## _wp14195 - References

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### I. INTRODUCTION — Core thesis and rationale
- Mismanaged risk transcends national borders and can quickly create widespread economic and social damage.
- Globalization increases opportunities for growth and poverty reduction but also magnifies some global risks and complicates their management.
- Risks that spread across borders and affect several countries or generations constitute global public goods; their management requires collective action by the international community.
- Low income countries are disproportionately vulnerable due to greater exposure to shocks, weak infrastructures and institutions, and limited access to mitigation tools.
- Collective action problems (absence of appropriate institutional/governance mechanisms; lack of incentives) undermine provision of global public goods, potentially producing a fragmented global system and mismanaged risks.
- Paper focus:
  - Key global risks that exceed national capacity (macro critical risks with implications for stability and development).
  - Underlying causes of failure for, and effective responses to, resolving such risks.
  - Emphasis on global financial crises, environmental risks, pandemics, and risks associated with fragile and conflict states.
- Recommendations (high-level):
  - Forge consensus on transboundary and intergenerational risks.
  - Build cohesive international community to work collectively around well-defined common goals.
  - Facilitate knowledge buildup and sharing, encourage proactivity and longer-term planning, devote more resources to capacity building, and protect the most vulnerable.
  - Mobilize global resources and establish mechanisms to forge cooperation even when some countries fail to cooperate; realign incentives through advocacy and demonstration of incremental benefits.

### II. RISKS THAT RECOGNIZE NO BOUNDARIES — Examples and consequences
- Cross-border risks described:
  - Economic and financial crises:
    - International integration can diversify idiosyncratic shocks but also generates risks requiring collective action to contain costs and build resilience for the poor.
    - The global financial crisis of 2008:
      - Undoing between seven and fourteen years of economic progress in the countries hardest hit (Figure 1).
      - Around 30 million people lost jobs globally over the course of the crisis.
      - Unemployment rates reached unprecedented levels (Ötker-Robe and Podpiera 2013).
      - Pace of poverty reduction slowed; millions put at risk of falling into extreme poverty and exclusion.
  - Health risks / pandemics:
    - Increased air travel and trade can allow pathogens to reach major cities in less than 36 hours.
    - Examples: avian and swine flu, AIDS, SARS, Ebola.
    - International coordination is essential for prevention, detection, and rapid response.
  - Climate change and slow-onset risks:
    - Attributed largely to human activities (burning of fossil fuels, deforestation); building slowly and nearly invisibly for decades (Box 1).
    - Climate extremes (heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts, wildfires) have been increasing for the past 50 years and are expected to worsen as greenhouse gas concentrations reach unprecedented levels (IPCC 2007, 2012).
    - Recent data show carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increased at its fastest rate for 30 years in 2013.
    - Developing countries are most adversely affected due to limited capacity to prepare and cope with increased frequency/severity of extreme events, rising sea levels, reduced water and food security, and spread of infectious diseases.
  - Transboundary externalities:
    - National policies may create negative externalities (tragedy of the commons).
    - Examples: upstream dams affecting downstream water security; ring-fencing of bank affiliates during crises can reduce contagion locally but weaken home country financial resilience and raise costs of capital and liquidity elsewhere (D’Hulster and Ötker-Robe 2014).

### III. HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN SCALE UP RISK MANAGEMENT — Roles and instruments
- Four key functions the international community can perform:
  - Generate knowledge to address information gaps and overcome cognitive and behavioral biases that impede risk identification, measurement, and assessment.
    - Knowledge is a global public good: extensive cross-country analyses by IFIs provide impartial knowledge, raise risk awareness, and bridge gaps between global objectives and national policies.
    - Clear and prompt communication of knowledge is crucial to affect behavior.
  - Internalize externalities via rules, regulations, and standards that provide frameworks for collective action.
    - Recent initiatives cited include: post-2008 global financial infrastructure strengthening (BCBS 2011); Millennium Development Goals (UN 2000); New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (OECD 2011a,b); global pandemic countermeasures (UN 2011); Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC (UN 1998); Montreal Protocol (UNEP 2007).
  - Facilitate collective action and cooperation through platforms for policy dialogue to coordinate sovereign states and limit externalities and inconsistencies in implementation.
  - Improve access to markets and resources necessary to protect against, insure against, or cope with risks when they materialize (Figure 2).
- Obstacles addressed by international community:
  - Knowledge deficiencies that become more formidable as risks grow in intensity and complexity and uncertainties about sources, drivers, and impacts deepen.
  - Cognitive failures and capacity constraints that prevent effective internalization and action on known risks.
  - Incentive misalignment that favors short-term national gains over long-term, cooperative solutions.
- Strategic emphasis:
  - Greater emphasis on preparation, proactivity, and longer-term planning rather than predominantly on reactive responses.
  - Use advocacy and demonstration of incremental benefits to realign incentives and reach fuller cooperation.
  - Protect the most vulnerable and devote resources to capacity building in low income and fragile states.

