## _wp14163

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---

### III. Background and literature
- Seminal model: Ho and Saunders (1981) identifies two basic components of interest margins: the degree of competition and interest rate risk.  
- Extensions: incorporate money markets, different credits/deposits, credit and interest rate risks, and banks’ operating costs (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Allen, 1988; Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004).  
- Cross-country empirical challenges: different institutional and regulatory environments; some studies apply a two-step approach isolating bank-specific impacts before modeling the “pure spread.”  
- International-comparison determinants: macroeconomic conditions, bank taxation, deposit insurance, financial structure, legal/institutional indicators (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998; Moore and Craigwell, 2000; Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Gelos, 2006).  
- Reserve requirements and macroeconomic volatility (e.g., inflation) widen interest margins in developing countries (Tennant and Folawewo, 2009).  
- Ownership structure matters: foreign-owned banks often outperform locally owned banks; locally owned banks allocate a higher proportion of loans to low-quality industries (Micco, Panizza and Yanez, 2007; Fungacova and Poghosyan, 2009; La Porta, 2003; Taboada, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Martinez and Mody, 2004).  
- Martinez and Mody (2004) find foreign banks charge lower spreads; foreign participation influences spreads through administrative costs; concentration relates positively to spreads and administrative costs.

- Honduras institutional background (selected indicators, end-2013):  
  - Population: about 7.8 million in 2011.  
  - GDP: about US$18.8 billion in 2013.  
  - Banking structure: 7 locally owned banks and 10 subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
  - Subsidiaries’ share: about 43 percent of deposits and 45 percent of loans.  
  - Total assets: equivalent to 94 percent of GDP.  
  - Credit to the private sector: 51 percent of GDP.  
  - Broad money (M3): 50 percent of GDP.  
  - Banking sector share of financial system assets: over 90 percent.  
  - Deposits: about 12 percent in demand deposits; remainder in time and savings deposits.  
  - Dollarization of deposits: about 31 percent of total deposits.  
  - National insurance system assets: about 15 percent of the total financial system; about 50 percent of social security funds are placed in bank deposits—mainly in locally owned banks.  
  - Regulatory reform (related-lending and equity participation limits): from 120 percent and 50 percent of Tier I capital (pre-2004) to limits consistent with international best practices by 2007 (20-30 percent and 25 percent of Tier I capital, respectively).  
  - Remaining structural issues: lack of a well-functioning interbank market, informality, slow legal-case resolution.

### IV. Methodology and data
- Empirical framework: extension of Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) cost-function model; Costs = C(A; K, L) and profit-maximization linking spreads to marginal costs and market structure (competitive, monopolistic, oligopolistic).  
- Theoretical priors: increases in operating costs and market concentration affect spreads; oligopolistic structure associated with higher spreads and marginal operating costs. Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) used as empirical proxy for concentration.  
- Risks modeled: liquidity risk (LR), credit risk (CR), funding risk (FR).  
  - Liquidity risk proxy: ratio of liquid assets-to-total assets (LR). Hypothesized: higher LR → higher spreads.  
  - Credit risk proxy: lagged ratio of loan loss provisions-to-total loans and advances (CR). Hypothesized: higher CR → higher spreads.  
  - Funding risk proxy: credit-to-deposit ratio (FR). High/increasing loan-to-deposit ratios (possibly funded by capital inflows) → higher spreads; reversals → higher spreads. Currency risk not assessed due to lack of bank-by-bank currency composition data.  
- Full empirical specification: microstructure variables (OC, LR, CR, HHI, FR) plus macro variables real GDP growth (RGDP) and CPI inflation (INFL) to explain NIM. Expected signs summarized:  
  - Higher operating costs → higher interest margins.  
  - Higher market concentration → higher interest margins (theoretical prior).  
  - Higher liquidity ratio, credit risk, GDP and inflation → positively related to interest margins.  
- Estimation approach: OLS-based PCSE to correct for autocorrelation, contemporaneous correlation, and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in panel error structure.  
- Data: quarterly bank-level data (1998–2013) from Comisión Nacional de Bancos y Seguros (CNBS); quarterly real GDP growth and inflation from Central Bank of Honduras. All series in levels; Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root tests indicate stationarity in most cases.

