## _wp14168

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---

### I. INTRODUCTION — research question and setup
- Research question: how the maturity structure of a Sovereign's debt portfolio relates to situations of near-default and financial fragility.
- Sovereign trade-off: default cost versus fiscal effort (positive primary balances) needed to meet obligations.
- Mechanism: after a negative macroeconomic shock, high fiscal effort may be costly and the Sovereign may prefer to let the debt burden increase, creating near-default risk if a subsequent negative shock occurs.
- Model focus: financing decisions in a 3 period model where the Sovereign
  - issues both short term (ST) and long term (LT) debt in the initial period,
  - exerts a fiscal effort and/or rolls over ST debt in the intermediate period,
  - reimburses debt if fundamentals are good enough, or defaults in the last period.
- Market assumptions: perfectly competitive financial markets, investors are risk neutral, information is symmetric; high interest rates reflect high expected default probability (reference to Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)).
- Default timing: Default can occur in the last period only and is the consequence of previous financing choices that create "potential default".
- Interpretation of debt types:
  - ST debt: very short term horizon, no default risk.
  - LT debt: longer horizon, default possible if fundamentals are bad and fiscal effort insufficient; LT debt provides insurance against future bad shocks but is more costly due to default risk.

### A. MAIN RESULTS — qualitative findings
- Debt structure and fundamentals jointly influence fiscal effort and occurrence of default.
- Key mechanism:
  - A large amount of LT debt and poor fundamentals lead to potential default due to insufficient fiscal effort in the intermediate period.
  - ST financing disciplines the Sovereign in the intermediate period better than LT financing.
  - If initial maturity structure is heavy in LT debt, the need to roll over ST debt is small; increases in expected default probability (and hence interest rates) in the intermediate period are not very costly, weakening incentives to exert fiscal effort.
- Partition of fundamentals into 3 regions:
  - Two extreme regions (low and high): occurrence of default does not depend on maturity structure (no default in high, potential default in low regardless of LT share).
  - Moderate region: occurrence of default is a function of the maturity structure.
- Prior uncertainty as source of default:
  - Prior uncertainty about fundamentals affects interest rates, which affects the optimal portfolio choice and thus the decision to be in a potential-default position.
  - When fundamentals are known to be moderate, the Sovereign chooses a portfolio that provides incentives not to default; with uncertainty, the optimal portfolio sometimes leads to potential default for the same fundamentals.
- Hedging role of LT debt under uncertainty:
  - LT debt can hedge against risk from uncertain fundamentals only if the price of LT debt (interest rate) is correlated with fundamentals.
  - The cost of default is the price to access this hedging tool; market incompleteness (non-existence of indexed bonds) constrains the Sovereign to potentially choose default as part of a hedging strategy.
- Comparative statics — optimism can increase interest rates:
  - More optimistic initial beliefs about future fundamentals can lead to higher interest rates.
  - Rationale: If the probability of a sequence of negative shocks is low (optimism), the Sovereign issues a large amount of LT debt that may generate default; the LT interest rate is larger than the risk free rate.
  - Conversely, under pessimism, the Sovereign issues a limited amount of LT debt that preserves interim incentives and the LT interest rate remains low.

### B. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
- Markets may fail to manage extreme risks; international institutions can offer alternative contracts.
- Contracts involving a sequence of ST debt, conditional on Sovereign fiscal effort, can provide incentives for sufficient fiscal effort and fulfillment of obligations.
- International financial institutions can commit to roll over ST debt conditionally on effort; such contracts have value correlated with fundamentals (via effort cost) and are offered without the additional cost embedded in LT market debt (which reflects costly default).
- Theoretical implication: conditional rollover contracts by international institutions make exposure to default risk less attractive to the Sovereign.
- Caveat: role of IFIs must be weighed against moral hazard concerns associated with interventions contingent on fiscal effort.

### MODEL OUTLINE — primitives, timing, and interpretation
- Basic setup:
  - 3 periods t = 0;1;2.
  - Two types of agents: investors and a Sovereign.
  - Sovereign carries an exogenous stock D of debt and issues ST debt (lasting 1 period) at t = 0 and t = 1, and LT debt (lasting 2 periods) at t = 0.
  - Sovereign exerts fiscal efforts et ≥ 0 at t = 1,2 and minimizes expected quadratic cost: min E(e1^2 1 + e2^2).
- Fundamentals:
  - Fundamental at t = 1 is 1 (public at beginning of t = 1); at t = 2 the fundamental 2 takes two values L2 and H2 with 0 < L2 < H2.
  - Prior probability at t = 0: agents assign a prior s t to events t = s t for t = 1,2.
- Default notion and interpretation:
  - No default at t = 1.
  - Default only at t = 2 if e2 is insufficient; e2 is exogenously bounded by 2.
  - Default implies no debt reimbursed and an exogenous penalty K > 0; no renegotiation/roll-over/restructuring.

### TIMING, BUDGET CONSTRAINTS, AND PRICING — exact expressions
- t = 0 issuance budget constraint:
  - D = p′0 ST0 + p0 LT.
- t = 1 operations:
  - ST0 = e1 + p1 ST1.
  - At beginning of t = 1, 1 is revealed; 2 unknown until t = 2.
- t = 2 outcome rule:
  - If LT + ST1 ≤ 2 then no default and e2 = LT + ST1.
  - If LT + ST1 > 2 then default and e2 = pK with default cost e2^2 = K.
- Debt pricing (risk neutrality, exogenous r):
  - Exogenous risk-free one-period interest rate r > 0.
  - p1 = (1 D) / (1 + r). (Equation (2))
  - p′0 = 1 / (1 + r).
  - p0 = E(p1) / (1 + r) = (1 E(D)) / (1 + r)^2. (Equation (3))
  - t = 0 budget constraint (using p0):
    - D = (1 / (1 + r)) ST0 + (1 E(D)) / (1 + r)^2 LT. (Equation (4))