### Box 1. Climate Change and Implications for Stability and Development
- Overview and key metrics:
  - Climate change is the rise in Earth’s temperature associated with increased atmospheric concentrations of heat-trapping greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2).
  - CO2 concentration rose from its pre-industrial level of 278 parts per million (ppm) to a daily average of 400 ppm in May 2013, approaching the 450 ppm threshold that corresponds to a likely increase in Earth’s temperature of more than 2oC.
  - New research suggests Earth is warmer today than at any time during the past 11,300 years.
  - If greenhouse gas concentrations continue unabated, a warming of more than 4oC could occur as early as the 2060s.
  - Estimated cumulative cost from damage to health, food security, and the physical environment ranges from $2 trillion to $4 trillion by 2030 depending on the climate scenario.
- Observed and projected impacts:
  - Effects already visible:
    - widespread melting of Arctic glaciers;
    - rising sea levels;
    - higher frequency and severity of extreme weather events and natural hazards.
  - Projected large-scale impacts with continued unabated emissions:
    - heightened risk of inundation of coastal areas;
    - spread of infectious diseases;
    - declining water and food security;
    - destruction of habitats for many species;
    - social and economic consequences of large displaced populations.
  - Catastrophic/irreversible risks are associated with passing critical warming thresholds (“tipping points”), but significant scientific uncertainty remains about their location and magnitude.
- Obstacles to effective collective action on climate change:
  - Scientific and informational obstacles:
    - significant scientific uncertainty on critical warming thresholds and magnitude of effects;
    - extensive environmental data remain scattered and lagged, with no systematic dissemination to summon global action.
  - Incentive and political-economy obstacles:
    - countries diverge in how climate change affects them, creating competing incentives for action;
    - absence of a global authority to enforce cooperation; free-riding problems persist;
    - short-termism and different valuations of ecosystems, biodiversity, and loss of life lead to inaction and pass risk to future generations.
  - Behavioral and cognitive obstacles:
    - individuals and governments often view rare or distant events as low priority, underestimating costs and failing to insure or take preventive action;
    - deep uncertainty about benefits and costs of action undermines cooperation.
  - Resource and capacity obstacles:
    - implementation capacity and resource constraints limit some countries’ ability to adopt available tools; during 2007-12, insurance covered less than 20 percent of total disaster losses in developing countries, on average, compared to about 60 percent in North America (SwissRe).
- International community tools and roles:
  - Capacity building and knowledge:
    - strengthen governance and capacity to implement global standards (example: Basel III framework);
    - set up early warning and monitoring systems for systemic risk, communicable diseases, and natural disasters;
    - design contingency planning and crisis management mechanisms; develop markets and tools for hedging and insurance.
  - Mobilizing global resources and risk-sharing tools:
    - Emergency support: ex post support from bilateral or multilateral creditors or private organizations to mitigate sudden shortages of resources after severe crises or disasters.
    - Insurance mechanisms: insurance pools resources across states; examples include reserve pooling and swap lines (e.g., Chiang Mai Initiative, BRICs bank, European Stability Mechanism) though regional pools may have limited lending power.
    - Facilitating insurance: help countries pool resources to jointly access international markets at lower premiums, especially useful for small states where private markets are segmented or unaffordable.
  - Examples of international cooperation success and failure illustrate tool use:
    - Smallpox eradication (1967–79): goals achieved; costs about $300 million worldwide; benefit-cost ratio over 400:1; strong leadership, technical support, surveillance, and containment.
    - Montreal Protocol (1987): broad participation (197 UN nations), developed countries reduced production/consumption/emission of controlled chemicals by 99%; developing countries by 72%; success due to addressing source (chemicals), cost-effective substitutes, scientific consensus, and a multilateral fund.
    - Kyoto Protocol (1997): aimed for a 5.2% cut on average in emissions of industrial countries below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012; many countries did not meet targets; failure factors included limited participation by major emitters, absence of effective enforcement, and diverging incentives.
- Policy implications and recommendations:
  - General principles:
    - Preserve gains from globalization and continue efforts to find tools, incentives, and institutions to promote international cooperation.
    - Realign incentives around shared goals and attract participation of major players capable of achieving progress.
    - Use combinations of knowledge, protection, insurance, and coping tools to scale up risk management.
  - When incentives are well aligned (full participation):
    - Promote prompt sharing of information and resources.
    - Build appropriate capacity and infrastructure to monitor, identify, and contain emerging risks.
    - Improve access to knowledge as first step: systematic, frequent, and targeted dissemination of key information and best practices; targeted education and information campaigns by IFIs, national governments, civil society, and global media.
    - Reduce uncertainty by devoting more resources to scientific research and fostering partnerships among international organizations, governments, the scientific community, and civil society.
    - Promote systematic, integrated risk management that considers complexity and connectivity of risks with a long-term view.
    - Ease capacity constraints: design proactive contingency plans, build buffers, set up monitoring/EWS/communication systems, analyze network complexities, develop insurance and hedging markets and widen access.
    - Ease financial constraints: augment national resources and facilitate risk-pooling solutions; reward self-insurance and protection; make financing contingent on adequate risk management; provide technical assistance to build capacity.
  - When incentives are not well aligned (incremental approaches):
    - Use coalitions of the willing: start with a smaller group to coordinate, advocate, and take action while creating incentives for others to join.
    - Coalition design principles:
      - include major contributors to the problem and those most affected;
      - engage civil society, media, and scientific community;
      - improve access to knowledge and advocacy through targeted campaigns and persuasive scientific evidence;
      - provide financial and technological transfers to lower participation costs (important for developing countries);
      - deploy positive and negative financial incentives to internalize externalities (examples: carbon taxes, reduced fuel subsidies, trade restrictions);
      - encourage environmental accounting to internalize costs of resource depletion and environmental degradation.
    - Acknowledge risks of incremental approach: formalizes free riding by outsiders; no guarantee of scaling to full participation; some risks (e.g., pandemics) ultimately require global cooperation.
    - Consider establishing an international risk board / international panel on global systemic risks to pool knowledge, identify and prioritize systemic risks, and provide impartial assessments to inform coalitions and policymakers.
- Conclusions and key takeaways:
  - Global risks that cross national and generational boundaries (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, fragility and conflict) can reverse development gains and jeopardize future generations.
  - Growing interconnectedness magnifies impacts of global risks and complicates management; current international architecture has not kept pace with connectivity and complexity.
  - Primary impediments to resolving these risks include insufficient knowledge, deep uncertainty, limited resources and capacity, and diverging national interests in the absence of global enforcement authority or perceived common goals.
  - Abandoning global cooperative solutions would be costly; instead:
    - build on national and individual positive steps and lessons from successful international cooperation;
    - enhance knowledge buildup and sharing, devote more resources to research and capacity building, and protect the vulnerable;
    - realign incentives and mobilize global resources to enable incremental steps that demonstrate benefits and converge to full cooperation.
  - Systematic, proactive, and integrated risk management and contingency planning at national and international levels are essential to address interconnections and avoid compounding adverse consequences across risks.