### V. Empirical results and key statistics
- Descriptive statistics (means and standard deviations):  
  - All banks (No. of banks: 17):  
    - Net interest margins (NIM): 2.2% mean; 0.023 standard deviation.  
    - Liquidity risk (LR): 29.3% mean; 0.137 standard deviation.  
    - Operating costs (OC): 2.6% mean; 0.025 standard deviation.  
    - Credit risk (CR): 4.1% mean; 0.029 standard deviation.  
    - HHI: 0.70 mean; 0.009 standard deviation.  
    - Funding risk (FR) credit-to-deposit ratio: 96.2% mean; 0.415 standard deviation.  
    - Real GDP growth (RGDP): 3.8% mean; 0.0297 standard deviation.  
    - Inflation (INF): 1.9% mean; 0.009 standard deviation.  
  - Subsidiaries of international banks (No. of banks: 11):  
    - NIM: 2.6% mean; 0.032 standard deviation.  
    - LR: 31.3% mean; 0.179 standard deviation.  
    - OC: 3.3% mean; 0.035 standard deviation.  
    - CR: 4.1% mean; 0.034 standard deviation.  
    - HHI: 0.50 mean; 0.008 standard deviation.  
    - FR: 99.2% mean; 0.551 standard deviation.  
  - Locally owned banks (No. of banks: 10):  
    - NIM: 1.9% mean; 0.006 standard deviation.  
    - LR: 27.6% mean; 0.085 standard deviation.  
    - OC: 2.0% mean; 0.007 standard deviation.  
    - CR: 4.2% mean; 0.024 standard deviation.  
    - HHI: 0.77 mean; 0.011 standard deviation.  
    - FR: 93.7% mean; 0.250 standard deviation.

- Stylized facts:  
  - NIM averaged 260 basis points (2.6%) for subsidiaries of foreign banks vs. 190 basis points (1.9%) for locally owned banks.  
  - Since 2007, banks’ NIM increased overall; increase driven solely by subsidiaries of foreign banks; locally owned banks’ NIM decreased steadily since 1998.  
  - Dispersion of NIM: subsidiaries of foreign banks 0.032 vs. locally owned banks 0.006.  
  - Subsidiaries rely more on off-shore funding; locally owned banks exhibit higher market concentration (HHI 0.77) vs. subsidiaries (HHI 0.50).  
  - Average operating costs: locally owned banks 2.0 percent vs. subsidiaries 3.3 percent.

- Panel estimation results (OLS-PCSE, selected coefficients and statistical significance):  
  - Liquidity risk: coefficient 0.01 *** (z values: 4.10, 4.17, 4.39, 3.26, 2.90, 3.85, 3.53, 3.52, 3.91). Positive and statistically significant.  
  - Operating costs: coefficient 0.46 *** (z values: 6.99, 7.04, 7.04, 9.21, 8.34, 9.26, 7.04, 7.11, 7.12). Largest estimated effect; positive and highly significant.  
  - Credit risk: coefficient 0.09 *** (z values: 2.77, 2.89, 2.68, 3.93, 4.03, 3.84, 2.73, 2.93, 2.79). Positive and significant.  
  - Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): negative and statistically significant coefficients (examples: -0.08 ***; -0.10 ***; -0.09 *** across columns). Concentration associated with lower NIM (contrary to theoretical prior).  
  - Funding risk (credit-to-deposit ratio): coefficient 0.004 *** (z values: 3.51, 3.02, 3.55, 3.26, 2.70, 3.24). Positive and significant; particularly important for subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
  - Inflation: positive and significant in full specifications (examples: 0.12 ***; 0.11 ***; 0.12 *** with z values 4.31, 4.27, 4.36; and 0.07 *** with z around 3.03–3.13 in other specs).  
  - Real GDP growth: coefficients statistically insignificant (examples: -0.01 with z values -1.14, -1.01, -1.03, -1.46, -1.44, -1.37).  
  - Ownership dummies: when funding risk is not controlled, dummy for subsidiaries of foreign banks is positive and significant in some specifications; when controlling for funding risk, ownership dummy becomes statistically insignificant—ownership effect is explained by funding risk transmission.  
  - Model fit and tests: R-square values around 0.79–0.80; Wald tests: Prob > X2 = 0.000 in reported specifications. Number of observations N = 171 in reported models.

