## _wp14197 — 6. Drivers behind growth local and cross-border lending

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### Major findings on foreign bank presence and global banking integration
- After the global financial crisis foreign bank entries fell sharply: in 2013 only 22 foreign banks entered compared to a peak of 132 in 2007, i.e., about one-fifth as many.
- Exits remained similar to pre-crisis levels, producing negative net entry and some retrenchment in foreign bank presence.
- Foreign banks accounted for about 35 percent of banks as of end 2013.
- In asset terms, foreign banks accounted for some 11 percent of global bank assets as of end 2012, down from a peak of 13 percent in 2007.
- Domestic banks declined in number and grew their balance sheets faster than foreign banks after the crisis.
- Activity concentrated at the intensive margin: many foreign banks were sold to other foreign parents rather than fully exiting.
- OECD countries still represented 89 percent of foreign bank assets globally (post-crisis), a 5 percent decline from before the crisis, mainly due to retrenchment by Western European banks.
- Banks from emerging markets and developing countries represented close to two-thirds of new entries after the crisis.
- Foreign bank presence became more regional: the average intraregional share increased by some 5 percentage points.

### Heterogeneity across host and home countries
- 66 host countries saw foreign bank presence decline between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods; 48 host countries saw increases.
- Foreign bank presence grew from 784 foreign banks in 1995 to 1,301 in 2007.
- Relative importance of foreign banks rose from 19 percent in 1995 to 32 percent in 2007 (in numbers).
- In 2007 the foreign share of assets equaled 13 percent.
- OECD countries in 2007: foreign bank market shares equaled 23 percent (number) and 12 percent (asset share).
- Emerging markets and developing countries in 2007: foreign bank market shares equaled 35 percent and 43 percent (numbers) and 16 percent and 24 percent (assets), respectively.
- Regions with highest foreign bank presence in 2007: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (number share 47 percent; asset share 43 percent) and Sub Saharan Africa (number share 49 percent; asset share 30 percent).
- Regions with lowest foreign bank presence in 2007: South Asia (number share 12 percent) and East Asia and Pacific (asset share 5 percent).

### Drivers and determinants of changes in foreign bank presence
- Home-country systemic crises reduce representation abroad: countries hit by a systemic crisis at home are less represented abroad today.
- Host-country growth matters: host countries growing slower saw their local foreign banks’ assets grow less; entry was greater in host countries that were faster growing and closer to home.
- Distance and size matter: far-flung and relatively small bilateral investments experienced more retrenchment; large pre-crisis bilateral foreign bank presences tended to grow their balance sheets less after the crisis.
- Shift in home country composition: rising importance of foreign banks from emerging markets and developing countries—these banks often had relatively stronger balance sheets and greater willingness to expand credit—mitigated declines in local lending in many markets.
- Funding and balance-sheet channels:
  - Cutbacks in local lending were larger for foreign affiliates not financed by local deposits.
  - Domestic banks funded through international capital markets contracted lending equally strongly as foreign banks did during the crisis.
  - Dollar funding shortages contributed to contractions in both cross-border and affiliate lending.

### Data, sample construction, and methodological notes
- Ownership database extended to 2013: 138 countries and 5,498 banks (3,853 active in 2013); after excluding eight offshore host countries and Taiwan for balance sheet limitations, banks active in 2013 reduce from 3,853 to 3,656.
- Coverage: banks included account for 90 percent or more of each country’s banking system assets; for advanced countries coverage limited to the 100 largest banks in each country in terms of 2009 assets.
- Foreign ownership defined as 50 percent or more of shares held by foreigners.
- Home country attribution: country with the highest percentage of foreign-held shares; direct ownership used with adjustments for tax-haven intermediates to record ultimate owner nationality.
- Ownership completeness: complete ownership/home country determined for 5,427 of 5,498 banks (99 percent); partial for 16 banks; none for 55 banks.
- Balance sheet linkage: consolidated and/or unconsolidated index numbers (Bankscope identifiers) provided to link ownership to balance sheet information.
- Final sample for bilateral analyses: 108 host countries, 79 home countries, 8,532 home-host country pairs (balance-sheet availability rules applied; host countries with >50 percent missing dropped).

### Empirical framework and dependent variables
- Three research questions:
  - Exit: factors driving a complete end to presence of banks from home country i in host country j between 2007 and 2012.
  - Entry: drivers of new bilateral banking links by 2012.
  - Growth: factors impacting change in size of presence (intensive margin), conditional on presence not fully ended.
- Dependent variables:
  - Exit: dummy = 1 if all banks from home i fully end operations in host j between 2007 and 2012; occurred for 63 out of 567 pairs with presence in 2007.
  - Entry: dummy = 1 if at least one foreign bank from home i newly entered host j by 2012; new entries occurred in 106 out of 7,965 pairs.
  - Growth: log change in bilateral foreign bank assets from home i in host j between 2007 and 2012; calculated only for pairs where banks remained active (504 pairs). On average, bilateral assets grew by 34 percent; 335 country pairs experienced negative growth.
- Cross-sectional model: ΔForeign_ij = ß1 Mi + ß2 Xj + ß3 Zij + εij
  - Estimation: probit for Exit and Entry; OLS for Growth. Standard errors heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at host country level.

### Key explanatory variables and theoretical expectations
- Host foreign presence: sum of all assets held by foreign banks divided by all bank assets in the host country (2007) — larger host foreign presence expected to reduce exit and encourage entry/expansion.
- Host growth real GDP: log difference of real GDP in host between 2007 and 2012 — stronger growth expected to reduce exit, increase entry and expansion.
- Bilateral market share: assets held by home i in host j divided by total bank assets in host j in 2007 — large bilateral share expected to reduce exit but potentially limit further expansion.
- Distance: log great-circle distance between home and host — greater distance expected to increase exit likelihood and reduce entry.

### Empirical results — Exit, Entry, Growth (overview)
- Exit:
  - Banks more likely to pull out when host is less developed, when home country is more developed, when bilateral market share is small, and when distance is large.
  - R2s: explanatory power of bilateral variables is triple that of home variables and four times that of host variables.
  - Home-country crisis dummy increases exit probability; paradoxically banks were more likely to stay if the host itself was in a crisis.
- Entry:
  - Host real GDP growth is the only important host characteristic (positive).
  - Home country economic development is not important for entry.
  - Distance importantly reduces entry.
  - Host real GDP growth and distance together explain about 10 percent of entry variation.
- Growth in bilateral foreign assets:
  - Host characteristics explain about 17 percent of variation.
  - Host real GDP growth positive and significant at the one percent level.
  - Bilateral market share tends to be negatively related to Growth (limits to expansion).
  - Growth of bilateral foreign assets is less if the home country has higher income.
  - Distance does not affect Growth.