### t = 1 optimization and supply curves — key formulas
- Sovereign chooses (ST1, e1) at t = 1 minimizing:
  - V = e1^2 1 + L2 e2(L2)^2 + H2 e2(H2)^2. (Equation (8))
- Default probability assessed at t = 1:
  - D = 0 if ST1 + LT ≤ L2;
  - D = L2 if L2 < ST1 + LT ≤ H2;
  - D = 1 if ST1 + LT > H2.
- Supply curve for ST1 at t = 1 (p1 as function of ST1):
  - p1 = 1 / (1 + r) if ST1 ≤ L2   LT. (Equation (5))
  - p1 = H2 / (1 + r) if L2   LT < ST1 ≤ H2   LT. (Equation (6))
  - p1 = 0 if ST1 > H2   LT. (Equation (7))
- e2 mapping:
  - e2(L2) = ST1 + LT if ST1 + LT ≤ L2; pK otherwise. (Equation (12))
  - e2(H2) = ST1 + LT if ST1 + LT ≤ H2; pK otherwise. (Equation (13))

### CHARACTERIZATION OF t = 1 CHOICES — ND and PD cost functions and optima
- ND cost (p1 = 1 / (1 + r)):
  - V_ND = (ST0   (1/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + (LT + ST1)^2. (Equation (14))
- PD cost (p1 = H2 / (1 + r)):
  - V_PD = (ST0   (H2/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + H2 (LT + ST1)^2 + L2 K. (Equation (15))
- Optimal interior ST issuance:
  - ST^ND_1,min = (1/(1 + r)) ST0   1 LT / (1/(1 + r)^2 + 1). (Equation (19))
  - ST^PD_1,min = (1/(1 + r)) ST0   1 LT H2 / (1/(1 + r)^2 + 1). (Equation (22))
- V_ND_min and V_PD_min:
  - V_ND_min(1; LT; E(D)) = (D(1 + r) + E(D) / (1 + r) LT)^2 / (1/(1+r)^2 + 1). (Equation (20))
  - V_PD_min(1; LT; E(D)) = (D(1 + r) + (E(D)   L2)/(1 + r) LT)^2 / (H2 (1/(1+r)^2) + 1) + L2 K. (Equation (23))

### PARAMETER ASSUMPTIONS, THRESHOLDS, AND REGIONS (exact statements)
- Assumption 1 (parameter restrictions):
  - 0 ≤ LT ≤ L2,
  - D ∈ [0; D_max] with D_max = L2,
  - D > L2 (1 + r)^2,
  - K ≥ (H2)^2,
  - L2 K > (L2)^2.
- Thresholds on 1 (Definition 3 and ordering):
  - ¯1: unique positive solution (see Equation (25)).
  - +1: unique positive solution (see Equation (26)).
  - ^1 = value of +1 for E(D) = 0;  ˜1 = value of +1 for E(D) = D_max.
  - Ordering: 0 < ¯1 < ^1 ≤ +1 ≤ ˜1. (Inequality (27))
- Proposition 4 — regions of 1 and t = 1 choices:
  - If 1 < ¯1 then Sovereign chooses PD irrespective of debt portfolio.
  - If ¯1 ≤ 1 < +1 then decision depends on LT: there is LT̃(1; E(D)) with 0 < LT̃ < L2 such that Sovereign chooses ND iff LT < LT̃(1; E(D)). LT̃ decreases in E(D) and increases in 1.
  - If 1 ≥ +1 then Sovereign chooses ND irrespective of the debt portfolio.
- Corollary 5:
  - Let ̂1 = D L2 + D_max (1 + r)^2   1/(1 + r)^2 > ^1. If 1 ≥ ̂1 then Sovereign chooses interior ND solution independent of LT and E(D).

### INITIAL UNCERTAINTY, ENDOGENOUS DEFAULT, AND TWO-VALUE EXAMPLES
- Pricing at t = 0 uses E(D); in equilibrium E(D) depends on portfolio (ST0, LT).
  - If portfolio leads to ND at t = 1 then p0 = 1/(1 + r)^2 (E(D) = 0).
  - If portfolio leads to PD then p0 = (1   E(D)) / (1 + r)^2 with E(D) > 0.
- Benchmark (no uncertainty on 1) — Proposition 6:
  - If no uncertainty and unique 1 then optimal portfolio leads to ND iff 1 ≥ ¯1.
- Two-value uncertainty (Proposition 7 and 8):
  - Proposition 7 (M1 in median region, H1 in high region):
    - Assume M1 ∈ [¯1; ^1) and H1 ≥ ̂1. Prior probabilities M1 and H1.
    - Under technical condition D > 6 (1 + r)^2 L2, there exists ^H1 (0 < ^H1 < 1) such that:
      - If H1 > ^H1 the Sovereign chooses portfolio that leads to PD (default after 1 = M1 and 2 = L2).
      - If H1 ≤ ^H1 the Sovereign chooses portfolio that leads to ND.
    - Interpretation: More optimistic priors can induce a positive expected probability of default because the Sovereign exploits LT issuance to hedge.
  - Proposition 8 (low and median states):
    - If 1 ∈ {L1 ∈ (0; ¯1), M1 ∈ [¯1; ^1)} then Sovereign chooses portfolio that leads to ND when M1 occurs and PD when L1 occurs.
- Proposition 9 and comparative statics (canonical two-state PD/ND case):
  - Consider M1 (PD) and H1 (ND) with H1 ≥ ̂1, prior probabilities M1 and H1. Expected default probability at t = 0 is E(D) = M1 L2.
  - First-order condition yields closed-form optimal ST0 and LT (see Equations (35) and (36) in source).
  - Comparative statics: LT is decreasing in H1; p0 = 1   M1 L2 (1 + r)^2 is increasing in H1.
- Corollary 10 (effort and debt burdens):
  - Debt burdens B1(1) = ST0 + p1(1) LT with p1(1) = 1/(1 + r) under ND and H2 / (1 + r) under PD.
  - All B1(M1), B1(H1) and efforts e1(·), e2(·) are decreasing in H1 (more optimistic prior reduces debt burdens and efforts).
- Corollary 11 (ND vs PD characterization):
  - If Sovereign chooses ND under M1 then LT ≤ LT̃(M1;0), B1(M1) = D(1 + r) = B1(H1) and e1(M1) = D(1 + r)   L2/(1 + r).
  - If Sovereign chooses PD under M1 then LT > LT̃(M1;0), B1(M1) < D(1 + r) < B1(H1) and e1(M1) < D(1 + r)   L2/(1 + r).