### Key empirical interpretations
- Operating costs are the most important determinant of banks’ net interest margins in Honduras.  
- Higher liquidity ratios and higher loan-loss-provision ratios (credit risk) translate into higher net interest margins.  
- Funding risk (credit-to-deposit ratio) raises net interest margins, especially for subsidiaries of foreign banks; high/increasing loan-to-deposit ratios funded by parent banks put pressure on subsidiaries’ business models and lead to higher margins.  
- Greater market concentration (higher HHI) is associated with lower NIM, suggesting market contestability and that consolidation may reflect efficiency gains by lower-cost banks.  
- Inflation increases NIM; real GDP growth has no statistically significant impact, suggesting banks may not be adequately pricing intrinsic project risks.  
- Ownership does not matter if transmission of funding risks from parent banks is limited.

### VI. Conclusions and policy implications
- Main empirical findings:  
  - All explanatory variables, except for bank concentration, real GDP growth and bank ownership, have the expected effect on banks’ net interest margins.  
  - Operating costs are the most important determinant of banks’ interest margins.  
  - High provisions for nonperforming loans and liquidity ratio get translated into high net interest margins.  
  - Credit-to-deposit ratio positively impacts banks’ net interest margins.  
  - Banking concentration variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating tougher competition has led to higher concentration and lower net interest margins.  
  - Inflation is an important determinant of high interest margins; real GDP growth has no statistically significant impact.  
  - Ownership does not matter if transmission of funding risks from parent banks is limited.

- Policy recommendations:  
  - Structural reforms to support the information environment: promoting credit information-sharing systems and collateral registries.  
  - Promote international accounting standards, independent and credible auditing of borrowers (private companies).  
  - Prompt adjudication of legal cases (speed up legal-case resolution).  
  - Promote financial inclusion to increase formal account ownership and limit negative cross-border spillovers.  
  - Develop a vibrant interbank market to improve operational efficiency and lower net interest margins.  
  - Maintain macroeconomic stability, such as low and stable inflation, to lower information asymmetries.  
  - Encourage banks, particularly subsidiaries of foreign banks, to consolidate and reduce operating costs to offer competitive interest margins and to improve pricing of intrinsic risk and resource allocation efficiency.

*Source: _wp14163 — authors' calculations and analysis from the provided IMF working paper content.*

### Section IV presents the methodology and data. Section V discusses the empirical results.

### _wp14163 - Section IV presents the methodology and data. Section V discusses the empirical results.

### Methodology and data
- Section IV presents the methodology and data.

### Empirical results
- Section V discusses the empirical results.

*Source: _wp14163 - Section IV presents the methodology and data. Section V discusses the empirical results.*

### Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section VI.

### Conclusions and policy implications are presented in Section VI.

### II. Literature review
- The seminal model by Ho and Saunders (1981) identifies two basic components of interest margins: the degree of competition and interest rate risk.  
- Extensions incorporate money markets, different credits/deposits, credit and interest rate risks, and banks’ operating costs (McShane and Sharpe, 1985; Allen, 1988; Angbazo, 1997; Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara, 2004).  
- Cross-country empirical verification is difficult because of different institutional and regulatory environments; some studies apply a two-step approach isolating bank-specific impacts before modeling the “pure spread.”  
- International-comparison studies consider macroeconomic conditions, bank taxation, deposit insurance, financial structure, and legal/institutional indicators (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1998; Moore and Craigwell, 2000; Brock and Rojas-Suarez, 2000; Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2001; Gelos, 2006).  
- Tennant and Folawewo (2009) find reserve requirements and macroeconomic volatility (e.g., inflation) widen interest margins in developing countries.  
- Ownership structure matters: foreign-owned banks often outperform locally owned banks; locally owned banks allocate a higher proportion of loans to low-quality industries (Micco, Panizza and Yanez, 2007; Fungacova and Poghosyan, 2009; La Porta, 2003; Taboada, 2011; Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Martinez and Mody, 2004).  
- Martinez and Mody (2004) find foreign banks charge lower spreads, foreign participation influences spreads through administrative costs, and concentration relates positively to spreads and administrative costs.