### OECD versus non-OECD home countries (heterogeneity)
- 65 percent of pairs involve OECD home country; OECD home countries account for 76 percent of exits and 41 percent of entries.
- For OECD home countries: host and home economic development matter for Exit and Growth, but not Entry.
- For non-OECD home countries: fewer of these variables are important drivers; entry still depends on host country growth.
- Bilateral foreign presence increases exits when market share is small; conditional on staying, asset growth tends to be higher when market share is small.
- Distance affects exit decisions for OECD but not for non-OECD home countries; distance affects entry for both groups.

### Local lending versus cross-border lending — levels and growth (selected statistics)
- Local lending by foreign affiliates in 2007: some 5,819 US Dollar Billions (All countries total).
- Local lending by foreign affiliates from OECD home countries in 2007: 5,383 US Dollar Billions.
- Cross-border lending in 2007: 10,627 US Dollar Billions.
- Local lending (all foreign banks) grew by 8 percent overall between 2007 and 2012.
- OECD home country foreign banks’ local lending grew by 2 percent between 2007 and 2012.
- Cross-border loans fell by 14 percent on a group basis over 2007–2012.
- OECD borrowing countries: reduction in cross-border lending of 21 percent on a group basis and 27 percent on a country average basis.
- For foreign banks from OECD countries, local lending on average grew 16 percentage points more than cross-border lending.
- Share of local lending by foreign affiliates in total international bank lending increased by 6 percentage points to 41 percent by 2012.
- Local lending by foreign affiliates in 2007 amounted to some 5.8 trillion US dollars; direct cross-border lending amounted to some 10.6 trillion US dollars in 2007, or 65 percent of total international lending in 2007.

### Drivers behind loan growth of foreign banks and cross-border loans (regression insights — Table 6)
- Sample: 93 host countries, 15 home countries, 245 home-host country pairs.
- Key coefficient estimates (OLS; robust SEs in parentheses):
  - Host GDP/cap: -0.014 (0.052) for Growth local lending; -0.040 (0.077) for Growth cross-border lending; 0.024 (0.088) for Growth difference.
  - Host foreign presence: 0.412*** (0.154) for Growth local lending; 0.365** (0.181) for Growth cross-border lending; 0.033 (0.215) for Growth difference.
  - Host growth real GDP: 2.202*** (0.550) for Growth local lending; 1.398 (0.854) for Growth cross-border lending; 0.690 (0.881) for Growth difference.
  - Home GDP/cap: -0.479** (0.216) for Growth local lending; 0.471 (0.308) for Growth cross-border lending; -0.871*** (0.319) for Growth difference.
  - Bilateral foreign presence: -1.144*** (0.340) for Growth local lending; -0.439 (0.542) for Growth cross-border lending; -0.626 (0.542) for Growth difference.
  - Distance: -0.087 (0.062) for Growth local lending; 0.152*** (0.051) for Growth cross-border lending; -0.220*** (0.085) for Growth difference.
  - Growth cross-border claims coefficient: 0.077 (0.050).
  - Growth local lending coefficient: 0.103 (0.075).
  - Number of obs.: 245 for each regression. Adjusted R2: 0.154, 0.176, 0.066 respectively.
- Interpretations:
  - Host foreign presence and host growth support both local and cross-border lending growth (host growth strongly significant for local lending).
  - Home GDP/cap negative for local lending growth (suggesting richer-home-country banks reduced local lending), and reduces the difference (local minus cross-border).
  - Bilateral market share strongly reduces local lending growth (limits to expansion) but not cross-border lending growth.
  - Distance increases cross-border lending growth (for OECD banks redirected cross-border lending to more distant non-OECD countries) and reduces the difference between local and cross-border growth.
  - Once controlling for observables, growth in local lending is not significantly affected by growth in cross-border lending, and vice versa.

### Conclusions, policy implications, and research needs
- Structural change:
  - Post-crisis foreign bank presence has become somewhat less global but not more fragmented; increased variety of home countries and more regional focus.
  - Secular increase in foreign banks from emerging markets and developing countries is important and likely to continue alongside regionalization.
- Policy implications:
  - Keeping open financial borders remains important; few countries have retracted commitments to liberalize financial services, but more is needed for an open and efficient global financial system.
  - Strengthening cross-border regulation and supervision is crucial; many non-tariff barriers and unresolved issues persist.
  - Resolution frameworks need reform: “banks which are global in life are national in death.” Implementing effective resolution regimes and clear burden-sharing modalities remains incomplete.
  - Regional coordination may be easier as banking regionalizes, but regionalization can increase susceptibility to shocks, limit diversification, and risk suboptimal diffusion of banking technology and capitalization.
  - Rise of emerging market and developing country banks makes it imperative that their policymakers participate actively in international deliberations and perform effectively as home regulators and supervisors.
- Data and research needs:
  - Expand data coverage on direct cross-border and affiliate lending to better assess retrenchment and fragmentation and capture growing intra-emerging-market and developing-country lending.
  - Research needed on how characteristics of newly entering foreign banks (home country, funding, business focus) affect competition, efficiency, access to finance for SMEs and households, and financial stability.
  - The extended database assembled by the authors can help address these questions.

### Key statistics and counts (selected exact figures preserved)
- Number of foreign banks entering in 2013: 22.
- Peak foreign bank entries in 2007: 132.
- Foreign banks as share of banks end-2013: 35 percent.
- Foreign banks share of global bank assets end-2012: 11 percent; peak in 2007: 13 percent.
- OECD share of foreign bank assets globally (post-crisis): 89 percent (5 percent decline from before the crisis).
- Number of foreign banks active: 1,301 in 2007 (peaked at 1,350 in 2009); 1,272 in 2013.
- Number of domestic banks active: 2,704 in 2007; 2,384 in 2013.
- M&As in 2013: 21 (peak in 2007: 97).
- Change in number of foreign banks by income group (2007→2013): OECD decline by 40 banks; Emerging markets decline by 19 banks; Developing countries increase by 30 banks.
- Regional changes in numbers of foreign banks (2007→2013): Eastern Europe and Central Asia reduction of 29 banks; Sub-Saharan Africa increase of 31 banks.
- Assets controlled by banks from emerging markets: increased from $365 billion to $728 billion (timeframe implied 2007→2012).
- Share of foreign bank assets owned by banks headquartered in same region: 56 percent in 2007; 60 percent in 2012.
- New home-host pairs after the crisis: 106; 59 percent involved emerging market or developing country home country; 93 percent involved emerging market or developing country host country.
- Bilateral pairs with presence in 2007: 576; bilateral relationships fully ended for 63 of these pairs.
- Average bilateral assets growth (for remaining pairs): 34 percent; 335 pairs had negative growth.
- Local lending by foreign affiliates in 2007: 5,819 US Dollar Billions (All countries total).
- Cross-border lending in 2007: 10,627 US Dollar Billions.
- Local lending growth 2007–2012 (all foreign banks): 8 percent.
- OECD home country foreign banks’ local lending growth 2007–2012: 2 percent.
- Cross-border loans group decline 2007–2012: -14 percent.
- Share of local lending in total international bank lending by 2012: 41 percent (increase of 6 percentage points).