### MECHANISM SUMMARY — economic interpretation
- Principal trade-off: Issuing LT debt smooths fiscal effort and lowers costly e1 in bad states, but large LT issuance can create incentive to default in some realizations (PD).
- Incomplete markets: With only ST and LT available at t = 0, the Sovereign may use LT to reallocate burden across states; this can make default endogenous and correlated with fundamentals.
- Uncertainty as source of default:
  - Prior uncertainty about 1 can induce PD in median states even when the expected 1 is favorable.
  - More optimistic priors can paradoxically raise probability of default in equilibrium (Proposition 7) because the Sovereign optimally issues LT to hedge, transferring burden across states at the cost of incurring default risk in the median state.
- Comparative statics:
  - In canonical two-state PD/ND case optimal LT is decreasing in H1; increased optimism reduces both ST0 and LT issuance and lowers t = 1 debt burdens and efforts (Proposition 9, Corollary 10).

### KEY EQUATIONS AND SELECTED THRESHOLDS (verbatim)
- p1 = (1 D) / (1 + r). (2)
- p0 = (1   E(D)) / (1 + r)^2. (3)
- D = (1 / (1 + r)) ST0 + (1   E(D)) / (1 + r)^2 LT. (4)
- V_ND = (ST0   (1/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + (LT + ST1)^2. (14)
- V_PD = (ST0   (H2/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + H2 (LT + ST1)^2 + L2 K. (15)
- ST^ND_1,min = (1/(1 + r)) ST0   1 LT / (1/(1 + r)^2 + 1). (19)
- ST^PD_1,min = (1/(1 + r)) ST0   1 LT H2 / (1/(1 + r)^2 + 1). (22)
- PD existence condition (from Lemma 2):
  - 1 < D L2 + E(D) (1 + r)^2 LT  L2   1/(1 + r)^2 (L2 LT L2 + H2). (24)
- Assumption 1 recapped:
  - 0 ≤ LT ≤ L2;
  - D ∈ [0; D_max] with D_max = L2;
  - D > L2 (1 + r)^2;
  - K ≥ (H2)^2;
  - L2 K > (L2)^2.

*Source: Excerpt from _wp14168 - Section IV.*

### References..............................................................................................................

### _wp14168 - References............................................................................................................................... 41

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Research question: how the maturity structure of a Sovereign's debt portfolio relates to situations of near-default and financial fragility.
- Sovereign trade-off: default cost versus fiscal effort (positive primary balances) needed to meet obligations.
- Mechanism: after a negative macroeconomic shock, high fiscal effort may be costly and the Sovereign may prefer to let the debt burden increase, creating near-default risk if a subsequent negative shock occurs.
- Model focus: financing decisions in a 3 period model where the Sovereign
  - issues both short term (ST) and long term (LT) debt in the initial period,
  - exerts a fiscal effort and/or rolls over ST debt in the intermediate period,
  - reimburses debt if fundamentals are good enough, or defaults in the last period.
- Market assumptions: perfectly competitive financial markets, investors are risk neutral, information is symmetric; high interest rates reflect high expected default probability (reference to Arellano and Ramanarayanan (2012)).
- Default timing: Default can occur in the last period only and is the consequence of previous financing choices that create "potential default" (being in a position that will lead to default if a negative shock materializes).
- Interpretation of debt types:
  - ST debt: very short term horizon, no default risk.
  - LT debt: longer horizon, default possible if fundamentals are bad and fiscal effort insufficient; LT debt provides insurance against future bad shocks but is more costly due to default risk.

### A. RESULTS
- Debt structure and fundamentals jointly influence fiscal effort and occurrence of default.
- Key mechanism: a large amount of LT debt and poor fundamentals lead to potential default due to insufficient fiscal effort in the intermediate period.
  - ST financing disciplines the Sovereign in the intermediate period better than LT financing.
  - If initial maturity structure is heavy in LT debt, the need to roll over ST debt is small; increases in expected default probability (and hence interest rates) in the intermediate period are not very costly, weakening incentives to exert fiscal effort.
- Partition of fundamentals into 3 regions:
  - Two extreme regions (low and high): occurrence of default does not depend on maturity structure (no default in high, potential default in low regardless of LT share).
  - Moderate region: occurrence of default is a function of the maturity structure.
- Main result on prior uncertainty:
  - Prior uncertainty about fundamentals is a source of default: insolvency is not solely determined by the sequence of fundamentals.
  - Prior uncertainty affects interest rates, which affects the optimal portfolio choice and thus the decision to be in a potential-default position.
  - When fundamentals are known to be moderate, the Sovereign chooses a portfolio that provides incentives not to default; with uncertainty, the optimal portfolio sometimes leads to potential default for the same fundamentals.
- Hedging role of LT debt under uncertainty:
  - LT debt can hedge against risk from uncertain fundamentals only if the price of LT debt (interest rate) is correlated with fundamentals.
  - Correlation requirement: Sovereign must be exposed to default when fundamentals are weak (interest rates high/low when default probability is high/low corresponding to weak/strong fundamentals).
  - The cost of default is the price to access this hedging tool; market incompleteness (non-existence of indexed bonds) constrains the Sovereign to potentially choose default as part of a hedging strategy.
- Comparative statics — optimism can increase interest rates:
  - More optimistic initial beliefs about future fundamentals can lead to higher interest rates.
  - Rationale: If the probability of a sequence of negative shocks is low (optimism), the Sovereign issues a large amount of LT debt that may generate default; the LT interest rate is larger than the risk free rate.
  - Conversely, under pessimism (high probability of negative shocks), issuing a large amount of LT debt would require a very high LT interest rate; the Sovereign issues a limited amount of LT debt that preserves interim incentives and the LT interest rate remains low (the risk free rate).