### III. Background: institutional structure of the banking sector (Honduras)
- Commercial banking started in 1889; first foreign-owned bank entered in 1965.  
- In the 1990s and 2007-08, subsidiaries of international banks entered via acquisition/merger (none de novo). Four subsidiaries entered during 2007-08.  
- Market structure and size (end-2013):  
  - Population: about 7.8 million in 2011.  
  - GDP: about US$18.8 billion in 2013.  
  - As at end-2013: 7 locally owned banks and 10 subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
  - Subsidiaries of foreign banks hold about 43 percent of deposits and 45 percent of loans.  
- Financial system indicators:  
  - Total assets equivalent to 94 percent of GDP.  
  - Credit to the private sector amounting to 51 percent of GDP.  
  - Broad money (M3) at 50 percent of GDP.  
  - Banking sector accounts for over 90 percent of total financial system assets.  
  - Deposits: about 12 percent in demand deposits; remainder in time and savings deposits.  
  - Dollarization of deposits: about 31 percent of total deposits.  
  - National insurance system assets: about 15 percent of the total financial system; about 50 percent of social security funds are placed in bank deposits—mainly in locally owned banks.  
- Regulatory reforms: related-lending and equity participation limits reduced from 120 percent and 50 percent of Tier I capital (pre-2004) to limits consistent with international best practices by 2007 (20-30 percent and 25 percent of Tier I capital, respectively).  
- Remaining structural issues: lack of a well-functioning interbank market, informality, slow legal-case resolution.

### IV. Methodology and data
- Empirical framework: extension of Klein (1971) and Monti (1972) cost-function model; assumes Costs = C(A; K, L) and profit-maximization conditions linking spreads to marginal costs and market structure (competitive, monopolistic, oligopolistic).  
- Key theoretical implications: increases in operating costs and market concentration affect spreads; oligopolistic structure (fewer banks) associated with higher spreads and marginal operating costs (equations 1–5 in source). Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) used as empirical proxy for concentration.  
- Risks incorporated: liquidity risk (LR), credit risk (CR), funding risk (FR).  
  - Liquidity risk proxy: ratio of liquid assets-to-total assets (LR). Hypothesized: higher LR → higher spreads (opportunity cost of holding liquidity).  
  - Credit risk proxy: lagged ratio of loan loss provisions-to-total loans and advances (CR). Hypothesized: higher CR → higher spreads via resource use and risk premium.  
  - Funding risk proxy: credit-to-deposit ratio (FR). High/increasing loan-to-deposit ratios (possibly funded by capital inflows) → higher spreads; reversals → pressure on business models and higher spreads. Currency risk not assessed due to lack of bank-by-bank currency composition data.  
- Full empirical specification: combines microstructure variables (OCO, LR, CR, HHI, FR) with macro variables real GDP growth (RGDP) and CPI inflation (INFL) to explain NIM (equation 7). Model predictions summarized:  
  - Higher operating costs → higher interest margins.  
  - Higher market concentration → higher interest margins (theoretical prior).  
  - Higher liquidity ratio, credit risk, GDP and inflation → positively related to interest margins (Table 1 expectation column).  
- Estimation approach: OLS-based PCSE to correct for autocorrelation, contemporaneous correlation, and cross-sectional heteroskedasticity in panel error structure.  
- Data: quarterly bank-level data (1998–2013) from Comisión Nacional de Bancos y Seguros (CNBS); quarterly real GDP growth and inflation from Central Bank of Honduras. All series in levels; Im-Pesaran-Shin unit root tests indicate stationarity in most cases (Table 2).