*Source: _wp14197 — 6. Drivers behind growth local and cross-border lending (IMF working paper content excerpt).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp14197 - References .............................................................................................................

### Figures
- 1. Number and share of foreign banks, 1995-2013 .............................................................................. 29
- 2. Number of entries and exits of foreign banks, 1995-2013 ............................................................... 30
- 3. Number of foreign banks by home country income group, 1995-2013 ........................................... 31
- 4. Number of net entries by home country income group .................................................................... 32
- 5. Share regional foreign banks before and after the crisis, by home country income group  ............. 33
- 6. Change share foreign assets, 2007-2012 .......................................................................................... 34
- 7. Comparison growth local and cross-border lending, 2007-2012...................................................... 35

### Tables
- 1. Number and assets of banks by host country, Aggregates by income level and region ................... 36
- 2. Number of foreign banks by home country, Aggregates by income level and region ..................... 37
- 3. Drivers behind transformation .......................................................................................................... 38
- 4. Drivers behind transformation, OECD versus non-OECD home countries ..................................... 39
- 5. Local versus cross-border local lending, level and growth comparison ........................................... 40

*Source PDF filename: _wp14197 - References .............................................................................................................
Canonical source URL: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp14197.pdf*

### 6. Drivers behind growth local and cross-border lending ................................................................

### 6. Drivers behind growth local and cross-border lending

### Major findings on foreign bank presence and global banking integration
- After the global financial crisis foreign bank entries fell sharply: in 2013 only 22 foreign banks entered compared to a peak of 132 in 2007, i.e., about one-fifth as many.
- Exits remained similar to pre-crisis levels, producing negative net entry and some retrenchment in foreign bank presence.
- In numbers, foreign banks accounted for about 35 percent of banks as of end 2013.
- In asset terms, foreign banks accounted for some 11 percent of global bank assets as of end 2012, down from a peak of 13 percent in 2007.
- While aggregate foreign bank numbers declined, domestic banks also declined in number; domestic banks grew their balance sheets faster than foreign banks after the crisis.
- Activity has been concentrated at the intensive margin: many foreign banks were sold to other foreign parents rather than fully exiting.
- Bank ownership by OECD countries still represented 89 percent of foreign bank assets globally (post-crisis), a 5 percent decline from before the crisis, mainly due to retrenchment by Western European banks.
- Banks from emerging markets and developing countries represented close to two-thirds of new entries after the crisis, increasing the variety of home countries active abroad.
- Foreign bank presence became more regional: the average intraregional share increased by some 5 percentage points.

### Heterogeneity across host and home countries
- For 66 host countries foreign bank presence declined between pre-crisis and post-crisis periods; for 48 host countries it increased.
- Foreign bank presence before the crisis (1995–2007) grew from 784 foreign banks in 1995 to 1,301 in 2007.
- Relative importance of foreign banks rose from a share of 19 percent in 1995 to 32 percent in 2007 (in numbers).
- In 2007 the foreign share of assets equaled 13 percent (noting balance sheet data are limited before 2005).
- OECD countries in 2007: foreign bank market shares equaled 23 percent (number) and 12 percent (asset share).
- Emerging markets and developing countries in 2007: foreign bank market shares equaled 35 percent and 43 percent (numbers) and 16 percent and 24 percent (assets), respectively.
- Regions with highest foreign bank presence in 2007: Eastern Europe and Central Asia (number share 47 percent; asset share 43 percent) and Sub Saharan Africa (number share 49 percent; asset share 30 percent).
- Regions with lowest foreign bank presence in 2007: South Asia (number share 12 percent) and East Asia and Pacific (asset share 5 percent).

### Drivers and determinants of changes in foreign bank presence
- Home-country systemic crises reduce representation abroad: countries hit by a systemic crisis at home are less represented abroad today.
- Host-country growth matters: host countries growing slower saw their local foreign banks’ assets grow less; entry was greater in host countries that were faster growing and closer to home.
- Distance and size matter: far-flung and relatively small bilateral investments experienced more retrenchment; large pre-crisis bilateral foreign bank presences tended to grow their balance sheets less after the crisis.
- Home country composition shift: rising importance of foreign banks from emerging markets and developing countries—these banks often had relatively stronger balance sheets and greater willingness to expand credit—mitigated declines in local lending in many markets.
- Cross-border vs. local lending divergence:
  - Local lending by foreign banks declined less during the crisis than cross-border banking claims did, providing evidence that foreign bank presence acted as a relative source of stability.
  - There is little general relation between developments in cross-border claims and local lending; retrenchment in cross-border lending is distinct from changes in foreign banks’ local activity.
- Funding and balance-sheet channels:
  - Cutbacks in local lending were larger for foreign affiliates not financed by local deposits.
  - Domestic banks funded through international capital markets contracted lending equally strongly as foreign banks did during the crisis.
  - Dollar funding shortages contributed to contractions in both cross-border and affiliate lending.

### Data and methodological notes relevant to interpretation
- Database extension: ownership information is extended to 2013 and includes 138 countries and 5,498 banks (3,853 active in 2013); after excluding eight offshore host countries and Taiwan for balance sheet limitations, banks active in 2013 reduce from 3,853 to 3,656.
- Coverage: banks included account for 90 percent or more of each country’s banking system assets; for advanced countries coverage is limited to the 100 largest banks in each country in terms of 2009 assets.
- Foreign ownership definition: a bank is coded as foreign owned when 50 percent or more of its shares are held by foreigners.
- Home country attribution: the country with the highest percentage of foreign-held shares is considered the home country; direct ownership is used, with adjustments for tax-haven intermediate owners by recording the ultimate owner’s nationality.
- Ownership completeness: complete ownership structure and home country of largest foreign shareholder determined for 5,427 of 5,498 banks (99 percent); partial for 16 banks; none for 55 banks.
- Balance sheet linkage: consolidated and/or unconsolidated index numbers (Bankscope identifiers) are provided to link ownership to balance sheet information.

### Implications and analytical insights
- The crisis accelerated structural transformations in the global banking system, producing a system with a larger diversity of home countries active abroad and greater regional integration despite declines in cross-border bank flows.
- Retracement in cross-border banking claims during the crisis is not a direct proxy for changes in local foreign bank presence; policy and stability assessments should distinguish between cross-border flow retrenchment and local affiliate behavior.
- Growing presence of banks from emerging markets and developing countries altered the composition of global banking networks and helped stabilize local credit provision in several host markets.