### B. IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY ISSUES
- Markets may fail to manage extreme risks; international institutions can offer alternative contracts.
- Contracts involving a sequence of ST debt, conditional on Sovereign fiscal effort, can provide incentives for sufficient fiscal effort and fulfillment of obligations.
- International financial institutions can commit to roll over ST debt conditionally on effort; such contracts have value correlated with fundamentals (via effort cost) and are offered without the additional cost embedded in LT market debt (which reflects costly default).
- Theoretical implication: conditional rollover contracts by international institutions make exposure to default risk less attractive to the Sovereign.

### C. LITERATURE
- Paper belongs to literature on LT debt and endogenous maturity structure where LT debt is typically issued in normal times and ST debt in distress (Arellano 2008; Arellano and Ramanarayanan 2012; Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler 2007).
- Distinctions and relations:
  - Closest: Arellano (2008) — current paper focuses on Sovereign optimal portfolio and hedging role of LT debt.
  - Conesa and Kehoe (2012, 2014) — self-fulfilling crises model with "gamble for redemption"; analogous to potential default but with different timing and structure.
  - Cole and Kehoe (1996) — crises depend on uncertainty (sunspots) and coordination failure; current paper attributes default-driving uncertainty to fundamentals and abstracts from coordination issues.
  - Broner, Lorenzoni and Schmukler (2013) — links optimal maturity to risk premium from risk averse investors; current model assumes risk neutral investors.
  - Jeanne (2009) — LT debt provides incentives that can induce default; current paper highlights default related to optimistic expectations.
  - Buera and Nicolini (2004) — maturity structure as substitute for state-contingent bonds, related to market incompleteness.
  - Grossman and Van Huyck (1988) — early reference on defaultable sovereign debt as contingent claims.
  - Coordination and global games literature referenced (Morris and Shin (2004); Chamley (2004); Morris and Shin (2006)) — current paper differs by having a unique equilibrium and insolvency-driven default, not coordination failure.
  - Empirical and theoretical works on interest rates, bond supply, yield curve slope, bond duration, rollover risk, debt dilution, and restructuring are cited (Challeet al.(2012), Laubach (2009), Longstaff (2004), Reinhard and Sack (2000), Dai and Philippon (2006), Hatchondoet al. (2009, 2010, 2012), Ghosal and Miller (2003), Jeanneet al.(2008), Bolton and Jeanne (2009)).

### MODEL OUTLINE (beginning of Section II)
- Basic setup:
  - 3 periods t= 0;1;2.
  - Two types of agents: investors and a Sovereign.
  - Sovereign has a financing need at t= 0 (carries over a stock D of debt).
  - Financing instruments:
    - issuing debt: ST debt (lasting 1 period) at t= 0 and t= 1, and LT debt (lasting 2 periods) at t= 0,
    - exerting a fiscal effort (primary balances) at t= 1 and t= 2.
  - Investors: continuum of competitive risk neutral investors; price of debt equals discounted expected future value.
- Information structure:
  - Information about macroeconomic fundamentals at t= 1 and t= 2 is incomplete but symmetric.
  - Uncertainty about fundamentals at t= 1;2 is summarized by a real variable t. The values of 1 are described in (text continues).

*Source: Excerpt from _wp14168 - References............................................................................................................................... 41*

### Section IV.

### Section IV.

### Model setup and primitives
- Fundamentals:
  - Two-period model with t = 0,1,2. Fundamental at t = 1 is 1 (public at beginning of t = 1); at t = 2 the fundamental 2 takes two values L2 and H2 (with 0 < L2 < H2). 1 and 2 are not correlated.
  - Prior probability at t = 0: agents assign a prior s t to events t = s t for t = 1,2 and every state.
- Sovereign fiscal effort:
  - Efforts et ≥ 0 at t = 1,2.
  - Sovereign minimizes expected quadratic cost: min E(e1^2 1 + e2^2).
  - Quadratic cost implies convexity properties and that optimal e1 is increasing in 1 under the specification.
- Default notion and interpretation of ST/LT debt:
  - No default at t = 1 (fiscal effort e1 always covers financing need).
  - Default can occur only at t = 2 if fiscal effort e2 is insufficient. e2 is exogenously bounded by 2.
  - In default, no debt reimbursed; Sovereign pays exogenous penalty K > 0; no renegotiation/roll-over/ restructuring.
  - ST horizon (t = 1) short enough that t = 0 agents face no uncertainty about repayment at t = 1; LT maturity extends to t = 2 where default is possible.

### Timing and budget constraints
- t = 0 issuance:
  - Sovereign issues ST0 and LT to cover exogenous debt D:
    - D = p′0 ST0 + p0 LT.
- t = 1 operations:
  - Sovereign reimburses ST0 by issuing ST1 and exerting e1:
    - ST0 = e1 + p1 ST1.
  - At beginning of t = 1, 1 is revealed; 2 unknown until t = 2.
- t = 2 outcomes:
  - If LT + ST1 ≤ 2 then no default and e2 = LT + ST1.
  - If LT + ST1 > 2 then default and e2 = pK with default cost e2^2 = K.
  - Interpretation: 2 = maximum possible fiscal effort at t = 2.