### V. Estimation results (summary and key statistics)
- Descriptive statistics (Table 1) – means and standard deviations (preserve exact values):  
  - All banks:  
    - Net interest margins (NIM): 2.2% mean; 0.023 standard deviation; No. of banks: 17.  
    - Liquidity risk (LR): 29.3% mean; 0.137 standard deviation.  
    - Operating costs (OC): 2.6% mean; 0.025 standard deviation.  
    - Credit risk (CR): 4.1% mean; 0.029 standard deviation.  
    - HHI: 0.70 mean; 0.009 standard deviation.  
    - Funding risk (FR) credit-to-deposit ratio: 96.2% mean; 0.415 standard deviation.  
    - Real GDP growth (RGDP): 3.8% mean; 0.0297 standard deviation.  
    - Inflation (INF): 1.9% mean; 0.009 standard deviation.  
  - Subsidiaries of international banks (No. of banks: 11):  
    - NIM: 2.6% mean; 0.032 standard deviation.  
    - LR: 31.3% mean; 0.179 standard deviation.  
    - OC: 3.3% mean; 0.035 standard deviation.  
    - CR: 4.1% mean; 0.034 standard deviation.  
    - HHI: 0.50 mean; 0.008 standard deviation.  
    - FR: 99.2% mean; 0.551 standard deviation.  
  - Locally owned banks (No. of banks: 10):  
    - NIM: 1.9% mean; 0.006 standard deviation.  
    - LR: 27.6% mean; 0.085 standard deviation.  
    - OC: 2.0% mean; 0.007 standard deviation.  
    - CR: 4.2% mean; 0.024 standard deviation.  
    - HHI: 0.77 mean; 0.011 standard deviation.  
    - FR: 93.7% mean; 0.250 standard deviation.  
- Stylized facts:  
  - NIM averaged 260 basis points (2.6%) for subsidiaries of foreign banks vs. 190 basis points (1.9%) for locally owned banks.  
  - Since 2007, banks’ NIM increased overall; increase driven solely by subsidiaries of foreign banks; locally owned banks’ NIM decreased steadily since 1998.  
  - Dispersion (standard deviation) of NIM: subsidiaries of foreign banks 0.032 vs. locally owned banks 0.006.  
  - Subsidiaries rely more on off-shore funding; locally owned banks exhibit higher market concentration (HHI 0.77) vs. subsidiaries (HHI 0.50).  
  - Average operating costs: locally owned banks 2.0 percent vs. subsidiaries 3.3 percent.  
- Panel estimation (OLS-PCSE, Table 3) – key coefficient signs and significance (coefficients and z-values preserved as in Table 3 where shown):  
  - Liquidity risk: coefficient 0.01 *** (z values in various specs: 4.10, 4.17, 4.39, 3.26, 2.90, 3.85, 3.53, 3.52, 3.91). Positive and statistically significant.  
  - Operating costs: coefficient 0.46 *** (z values: 6.99, 7.04, 7.04, 9.21, 8.34, 9.26, 7.04, 7.11, 7.12). Largest estimated effect; positive and highly significant.  
  - Credit risk: coefficient 0.09 *** (z values: 2.77, 2.89, 2.68, 3.93, 4.03, 3.84, 2.73, 2.93, 2.79). Positive and significant.  
  - Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI): negative and statistically significant coefficients (examples: -0.08 ***; -0.10 ***; -0.09 *** across columns; z values indicate statistical significance). Contrary to theoretical prior, concentration is associated with lower NIM.  
  - Funding risk (credit-to-deposit ratio): coefficient 0.004 *** (z values: 3.51, 3.02, 3.55, 3.26, 2.70, 3.24). Positive and significant; particularly important for subsidiaries of foreign banks.  
  - Inflation: positive and significant in full specifications (e.g., 0.12 ***, 0.11 ***, 0.12 *** with z values 4.31, 4.27, 4.36; and smaller but significant coefficients 0.07 *** with z around 3.03–3.13 in other specs).  
  - Real GDP growth: coefficients statistically insignificant (examples: -0.01 with z values -1.14, -1.01, -1.03, -1.46, -1.44, -1.37).  
  - Ownership dummies: when funding risk is not controlled, dummy for subsidiaries of foreign banks is positive and significant in some specifications; when controlling for funding risk, ownership dummy becomes statistically insignificant—ownership effect is explained by funding risk transmission.  
  - R-square values across specifications: around 0.79–0.80. Wald tests: Prob > X2 = 0.000 in reported specifications. Number of observations N = 171 in reported models.