*Source: _wp14197 - 6. Drivers behind growth local and cross-border lending (IMF PDF chapter, content excerpt).*

### 2007.  While  relatively  much  more  entry  occurred  in  the  form  of  M&As,  there  were  just  21

### IV. DRIVERS BEHIND THE SHIFTS IN GLOBAL BANKING

### Post-crisis aggregate developments and key statistics
- M&As in 2013: 21 M&As in 2013, less than one-quarter of their peak in 2007 (97).
- Net foreign bank entry: Negative in the years 2010-2013; first net exit since 1995.
- Number of foreign banks active:
  - 1,301 in 2007 (after peaking at 1,350 in 2009)
  - 1,272 in 2013
- Number of domestic banks active:
  - 2,704 in 2007
  - 2,384 in 2013
- Foreign bank presence (share of banks): increased from 32 percent to 35 percent between 2007 and 2013.
- Share of total assets controlled by foreign banks globally: declined from 13 percent in 2007 to 11 percent in 2012.
- Balance sheet data note: end of 2012 information used because balance sheet information for 2013 is missing for more than 25 percent of banks in sample.

### Heterogeneity by income group and region
- Change in number of foreign banks by income group (2007→2013):
  - OECD countries: decline by 40 banks (largest retrenchment)
  - Emerging markets: decline by 19 banks
  - Developing countries: increase by 30 banks
- Regional changes in numbers of foreign banks:
  - Eastern Europe and Central Asia: reduction of 29 banks (largest reduction)
  - Sub-Saharan Africa: increase of 31 foreign banks
- Relative foreign bank presence: generally increased across groups because domestic banks declined more in number.
- Asset-share dynamics by group (2007→2012):
  - OECD countries: some decline in asset share (remaining domestic banks grew faster)
  - Emerging markets: larger decline in asset share
  - Other high-income and developing countries: increase in asset share
- Regional asset-share changes: broadly stable in most regions, but declined substantially in Eastern Europe and Central Asia and Latin America.

### Shifts in ownership origins and concentration
- Change in number of foreign banks owned by home-income grouping since 2007:
  - Sharp reduction in banks owned by high-income countries: number dropped by 122.
    - Of this drop, 111 attributable to Western European banks shedding subsidiaries (and assets), followed by North American banks.
  - Asian OECD countries (Japan, Australia, New Zealand): increased ownership by 5 banks.
  - Emerging markets: increased foreign presence by 70 banks.
  - Developing countries: increased foreign presence by 19 banks.
- Notable investors among developing/home regions:
  - Sub-Saharan African banks (including Ecobank, United Bank of Africa, Bank of Africa): added 34 banks.
  - Eastern Europe and Central Asia: important investors (exact number not specified in provided excerpt).
- Assets controlled by banks from emerging markets:
  - Increased from $365 billion to $728 billion (timeframe implied 2007→2012).
  - These banks now account for 8 percent of total foreign bank assets, a doubling compared to 2007.
- Regional concentration:
  - Share of foreign bank assets owned by banks headquartered in the same region:
    - 56 percent in 2007
    - 60 percent in 2012
  - Americas example: regional foreign bank share increased from 7 to 20 percent (almost threefold), reflecting sales of European subsidiaries to Latin American banks and acquisitions among high-income countries (example cited: US Commerce Bank by Canadian TD Bank).

### Host-country and bilateral patterns of change
- Host-country level (change in asset share of foreign banks between 2007 and 2012):
  - In none of host countries did all foreign banks completely exit.
  - 66 countries where foreign banks were active before the crisis: role of foreign banks decreased on average by 16 percent (median 11 percent).
  - 47 countries: relative foreign bank presence increased on average by 61 percent (median 13 percent).
  - One host country without foreign bank activity in 2007 (Oman): a foreign bank entered (acquisition of Oman International Bank by HSBC).
- Bilateral level (home-host pairs):
  - Sample counts and changes:
    - 576 pairs where there was presence in 2007: for 63 of these pairs there is no longer bilateral foreign bank presence after the crisis.
    - Among pairs where at least one bank of the home country stayed present:
      - 53 percent of pairs saw a decrease in the share of bilateral foreign assets.
      - 47 percent saw an increase.
    - 106 new home-host country pairs came into existence after the crisis.
      - 59 percent of these involved investments by a bank from an emerging market or developing country home country.
      - 93 percent involved investments in an emerging market or developing country host country.
  - Turnover at bilateral level translated into less change at host-country level because foreign banks were often acquired by other foreign owners, many from emerging markets and developing countries.

### Methodology for analyzing drivers of exits, entries, and growth
- Sample construction:
  - Host countries with foreign bank presence in 2007 and/or 2012 and home countries with foreign investment in 2007 and/or 2012 were paired.
  - For each home-host pair assets of all banks from that home country active in that host country summed for 2007 and 2012.
  - Balance sheet availability rules:
    - Sum assets only for banks with balance sheet information available for both years when comparing changes.
    - To account for entry and exit, banks active only in 2007 or only in 2012 are included provided balance sheet data available.
    - Host countries where more than 50 percent of banks have missing balance sheet data are dropped.
  - Final sample: 108 host countries, 79 home countries, 8,532 home-host country pairs.
- Three research questions (extensive and intensive margins):
  - Exit: what factors drive a complete end to presence of banks from home country i in host country j between 2007 and 2012.
  - Entry: what drives the start of a new bilateral banking link by 2012.
  - Growth: what factors impact change in size of presence (intensive margin), conditional on presence not fully ended.
- Dependent variables constructed:
  - Exit: dummy = 1 if all banks from home country i fully end operations in host country j between 2007 and 2012; occurred for 63 out of 567 pairs with presence in 2007.
  - Entry: dummy = 1 if at least one foreign bank from home country i newly entered host country j by 2012; new entries occurred in 106 out of 7,965 pairs.
  - Growth: log change in bilateral foreign bank assets from home country i in host country j between 2007 and 2012; calculated only for pairs where banks remained active (504 pairs). On average, bilateral assets grew by 34 percent; 335 country pairs experienced negative growth.
- Cross-sectional empirical model:
  - ΔForeign_ij = ß1 Mi + ß2 Xj + ß3 Zij + εij
    - ΔForeign_ij is Exit, Entry, or Growth for home i and host j.
    - Mi: matrix of home country characteristics.
    - Xj: matrix of host country characteristics.
    - Zij: matrix of home-host pair variables.
  - Estimation:
    - Probit for Exit and Entry regressions.
    - OLS for Growth regressions.
    - All regressions include a constant.
    - Standard errors: heteroscedasticity robust and clustered at the host country level.
    - Details on variable definitions and sources in Appendix Table 3 (not reproduced here).