### Debt pricing (risk neutrality, exogenous r)
- Exogenous risk-free one-period interest rate r > 0 (constant).
- Price at t = 1 of one unit of debt (ST1 or LT) given assessed default probability D at t = 1:
  - p1 = (1 D) / (1 + r). (Equation (2))
- Prices at t = 0:
  - ST0 price p′0 = 1 / (1 + r).
  - LT price p0 = E(p1) / (1 + r) = (1 E(D)) / (1 + r)^2. (Equation (3))
- t = 0 budget constraint (using p0 above):
  - D = (1 / (1 + r)) ST0 + (1 E(D)) / (1 + r)^2 LT. (Equation (4))

### Sovereign objective and strategic timing (choice at t = 1)
- Sovereign chooses (ST1, e1) at t = 1 minimizing:
  - V = e1^2 1 + L2 e2(L2)^2 + H2 e2(H2)^2. (Equation (8))
- Default probability assessed at t = 1 depends on ST1 + LT relative to L2 and H2:
  - D = 0 if ST1 + LT ≤ L2;
  - D = L2 if L2 < ST1 + LT ≤ H2;
  - D = 1 if ST1 + LT > H2.
- Supply curve for ST1 at t = 1 (p1 as function of ST1):
  - p1 = 1 / (1 + r) if ST1 ≤ L2   LT. (Equation (5))
  - p1 = H2 / (1 + r) if L2   LT < ST1 ≤ H2   LT. (Equation (6))
  - p1 = 0 if ST1 > H2   LT. (Equation (7))
- e2(·) mapping:
  - e2(L2) = ST1 + LT if ST1 + LT ≤ L2; pK otherwise. (Equation (12))
  - e2(H2) = ST1 + LT if ST1 + LT ≤ H2; pK otherwise. (Equation (13))
- Three potential t = 2 outcomes from t = 1 decision:
  - No default.
  - Default when 2 = L2 only (PD: “potential default”).
  - Default for either 2 = L2 or 2 = H2 (shown to never occur; Claim 12).

### Characterization of t = 1 optimal choices (Lemma 2 and Proposition 4)
- Cost in No Default (ND) case (using budget constraint ST0 = e1 + p1 ST1 with p1 = 1 / (1 + r)):
  - V_ND = (ST0   (1/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + (LT + ST1)^2. (Equation (14))
- Cost in Potential Default (PD) case (p1 = H2 / (1 + r)):
  - V_PD = (ST0   (H2/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + H2 (LT + ST1)^2 + L2 K. (Equation (15))
- Optimal interior solutions (when available):
  - ST^ND_1,min = (1/(1+r)) ST0   1 LT / (1/(1+r)^2 + 1). (Equation (19))
  - V_ND_min(1; LT; E(D)) = (D(1 + r) + E(D) / (1 + r) LT)^2 / (1/(1+r)^2 + 1). (Equation (20))
  - ST^PD_1,min = (1/(1+r)) ST0   1 LT H2 / (1/(1+r)^2 + 1). (Equation (22))
  - V_PD_min(1; LT; E(D)) = (D(1 + r) + (E(D)   L2)/(1 + r) LT)^2 / (H2 (1/(1+r)^2) + 1) + L2 K. (Equation (23))
- Assumption 1 (parameter restrictions used throughout):
  - 0 ≤ LT ≤ L2,
  - D ∈ [0; D_max] with D_max = L2,
  - D > L2 (1 + r)^2,
  - K ≥ (H2)^2,
  - L2 K > (L2)^2.
- Thresholds on 1 (Definition 3):
  - ¯1: unique positive solution of an equality equating constrained ND and PD costs when LT = 0. (Equation (25))
  - +1: unique positive solution equating constrained ND and PD costs when LT = L2. (Equation (26))
  - ^1 =  value of +1 for E(D) = 0;  ˜1 = value of +1 for E(D) = D_max.
  - Ordering: 0 < ¯1 < ^1 ≤ +1 ≤ ˜1. (Inequality (27))
- Proposition 4 (regions of 1 and t = 1 choices):
  - If 1 < ¯1 then Sovereign chooses PD irrespective of debt portfolio.
  - If ¯1 ≤ 1 < +1 then decision depends on LT: there is LT̃(1; E(D)) with 0 < LT̃ < L2 such that Sovereign chooses ND iff LT < LT̃(1; E(D)). LT̃ decreases in E(D) and increases in 1.
  - If 1 ≥ +1 then Sovereign chooses ND irrespective of the debt portfolio.
- Corollary 5 (interior ND region):
  - Let ̂1 = D L2 + D_max (1 + r)^2   1/(1 + r)^2 > ^1. If 1 ≥ ̂1 then Sovereign chooses interior ND solution independent of LT and E(D).