*Source: _wp14195 - References (excerpt provided).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp14195 - References

### I. INTRODUCTION — Core thesis and rationale
- Mismanaged risk transcends national borders and can quickly create widespread economic and social damage.
- Globalization increases opportunities for growth and poverty reduction but also magnifies some global risks and complicates their management.
- Risks that spread across borders and affect several countries or generations constitute global public goods; their management requires collective action by the international community.
- Low income countries are disproportionately vulnerable due to greater exposure to shocks, weak infrastructures and institutions, and limited access to mitigation tools.
- Collective action problems (absence of appropriate institutional/governance mechanisms; lack of incentives) undermine provision of global public goods, potentially producing a fragmented global system and mismanaged risks.
- Paper focus:
  - Key global risks that exceed national capacity (macro critical risks with implications for stability and development).
  - Underlying causes of failure for, and effective responses to, resolving such risks.
  - Emphasis on global financial crises, environmental risks, pandemics, and risks associated with fragile and conflict states.
- Recommendations (high-level):
  - Forge consensus on transboundary and intergenerational risks.
  - Build cohesive international community to work collectively around well-defined common goals.
  - Facilitate knowledge buildup and sharing, encourage proactivity and longer-term planning, devote more resources to capacity building, and protect the most vulnerable.
  - Mobilize global resources and establish mechanisms to forge cooperation even when some countries fail to cooperate; realign incentives through advocacy and demonstration of incremental benefits.