### Key explanatory variables considered
- Home GDP/cap and Host GDP/cap: log of GDP per capita in 2007 for home and host to capture economic and institutional development differences and to test whether crisis-led withdrawals concentrate on poorer/smaller markets.
- Crisis dummies:
  - Home crisis: dummy = 1 if home country experiences a banking crisis over 2007-2012 (Laeven and Valencia (2013) definition).
  - Host crisis: dummy = 1 if host country experiences a banking crisis over 2007-2012.
  - Note: high correlation between income levels and crisis occurrence (correlations of 0.63 and 0.66); regressions include one of these two variables only to mitigate multicollinearity.
- Host foreign presence: defined as sum of all assets held by foreign banks divided by all bank assets in the host country in (text cut; variable introduced but definition incomplete in provided excerpt).

*Source: _wp14197 (excerpt provided).*

### 2007. As Claessens and Van Horen (2013) show, lending by foreign banks tends to be more

### _wp14197 - 2007. As Claessens and Van Horen (2013) show, lending by foreign banks tends to be more

### Key variables and theoretical expectations
- Host foreign presence: foreign banks representing an important share of the local banking system — expected to make foreign banks less likely to pull out and more likely to enter or expand.
- Host growth real GDP: log difference of real GDP in the host country between 2007 and 2012 — stronger host growth expected to make banks less likely to exit, more likely to enter, and more likely to expand balance sheets.
- Bilateral market share: sum of assets held by banks from home country i divided by total bank assets in host country j in 2007 — large bilateral market share expected to reduce exit probability but may dampen further balance-sheet expansion.
- Distance: log distance between home and host country — greater distance expected to increase exit likelihood and reduce entry; closer countries expected to be entered more likely.

### Empirical results — Exit, Entry, Growth (overview)
- Regression structure: for each dependent variable (Exit, Entry, Growth) authors estimate five sets:
  - (1) host country characteristics (Host GDP/cap, Host foreign presence, Host growth real GDP);
  - (2) add home country characteristics (Home GDP/cap);
  - (3) add bilateral characteristics (Bilateral market share — not in new entry regressions — and Distance);
  - (4) include all variables together;
  - (5) replace GDP per capita in home and host with respective crisis dummies.
- Main findings on Exit:
  - Banks are more likely to completely pull out when the host is less developed, when the home country is more developed, when home-country banks represent a small share of host banking system, and when distance is large.
  - R2s: explanatory power of bilateral variables is triple that of home country variables, and four times that of host country variables.
  - Crisis effect: banks headquartered in a country that experienced a crisis were more likely to exit from any host country (column 5). Paradoxically, banks were more likely to stay if the host itself was in a crisis.
- Main findings on Entry (columns [6]-[10]):
  - Host real GDP growth is the only important host characteristic (positive).
  - Home country economic development is not important for entry.
  - Distance importantly reduces entry.
  - Combined, real GDP growth in the host country and distance explain about 10 percent combined of entry variation.
- Main findings on Growth in bilateral foreign assets (last 5 columns):
  - Host country characteristics explain about 17 percent of the variation in Growth.
  - Real GDP growth of host is positive and significant at the one percent level.
  - Bilateral foreign assets grow less when the host is more developed; bilateral market share tends to be negatively related to Growth (limits to expansion), though not always significant when all variables are included.
  - Growth of bilateral foreign assets is less if the home country has higher income — partly driven by many high-income home countries experiencing severe banking crises, and partly reflecting rising role of emerging market and developing country banks.
  - Distance does not have an impact on Growth (though it affects Exit and Entry).

### OECD vs non-OECD home countries (heterogeneity)
- Sample shares:
  - 65 percent of pairs involve a home country that is an OECD country.
  - OECD home countries account for 76 percent of the exits and 41 percent of the entries.
- Differences in drivers:
  - For OECD home countries: host and home economic development matter for Exit and Growth, but not Entry.
  - For non-OECD home countries: few of these variables are important drivers; entry still depends on host country growth.
  - Bilateral foreign presence has similar impacts for OECD and non-OECD: exits are higher when market share is small; conditional on staying, asset growth tends to be higher when market share is small.
  - Distance affects exit decisions for OECD but not for non-OECD home countries; distance affects entry for both groups.

### Data, basic statistics, and magnitudes (local lending vs cross-border)
- Data sources:
  - Cross-border lending: BIS consolidated banking statistics at ultimate risk basis — log difference between 2007 and 2012 in gross cross-border claims between lender country i and borrower country j.
  - Local lending by foreign affiliates: sum of local loans of all foreign banks owned by home country i in host country j using Bankscope — log difference between 2007 and 2012.
  - For comparability, sample restricted to OECD home countries for cross-border analyses.
- Level and composition in 2007:
  - Local lending by foreign affiliates amounted to some 5.8 trillion US dollars in 2007.
  - Direct cross-border lending amounted to some 10.6 trillion US dollars in 2007, or 65 percent of total international lending in 2007.
  - For non-OECD host groups, local lending was more important than cross-border lending.
- Growth between 2007 and 2012:
  - Foreign bank loans (all foreign banks) grew by 8 percent overall between 2007 and 2012.
  - OECD home country foreign banks’ local lending grew by only 2 percent between 2007 and 2012.
  - Cross-border loans fell by 14 percent on a group basis over 2007–2012.
  - OECD borrowing countries experienced a reduction in cross-border lending of 21 percent on a group basis and 27 percent on a country average basis.
  - For the set of foreign banks from OECD countries, local lending on average grew 16 percentage points more than cross-border lending.
  - Share of local lending by foreign affiliates in total international bank lending increased by 6 percentage points to 41 percent by 2012.
- Heterogeneity:
  - Large cross-country variation: some host countries saw cross-border lending decrease more than local lending, other countries saw the opposite, and in many countries one type of lending decreased while the other increased.

### Drivers behind loan growth of foreign banks and cross-border loans (regression insights)
- Sample for these regressions:
  - 93 host countries, 15 home countries, 245 home-host country pairs (pairs for which growth in both local lending and cross-border claims are available).
- Dependent variables:
  - Growth in local lending (log change in bank loans for foreign banks from home i in host j, 2007–2012).
  - Growth in cross-border lending (log change in cross-border loans provided by banks from creditor country i to borrowers in country j, 2007–2012).
  - Difference: growth in local lending minus growth in cross-border claims.
- Shared drivers:
  - Larger foreign-bank market share in host positively impacts both local lending growth (from OECD home countries) and cross-border lending growth — indicates greater commitment to market and continued lending after crisis.
  - Real GDP growth of the borrower/host drives both types, but statistically significant only for local lending (reflecting greater volatility in cross-border flows).
- Key distinctions:
  - Home GDP per capita: banks from richer home countries reduced local lending (possibly due to home crises), but Home GDP per capita not statistically significant for cross-border lending.
  - Bilateral market share: larger bilateral market share led to lower growth in local lending but did not affect growth in cross-border lending.
  - Distance: positive effect on cross-border lending (OECD banks redirected cross-border lending to non-OECD countries, which are generally further away); distance not significant for local lending.
  - Once controlling for home, host, and bilateral characteristics, growth in local lending is not affected by growth in cross-border lending, nor vice versa — suggesting the two flows are neither complements nor substitutes at the margin.
- Regression on differences (local minus cross-border growth, column [3]):
  - Distance between host and home reduces the difference.
  - Income level of the home country reduces the difference.
  - Other variables show no significant impact on the difference.