### Role of initial uncertainty (t = 0 beliefs about 1) and endogenous default
- Investors at t = 0 price LT using expected default probability E(D); in equilibrium E(D) depends on portfolio (ST0, LT).
  - If portfolio leads to ND at t = 1 then p0 = 1/(1 + r)^2 (E(D) = 0).
  - If portfolio leads to PD then p0 = (1   E(D)) / (1 + r)^2 with E(D) > 0.
- Benchmark (no uncertainty on 1):
  - Proposition 6: If no uncertainty and unique 1 then optimal portfolio leads to ND iff 1 ≥ ¯1. Portfolio selection largely indeterminate when there is no uncertainty (LT instrument is equivalent to rolling ST when default behavior is certain).
- Uncertainty case (two values): main mechanism
  - With t = 0 uncertainty over 1, LT can be used by the Sovereign as a hedging device because the return on LT is correlated with the Sovereign's future decision (ND vs PD).
  - Since markets are incomplete at t = 0 (only ST and LT available), the Sovereign may choose a portfolio that gives incentives to default in some states to optimally allocate debt burden across states — thereby creating a positive endogenous default probability even when expected fundamentals may be optimistic.
- Proposition 7 (two-value case: M1 in median region, H1 in high region):
  - Assume M1 ∈ [¯1; ^1) and H1 ≥ ̂1. Prior probabilities on M1 and H1 are M1 and H1 respectively.
  - Under technical condition D > 6 (1 + r)^2 L2, there exists ^H1 (0 < ^H1 < 1) s.t.:
    - If H1 > ^H1 the Sovereign chooses portfolio that leads to PD (default after 1 = M1 and 2 = L2).
    - If H1 ≤ ^H1 the Sovereign chooses portfolio that leads to ND.
  - Interpretation: More optimistic priors (large H1) can induce a positive expected probability of default because the Sovereign exploits LT issuance to hedge, transferring burden across states at the cost of incurring default risk in the median state.
- Proposition 8 (two-value case: low and median):
  - If 1 ∈ {L1 ∈ (0; ¯1), M1 ∈ [¯1; ^1)} then Sovereign chooses portfolio that leads to ND when M1 occurs and PD when L1 occurs (i.e., default in low state, no default in median state).

### Optimal portfolio at t = 0 when one median state PD and one high state ND (Proposition 9 and Corollaries)
- Consider M1 (PD) and H1 (ND) with H1 ≥ ̂1, prior probabilities M1 and H1. Expected default probability at t = 0 is E(D) = M1 L2.
- First-order condition yields closed-form optimal ST0 and LT:
  - ST0 = H1   (1 / L2) (L2 (H1   M1)) / (1   M1 L2 (1 + r)^2 + 1 D (1 + r)). (Equation (35)) [expression in text]
  - LT = 1/(1 + r) + (1 + r) L2 (H1   M1) / (1   M1 L2 (1 + r)^2 + 1 D (1 + r)). (Equation (36))
  - where 1 = M1 M1 + H1 H1.
- Comparative statics:
  - LT is decreasing in H1 (the Sovereign issues less LT when prior optimism on the high state increases in the objective weight).
  - If M1 > H2 H1 then ST0 > 0 and ST0 is decreasing in H1.
  - Price p0 = 1   M1 L2 (1 + r)^2 is increasing in H1.
- Corollary 10 (effort and debt burdens):
  - Fiscal efforts at t = 1:
    - e1(M1) = M1 H2 (1 + r)^2 + M1 B1(M1) / (1 + r)?? [see exact equations (37),(38) in source]
    - e1(H1) = H1 / (1/(1 + r)^2 + H1) ??? (Equations (37),(38): exact algebraic forms preserved in source)
  - Fiscal efforts at t = 2:
    - e2(M1; H2) = (1/(1 + r)) H2 (1 + r)^2 + M1 B1(M1); e2(M1; L2) = pK. (Equation (39))
    - e2(H1; H2) = e2(H1; L2) = 1/(1 + r) 1/(1 + r)^2 + H1 B1(H1). (Equation (40))
  - Debt burdens B1(1) = ST0 + p1(1) LT with p1(1) = 1/(1 + r) under ND and H2 / (1 + r) under PD.
  - All B1(M1), B1(H1) and efforts e1(·), e2(·) are decreasing in H1 (more optimistic prior reduces debt burdens and efforts).
- Corollary 11 (ND vs PD characterization in terms of LT and burdens):
  - If Sovereign chooses ND under M1 then LT ≤ LT̃(M1;0), B1(M1) = D(1 + r) = B1(H1) and e1(M1) = D(1 + r)   L2/(1 + r).
  - If Sovereign chooses PD under M1 then LT > LT̃(M1;0), B1(M1) < D(1 + r) < B1(H1) and e1(M1) < D(1 + r)   L2/(1 + r).

### Mechanism summary and economic interpretation
- Principal trade-off: Issuing LT debt smooths fiscal effort and lowers costly e1 in bad states, but large LT issuance can create incentive to default in some realizations (PD).
- Incomplete markets: At t = 0 with limited instruments (ST and LT), Sovereign may use LT to reallocate burden across states; this can make default endogenous and correlated with fundamentals.
- Uncertainty as source of default:
  - Prior uncertainty about 1 can induce PD in median states even when the expected 1 is favorable.
  - More optimistic priors (higher probability on high state) can paradoxically raise probability of default in equilibrium (Proposition 7) because the Sovereign optimally issues more LT to hedge, which raises the expected default probability sufficiently to justify PD in median state.
- Comparative statics:
  - LT issuance can either increase or decrease with prior optimism, but in the canonical two-state PD/ND case optimal LT is decreasing in H1; increased optimism reduces both ST0 and LT issuance and lowers t = 1 debt burdens and efforts (Proposition 9, Corollary 10).

### Policy implications and role of international financial institutions (IFIs)
- Markets may fail to provide complete contingent claims correlated with future fundamentals; Sovereign may self-insure by creating endogenous default risk.
- IFIs can improve outcomes by offering conditional LT contracts:
  - An IFI could buy ST debt at t = 0 and commit to roll it over at t = 1 conditional on observed fiscal effort e1 (or other conditionality).
  - Such IFI contracts create an LT asset whose intermediate value is contingent on e1 (hence correlated with 1 via Sovereign’s optimization), expanding the set of available contingent instruments.
  - By providing hedging instruments correlated with fundamentals, IFIs can reduce the need for the Sovereign to issue risky LT debt and thereby reduce PD in median states.
- Caveat noted in text: Role of IFIs must be weighed against moral hazard concerns associated with interventions contingent on fiscal effort.