### Key empirical interpretations
- Operating costs are the most important determinant of banks’ net interest margins in Honduras.  
- Higher liquidity ratios and higher loan-loss-provision ratios (credit risk) translate into higher net interest margins.  
- Funding risk (credit-to-deposit ratio) raises net interest margins, especially for subsidiaries of foreign banks; high/increasing loan-to-deposit ratios funded by parent banks put pressure on subsidiaries’ business models and lead to higher margins.  
- Contrary to standard model priors, greater market concentration (higher HHI) is associated with lower NIM, suggesting market contestability and that consolidation may reflect efficiency gains by lower-cost banks.  
- Inflation increases NIM; real GDP growth has no statistically significant impact, suggesting banks may not be adequately pricing intrinsic project risks.

### VI. Conclusions and policy implications
- Main empirical findings (preserve exact phrasing of key findings):  
  - All explanatory variables, except for bank concentration, real GDP growth and bank ownership, have the expected effect on banks’ net interest margins.  
  - Operating costs are the most important determinant of banks’ interest margins.  
  - High provisions for nonperforming loans and liquidity ratio get translated into high net interest margins.  
  - Credit-to-deposit ratio positively impacts banks’ net interest margins.  
  - Banking concentration variable is negative and statistically significant, indicating tougher competition has led to higher concentration and lower net interest margins.  
  - Inflation is an important determinant of high interest margins; real GDP growth has no statistically significant impact.  
  - Ownership does not matter if transmission of funding risks from parent banks is limited.  
- Policy recommendations (as stated):  
  - Structural reforms to support the information environment: promoting credit information-sharing systems and collateral registries.  
  - Promote international accounting standards, independent and credible auditing of borrowers (private companies).  
  - Prompt adjudication of legal cases (speed up legal-case resolution).  
  - Promote financial inclusion to increase formal account ownership and limit negative cross-border spillovers.  
  - Develop a vibrant interbank market to improve operational efficiency and lower net interest margins.  
  - Maintain macroeconomic stability, such as low and stable inflation, to lower information asymmetries.  
  - Encourage banks, particularly subsidiaries of foreign banks, to consolidate and reduce operating costs to offer competitive interest margins and to improve pricing of intrinsic risk and resource allocation efficiency.

*Source: Authors' calculations and analysis from the provided IMF working paper content.*

### References

### _wp14163 - References

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### Figures and Annex captions
- Figure 1. Honduras: Banks' Net Interest Margins (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 2. Honduras: Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks' Net Interest Margins (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 3. Honduras: Locally Owned Banks' Net Interest Margins (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 4. Honduras: Banks' Interest Income and Interest Expenditure (in percent of interest earning assets) — Income NIM; Expenses NIM — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 5. Honduras: Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks' Interest Income and Interest Expenditure (in percent of interest earning assets) — Income NIM; Expenses NIM — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 6. Honduras: Locally Owned Banks' Interest Income and Interest Expenditure (in percent of interest earning assets) — Income NIM; Expenses NIM — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 7. Honduras: Banks' Liquidity Ratio (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Table 8. Honduras: Banks' Operational Costs (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 9. Honduras: Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks' Operational Costs (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 10. Honduras: Locally Owned Banks' Operating Costs (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 11. Honduras: Banks' Credit Risks (in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 12. Honduras: Banks' Herfindahl-Hirschman Index — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 13. Honduras: Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks' Herfindahl-Hirschman Index — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 14. Honduras: Locally Owned Banks' Herfindahl-Hirschman Index — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 15. Honduras: Banks' Credit-to-Deposit Ratio (quarterly; in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 16. Honduras: Subsidiaries of Foreign Banks' Credit-to-Deposit Ratio (quarterly; in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 17. Honduras: Locally Owned Banks' Credit-to-Deposit Ratio (quarterly; in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 18. Honduras: Real GDP Growth (quarterly; in percent) — Source: CNBS.
- Figure 19. Honduras: Inflation (quarterly; in percent) — Source: CNBS.

*Content derived from the PDF: _wp14163 - References*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp14163.pdf_