### Conclusions, policy implications, and research needs
- Structural change:
  - Post-crisis foreign bank presence has become somewhat less global but not more fragmented; there is increasing variety of players and more regional focus.
  - Secular increase in foreign banks from emerging markets and developing countries is an important factor and is likely to continue alongside regionalization.
- Policy implications:
  - Keeping open financial borders remains important; few countries have retracted commitments to liberalize financial services, but more is needed for an open and efficient global financial system.
  - Strengthening cross-border regulation and supervision is crucial; many non-tariff barriers and unresolved issues persist.
  - Resolution frameworks need reform: “banks which are global in life are national in death.” Implementing effective resolution regimes and clear burden-sharing modalities remains incomplete.
  - As global banking regionalizes, regional coordination (example: European banking union) may be easier, but regionalization can increase susceptibility to shocks, limit diversification, and risk suboptimal diffusion of banking technology and capitalization.
  - The rise of emerging market and developing country banks makes it imperative that their policymakers participate actively in international deliberations (e.g., Basel III, resolution modalities) and perform effectively as home regulators and supervisors.
- Data and research needs:
  - Expand data coverage on direct cross-border and affiliate lending to better assess whether retrenchment and fragmentation are general, and to capture growing intra-emerging-market and developing-country lending.
  - Important research questions remain about how characteristics of newly entering foreign banks (home country, funding, business focus) affect competition, efficiency, access to finance for SMEs and households, and financial stability.
  - The extended database assembled by the authors can help address these questions.

*Source: IMF working paper content provided in the input*

### REFERENCES

### _wp14197 - REFERENCES

### References (selected entries as listed)
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- Beck, Thorsten, Olivier De Jonghe, and Glenn Schepens, 2013, “Bank Competition and Stability: Cross-country Heterogeneity,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 22(2), 218-244.  
- Beck, Thorsten, Michael Fuchs, Dorothe Singer, and Makaio Witte, 2014, Making Cross-Border Banking Work for Africa, GIZ and the World Bank.  
- Beck, Thorsten and María Soledad Martinez Peria, 2007, “Foreign Bank Acquisitions and Outreach: Evidence from Mexico,” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4467.  
- Buch, Claudia and Gayle DeLong, 2004, “Cross-border Bank Mergers: What Lures the Rare Animal?” Journal of Banking and Finance, 28(9), 2077-2102.  
- Buch, Claudia and Linda Goldberg, 2014, “International Banking and Liquidity Risk Transformation, Lesson from Across Countries,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Reports 675.  
- Buch, Claudia, Michael Koetter and Catherine Koch, 2013, “Do Banks Benefit from Internationalization? Revisiting the Market Power-Risk Nexus,” Review of Finance, 17(4), 1401-1435.  
- Cetorelli, Nicola, and Linda Goldberg, 2011, “Global Banks and International Shock Transmission: Evidence from the Crisis,” IMF Economic Review, 59, 41-76.  
- Cetorelli and Goldberg, 2012, “Liquidity Management of US Global Banks: Internal Capital Markets in the Great Recession,” Journal of International Economics, 88(2), 299-311.  
- Cerutti, Eugenio, 2014, “Drivers of Cross-Border Banking Exposures During the Crisis,” Journal of Banking and Finance, forthcoming.  
- Cerutti, Eugenio, Galinda Hale, and Camelia Minoiu, forthcoming, “Financial Crisis and the Composition of Cross-border Lending,” Journal of International Money and Finance.  
- Cerutti, Eugenio, and Stijn Claessens, 2014, “The Great Cross-Border Bank Deleveraging: Supply Constraints and Intra-Group Frictions,” IMF Working Paper 14/180.  
- Claessens, Stijn, 2006, “Competitive Implications of Cross-Border Banking,” in Cross-Border Banking: Regulatory Challenges, by Gerard Caprio, Douglas D. Evanoff and George G. Kaufman (Eds), World Scientific Publishing Co, New Jersey, 151-182.  
- Claessens, Stijn, Asli Demirgüç-Kunt, and Harry Huizinga, 2001, “How Does Foreign Entry Affect the Domestic Banking Market?” Journal of Banking and Finance, 25(5), 891–911.  
- Claessens, Stijn and Juan M. Marchetti, 2013, “Global Banking Regroups,” Finance and Development, December, 14-17, IMF.  
- Claessens, Stijn and Neeltje van Horen, 2013, “Impact of foreign banks,” Journal of Financial Perspectives, 1(1), 1-14.  
- Claessens and van Horen, 2014a, “Foreign Banks: Trends and Impact,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 46(1), 295-326.  
- Claessens and van Horen, 2014b, “Location Decisions of Foreign Banks and Competitor Remoteness,” Journal of Money Credit and Banking, 46(1), 145-170.  
- Clarke, George, Robert Cull, María Soledad Martínez Peria and Susana Sánchez, 2003, “Foreign Bank Entry: Experience, Implications for Developing Countries, and Agenda for Further Research,” World Bank Research Observer, 18(1), 25–40.  
- De Haas, Ralph, and Neeltje van Horen, 2012, “International Shock Transmission after the Lehman Brothers Collapse: Evidence from Syndicated Lending,” American Economic Review, 102(3), 231-37.  
- De Haas and van Horen, 2013, “Running for the Exit? International Bank Lending During a Financial Crisis,” Review of Financial Studies, 26(1), 244-85.  
- De Haas, Ralph, and Iman van Lelyveld, 2010, “Internal Capital Markets and Lending by Multinational Bank Subsidiaries,” Journal of Financial Intermediation, 19(1), 689-721.  
- De Haas and van Lelyveld, 2014, “Multinational Banks and the Global Financial Crisis: Weathering the Perfect Storm,” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 46(1), 333-364.  
- Degryse, Hans, Muhammad A. Elahi, and Maria F. Penas, 2010, “Cross-Border Exposures and Financial Contagion,” International Review of Finance, 10(2), 209-240.  
- Demirgüç-Kunt, Asli, Luc Laeven, and Ross Levine, 2004, “Regulations, Market Structure, Institutions, and the Cost of Financial Intermediation,” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 36(3), 593-622.  
- Detragiache, Enrica, Poonam Gupta, and Thierry Tressel, 2008, “Foreign Banks in Poor Countries: Theory and Evidence,” Journal of Finance, 63(5), 2123-2160.  
- European Central Bank (ECB), 2013, “Banking Structures Report,” November, Frankfurt.  
- ECB, 2014, “Financial Integration in Europe”, April, Frankfurt.  
- Fáykiss, Péter, Gabriella Grosz, and Gábor Szigel, 2013, “Transforming Subsidiaries Into Branches - Should we be Worrying About it?,” MNB Occasional Papers 2013/106, Magyar Nemzeti Bank, Hungary.  
- Fiechter, Jonathan, İnci Ötker-Robe, Anna Ilyina, Michael Hsu, André Santos, and Jay Surti, 2011, “Subsidiaries or Branches: Does One Size Fit All?”, IMF Staff Discussion Paper 11/04, March.  
- Garcia-Herrero, Alicia and Maria Soledad Martinez Peria, 2007, “The Mix of International Banks’ Foreign Claims: Determinants and Implications,” Journal of Banking and Finance, 31(6), 1613-31.  
- Giannetti, Mariassunta, and Luc Laeven, 2012a, “The Flight Home Effect: Evidence from Syndicated Loan Market during Financial Crises,” Journal of Financial Economics, 104(1), 23-43.  
- Giannetti and Laeven, 2012b, “Flight Home, Flight Abroad and International Credit Cycles,” American Economic Review, 102(3), 219-24.  
- Goldberg, Linda, 2009, “Understanding Banking Sector Globalization,” International Monetary Fund Staff Papers, 56(1), 171-197.  
- Kalemli-Ozcan, Sebnem, Elias Papaioannou and Fabrizio Perri, 2013, “Global Banks and Crisis Transmission,” Journal of International Economics, 89(2), 495-510.  
- Karolyi, G. Andrew, and Alvaro G. Taboada, forthcoming, “Regulatory Arbitrage and Cross-Border Bank Acquisitions,” Journal of Finance.  
- Kerl, Cornelia and Friederike Niepmann, 2014, “What determines the Composition of International Bank Flows,” mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.  
- Khwaja, Asim Ijaz and Atif Mian, 2008, “Tracing the Effect of Bank Liquidity Shocks: Evidence from Emerging Markets,” American Economic Review, 98(4), 1413-42.  
- Kose, M. Ayhan, Eswar Prasad, Kenneth Rogoff and Shang-Jin Wei, 2010, “Financial Globalization and Economic Policies,” in Dani Rodrik and Mark Rosenzweig (Editors), Handbook of Development Economics, Vol. 5, The Netherlands: North-Holland, 4283-4362.  
- Laeven, Luc, Lev Ratnovski and Hui Tong, 2014, “Bank Size and Systemic Risk,” Staff Discussion Notes No. 14/4, IMF, Washington, D.C.  
- Laeven, Luc, and Fabian Valencia, 2013, “Systemic Banking Crises Database,” IMF Economic Review, 61(2), 225-270.  
- Lane, Philip R. and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, 2012, “External Adjustment and the Global Crisis” Journal of International Economics, 88(2), 252-265.  
- McGuire, Patrick, and Goetz von Peter, 2009, “The US Dollar Shortage in Global Banking,” BIS Quarterly Review, March.  
- Milesi‐Ferretti, Gian‐Maria and Cédric Tille, 2011, “The Great Retrenchment: International Capital Flows During the Global Financial Crisis,” Economic Policy, 26(66), 285-342.  
- Minoiu, Camelia and Reyes, Javier A., 2013. “A Network Analysis of Global Banking: 1978–2010,” Journal of Financial Stability, 9(2), 168-184.  
- Ongena, Steven, Jose Luis Peydro, and Neeltje van Horen, 2013, “Shocks Abroad, Pain at Home? Bank-firm Level Evidence on the International Transmission of Financial Shocks,” De Nederlandsche Bank, Working Paper 385.  
- Peek, Joe and Eric S. Rosengren, 1997, “The International Transmission of Financial Shocks: The Case of Japan,” American Economic Review 87(4), 495–505.  
- Peek and Rosengren, 2000a, “Collateral Damage: Effects of the Japanese Bank Crisis on the United States,” American Economic Review 90(1), 30–45.  
- Peek and Rosengren, 2000b, “Implications of the Globalization of the Banking Sector: The Latin American Experience,” New England Economic Review (September/October), 45–63.  
- Schoenmaker, Dirk, 2013, “Post-Crisis Reversal in Banking and Insurance Integration,” Economic Papers 496, April, European Commission, Brussels.  
- Strahan, Philip, 2013, “Too Big To Fail: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Responses,” Annual Review of Financial Economics, 5, 43-61.  
- Van Horen, Neeltje, 2011, “The changing role of emerging market banks,” in Thorsten Beck (ed.), The Future of Banking, CEPR/VoxEU-eBook, 79-83.