### Key quantitative expressions and thresholds (selected)
- Debt pricing:
  - p1 = (1 D) / (1 + r). (2)
  - p0 = (1   E(D)) / (1 + r)^2. (3)
- t = 0 budget constraint:
  - D = (1 / (1 + r)) ST0 + (1   E(D)) / (1 + r)^2 LT. (4)
- ND and PD cost forms:
  - V_ND = (ST0   (1/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + (LT + ST1)^2. (14)
  - V_PD = (ST0   (H2/(1+r)) ST1)^2 1 + H2 (LT + ST1)^2 + L2 K. (15)
- Optimal interior ST issuance:
  - ST^ND_1,min = (1/(1 + r)) ST0   1 LT / (1/(1 + r)^2 + 1). (19)
  - ST^PD_1,min = (1/(1 + r)) ST0   1 LT H2 / (1/(1 + r)^2 + 1). (22)
- PD existence condition (from Lemma 2):
  - 1 < D L2 + E(D) (1 + r)^2 LT  L2   1/(1 + r)^2 (L2 LT L2 + H2). (24)
- Assumption 1 parameter inequalities:
  - 0 ≤ LT ≤ L2;
  - D ∈ [0; D_max] with D_max = L2;
  - D > L2 (1 + r)^2;
  - K ≥ (H2)^2;
  - L2 K > (L2)^2.

*Italic source: _wp14168 - Section IV.*

### REFERENCES

### _wp14168 - REFERENCES

### Major thematic groupings in the cited literature
- Sovereign default, renegotiation, and bailout theory
  - Arellano, C., 2008, "Default risk and income uctuations in emerging economies", American Economic Review, 98(3), pp.690-712.
  - Arellano, C. and A. Ramanarayanan, 2010, "Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds," Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), pp.187-232.
  - Bolton, P, and O. Jeanne, 2009, "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority," Review of Economic Studies, 76(3), pp.879-902.
  - Bolton, P. and O. Jeanne, 2008, "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime," Journal of Political Economy.
  - Cole, H. and T. Kehoe, 1996, "A Self-Fullling Model of Mexico's 1994{95 Debt Crisis," Journal of International Economics, 41, pp.309{30.
  - Cole, H. and T. Kehoe, 2000, "Self-fullling debt crisis," Review of Economic Studies, 67(1), pp.91-113.
  - Conesa, J. and T. Kehoe, 2012, "Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fullling Debt Crises," Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 465.
  - Conesa, J. and T. Kehoe, 2014, "Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?" American Economic Review, 104(5), pp.88{93.
  - Jeanne, O., J. Ostry and J. Zettelmeyer, 2008, "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality," IMF Working paper 08/236 and CEPR Discussion Paper 7022.
  - Yue, V., 2010, "Sovereign default and debt renegotiation," Journal of International Economics, 80 (2), pp.176-187.
  - Grossman, H. and J. Van Huyck, 1988, "Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation," The American Economic Review 78(5), pp.1088-1097.
  - Haldane, A., A Penalver, V. Saporta and H S Shin, 2005, "Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring," Journal of International Economics, 65(2), pp.315-333.
  - Ghosal, S. and M. Miller, 2003, "Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Soreveign Bankruptcy Procedures," Economic Journal 113, pp.276-304.
  - Hatchondo, J.C., Martinez, L. and C. Sosa Padilla, 2010, "Debt dilution and sovereign default risk," Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond WP 10-08R.

- Debt maturity, term structure, and duration of government debt
  - Angeletos, George-Marios, 2002, "Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure", Quarterly Journal of Economics 117, pp.1105-1131.
  - Buera, F. and J. P. Nicolini, 2004, "Optimal Maturity of Government Debt without State Contingent Bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics 51, pp.531-554.
  - Hatchondo, J.C. and L. Martinez, 2009, "Long-duration bonds and sovereign default," Journal of International Economics, 79, pp.117-125.
  - Hatchondo, J.C. and L. Martinez, 2012, "Sudden stops, time inconsistency, and the duration of sovereign debt," mimeo.
  - Broner, F., G. Lorenzoni and S. Schmukler, 2013, "Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?" Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, pp. 67-100.
  - Jeanne, O., 2009, "Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture," The American Economic Review, 99(5), pp.2135-2148.
  - Gai, P. and H. S. Shin, 2004, "Debt Maturity Structure with Pre-emptive Creditors," Economics Letters, 85(2), pp.195 - 200.
  - Dai, Q., and T. Philippon, 2006, "Fiscal Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates," Working Paper.
  - Buera, F. and J. P. Nicolini, 2004, "Optimal Maturity of Government Debt without State Contingent Bonds," Journal of Monetary Economics 51, pp.531-554.

- Coordination, self-fulfilling crises, and information problems
  - Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 1998, "Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fullling Currency Attacks," The American Economic Review, 88(3), pp.587-597.
  - Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 2004, "Coordination risk and the price of debt," European Economic Review, 48, pp.133-153.
  - Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 2006, "Catalytic nance: When does it work?," Journal of International Economics, 70, pp.161-177.
  - Hellwig, M. G. Lorenzoni, 2009, "Bubbles and self enforcing debt," Econometrica, 77(4), pp.1137-1164.
  - Longstaff, F. A., 2004, "The Flight-to-Liquidity Premium in U.S. Treasury Bond Prices," Journal of Business, 77(3), pp.511-526.
  - Laubach, T., 2009, "New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Decits and Debt," Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(4), pp. 858-885.
  - Haldane, A., A Penalver, V. Saporta and H S Shin, 2005, "Analytics of sovereign debt restructuring," Journal of International Economics, 65(2), pp.315-333.

