grouped according to more disaggregated characteristic.
  - Assessing the impact of war on socio-economic indicators.

### Appendix highlights — selected country experiences (excerpted)
- Lebanese Civil War (April 13, 1975–October 13, 1990):
  - Pre-1975 Lebanon: low inflation, high growth, large balance of payments surpluses, small fiscal deficits, floating stable and fully convertible currency; strong services sector (banking and finance, tourism, insurance, trade-related services).
  - War impact: destruction of infrastructure and industrial facilities; mass emigration and flight of capital; deterioration of public finances; large fiscal deficits financed primarily through the banking system leading to rapid growth in liquidity, inflationary pressures, high currency substitution; weakened banking system; loss of Lebanon’s role as regional intermediary.
  - Post-conflict recovery:
    - Taif Accord (1989) provided basis for settlement; hostilities ended in 1990.
    - Confidence restored in last quarter of 1992 after parliamentary elections.
    - Government reconstruction programs: National Emergency Reconstruction Program and Horizon 2000 Program.
    - Real GDP recovered gradually reaching its pre-war level in 2010 while real GDP per capita still remains well below its pre-war level.
    - Exchange-rate-based nominal anchor policy adopted starting at the end of 1992, implemented by means of a supportive interest rate policy; high interest rates helped attract large capital inflows and finance reconstruction.
    - Dollarization declined but remained well above its pre-war level.
    - Banking sector consolidation occurred (1990–93 and 1997–98); a 1993 law (expired 1998) encouraged consolidation via limited concessional central bank loans related to goodwill value.
    - Fiscal imbalances: deficit fell from 16 percent of GDP in 1991 to 8 percent in 1993 but rose and remained high thereafter; deficits financed mostly through government papers denominated in Lebanese pounds held primarily by the domestic banking system; public debt increased rapidly.
    - Constraints to recovery: lack of adequate infrastructure, weak institutional framework, shortages of human capital.
  - Spillovers from Lebanese civil war into neighboring countries considered limited due to migration to Gulf and Western countries.

- Gulf War — Kuwait’s invasion by Iraq (August 2, 1990–February 28, 1991):
  - Pre-invasion: economic progress driven by oil; growth in second half of 1980s averaged 5.5 percent per year; prices increased by an average of 1.5 percent per year; oil sector about 60 percent of GDP; expatriates about 70 percent of total population and 85 percent of labor force.
  - War impact: widespread physical damage; large budgetary and balance of payments deficits; halted foreign trade; paralysis of labor market; over 60 percent of oil wells set on fire; damage to oil infrastructure and environmental hazards; communications and electricity-generating plants damaged; production of goods and services virtually halted.
  - Financial impact: disrupted financial contracts; looting of bank assets including Central Bank of Kuwait’s gold holdings and unissued currency; decline in real estate and financial asset values; disruptions to records though some financial databases preserved abroad.
  - Demographic impact: large-scale exodus of Kuwaitis and expatriates, sharp contraction of population by end-1991 affecting supply and demand.
  - Post-conflict recovery:
    - Recovery and reconstruction program initiated March 1991 largely complete by mid-1994.
    - Real GDP per capita was well above its pre-invasion level by end-1993.
    - Oil sector infrastructure quickly restored; financial system rapidly resumed operations; restoration of economic and social infrastructure and services virtually complete by end-1992.
    - Domestic price increases reversed by late 1991; inflation after 1992 was small.
    - Current account resumed surplus position in 1993.
    - Authorities supported private activity by restoring bank balances of nationals to pre-war levels and canceling their consumer debt as banks reopened.
    - Budget developments over 1990/91–1991/92: large revenue shortfalls, exceptional expenditure and deficit levels, substantial draw-downs of government external reserves.
    - Debt settlement program (approved May 1992): buy-out of government bonds of “problem” loans extended to Kuwaiti nationals, effectively shifting private nonperforming debt to public sector obligations; commercial banks achieved strong capital adequacy positions given high proportion of government bonds in their portfolios.

- Spillovers — Impact on Jordan (post-1990 regional crisis context):
  - Following prolonged macroeconomic difficulties in the 1980s, Jordan adopted a medium-term adjustment program covering 1992–2002.
  - Real GDP rebounded by about 14 percent in 1992 on strength in construction, manufacturing, transportation and communications, and agricultural sectors.
  - Return of 300,000 Jordanians from neighboring countries increased housing demand and buoyed construction-related activities.
  - Inflation decelerated to 4 percent in 1992.
  - Unemployment, which rose to a peak of about 20 percent in the aftermath of the regional crisis, declined to 16 percent in 1994 as workers were absorbed in fast-growing labor-intensive sectors such as construction and tourism.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp14100.pdf*

### Appendix Figure 2. Kuwait: Macroeconomic Indicators

### Appendix Figure 2. Kuwait: Macroeconomic Indicators

### Real GDP
- Series shown:
  - "Real GDP per capita index (1989=100)"
  - "Real GDP index (1989=100)"
  - "Real GDP growth, rhs"
- Time span on figure: 1987–2000 (years labeled 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000)
- Axis ranges depicted:
  - Left vertical axis (index/value scale): 0 to 180 (ticks at 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180)
  - Right vertical axis (growth, rhs): -60 to 80 (ticks at -60 -40 -20 0 20 40 60 80)

### External Sector (In percent of GDP, unless otherwise indicated)
- Series shown:
  - "Gross international reserves, rhs (in billions of $)"
  - "Current account balance"
  - "Exports of goods and services"
  - "Imports of goods and services"
- Time span on figure: 1987–2000
- Axis ranges depicted:
  - Left vertical axis (percent of GDP): -300 to 200 (ticks at -300 -250 -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200)
  - Right vertical axis for reserves (in billions of $): 0 to 200 (ticks at 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200)

### Inflation and Exchange Rate (Percentage change)
- Series shown:
  - "Inflation"
  - "E x c h a n g e  r a t e  (+  d e pr e c ia ti on)"
- Time span on figure: 1987–2000
- Axis ranges depicted:
  - Percent change scale: -5 to 20 (ticks at -5 0 5 10 15 20)

### Total Investment (In percent of GDP)
- Time span on figure: 1987–2000
- Axis range depicted: 0 to 45 (ticks at 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45)

### Fiscal Sector (In percent of GDP)
- Series shown:
  - "Total public debt"
  - "Revenue"
  - "Expenditure"
  - "Fiscal balance"
- Time span on figure: 1990–2000 (years labeled 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000)
- Axis ranges depicted:
  - Left vertical axis (percent of GDP for revenue/expenditure/fiscal balance): -200 to 250 (ticks at -200 -150 -100 -50 0 50 100 150 200 250)
  - Right vertical axis for total public debt (percent of GDP or alternate scale): 0 to 30 (ticks at 0 5 10 15 20 25 30)

### Monetary Sector (In percent of GDP)
- Series shown:
  - "Broad money"
  - "Private sector credit"
  - "Deposit dollarization (in percent of total), rhs"
- Time span on figure: 1987–2000
- Axis ranges depicted:
  - Left vertical axis (percent of GDP for broad money and private sector credit): 0 to 250 (ticks at 0 50 100 150 200 250)
  - Right vertical axis for deposit dollarization (percent of total): 0 to 30 (ticks at 0 5 10 15 20 25 30)

*Sources: IMF World Economic Outlook; and Regional Economic Outlook.*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp14100.pdf_