## 1. World War I: Maturity and Currency

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### I. Scope and data overview
- Sample covers thirteen advanced economies over 1900–2011 where available: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.).
- Objectives:
  - Document long-run trends in sovereign central government debt structure by currency, maturity, marketability, and holder structure.
  - Examine composition changes during major debt episodes (World Wars, Great Depression, Great Accumulation, Great Recession) and consolidations.
  - Derive lessons for contemporary debt and fiscal risk management.
- Key measurement dimensions (components expressed in percent of total central government debt, summing to 100):
  - Currency: foreign currency (FCY) vs. local currency (LCY) debt at issuance.
  - Maturity (LCY): short-term (ST) = less than one year (or shortest maturity available at issuance) and medium- and long-term (MLT) = residual LCY debt.
  - Holders: central bank, domestic commercial banks, non-residents, domestic non-bank sector (residual).
  - Marketability: non-marketable vs. marketable debt.
- Data coverage caveats:
  - Near-full coverage on currency and maturity for all sample countries.
  - Central bank holdings mostly from the 1920s; commercial bank holdings largely from the 1950s; non-resident holdings typically not available before mid-century (exceptions: Italy, the U.K., the U.S.).
  - For periods/countries without non-resident holdings data (and for the period through 1970), assumption: foreign investors hold all FCY debt but no LCY debt.
  - Six countries (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.) have long historical series on marketable debt beginning no later than 1936.
- PPPGDP-weighted averages use Maddison (2010).

### II. Quantitative findings: debt levels and composition over 1900–2011
- Debt-to-GDP dynamics:
  - Large spikes during World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II, with subsequent reductions.
  - Debt rose consistently since the 1970s; the Great Recession exacerbated the increase.
- Currency composition:
  - FCY debt < 5 percent of central government debt prior to World War I.
  - FCY debt peaked at 17 percent by the end of the post-World War I consolidation (linked to U.S. loans to European allies).
  - FCY share fell during the Great Depression and World War II; post-World War II spike raised FCY shares to around 8 percent in the late 1950s before declining to negligible levels today (Sweden notable exception).
  - Six of thirteen countries saw FCY debt share rise above 50 percent at some point.
  - Extreme example: foreign-currency debt-to-GDP approached 100 percent in France in the mid 1930s.
- Maturity composition:
  - PPPGDP-weighted average share of domestic MLT debt never below 50 percent over the 111-year sample.
  - Pre-World War I: governments issued over 90 percent of debt as domestic MLT securities.
  - Domestic MLT share fell dramatically during World War I, rebounded to about 80 percent in the late 1930s, plunged to about 64 percent during World War II, continued to fall until 1960, then recovered gradually to pre-World War II peaks by the mid-1990s (interrupted temporarily by the Great Recession).
  - Short-term domestic debt (share relative to GDP):
    - Averaged 12 percent of GDP over the sample.
    - Exceeded 40 percent of GDP in seven countries at some point (mostly during World War II).
    - Sustained increase from mid-1970s through mid-1990s: rose from 9 percent of GDP to 15 percent of GDP.
- Marketability:
  - Almost all central government debt was marketable prior to World War I.
  - Marketable share declined during post-World War I consolidation and fell to as low as around 55 percent during and after World War II.
  - Marketable debt recovered starting mid-1970s and stands at about 80 percent of total central government debt today.
- Holders:
  - Central bank holdings averaged about 5 percent of GDP over the sample; peaked at 19 percent of GDP during World War II.
  - Central bank share rose substantially from the early 1930s, reached 17 percent and stayed broadly at that level until the mid-1970s; then fell to about 6 percent in the run-up to the Great Recession.
  - Central bank holdings rose across almost all countries during World War II (notably Belgium, France, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S.).
  - Non-resident holdings increased from 2 percent of GDP in the mid-1970s to 29 percent of GDP in 2011.
  - Drivers of rising non-resident holdings: financial innovation, globalization since the 1970s/1980s, reduced capital controls, improved debt management, independent central banks committed to low inflation.
  - Domestic commercial banks typically increased holdings during wars and the 1970s, offsetting declines in the domestic non-bank sector.

### III. Episode-specific structural changes
- World War I:
  - Sharp decrease in domestic MLT share; risk transferred from voluntary investors to the issuing government.
  - Shortfall compensated by increases in FCY debt and/or domestic ST debt; banking system emerged as a source of short-term finance.
  - Example: France’s domestic MLT share fell from 94 percent in 1913 to 41 percent in 1919.
- Great Depression:
  - Increases in central/commercial bank holdings for Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S.
  - Non-resident holdings fell for all but one country.
  - No uniform pattern in issuance maturity across countries.
- World War II:
  - Domestic MLT share fell; not offset by FCY debt increases.
  - Increased central bank-held debt and non-marketable debt—signs of financial repression.
  - Example central bank share rises: Belgium from 3 percent in 1938 to 48 percent in 1945; Italy from 5 percent to 45 percent in same period.
- Post-World War I consolidations:
  - On average, a 7 percentage-point increase in domestic MLT share at the expense of domestic ST debt.
  - FCY share continued to grow slightly via U.S. loans for relief and reconstruction.
- Post-World War II consolidations:
  - Two broad country groups emerged:
    - Group 1 (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, U.S.): central bank-held and non-marketable debt shares rose on average; domestic MLT share declined.
    - Group 2 (Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, U.K.): central bank-held and non-marketable debt shares fell on average; maturity lengthened.
  - Greater inflation intensity correlated with larger debt ratio declines and greater reliance on non-market interventions.
- The Great Accumulation (1975–2005):
  - Lengthening of maturities, greater marketability, stronger non-resident participation.
  - Sovereign debt increased at a weighted average of 3 percentage points of GDP per year (the slowest pace of accumulation in sample).
  - Innovations: index-linked instruments, higher-liquidity “benchmark” securities.
- The Great Recession (2007 onward):
  - Little change in maturity or currency composition overall.
  - Clear rise in the banking system’s holdings and an increase in central bank purchases of sovereign debt in secondary markets (quantitative easing).
  - Decline in domestic non-bank sector share; large example: U.K. non-bank share fell by 33 percentage points, absorbed mainly by central bank and domestic banks.
  - Euro zone crisis countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal) showed shifts toward shorter maturity and foreign currency issuance in flow data.

### IV. Valuation and exchange-rate effects
- Exchange-rate valuation effects substantially contributed to observed FCY-debt rises during 1914–1945:
  - France (1925): three-fourths of the 16 percent of GDP rise in FCY debt was valuation effect of a 20 percent real depreciation.
  - Italy (1913–20): FCY debt grew by 88 percent of GDP, two thirds of which reflected a 130 percent cumulative real depreciation.