### Figures and tables (titles and key labels preserved)
- Figure 1: Number and share of foreign banks, 1995 - 2013
  - Axis labels showing values including 0.05, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20, 0.25, 0.30, 0.35, 0.40 and counts from 0 to 1,600 across years 1995–2013.
  - Series: Number foreign banks; Share foreign banks (number); Share foreign banks (assets).

- Figure 2: Number of entries and exits of foreign banks, 1995-2013
  - Y-axis range: -100 to 150; years 1995–2013.
  - Series: Entry; Exit; Net entry.
  - Note: As the database starts in 1995 the number of foreign banks that exited the market in that year cannot be determined.

- Figure 3: Number of foreign banks by home country income group, 1995 - 2013
  - Series: High-income country banks; Emerging market and developing country banks.

- Figure 4: Number of net entries by home country income group
  - Y-axis range: -60 to 80; years 1996–2013.
  - Series: High-income country banks; Emerging market and developing country banks.
  - Note: Net entries refers to entries minus exits in the respective year.

- Figure 5: Share regional foreign banks before and after the crisis, by home country income group
  - Years shown: 2007 and 2012.
  - Regions: Americas, Europe, Asia, Middle East and Africa, All.
  - Series: High-income country banks; Emerging market and developing country banks.
  - Note: Countries are grouped in four geographical regions irrespective of the income level of the countries. "America" includes Canada, United States and all countries in Latin American and the Caribbean; "Europe" includes all Western and Eastern European countries; "Asia" includes all countries in Central, East and South Asia and the Pacific countries including Japan, Australia and New Zealand; "Middle East and Africa" includes all countries in the Middle East and North and Sub-Saharan Africa.

- Figure 6: Change share foreign assets, 2007-2012
  - Panel A: By host country — number of countries with Decrease in share foreign banks and Increase in share foreign banks (values include 0, 1, 3, 4, 7, 10, 11, 19, 22, 28).
  - Panel B: By home-host country pair — counts including 0, 8, 18, 20, 28, 35, 50, 59, 63, 106, 114, 3737 (as shown).