### II. RISKS THAT RECOGNIZE NO BOUNDARIES — Examples and consequences
- Cross-border risks described:
  - Economic and financial crises: international integration can diversify idiosyncratic shocks but also generates risks requiring collective action to contain costs and build resilience for the poor.
    - The global financial crisis of 2008:
      - Undoing between seven and fourteen years of economic progress in the countries hardest hit (Figure 1).
      - Around 30 million people lost jobs globally over the course of the crisis.
      - Unemployment rates reached unprecedented levels (Ötker-Robe and Podpiera 2013).
      - Pace of poverty reduction slowed; millions put at risk of falling into extreme poverty and exclusion.
  - Health risks / pandemics:
    - Increased air travel and trade can allow pathogens to reach major cities in less than 36 hours.
    - Examples: avian and swine flu, AIDS, SARS, Ebola.
    - International coordination is essential for prevention, detection, and rapid response.
  - Climate change and slow-onset risks:
    - Attributed largely to human activities (burning of fossil fuels, deforestation); building slowly and nearly invisibly for decades (Box 1).
    - Climate extremes (heat waves, heavy precipitation, droughts, wildfires) have been increasing for the past 50 years and are expected to worsen as greenhouse gas concentrations reach unprecedented levels (IPCC 2007, 2012).
    - Recent data show carbon dioxide in the atmosphere increased at its fastest rate for 30 years in 2013.
    - Developing countries are most adversely affected due to limited capacity to prepare and cope with increased frequency/severity of extreme events, rising sea levels, reduced water and food security, and spread of infectious diseases.
  - Transboundary externalities:
    - National policies may create negative externalities (tragedy of the commons).
    - Examples: upstream dams affecting downstream water security; ring-fencing of bank affiliates during crises can reduce contagion locally but weaken home country financial resilience and raise costs of capital and liquidity elsewhere (D’Hulster and Ötker-Robe 2014).

### III. HOW THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY CAN SCALE UP RISK MANAGEMENT — Roles and instruments
- Four key functions the international community can perform:
  - Generate knowledge to address information gaps and overcome cognitive and behavioral biases that impede risk identification, measurement, and assessment.
    - Knowledge is a global public good: extensive cross-country analyses by IFIs provide impartial knowledge, raise risk awareness, and bridge gaps between global objectives and national policies.
    - Clear and prompt communication of knowledge is crucial to affect behavior.
  - Internalize externalities via rules, regulations, and standards that provide frameworks for collective action.
    - Recent initiatives cited include: post-2008 global financial infrastructure strengthening (BCBS 2011); Millennium Development Goals (UN 2000); New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States (OECD 2011a,b); global pandemic countermeasures (UN 2011); Kyoto Protocol and UNFCCC (UN 1998); Montreal Protocol (UNEP 2007).
  - Facilitate collective action and cooperation through platforms for policy dialogue to coordinate sovereign states and limit externalities and inconsistencies in implementation.
  - Improve access to markets and resources necessary to protect against, insure against, or cope with risks when they materialize (Figure 2).
- Obstacles addressed by international community:
  - Knowledge deficiencies that become more formidable as risks grow in intensity and complexity and uncertainties about sources, drivers, and impacts deepen.
  - Cognitive failures and capacity constraints that prevent effective internalization and action on known risks.
  - Incentive misalignment that favors short-term national gains over long-term, cooperative solutions.
- Strategic emphasis:
  - Greater emphasis on preparation, proactivity, and longer-term planning rather than predominantly on reactive responses.
  - Use advocacy and demonstration of incremental benefits to realign incentives and reach fuller cooperation.
  - Protect the most vulnerable and devote resources to capacity building in low income and fragile states.