### V. Interpretation framework: portfolio balance and market-clearing constraints
- Framework components:
  - Sovereign debt manager supplies debt to meet financing needs, choosing composition based on cost-risk trade-offs, monetary policy, market development, and investor demand.
  - Investor demand reflects return-risk trade-offs, regulatory requirements, preferred-habitat preferences, and desire for geographic diversification; expected returns adjust when markets clear.
- When markets do not clear because sovereign unwilling to pay market-clearing rates or private sector caps volume, sovereign responses include:
  - Impose interest rate ceilings.
  - Place debt with domestic central bank.
  - Borrow from official lenders abroad.
  - Use non-marketable debt for earmarked borrowing from designated investor classes.
- Large composition shifts driven by:
  - Supply shocks (wars, deep downturns) forcing acceptance of shorter maturity or FCY denomination or resort to financial repression.
  - Demand-side shifts (post-1971 financial innovation, globalization, capital liberalization) increasing foreign ownership of LCY debt.
  - Structural political/military crises, financial turmoil, financial liberalization.

### VI. Implications for debt management and policy
- Debt composition matters for:
  - Minimizing debt servicing cost at acceptable refinancing/rollover risk.
  - Reducing fiscal vulnerabilities and crisis risk (currency denomination, maturity, holder structure).
  - Tax-smoothing objectives and incentives to reduce debt (via inflation, financial repression, or default); maturity and ownership composition influence time-consistency and incentive problems.
- Practical considerations:
  - Preference for relatively long average maturity to balance cost and refinancing risk.
  - Preference for marketable, LCY-denominated debt and diversified investor base, up to point where additional risk transfer raises debt service cost.
  - In extreme financing stress, non-marketable issuance, central bank financing, or other non-market interventions have been observed as necessary or cost-effective.
- Historical lessons:
  - No single “optimal” debt composition across regimes; debt managers should weigh cost-risk trade-offs in light of market structure and market-clearing constraints.
  - Reliance on central bank appetite for sovereign paper is risky; improving macro conditions could reverse central bank holdings.
  - Financial repression strategies are less feasible today given modern debt structures: 36 percent of debt held by non-residents (compared with 3 percent at end-World War II), 81 percent of debt marketable (compared with 75 percent in 1945).

### VII. Empirical patterns linking central bank holdings and maturity
- On a PPPGDP-weighted basis, domestic MLT debt and central bank holdings moved together until the Great Depression.
- A strong inverse relationship emerged in the late 1930s as central banks held more government debt; this inverse relationship held until the 1990s.
- By the 1990s, central bank holdings reached their lowest share of total debt since 1938 due to central bank independence and prohibitions on monetary financing.
- Since then, the relationship between domestic MLT debt and central bank holdings appears to have resumed the positive correlation that held pre-Great Depression.
- The recent spike in central bank holdings has not yet had permanent deleterious effects on the maturity profile; persistence uncertain.

### VIII. Boxed case studies and lessons
- Box 1 — Financial Innovation in Belgium and France, 1976-1998:
  - France adopted innovations earlier (early to mid-1980s); Belgium lagged by more than half a decade.
  - Innovations: standardized bills and bonds via competitive auctions, primary dealer arrangements, lines of linear bonds (successive tranches with same coupon and maturity).
  - Outcomes: enhanced liquidity, stimulated foreign investor interest, shifted ownership composition beyond sovereign’s unilateral choice.
  - During the Great Recession both countries increased debt without major composition changes, suggesting resilience from financial innovation.
  - Historical consolidation strategies:
    - Strategy A: rely on marketable instruments, non-resident holders, maturity lengthening.
    - Strategy B: rely on non-marketable debt, captive domestic investors, maturity shortening, higher inflation (financial repression).
  - Feasibility and risks of financial repression today:
    - Surprising inflation unlikely within current regimes; compelled regulatory measures to force bank holdings would not reduce debt unless real rates fall and could create sovereign-bank feedback loops.
- Box 2 — Debt Structure, Inflation, and the Central Bank: Italy and the United States:
  - Italy:
    - Early 1970s inflation spike correlated with increased central bank holdings; 1976 central bank holdings reached a post-World War II peak coinciding with the “divorce” between central bank and treasury.
    - Inflation did not fall below 5 percent until the late 1980s; structural debt composition changes took hold only by mid-1990s.
    - Combined share of domestic ST and variable rate LT debt declined even later.
  - United States:
    - Peak central bank holdings: 16.3 percent in 1973; historical average: 8.4 percent.
    - Inflation fell into lower single digits only in 1983; permanent decline in domestic ST debt from mid-1980s.
  - Broader insights:
    - Great Recession produced minor composition changes relative to historical surges.
    - Financial innovation and globalization increased resilience but unknowns remain regarding normalization of long-term rates and evolving bank regulation.
    - Reliance on central banks to hold sovereign paper is not a sustainable fiscal strategy.

### IX. Research agenda and data needs
- Recommended further analyses:
  - Systematic statistical and econometric analysis of links between sovereign debt composition and factors influencing debt supply and demand, including yields.
  - Detailed country case studies of debt management policies and their impact on composition.
  - In-depth analyses of particular episodes and the connection between debt composition and subsequent financial crises.
- Data improvements called for:
  - Extend dataset to developing economies and other advanced economies affected by the Great Recession.
  - Improve national-source detail and coverage for ownership, marketability, currency, and maturity dimensions.

*Source: _wp14162 (authors’ calculations and discussion as presented in the source document).*

### 1. World War I: Maturity and Currency ..................................................................................

### 1. World War I: Maturity and Currency

### Major themes (chapter headings in this content unit)
- World War I: Maturity and Currency
- World War II: Maturity, Currency, and Marketability
- The Great Accumulation: Maturity, Holders, and Marketability
- The Great Recession: Holders
- Post-World War I Consolidation: Issuance and Currency
- Post-World War II Consolidation: Maturity, Holders, and Marketability
- The Great Moderation: Issuance and Holders
- Sovereign Debt Composition, Past and Present

### Figures referenced in this content unit
- Debt-to-GDP Ratio in Advanced Economies, 1900-2011
- Share of Foreign Currency Debt in Central Government Debt, 1900-2011
- Share of Domestic Medium- and Long-term Debt in  
  Central Government Debt, 1900-2011
- Share of Marketable Debt in Central Government Debt, 1900-2011
- Holder Composition of Central Government Debt, 1900-2011
- Domestic MLT Debt and Central Bank Holdings, 1900-2011

### Boxes referenced in this content unit
- Financial Innovation in Belgium and France, 1976-1998
- Debt Structure, Inflation, and the Central Bank: A Tale of Two Countries

*Source: _wp14162 - 1. World War I: Maturity and Currency ..................................................................................*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp14162 - References

### I. Introduction and scope
- Study covers sovereign central government debt structure for thirteen advanced economies over the 20th century and into the early 21st century (sample spans 1900–2011 where available).
- Countries in sample: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom (U.K.), and the United States (U.S.).
- Objectives:
  - Document long-run trends in sovereign debt structure by currency of issuance, maturity, marketability, and holder structure.
  - Examine debt composition changes during major episodes of debt accumulation (two World Wars and three deep global downturns) and subsequent consolidations.
  - Draw lessons for contemporary debt management and fiscal risk management.