- Market microstructure, liquidation risk, and creditor behavior
  - Challe, E, F. Le Grand and X. Ragot, 2010, "Incomplete Markets, Liquidation Risk, and the Term Structure of Interest Rates," Banque de France WP 301.
  - Ghosal, S. and M. Miller, 2003, "Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Soreveign Bankruptcy Procedures," Economic Journal 113, pp.276-304.
  - Bolster references to creditor behavior and seniority: Bolton, P, and O. Jeanne, 2009, "Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority," Review of Economic Studies, 76(3), pp.879-902.

- Analytical and methodological contributions
  - Chamley, Ch., 2004, Rational herds: economic models of social learning, Cambridge University Press.
  - Reinhart, V., and B. Sack , 2000, "The Economic Consequences of Disappearing Government Debt," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 31(2000-2), pp.163-220.

### Representative citation entries (verbatim)
- Angeletos, George-Marios, 2002, \Fiscal Policy with Noncontingent Debt and the Optimal Maturity Structure",Quarterly Journal of Economics117, pp.1105-1131.
- Arellano, C., 2008, \Default risk and income uctuations in emerging economies ",American Economic Review, 98(3), pp.690-712.
- Arellano, C. and A. Ramanarayanan, 2010, \Default and the maturity structure in sovereign bonds,"Journal of Political Economy, 120(2), pp.187-232.
- Bolton, P, and O. Jeanne, 2009, \Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority,"Review of Economic Studies, 76(3), pp.879-902.
- Bolton, P. and O. Jeanne, 2008, \Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of a Bankruptcy Regime,"Journal of Political Economy.
- Broner, F., G. Lorenzoni and S. Schmukler, 2013, \Why Do Emerging Economies Borrow Short Term?"Journal of the European Economic Association, 11, pp. 67-100.
- Buera, F. and J. P. Nicolini, 2004, \Optimal Maturity of Government Debt without State Contingent Bonds,"Journal of Monetary Economics51, pp.531-554.
- Challe, E, F. Le Grand and X. Ragot, 2010, \Incomplete Markets, Liquidation Risk, and the Term Structure of Interest Rates,"Banque de France WP 301.
- Chamley, Ch., 2004, Rational herds: economic models of social learning, Cambridge University Press.
- Cole, H. and T. Kehoe, 1996, \A Self-Fullling Model of Mexico's 1994{95 Debt Crisis,"Journal of International Economics, 41, pp.309{30.
- Cole, H. and T. Kehoe, 2000, \Self-fullling debt crisis,"Review of Economic Studies, 67(1), pp.91-113.
- Conesa, J. and T. Kehoe, 2012, \Gambling for Redemption and Self-Fullling Debt Crises,"Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis Research Department Staff Report 465.
- Conesa, J. and T. Kehoe, 2014, \Is It Too Late to Bail Out the Troubled Countries in the Eurozone?"American Economic Review, 104(5), pp.88{93.
- Dai, Q., and T. Philippon, 2006, \Fiscal Policy and the Term Structure of Interest Rates,"Working Paper.
- Gai, P. and H. S. Shin, 2004, \Debt Maturity Structure with Pre-emptive Creditors,"Economics Letters, 85(2), pp.195 - 200.
- Ghosal, S. and M. Miller, 2003, \Coordination Failure, Moral Hazard and Soreveign Bankruptcy Procedures,"Economic Journal 113, pp.276-304.
- Grossman, H. and J. Van Huyck, 1988, \Sovereign Debt as a Contingent Claim: Excusable Default, Repudiation, and Reputation,"The American Economic Review78(5), pp.1088-1097.
- Haldane, A., A Penalver, V. Saporta and H S Shin, 2005, \Analytics of sovereign debt restruc- turing,"Journal of International Economics, 65(2), pp.315-333.
- Hatchondo, J.C. and L. Martinez, 2009, \Long-duration bonds and sovereign default,"Journal of International Economics, 79, pp.117-125.
- Hatchondo, J.C., Martinez, L. and C. Sosa Padilla, 2010, \Debt dilution and sovereign default risk,"Federal Reserve Bank of Richmond WP 10-08R.
- Hatchondo, J.C. and L. Martinez, 2012, \Sudden stops, time inconsistency, and the duration of sovereign debt,"mimeo.
- Hellwig, M. G. Lorenzoni, 2009, \Bubbles and self enforcing debt,"Econometrica, 77(4), pp.1137-1164.
- Jeanne, O., 2009, \Debt Maturity and the International Financial Architecture, "The American Economic Review, 99(5), pp.2135-2148.
- Jeanne, O., J. Ostry and J. Zettelmeyer, 2008, \A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality, "IMF Working paper 08/236 and CEPR Discussion Paper 7022.
- Laubach, T., 2009, \New Evidence on the Interest Rate Effects of Budget Decits and Debt,"Journal of the European Economic Association, 7(4), pp. 858-885.
- Longstaff, F. A., 2004, \The Flight-to-Liquidity Premium in U.S. Treasury Bond Prices,"Journal of Business, 77(3), pp.511-526.
- Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 1998, \Unique Equilibrium in a Model of Self-Fullling Currency Attacks,"The American Economic Review, 88(3), pp.587-597.
- Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 2004, \Coordination risk and the price of debt,"European Economic Review, 48, pp.133-153.
- Morris, S., and H.S. Shin, 2006, \Catalytic nance: When does it work?, "Journal of Interna- tional Economics, 70, pp.161-177.
- Reinhart, V., and B. Sack , 2000, \The Economic Consequences of Disappearing Government Debt,"Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 31(2000-2), pp.163-220.
- Yue, V., 2010, \Sovereign default and debt renegotiation,"Journal of International Economics, 80 (2), pp.176-187.

*Source: _wp14168 - REFERENCES*

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