*Source: _wp14195 - References (excerpt provided).*

### Box 1. Climate Change and Implications for Stability and Development

### Box 1. Climate Change and Implications for Stability and Development

### Overview and key metrics
- Climate change is the rise in Earth’s temperature associated with increased atmospheric concentrations of heat-trapping greenhouse gases such as carbon dioxide (CO2).
- CO2 concentration rose from its pre-industrial level of 278 parts per million (ppm) to a daily average of 400 ppm in May 2013, approaching the 450 ppm threshold that corresponds to a likely increase in Earth’s temperature of more than 2oC.
- New research suggests Earth is warmer today than at any time during the past 11,300 years.
- If greenhouse gas concentrations continue unabated, a warming of more than 4oC could occur as early as the 2060s.
- Estimated cumulative cost from damage to health, food security, and the physical environment ranges from $2 trillion to $4 trillion by 2030 depending on the climate scenario.

### Observed and projected impacts
- Effects already visible:
  - widespread melting of Arctic glaciers;
  - rising sea levels;
  - higher frequency and severity of extreme weather events and natural hazards.
- Projected large-scale impacts with continued unabated emissions:
  - heightened risk of inundation of coastal areas;
  - spread of infectious diseases;
  - declining water and food security;
  - destruction of habitats for many species;
  - social and economic consequences of large displaced populations.
- Catastrophic/irreversible risks are associated with passing critical warming thresholds (“tipping points”), but significant scientific uncertainty remains about their location and magnitude.

### Obstacles to effective collective action on climate change
- Scientific and informational obstacles:
  - significant scientific uncertainty on critical warming thresholds and magnitude of effects;
  - extensive environmental data remain scattered and lagged, with no systematic dissemination to summon global action.
- Incentive and political-economy obstacles:
  - countries diverge in how climate change affects them, creating competing incentives for action;
  - absence of a global authority to enforce cooperation; free-riding problems persist;
  - short-termism and different valuations of ecosystems, biodiversity, and loss of life lead to inaction and pass risk to future generations.
- Behavioral and cognitive obstacles:
  - individuals and governments often view rare or distant events as low priority, underestimating costs and failing to insure or take preventive action;
  - deep uncertainty about benefits and costs of action undermines cooperation.
- Resource and capacity obstacles:
  - implementation capacity and resource constraints limit some countries’ ability to adopt available tools; during 2007-12, insurance covered less than 20 percent of total disaster losses in developing countries, on average, compared to about 60 percent in North America (SwissRe).