### II. Data, definitions, and dimensions
- Data sources: historical general accounts, statistical yearbooks, debt management reports, League of Nations/UN/OECD/IMF compilations (see appendix in source for full accounting).
- Key dimensions and how they are measured (components expressed in percent of total central government debt, summing to 100):
  - Currency: foreign currency (FCY) vs. local currency (LCY) debt at issuance.
  - Maturity (LCY): short-term (ST) = less than one year (or shortest maturity available at issuance) and medium- and long-term (MLT) = residual LCY debt.
  - Holders: central bank, domestic commercial banks, non-residents, and domestic non-bank sector (domestic non-bank = residual).
  - Marketability: non-marketable vs. marketable debt.
- Data coverage caveats:
  - Near-full coverage on currency and maturity dimensions for all sample countries.
  - Central bank holdings data mostly available from the 1920s; commercial bank holdings largely from the 1950s; non-resident holdings typically not available before mid-century (exceptions: Italy, the U.K., the U.S.).
  - For periods/countries without non-resident holdings data (and for the period through 1970), assumption used: foreign investors hold all the foreign currency debt but no domestic currency debt.
  - Six countries (Canada, Germany, Italy, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S.) have long historical series on marketable debt beginning no later than 1936.
- Weighted averages: PPPGDP-weighted averages computed using PPPGDP data from Maddison (2010).

### III. Major historical patterns and quantitative findings
- General debt-level context:
  - Debt-to-GDP in advanced economies shows large spikes during World War I, the Great Depression, and World War II, with subsequent reductions; debt rose consistently since the 1970s and the Great Recession exacerbated the increase.
- Currency composition:
  - FCY debt accounted for less than 5 percent of central government debt prior to World War I.
  - FCY debt climbed to a peak share of 17 percent by the end of the post-World War I consolidation (linked to U.S. loans to European allies).
  - FCY share fell during the Great Depression and World War II; a post-World War II spike (notably Germany) raised FCY shares to around 8 percent in the late 1950s before declining to a negligible level today (Sweden is a notable exception with a persistent FCY feature).
  - Six of the thirteen countries saw FCY debt share rise above 50 percent at some point during the sample period.
  - Example extreme: the ratio of foreign-currency debt-to-GDP approached 100 percent in France in the mid 1930s.
- Maturity composition (domestic MLT vs. ST):
  - PPPGDP-weighted average share of domestic MLT debt never falls below 50 percent over the 111-year sample.
  - Pre-World War I: governments issued over 90 percent of debt as domestic MLT securities.
  - Domestic MLT share fell dramatically during World War I, rebounded to about 80 percent in the late 1930s, plunged to about 64 percent during World War II, continued to fall until 1960, then recovered gradually to pre-World War II peaks by the mid-1990s (interrupted temporarily by the Great Recession).
  - Short-term domestic debt (share relative to GDP):
    - Averaged 12 percent of GDP over the sample.
    - Exceeded 40 percent of GDP in seven countries at some point (mostly during World War II).
    - Sustained increase from mid-1970s through mid-1990s: rose from 9 percent of GDP to 15 percent of GDP.
- Marketability:
  - Almost all central government debt was marketable prior to World War I.
  - Marketable share declined during the post-World War I consolidation and fell to as low as around 55 percent during and after World War II (era of financial repression and captive markets).
  - Marketable debt share recovered starting mid-1970s and stands at about 80 percent of total central government debt today (trend not reversed by the Great Recession).
- Holders and holder substitutions:
  - Domestic commercial banks typically increased their share of holdings during wars and the “tough” 1970s, often offsetting declines in the domestic non-bank sector’s participation.
  - Central bank holdings:
    - Averaged about 5 percent of GDP over the sample.
    - Peaked at 19 percent of GDP during World War II.
    - Share of debt held by central banks rose substantially from the early 1930s, reached 17 percent and stayed broadly at that level until the mid-1970s; then fell to about 6 percent in the run up to the Great Recession.
    - Central bank holdings rose across almost all countries during World War II, particularly in Belgium, France, Italy, the U.K., and the U.S.
  - Non-resident holdings:
    - Ratio increased from 2 percent of GDP in the mid-1970s to 29 percent of GDP in 2011 (a rising trend since the “Great Accumulation”).
    - Drivers include financial innovation and globalization since the 1970s/1980s, reduced capital controls, improved debt management, and independent central banks committed to low inflation.
- Cross-sectional and country-specific notes:
  - Reserve currency status matters: the U.K. and the U.S. showed near-100 percent domestic MLT shares in earlier years and never fell below 50 percent.
  - Germany’s 1923 hyperinflation wiped out MLT debt and sharply affected its MLT share.
  - The 1953 London Agreement contributed to a temporary rise in German FCY liabilities (more than 40 percent in 1953, peaking at more than 45 percent in 1956) followed by rapid decline.

### IV. Interpretation framework and mechanisms
- Portfolio balance framework used to interpret major changes:
  - Sovereign debt manager supplies debt to cover financing needs driven by policy and economic conditions; chooses composition considering cost-risk trade-offs, monetary policy and financial market development, and investor demand.
  - Investor demand reflects return-risk trade-offs, regulatory requirements, preferred-habitat preferences, and desire for geographical diversification; expected returns adjust when markets clear.
  - When markets do not clear (sovereign unwilling to pay market-clearing rates or private sector caps volume), sovereign can:
    - Impose interest rate ceilings,
    - Place debt with the domestic central bank,
    - Borrow from official lenders abroad,
    - Use non-marketable debt for earmarked borrowing from designated investor classes.
  - The paper focuses on non-yield factors that influence debt supply and demand, offering a unified interpretation in terms of large increases in supply or demand whether markets clear or not.
- Drivers of large composition shifts:
  - Supply-driven debt surges (wars, deep downturns) often forced sovereigns to accept less favorable conditions (shorter maturity, FCY denomination) or resort to financial repression.
  - Demand-side shifts in the post-1971 era (financial innovation and globalization, reduced capital controls) increased foreign ownership of sovereign domestic-currency debt.
  - Structural shifts (political/military crises, deep economic/financial turmoil, financial innovation and liberalization) can generate large and sudden changes in debt composition.

### V. Implications for debt management and policy considerations
- Debt composition matters for:
  - Debt servicing cost minimization at acceptable refinancing/rollover risk.
  - Reducing broader fiscal vulnerabilities and crisis risk (e.g., currency denomination, maturity, holder structure).
  - Tax-smoothing objectives and incentives to reduce debt via inflation, financial repression, or default; maturity and ownership composition influence time-consistency and incentive problems.
- Practical debt management considerations highlighted:
  - Preference for relatively long average maturity to balance cost and refinancing risk.
  - Preference for marketable, LCY-denominated debt and diversified investor base, up to the point where additional risk transfer raises debt service cost.
  - In extreme financing stress episodes, non-marketable issuance, central bank financing, or other non-market interventions were observed as cost-effective or necessary.
- Historical experience suggests:
  - The nature of shocks, monetary policy stance, financial market conditions, and investor composition all shape what constitutes a prudent debt composition choice at any time.
  - No single “optimal” debt composition exists across all regimes; debt managers should weigh cost-risk trade-offs in light of financial market structure and possible market-clearing constraints.

*Source: _wp14162 (excerpts), Authors’ calculations and discussion as presented in the source document.*

### introduction of the euro, which led to the de facto elimination of currency risk within the

### _wp14162 - introduction of the euro, which led to the de facto elimination of currency risk within the

### Holder composition and long-run trends
- China’s holdings of U.S. treasury securities rose from 10 percent of total foreign holding in 2003 to 26 percent by 2010.
- The period labeled the “Great (Debt) Accumulation” covers the early-1970s till the mid-2000s, during which public debt (in PPPGDP-weighted average terms) of advanced economies rose by about 40 percentage points.
- Figures present PPPGDP-weighted averages for:
  - Central bank-held debt (LHS) and Debt ratio (RHS) across 1900–2011.
  - Non-resident-held debt (LHS) and Debt ratio (RHS) across 1900–2011.
  - Commercial bank-held debt (LHS) and Debt ratio (RHS) across 1900–2011.

### Debt structure changes during large debt increases and decreases (overview)
- Major global events around which debt expansions and contractions coalesced: World Wars I and II (1914–18 and 1939–45), the Great Depression (1929–34), the “Great Accumulation” (1975–2005), the Great Recession (2007 onward), and subsequent debt consolidations.
- Most noteworthy debt-structure shifts occurred when the debt stock itself was expanding or contracting substantially.
- Country-level episodes analyzed are a sub-sample reflecting data availability and episode nature.

### World Wars I and II, and the Great Depression: holder and maturity shifts
- World War I:
  - Decrease in the share of domestic MLT debt, representing a transfer of risk from voluntary investors to the issuing government.
  - Shortfall often compensated by increases in foreign currency debt and/or domestic ST debt, with the banking system emerging as a source of short-term finance.
  - Example: France’s share of domestic MLT debt fell from 94 percent in 1913 to 41 percent in 1919.
- World War II:
  - Similar decrease in domestic MLT share, but not offset by foreign-currency debt increases (consistent with compressed world trade and capital flows).
  - Increased shares of central bank-held debt and non-marketable debt—symptoms of “financial repression.”
  - Example central bank share rises: Belgium from 3 percent in 1938 to 48 percent in 1945; Italy from 5 percent to 45 percent in the same period.
- Great Depression:
  - Increases in central/commercial bank holdings observed for Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, the U.K., and the U.S.
  - Non-resident holdings fell for all but one country.
  - No clear pattern in issuance maturity: some countries saw declines in domestic MLT share (Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, the U.K., the U.S.), others saw increases (Belgium, France, Italy, Japan, Spain).
- Exchange-rate valuation effects contributed to debt surges during 1914–1945:
  - Example: In France (1925), three-fourth of the 16 percent of GDP rise in foreign currency debt was the valuation effect of a 20 percent real depreciation.
  - Italy (1913–20): foreign currency debt grew by 88 percent of GDP, two third of which reflected a 130 percent cumulative real depreciation.

### The Great Accumulation (1975–2005): maturity lengthening, marketability, and non-resident participation
- The Great Accumulation saw:
  - Lengthening debt maturities.
  - Greater marketability of sovereign debt.
  - Stronger non-resident participation.
- Sovereigns enhanced marketability and liquidity, and institutional frameworks for debt and inflation management strengthened (including emergence of independent central banks).
- Demand factors: higher real interest rates on sovereign debt, financial liberalization/global capital mobility, rising appetite for long-dated instruments from pension funds and insurance companies.
- These structural changes allowed financing rising debts via higher domestic MLT debt and non-resident holdings while reducing reliance on central banks and financial repression.
- Sovereign debt during this episode exhibited the slowest pace of accumulation in the sample period, increasing at a weighted average of 3 percentage points of GDP per year.
- Innovations noted: issuance of index-linked instruments and higher-liquidity “benchmark” securities.

### The Great Recession (2007 onward): holder shifts and limited structural change
- The Great Recession has overall not significantly altered maturity or currency structure of debt in the sample countries, but:
  - Clear rise in the share of the banking system’s holdings.
  - Additional debt supply from widening deficits and banking sector support was partially met by additional demand from central banks acquiring own-government debt in the secondary market to facilitate monetary policy transmission and achieve quantitative easing.
  - “Flight to safety” sustained demand from domestic commercial banks and non-residents despite very low yields.
- Holder-pattern observations:
  - Increases in holdings of commercial banks, central banks, and, to a lesser extent, non-residents.
  - Decline in the share held by the non-bank domestic sector (largest decline observed in the United Kingdom: a 33 percentage-point drop, absorbed mainly by the central bank and domestic banking sector).
- Note: In euro zone crisis countries (Cyprus, Greece, Ireland, Portugal) flow data show shifts toward shorter maturity and foreign currency issuance.

### Mechanisms and interpretations
- During large debt increases, relative sizes of debt components change most when total debt expands/contracts sharply.
- Demand-side factors (search for safe assets, contractual saving sector appetite) and supply-side changes (sovereign efforts to improve marketability, institutional reforms) jointly shaped observed shifts.
- Financial repression—via central bank and non-marketable debt—played a pronounced role in the World War II period.
- Exchange-rate movements and valuation effects can account for sizable fractions of observed foreign-currency debt increases during 1914–1945.