### International community tools and roles
- Capacity building and knowledge:
  - strengthen governance and capacity to implement global standards (example: Basel III framework);
  - set up early warning and monitoring systems for systemic risk, communicable diseases, and natural disasters;
  - design contingency planning and crisis management mechanisms; develop markets and tools for hedging and insurance.
- Mobilizing global resources and risk-sharing tools:
  - Emergency support: ex post support from bilateral or multilateral creditors or private organizations to mitigate sudden shortages of resources after severe crises or disasters.
  - Insurance mechanisms: insurance pools resources across states; examples include reserve pooling and swap lines (e.g., Chiang Mai Initiative, BRICs bank, European Stability Mechanism) though regional pools may have limited lending power.
  - Facilitating insurance: help countries pool resources to jointly access international markets at lower premiums, especially useful for small states where private markets are segmented or unaffordable.
- Examples of international cooperation success and failure illustrate tool use:
  - Smallpox eradication (1967–79): goals achieved; costs about $300 million worldwide; benefit-cost ratio over 400:1; strong leadership, technical support, surveillance, and containment.
  - Montreal Protocol (1987): broad participation (197 UN nations), developed countries reduced production/consumption/emission of controlled chemicals by 99%; developing countries by 72%; success due to addressing source (chemicals), cost-effective substitutes, scientific consensus, and a multilateral fund.
  - Kyoto Protocol (1997): aimed for a 5.2% cut on average in emissions of industrial countries below 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012; many countries did not meet targets; failure factors included limited participation by major emitters, absence of effective enforcement, and diverging incentives.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- General principles:
  - Preserve gains from globalization and continue efforts to find tools, incentives, and institutions to promote international cooperation.
  - Realign incentives around shared goals and attract participation of major players capable of achieving progress.
  - Use combinations of knowledge, protection, insurance, and coping tools to scale up risk management.
- When incentives are well aligned (full participation):
  - Promote prompt sharing of information and resources.
  - Build appropriate capacity and infrastructure to monitor, identify, and contain emerging risks.
  - Improve access to knowledge as first step: systematic, frequent, and targeted dissemination of key information and best practices; targeted education and information campaigns by IFIs, national governments, civil society, and global media.
  - Reduce uncertainty by devoting more resources to scientific research and fostering partnerships among international organizations, governments, the scientific community, and civil society.
  - Promote systematic, integrated risk management that considers complexity and connectivity of risks with a long-term view.
  - Ease capacity constraints: design proactive contingency plans, build buffers, set up monitoring/EWS/communication systems, analyze network complexities, develop insurance and hedging markets and widen access.
  - Ease financial constraints: augment national resources and facilitate risk-pooling solutions; reward self-insurance and protection; make financing contingent on adequate risk management; provide technical assistance to build capacity.
- When incentives are not well aligned (incremental approaches):
  - Use coalitions of the willing: start with a smaller group to coordinate, advocate, and take action while creating incentives for others to join.
  - Coalition design principles:
    - include major contributors to the problem and those most affected;
    - engage civil society, media, and scientific community;
    - improve access to knowledge and advocacy through targeted campaigns and persuasive scientific evidence;
    - provide financial and technological transfers to lower participation costs (important for developing countries);
    - deploy positive and negative financial incentives to internalize externalities (examples: carbon taxes, reduced fuel subsidies, trade restrictions);
    - encourage environmental accounting to internalize costs of resource depletion and environmental degradation.
  - Acknowledge risks of incremental approach: formalizes free riding by outsiders; no guarantee of scaling to full participation; some risks (e.g., pandemics) ultimately require global cooperation.
  - Consider establishing an international risk board / international panel on global systemic risks to pool knowledge, identify and prioritize systemic risks, and provide impartial assessments to inform coalitions and policymakers.

### Conclusions and key takeaways
- Global risks that cross national and generational boundaries (climate change, pandemics, financial crises, fragility and conflict) can reverse development gains and jeopardize future generations.
- Growing interconnectedness magnifies impacts of global risks and complicates management; current international architecture has not kept pace with connectivity and complexity.
- Primary impediments to resolving these risks include insufficient knowledge, deep uncertainty, limited resources and capacity, and diverging national interests in the absence of global enforcement authority or perceived common goals.
- Abandoning global cooperative solutions would be costly; instead:
  - build on national and individual positive steps and lessons from successful international cooperation;
  - enhance knowledge buildup and sharing, devote more resources to research and capacity building, and protect the vulnerable;
  - realign incentives and mobilize global resources to enable incremental steps that demonstrate benefits and converge to full cooperation.
- Systematic, proactive, and integrated risk management and contingency planning at national and international levels are essential to address interconnections and avoid compounding adverse consequences across risks.

*Source: Box 1. Climate Change and Implications for Stability and Development (extracted from the provided IMF content).*

### REFERENCES

### _wp14195 - REFERENCES

### Global public goods, cooperation, and governance
- Barrett, Scott, 2003, “Creating Incentives for Cooperation: Strategic Choices,” In Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, edited by Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceição, Katell Le Goulven, and Ronald U, Mendoza, pp. 308–28, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barrett, Scott, 2006, “The Smallpox Eradication Game,” Public Choice 130 (1/2): pp. 179–207.
- Barrett, Scott, 2007, Why Cooperate? The Incentive to Supply Global Public Goods, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Barrett, Scott, 2008, “Climate Treaties and the Imperative of Enforcement,” Oxford Review of Economic Policy 24 (2): pp. 239–58.
- Barrett, Scott, and Astrid Dannenberg, 2012, “Climate Negotiations under Scientific Uncertainty,” PNAS (Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America) 109 (43): pp. 17372–76.
- Kaul, Inge, 2003, Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1999, “Knowledge as a Public Good,” In Global Public Goods: International Cooperation in the 21st Century, edited by Isabelle Grunberg Inge Kaul, and Marc A. Stern, pp. 308–25. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Goldin, Ian, 2013, Divided Nations: Why Global Governance Is Failing and What We Can Do about It, New York: Oxford University Press.
- Naím, Moisés, 2013, “The G20 Is a Sad Sign of Our Uncooperative World,” Financial Times (The A List), February 15.