*Source: Authors’ calculations and analysis in the provided content.*

### Box 1. Financial Innovation in Belgium and France, 1976-1998

### Box 1. Financial Innovation in Belgium and France, 1976-1998

### Belgium and France: patterns, timing, and market innovations
- Belgium (first decade of the Great Accumulation, highlighted in pink):
  - experienced rapid debt growth accompanied by a shortening of the maturity profile, an increase in foreign currency debt, and a slight uptick in central bank holdings.
  - funding pressures delayed the introduction of financial innovation in the domestic sovereign debt market (relative to France).
- France:
  - went through a more gradual debt increase during the Great Accumulation.
  - saw the forces of financial innovation introduced in the early to mid-1980s play out in full.
- Common outcomes in both countries, with Belgium lagging France by more than half a decade:
  - standardized bills and bonds issued through competitive auctions following a pre-announced schedule and using a primary dealer arrangement replaced instruments tailored to particular investor groups and issued using different techniques.
  - lines of linear bonds were introduced: each line consisted of several successive tranches of straight bullet bonds with the same characteristics, including the coupon and the maturity.
  - these innovations greatly enhanced the liquidity and efficiency of the secondary markets for government bills and bonds, and stimulated foreign investor interest in these markets (a positive demand shift).
  - ownership composition of the debt moved beyond the sovereign’s unilateral choice.
- During the Great Recession (highlighted in yellow):
  - both countries experienced large debt increases without major changes to debt composition, suggesting financial innovation has made the debt structure more resilient.

### Historical patterns of debt-structure change across consolidation episodes
- Post-World War I consolidations:
  - sovereigns reverted, to varying extents, to pre-war funding orthodoxy.
  - on average, a 7 percentage-point increase in the share of domestic MLT debt occurred, at the expense of domestic ST debt.
  - the share of foreign currency debt continued to grow slightly as foreign loans from the U.S. were channeled to post-war relief and reconstruction.
- Debt decreases following the Great Depression:
  - characterized by a decline in the share of foreign currency debt as earlier war-related debts fell due or were forgiven.
  - decline in foreign currency debt was largely mirrored by an increase in domestic ST debt with the emergence of the banking sector as a source of financing.
  - marketable debt declined as a share of total debt (e.g., Italy and the U.K. declines of 16 and 4 percentage points, respectively).
  - non-residents’ holdings of central government debt fell.
- Post-World War II consolidations:
  - largest and often most rapid consolidations; heterogeneous changes across countries.
  - many reductions occurred with low or negative real interest rates and strong growth; negative real rates reflected steady relatively high inflation and financial repression in some countries.
  - two broad groups observed:
    - Group 1 (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, U.S.): shares of central bank-held and non-marketable debt rose, on average; share of domestic MLT debt declined.
    - Group 2 (Australia, Belgium, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, U.K.): central bank-held and non-marketable debt shares fell, on average; maturity lengthening observed.
  - greater inflation intensity in the first group where debt ratio fell more; associated with:
    - greater reliance on distortionary non-market interventions to extract involuntary demand for debt.
    - shortening of debt maturities, reflecting reduced voluntary investor demand for longer-dated paper.
  - tolerance for higher inflation reflected institutional arrangements coordinating fiscal and monetary policies and broader monetary policy choices, not primarily explicit sovereign debt reduction objectives.
- Great Moderation consolidations:
  - reductions were slower than after World War II; financial repression generally avoided and interest-growth differentials less favorable.
  - in a number of countries (Australia, Belgium, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden) consolidation had positive financial market confidence effects, supporting investor demand and a large increase in the share of domestic MLT debt, increasingly held by non-residents.
  - Canada and the U.S.: share of domestic MLT debt changed little; Canada is the only country that saw a drop in the non-resident share.
  - Netherlands and U.K.: share of domestic MLT debt decreased, potentially reflecting supply-side maturity shortening via active debt management.
  - general reduction in central bank holdings in both groups, consistent with monetary policy reforms.

### What this history implies for debt-reduction prospects today
- Two broad historical debt-reduction strategies:
  - Strategy A: increase reliance on marketable instruments and non-resident holders, accompanied by maturity lengthening.
  - Strategy B: rely on a larger share of non-marketable debt, increase holdings by captive domestic investors, shorten maturity profile, and use higher inflation (financial repression).
- Feasibility of financial repression today:
  - financial repression policies are unlikely to be similarly amenable today as after World War II because advanced economies’ debt structures differ markedly:
    - 36 percent of debt is now held by non-residents (compared with 3 percent at end-World War II).
    - 81 percent of debt is marketable (compared with 75 percent in 1945).
  - compelled regulatory measures to force banks to hold larger amounts of domestic government debt:
    - will not reduce the debt burden unless real interest rates can be brought down, possibly through surprise inflation.
    - can increase bank exposure to sovereign risk and create negative feedback loops between sovereign and banks, as observed during the euro zone crisis.
    - global nature of modern financial institutions and regulatory arbitrage complicate cross-border coordination.
- Surprise inflation as an alternative:
  - with the majority of sovereign debt issued in domestic MLT securities and inflation expectations well anchored, an unexpected inflation burst could reduce the real value of debt.
  - important limitations and costs:
    - resort to material surprise inflation is near-impossible within current globally-accepted regimes of open capital accounts and price stability (anchor for monetary policy).
    - surprise inflation is not a free lunch: either accept permanently higher inflation with direct costs to efficiency and investment, or accept a painful disinflation process to return to low inflation (e.g., Fischer, 1994; Bordo and Orphanides, 2013).
    - debt liquidation through inflation can entail a permanent hidden “cost” in terms of departure from a less risky debt structure; countries where domestic MLT debt declined experienced, on average, higher annual rates of inflation following the war, and in some cases hyperinflation (Italy, Japan).
    - moving back to a less risky structure (long-term domestic-currency fixed-rate debt) after high inflation can take many years (Italian example referenced).
- Central bank holdings and domestic MLT debt relationship (1900–2011):
  - on a PPPGDP-weighted basis, average shares of domestic MLT debt and central bank holdings moved somewhat in tandem until the Great Depression.
  - a strong inverse relationship emerged in the late 1930s when central banks began to hold more government debt; this inverse relationship held until the 1990s.
  - by the 1990s, central bank holdings reached their lowest share of total debt since 1938 due to measures strengthening central bank independence and prohibiting monetary financing.
  - since then, the relationship between domestic MLT debt and central bank holdings appears to have resumed the positive correlation that held pre-Great Depression.
  - the recent spike in central bank holdings has not yet had permanent deleterious effects on the maturity profile, but persistence of that outcome is uncertain.