### Climate change, adaptation, and climate finance
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2007, “Climate Change 2007— Mitigation of Climate Change: Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change,” Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, U.K.
- IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), 2012, Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate Change Adaptation, Special Report of the IPCC, Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
- Lenton, Timothy M., Hermann Held, Elmar Kriegler, Jim W. Hall, Wolfgang Lucht, Stefan Rahmstorf, and Hans Joachim Schellnhuber, 2008, “Tipping Elements in the Earth's Climate System,” PNAS 105 (6): pp. 1786–93.
- Stern, Nicholas, 2007, The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review, Cambridge, U.K: Cambridge University Press.
- Caravani, Alice, Smita Nakhooda, Charlene Watson, and Liane Schalatek, 2012, “The Global Climate Finance Architecture,” Climate Finance Fundamentals 2. http://www.climatefundsupdate.org.
- Schalatek, Liane, Smita Nakhooda, Sam Barnard, and Alice Caravani, 2012a, “Adaptation Finance,” Climate Finance Fundamentals 3. http:www.climatefundsupdates.org.
- Schalatek, Liane, Smita Nakhooda, Sam Barnard, and Alice Caravani, 2012b, “Mitigation Finance,” Climate Finance Fundamentals 4. http:www.climatefundsupdates.org.
- World Bank, 2010, Environmental Valuation and Greening the National Accounts: Challenges and Initial Practical Steps, December, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- World Bank, 2012b, “A Strategic Framework for the World Bank Group: Completion Report FY09–11,” Development and Climate Change, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- World Bank, 2012c, “Turn Down the Heat Why a 4oC Warmer World Must Be Avoided,” World Bank, Washington, DC.
- World Bank, 2009, World Development Report 2010: Development and Climate Change, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Marcott, Shaun A. Jeremy D. Shakun, Peter U. Clark, and Alan C. Mix, 2013, “A Reconstruction of Regional and Global Temperature for the Past 11,300 Years,” Science Magazine 339 (6124): pp. 1198–201.

### Disaster risk, pandemics, and early warning systems
- Bailey, Rob, 2013, “Managing Famine Risk: Linking Early Warning to Early Action,” Chatham House, London.
- UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), 2006, “Global Survey of Early Warning Systems: An Assessment of Capacities, Gaps and Opportunities Towards Building a Comprehensive Global Early Warning System for All Natural Hazards,” UNISDR, Geneva.
- UNISDR (United Nations International Strategy for Disaster Reduction), 2007, “Hyogo Framework for Action 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters,” UNISDR, Geneva.
- United Nations, 2011, “Beyond Pandemics: A Whole-of-Society Approach to Disaster Preparedness,” Toward a Safer World Initiative, September.
- Jonas, Olga, 2013, “Pandemic Risk,” Background paper for the World Development Report 2014.
- Mahul, Olivier, and J. David Cummins, 2009, Catastrophe Risk Financing in Developing Countries: Principles for Public Intervention, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Mahul, Olivier, and Francis Ghesquiere, 2010, “Financial Protection of the State against Natural Disasters: A Primer,” Policy Research Working Paper 5429, World Bank, Washington, DC.
- World Bank, and United Nations, 2010, Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters: The Economics of Effective Prevention, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Brahmbhatt, Milan, and Arindam Dutta, 2008, “Economic Effects during Outbreaks of Infectious Disease,” World Bank Research Digest 2 (2): 7.
- Barrett, Scott, 2006, “The Smallpox Eradication Game,” Public Choice 130 (1/2): pp. 179–207.
- United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 1998, “Kyoto Protocol,” United Nations, New York.