*Source: Authors’ calculations (from Box 1. Financial Innovation in Belgium and France, 1976-1998).*

### Box 2. Debt Structure, Inflation, and the Central Bank: A Tale of Two Countries

### Box 2. Debt Structure, Inflation, and the Central Bank: A Tale of Two Countries

### Italy: inflation, central bank holdings, and debt composition
- Large upward spike in inflation in the early 1970s was correlated with an increase in the share of the central bank’s holdings of debt.
- In 1976, central bank holdings reached a post-World War II peak; this period coincided with the “divorce” between the central bank and the treasury.
- Even after the central bank’s share of sovereign debt declined, there was a long adjustment period during which inflation fell:
  - Inflation did not fall below 5 percent until the late 1980s.
  - Structural debt composition changes visible in other countries did not take hold until the mid-1990s.
- The combined share of domestic ST and variable rate LT debt, instruments that offer protection against inflation shocks, took even longer to decline than central bank holdings.

### United States: a similar trajectory at a different scale
- The share of central bank holdings increased at a more gradual pace and peaked at a lower level than in Italy:
  - Peak central bank holdings: 16.3 percent in 1973.
  - Historical average central bank holdings: 8.4 percent.
- The higher-than-average central bank share was associated with higher and more volatile inflation.
- A prolonged adjustment followed the decline in the central bank’s share beginning in 1974:
  - Inflation only fell into the lower single digits in 1983.
  - A permanent decline in the share of domestic ST debt only materialized from the mid-1980s.

### Broader findings on debt composition and the Great Recession
- Compared with past debt surges, debt composition changes during the Great Recession were overall minor in the advanced economies in the sample.
- Financial innovation and financial globalization since the 1980s may have increased resilience of sovereign debt composition to shocks, but key unknowns remain:
  - Uncertainty about the consequences of the anticipated normalization of long-term interest rates.
  - The regulatory environment for banks continues to evolve, possibly less supportive of high demand by banks for sovereign debt globally.
  - Little appetite overall for further advancing financial innovation and globalization processes that contributed to demand shifts during the Great Moderation.
- One notable change during the Great Recession: an increase in the share of central bank holdings in some countries, observed most notably in Japan, the U.K., and the U.S.:
  - This increase was a by-product of independent central bankers’ attempts to prevent severe deflation, rather than to facilitate fiscal sustainability.

### Policy implications and risks
- Two broad debt-reduction strategies observed historically:
  - Raising the share of domestic MLT debt and that of debt in foreign currency and/or held by non-residents.
  - Relying on financial repression, surprise inflation, and a more pronounced role for the central bank.
- Preliminary analysis suggests the second set of policies can reduce the overall debt stock but may impose additional costs, including:
  - A riskier structure of debt.
  - Potential fiscal risks associated with that riskier structure.
- Sovereigns would be ill-advised to rely on central banks’ continued appetite for sovereign paper should economic conditions improve and warrant an off-loading of government securities from bloated central bank balance sheets.
- The fiscal challenge advanced economies face today is driven by:
  - Rising structural spending,
  - Stretched balance sheets,
  - Unfavorable long-term growth prospects.
- Reliance on favorable debt structure changes or unorthodox policies would fetch limited returns and could be counterproductive.

### Research agenda and open questions
- More work remains on sovereign debt structure; current sample limitations:
  - Focus on economies with readily available long-run data excludes developing economies and some advanced economies affected greatly during the Great Recession.
  - Shorter-period data for excluded countries could be examined.
- Recommended further analyses:
  - Systematic statistical and econometric analysis of links between sovereign debt composition and factors influencing debt supply and demand, including yields.
  - Detailed country case studies of debt management policies over time and their impact on debt composition.
  - In-depth analysis of particular episodes.
  - Examination of the connection between debt composition and subsequent financial crisis, and implications for fiscal risk management.
- Initial analysis based on the paper’s data suggests that changes in debt composition considered to increase exposure to crisis risk, such as maturity shortening, indeed could have these consequences.
- Call for improved data:
  - Motivation for officials, economic historians and statisticians worldwide to improve the dataset, extend it to other countries, and include more detailed national-source information.

*Source: _wp14162 - Box 2. Debt Structure, Inflation, and the Central Bank: A Tale of Two Countries*

### REFERENCES

### _wp14162 - REFERENCES

### References (selected entries)
- Abbas, S.M.A., N. Belhocine, A. El-Ganainy, and M. Horton, 2011, “Historical Patterns and Dynamics of Public Debt—Evidence From a New Database,” IMF Economic Review, Vol. 59, No. 4, pp. 717-742.
- Abbas, S.M.A., N. Belhocine, A. El-Ganainy, and A. Weber, 2014, “Current Crisis in Historical Perspective,” in C. Cottarelli, P. Gerson, and A. Senhadji, editors, Post-Crisis Fiscal Policy, pp. 161-191 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
- Agell, J., B. Friedman, and M. Persson, 1992, Does Debt Management Matter (Oxford: Clarendon Press).
- Alesina, A., 1988, “The End of Large Public Debts,” in F. Giavazzi and L. Spaventa, editors, High Public Debt: The Italian Experience, pp. 34-79 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press).
- Allen, W., 2012, “Government Debt Management and Monetary Policy in Britain since 1919,” Cass Business School Centre for Banking Research Working Paper 02/12 (London: Cass Business School). Available via the Internet: http://www.cass.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0014/132503/CBR-WP02-12.pdf .
- Andritzky, J.R., 2012, “Government Bonds and Their Investors: What Are the Facts and Do They Matter?” IMF Working Paper No. 12/158 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund). Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26004.0 .
- Arslanalp, S., and T. Tsuda, 2012, “Tracking Global Demand for Advanced Economy Sovereign Debt,” IMF Working Paper No. 12/284 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund). Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40135.0 .
- Borensztein, E., M. Chamon, O. Jeanne, P. Mauro, and J. Zettelmeyer, 2004, “Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention,” IMF Occasional Paper No. 237 (Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund).
- Debrun, X. and T. Kinda, 2013, “That Squeezing Feeling: The Interest Burden and Public Debt Stabilization,” IMF Working Paper No. 13/125. Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40567.0 .
- Dell’Erba, S., T. Mattina and A. Roitman, 2013, “Pressure or Prudence? Tales of Market Pressure and Fiscal Adjustment,” IMF Working Paper No. 13/170 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund). Available via the Internet at http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=40797.0 .
- Dippelsman, R., C. Dziobek, and C. Guitiérrez Mangas, 2012, “What Lies Beneath: The Statistical Definition of Public Sector Debt. An Overview of the Coverage of Public Sector Debt for 61 countries,” IMF Staff Discussion Note No. 12/09 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund). Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26101.0 .
- Eichengreen, B., 1996, Globalizing Capital: A History of the International Monetary System, (Princeton: Princeton University Press).
- Hausmann, R., B. Eichengreen and U. Panizza, 2003, “Currency Mismatches, Debt Intolerance and Original Sin: Why They Are Not the Same and Why it Matters,” NBER Working Paper No. 10036 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- IMF, issued since 1948, International Financial Statistics (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund).
- IMF, 2013, “Debt Sustainability Analysis for Market-Access Countries.” Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/dsa/mac.htm.
- IMF and World Bank, 2000, “Guidelines for Public Debt Management.” Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/pdebt/2000/eng/intro.htm.
- Maddison, A., 2010, Statistics on World Population, GDP, and Per Capita GDP, 1-2008 AD. Available via the Internet: http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/oriindex.htm .
- Missale, A., 1999, Public Debt Management (Oxford: Oxford University Press).
- Missale, A., 2012, “Sovereign Debt Management and Fiscal Vulnerabilities,” BIS Papers No. 65, “Threat of Fiscal Dominance,” pp. 157-176 (Basel: Bank for International Settlements).
- Noll, F., 2014, A Guide to Securities Issued by the United States Government: 1861-1975. Available via the Internet: www.franklinnoll.com/Treasury-Securities-Knowledgebase.html .
- OECD, 2002a, OECD Public Debt Markets—Trends and Structural Changes (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development).
- OECD, 2012, Central Government Debt. Available via the Internet: http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DatasetCode=GOV_DEBT.
- Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff, 2011, “The Forgotten History of Domestic Debt,” The Economic Journal, Vol. 121, No. 52, pp. 319-350.
- Reinhart, C., and K. Rogoff, 2013, “Financial and Sovereign Debt Crises: Some Lessons Learned and Those Forgotten,” IMF Working Paper No. 13/266 (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund). Available via the Internet: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=41173.0 .
- Reinhart, C., and B. Sbrancia, 2011, “The Liquidation of Government Debt,” NBER Working Paper No. 16893 (Cambridge, MA: National Bureau of Economic Research).
- United States Treasury Department, 2014, Monthly Statement of the Public Debt. Available via the Internet: http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/pd/mspd/mspd.htm .

### Data appendix — Data sources on total central government debt and on marketable/non-marketable data
- Australia
  - Central government debt: Butlin (1900-1940), UN (1914-1949), IFS (1952-1959), RBA (1950-2012)
  - Marketable debt: IFS (1952-1959), RBA (1950-2012)
  - Non-marketable debt: IFS (1952-1959), RBA (1950-2012)
- Belgium
  - Central government debt: Statistical Yearbook and Government Accounts (1835-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Ministry of Finance (1960-1980), OECD (1980-2010)
  - Non-marketable debt: Ministry of Finance (1960-1980), OECD (1980-2010)
- Canada
  - Central government debt: Statistics Canada/CANSIM (1867-2008), Department of Finance (2009-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Statistics Canada/CANSIM (1867-2008), Department of Finance (2009-2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: Statistics Canada/CANSIM (1867-2008), Department of Finance (2009-2011)
- France
  - Central government debt: Statistical Yearbook (1880-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Ministry of Finance (1952-2005), OECD (1980-2010)
  - Non-marketable debt: Ministry of Finance (1952-2005), OECD (1980-2010)
- Germany
  - Central government debt: Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen (1877-1945), Bundesbank (1950-2011), Ministry of Finance (1961-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen (1877-1945), Bundesbank (1950-2011), Ministry of Finance (1961-2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: Deutsches Geld- und Bankwesen in Zahlen (1877-1945), Bundesbank (1950-2011), Ministry of Finance (1961-2011)
- Ireland
  - Central government debt: Finance Accounts (1923-89), National Treasury Management Agency (1990-2011)
  - Marketable debt: OECD (1980-2010)
  - Non-marketable debt: OECD (1980-2010)
- Italy
  - Central government debt: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
- Japan
  - Central government debt: Ministry of Finance (1870-1979), OECD (1980-2009), Ministry of Finance Debt Management Report (2010-2011)
  - Marketable debt: OECD (1980-2009), Ministry of Finance Debt Management Report (2010-2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: OECD (1980-2009), Ministry of Finance Debt Management Report (2010-2011)
- Netherlands
  - Central government debt: Centraal Bureau Statistiek (1900-2011) and Ministry of Finance (1951-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Nederlandsche Bank (1900-2011), OECD (1980-2010)
  - Non-marketable debt: Nederlandsche Bank (1900-2011), OECD (1980-2010)
- Spain
  - Central government debt: Statistical Yearbook of Spain (1900-1985), Bank of Spain (1985-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Bank of Spain  (1900-1992, 2000-2011), OECD (1992-1999)
  - Non-marketable debt: Bank of Spain  (1900-1992, 2000-2011), OECD (1992-1999)
- Sweden
  - Central government debt: UN (1914-1969), Statistics Sweden (1970-2011)
  - Marketable debt: OECD (1980-2010), Statistics Sweden (2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: OECD (1980-2010), Statistics Sweden (2011)
- United Kingdom
  - Central government debt: Wormell (1892-1934), UN (1935-1976), Bank of England (1977-2003), Office of National Statistics (2004-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Pember & Boyle (1900-1976), Bank of England (1977-2002), Office of National Statistics (2003-2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: Pember & Boyle (1900-1976), Bank of England (1977-2002), Office of National Statistics (2003-2011)
- United States
  - Central government debt: Historical Statistics of the United States (1853-1868), Department of Treasury (1869-1979), Historical Statistics of the United States (1980-2000), Department of Treasury (2001-2011)
  - Marketable debt: Historical Statistics of the United States (1853-1868), Department of Treasury (1869-1979), Historical Statistics of the United States (1980-2000), Department of Treasury (2001-2011)
  - Non-marketable debt: Historical Statistics of the United States (1853-1868), Department of Treasury (1869-1979), Historical Statistics of the United States (1980-2000), Department of Treasury (2001-2011)