### Fragile, conflict-affected states, and post-conflict recovery
- Collier, Paul, and Anke Hoeffler, 2004, “Aid, Policy and Growth in Post-conflict Societies,” European Economic Review 48 (5): pp. 1125–45.
- DFID (Department for International Development), 2005, “Why We Need to Work More Effectively in Fragile States,” DFID, London.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2011a, “A New Deal for Engagement in Fragile States,” Paper prepared for the International Dialogue on Peacebuilding and Statebuilding organized by OECD, November 29–December 1.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2011b, Managing Risks in Fragile and Transitional Contexts, The Price of Success? Paris: OECD.
- OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), 2012, Fragile States 2013, Resource Flows and Trends in a Shifting World, Paris: OECD.
- OECD Development Assistance Committee, 2012, International Support to Post-Conflict Transition: Rethinking Policy, Changing Practice, DAC Guidelines and Reference Series, Paris: OECD.
- Ötker-Robe, İnci, 2013, “Seizing Opportunities under Extreme Risks: Fragile and Conflict-Affected States,” Let's Talk Development (blog), May 17. http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/seizing-opportunities-under-extreme-risks-fragile-and-conflict-affected-states.
- World Bank, 2013, “Stop Conflict, Reduce Fragility and End Poverty: Doing Things Differently in Fragile and Conflict-affected Situations,” World Bank, Washington, DC.
- Chalmers, Malcolm, 2004, “Spending to Save? An Analysis of the Cost Effectiveness of Conflict Prevention,” Paper prepared for the Bottom Billion Conference organized by the Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University, Oxford, June 27–29.

### Financial regulation, crises, and macroeconomic policy cooperation
- BCBS (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision), 2011, “Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More Resilient Banks and Banking Systems,” Bank for International Settlements, Basel.
- IMF and FSB, 2011, “The Financial Crisis and Information Gaps,” Implementation Progress Report G20, Washington, DC.
- Bayoumi, Tamim, 2014, "After the Fall: Lessons for Policy Cooperation from the Global Crisis, IMF Working Paper 14/97, IMF, Washington, DC.
- Kawai, Masahiro, and Domenico Lombardi, 2012, “Financial Regionalism,” Finance and Development 49 (3): pp. 23–25.
- Lagarde, Christine, 2012, “Fragmentation Risks,” Finance and Development 49 (3): pp, 26–27.
- Ötker-Robe, İnci, and Anca Podpiera, 2013, “The Social Impact of Financial Crises: Evidence from the Global Financial Crisis,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 6703, November.
- World Bank, and IMF, 2010, Global Monitoring Report: The MDGs after the Crisis, Washington, DC: World Bank.
- D’Hulster, Katia, and Inci Ötker-Robe, 2014, "Ring-fencing cross-border banks: An effective supervisory response?," Journal of Banking Regulation, advance online publication, October 1; doi:10.1057/jbr.2014.4.

### Environmental protocols, ozone, and success cases
- Rae, Ian, 2012, “Saving the Ozone Layer: Why the Montreal Protocol Worked,” The Conversation, September 10. http://theconversation.com/saving-the-ozone-layer-why-the-montreal-protocol-worked-9249.
- UNEP (United Nation Environment Program), 2007, “Montreal Protocol: A Success in the Making,” UNEP, Nairobi.

### Miscellaneous reports, essays, and datasets
- Campbell, Kurt M., Robert J. Einhorn, and Mitchell B. Reiss, 2004, The Nuclear Tipping Point: Why States Reconsider Their Nuclear Choices, Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
- Fitzpatrick, Mark, 2009, “Successes and Failure of NPT or World without NPT?” Paper presented at a seminar on Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Challenges & Opportunities, Webster University, St. Louis, MO, October 29.
- Falkner, Robert, Hannes Stephan, and John Vogler, 2010, “International Climate Policy after Copenhagen: Towards a ‘Building Blocks’ Approach,” Global Policy 1 (3): pp. 252–62.
- Hardin, Garrett 1968, “The Tragedy of the Commons,” Science 13, Vol. 162, No. 3859, pp. 1243-1248, December.
- Economist, 2012, “Lost Economic Time: The Proust Index,” February 25.
- Nielsen Company, 2011, “Sustainable Efforts & Environmental Concerns Around the World,” A Nielsen Report, New York.
- World Bank, 2007, “Global Public Goods: A Framework for the Role of the World Bank,” Paper prepared for the Development Commitee Meeting, Washington, DC, October 21.
- World Bank, 2001, World Development Report 2000/01: Attacking Poverty, New York: Oxford University Press, World Bank.
- World Bank, 2013, World Development Report 2014: Risk and Opportunity: Managing Risk for Development, Washington, DC: World Bank.

*References listed in _wp14195 - REFERENCES (source PDF).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp14195.pdf_