### Data appendix — Data sources on currency and maturity composition
- Australia
  - Foreign currency debt: UN (1914-1974), Missale (1975-1995), Australian Office of Financial Management  for general government data (1950-2012)
  - Domestic MLT debt: UN (1914-1974), Missale (1975-1995), Australian Office of Financial Management  for general government data (1950-2012)
  - Domestic ST debt: UN (1914-1974), Missale (1975-1995), Australian Office of Financial Management  for general government data (1950-2012)
- Belgium
  - Foreign currency debt: Statistical Yearbook and Government Accounts (1835-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Statistical Yearbook and Government Accounts (1835-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Statistical Yearbook and Government Accounts (1835-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
- Canada
  - Foreign currency debt: UN (1914-1959), Missale (1960-1980), OECD (1981-2010), Statistics Canada/CANSIM (1867-2008), Department of Finance (2009-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: UN (1914-1959), Missale (1960-1980), OECD (1981-2010), Statistics Canada/CANSIM (1867-2008), Department of Finance (2009-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: UN (1914-1959), Missale (1960-1980), OECD (1981-2010), Statistics Canada/CANSIM (1867-2008), Department of Finance (2009-2011)
- France
  - Foreign currency debt: Statistical Yearbook (1880-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Statistical Yearbook (1880-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Statistical Yearbook (1880-1914), UN (1914-1945), Ministry of Finance (1945-2011)
- Germany
  - Foreign currency debt: Bundesbank (1877-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Bundesbank (1877-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Bundesbank (1877-2011)
- Ireland
  - Foreign currency debt: United Nations (1924-1959), Missale (1960-1967), National Treasury Management Agency (1968-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: United Nations (1924-1959), Missale (1969-1997), OECD (1998-2001), National Treasury Management Agency (2002-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: United Nations (1924-1959), Missale (1969-1997), OECD (1998-2001), National Treasury Management Agency (2002-2011)
- Italy
  - Foreign currency debt: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
- Japan
  - Foreign currency debt: Ministry of Finance (1870-1979), OECD (1980-2009), Ministry of Finance Debt Management Report (2010-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Ministry of Finance (1870-1979), OECD (1980-2009), Ministry of Finance Debt Management Report (2010-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Ministry of Finance (1870-1979), OECD (1980-2009), Ministry of Finance Debt Management Report (2010-2011)
- Netherlands
  - Foreign currency debt: Centraal Bureau Statistiek (1900-2011) and Ministry of Finance (1951-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Centraal Bureau Statistiek (1900-2011) and Ministry of Finance (1951-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Centraal Bureau Statistiek (1900-2011) and Ministry of Finance (1951-2011)
- Spain
  - Foreign currency debt: Statistical Yearbook of Spain (1900-1985), Bank of Spain (1986-1991), OECD (1992-2000), Bank of Spain (2001-2010), Tesoro Público (2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Bank  of Spain (1900-2010), Tesoro Público (2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Bank  of Spain(1900-2011), Tesoro Público (2011)
- Sweden
  - Foreign currency debt: UN (1914-1969), Statistics Sweden (1970-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: UN (1914-1969), Statistics Sweden (1970-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: UN (1914-1969), Statistics Sweden (1970-2011)
- United Kingdom
  - Foreign currency debt: Wormell (1892-1934), UN (1935-1976), Bank of England (1977-2003), Office of National Statistics (2004-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Wormell (1892-1934), UN (1935-1976), Bank of England (1977-2003), Office of National Statistics (2004-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Wormell (1892-1934), UN (1935-1976), Bank of England (1977-2003), Office of National Statistics (2004-2011)
- United States
  - Foreign currency debt: Federal Reserve (1916-1938), Department of the Treasury (1939-2011)
  - Domestic MLT debt: Federal Reserve (1916-1938), Department of the Treasury (1939-2011)
  - Domestic ST debt: Federal Reserve (1916-1938), Department of the Treasury (1939-2011)

### Data appendix — Data sources on ownership
- Australia
  - Central bank: IFS (1935-1968), Reserve Bank of Australia (1950-2012)
  - Domestic commercial banks: IFS (1935-1968), Reserve Bank of Australia (1950-2012)
  - Non-residents: IFS (1935-1968), Reserve Bank of Australia (1950-2012)
- Belgium
  - Central bank: Belgian National Bank (1851-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Belgian National Bank and Ministry of Finance (1957-2011)
  - Non-residents: Belgian National Bank and Ministry of Finance (1957-2011)
- Canada
  - Central bank: Bank of Canada (1946-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Bank of Canada (1946-2011)
  - Non-residents: Bank of Canada (1946-2011)
- France
  - Central bank: IFS (1936--2011), Ministry of Finance (1945-2003)
  - Domestic commercial banks: IFS (1936-2011)
  - Non-residents: IFS (1936-2011), OECD (1987-1999)
- Germany
  - Central bank: Bundesbank (1950-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Bundesbank (1950-2011)
  - Non-residents: Bundesbank (1950-2011)
- Ireland
  - Central bank: Missale (1969-1996), IFS (1997-2003), Arslanalp and Tsuda (2004-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: IFS (1936-2001), Andritzky (2002-2011)
  - Non-residents: OECD (1995-2006), Andritzky (2007-2011)
- Italy
  - Central bank: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
  - Non-residents: Bank of Italy (1861-2011)
- Japan
  - Central bank: Bank of Japan (1882-1964), IFS (1965-1999), Andritzky (2000-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: IFS (1953-1999), Andritzky (2000-2011)
  - Non-residents: OECD (1980-1999), Andritzky (2000-2011)
- Netherlands
  - Central bank: Nederlandsche Bank (1900-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Nederlandsche Bank (1900-2011)
  - Non-residents: Nederlandsche Bank (1900-2011)
- Spain
  - Central bank: Bank of Spain (1987-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Bank of Spain (1987-2011)
  - Non-residents: Bank of Spain (1987-2011)
- Sweden
  - Central bank: Fregert and Gustafsson (1860-1935), IFS (1936-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: IFS (1945-2011)
  - Non-residents: OECD (1995-2010), Statistics Sweden (2011)
- United Kingdom
  - Central bank: Sheppard (1900-1956, Pember and Boyle data used to scale the shares), Stone (1957-1961), Bank of England Bulletin (1961-1970), Bank of England statistics (1971-1996), ONS(1997-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Sheppard (1900-1956, Pember and Boyle data used to scale the shares), Stone (1957-1961), Bank of England Bulletin (1961-1970), Bank of England statistics (1971-1996), ONS(1997-2011)
  - Non-residents: Sheppard (1900-1956, Pember and Boyle data used to scale the shares), Stone (1957-1961), Bank of England Bulletin (1961-1970), Bank of England statistics (1971-1996), ONS(1997-2011)
- United States
  - Central bank: Federal Reserve (1916-1938), Department of the Treasury (1939-2011)
  - Domestic commercial banks: Federal Reserve (1916-1938), Department of the Treasury (1939-2011)
  - Non-residents: Federal Reserve (1916-1938), Department of the Treasury (1939-2011)

*Content derived from _wp14162 - REFERENCES (Data Appendix and bibliographic references).*

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