- Figure 7: Comparison growth local and cross-border lending, 2007-2012
  - Panels: Growth cross-border lending vs Growth local lending by all foreign banks; and Growth cross-border lending vs Growth local lending by OECD home country foreign banks.
  - Axes from -3 to 3 for both dimensions.
  - Note: To calculate loan growth of foreign banks only banks that have loan information for both years are included. Countries in which less than 50 percent of the banks qualify are excluded. Only host countries with at least one foreign bank active in 2007 are included.

- Table 1: Number and assets of banks by host country, Aggregates by income level and region (2007, 2013)
  - Key aggregates:
    - All countries (2007): Domestic Number 2,704 Share 0.68; Foreign Number 1,301 Share 0.32; Total Number 4,005
    - All countries (2013): Domestic Number 2,384 Share 0.65; Foreign Number 1,272 Share 0.35; Total Number 3,656
    - Assets and shares presented for 2007 and 2012 with exact values preserved in table columns.
  - Income groups: OECD, Other high-income, Emerging markets, Developing countries.
  - Regions: East Asia and Pacific; Eastern Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; South Asia; Sub Saharan Africa.

- Table 2: Number of foreign banks by home country, Aggregates by income level and region (2007, 2012, 2013)
  - All countries 2013: Number foreign banks 1,301; 2012: 1,272; assets 14,774 (2007), 14,786 (2012) — values preserved as in table.
  - Breakdowns for OECD, Western Europe, North America, Japan/Australia/New Zealand, Other high-income, Emerging markets, Developing countries and subregions with shares and asset shares.

- Table 3: Drivers behind transformation — Entry, Exit, Growth (cross-section regressions)
  - Sample: 107 host countries and 79 home countries.
  - Variables and reported coefficient notes include:
    - Host GDP/cap coefficients, Host crisis, Home GDP/cap coefficients, Home crisis, Bilateral foreign-presence, Distance.
    - Number of obs.: 526, 557, 567, 522, 538, 7,527, 7,792, 7,997, 7,332, 7,677, 468, 495, 504, 464, 477 (as listed).
    - Adjusted R2 values: 0.010, 0.015, 0.047, 0.064, 0.078, 0.010, 0.000, 0.085, 0.117, 0.122, 0.174, 0.058, 0.015, 0.213, 0.193.
  - Note: Dependent variables defined: Exit (columns [1]-[5]) is a dummy equal to one if all banks from home country i active in host country j in 2007 ceased operations by end 2012; Entry (columns [6]-[10]) dummy equal to one if banks from home country i not active in host country j in 2007 started operations between 2008 and 2012; Growth (columns [11]-[15]) equals the log difference between assets in 2007 and 2012 held by foreign banks from home country i active in host country j. Models in first ten columns estimated using probit and last five columns using OLS. Robust standard errors clustered at host country level; parentheses show standard errors; ***,**, * correspond to 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

- Table 4: Drivers behind transformation, OECD versus non-OECD home countries
  - Sample: 107 host countries and 79 home countries; subsets by home country OECD status.
  - Number of obs.: 345, 177, 1,682, 5,650, 300, 164 (as listed).
  - Adjusted R2 values: 0.096, 0.041, 0.041, 0.168, 0.160, 0.157.
  - Note: Columns [1],[3],[5] include pairs where home country is OECD; columns [2],[4],[6] include pairs where home country is not OECD. Dependent variables and estimation methods as in Table 3.

- Table 5: Local versus cross-border local lending, level and growth comparison (US Dollar Billions)
  - Panel shows Loan growth 2007-2012 and Lending 2007.
  - All countries totals: Foreign banks 5,819; Foreign banks (OECD home countries) 5,383; Cross border 10,627.
  - Growth columns: Group-based and country-based growth comparisons include values: 0.08, 0.02, -0.14, 0.37, 0.14, 0.16 (as in table).
  - Income groups breakdowns and notes on data coverage and definitions preserved.

- Table 6: Drivers behind growth local and cross-border lending
  - Sample: 93 host countries, 15 home countries and 254 home-host country pairs.
  - Regression results for dependent variables Growth local lending (column [1]), Growth cross-border lending (column [2]), Growth difference (column [3]).
  - Coefficients and standard errors preserved exactly where listed:
    - Host GDP/cap: -0.014 (0.052), -0.040 (0.077), 0.024 (0.088).
    - Host foreign presence: 0.412*** (0.154), 0.365** (0.181), 0.033 (0.215).
    - Host growth real GDP: 2.202*** (0.550), 1.398 (0.854), 0.690 (0.881).
    - Home GDP/cap: -0.479** (0.216), 0.471 (0.308), -0.871*** (0.319).
    - Bilateral foreign presence: -1.144*** (0.340), -0.439 (0.542), -0.626 (0.542).
    - Distance: -0.087 (0.062), 0.152*** (0.051), -0.220*** (0.085).
    - Growth cross-border claims coefficient: 0.077 (0.050).
    - Growth local lending coefficient: 0.103 (0.075).
    - Number of obs.: 245, 245, 245.
    - Adjusted R2: 0.154, 0.176, 0.066.
  - Note: Dependent variables defined as log differences between 2007 and 2012 for local lending and cross-border lending. All models estimated using OLS, include a constant and cluster robust standard errors at the host country level. Robust standard errors in parentheses and ***,**, * correspond to 1, 5 and 10 percent significance levels, respectively.

### Country and code listings (fragment as shown)
- Selected country codes and names appearing in the listing: BOL, BRA, BWA, CAN, CHE, CHN, CIV, CMR, COL, CRI, CZE, DEU.

*Italic: Source: _wp14197 - REFERENCES (IMF PDF content provided).*

### Appendix Figure 1

### Appendix Figure 1

### Growth in local lending by foreign banks, 2007-2012
- Growth local lending by OECD home country foreign banks: plotted range displays values from -3.00 to 3.00 (axis marks: -3.00 -2.00 -1.00 0.00 1.00 2.00 3.00).
- Growth local lending by all foreign banks: plotted on the same axis range (-3.00 to 3.00).
- Note: Only banks are included that have loan information for both years. Banks that were only active in 2007 or 2012 are also included if loan information is available for that year. Countries in which less than 50 percent of the banks qualify are excluded from the sample.
- Logdifference between 2007 and 2012 of the sum of loans provided by foreign banks from home country i active in host country j.

### Appendix Table 1 — Percentage of foreign banks among total banks, by country (selected entries and totals)
- TOTAL: 30 32 33 34 35 35 35 36 36
- Selected country-year entries as presented:
  - EAP: 18 19 23 25 27 28 28 28 28
  - Cambodia: 42 38 46 53 59 61 61 61 61
  - China: 66 15 18 19 21 21 20 20
  - Indonesia: 33 35 46 48 50 47 48 48 48
  - Korea (South): 19 19 19 19 19 19 13 13 13
  - Malaysia: 32 33 34 34 35 40 40 42 42
  - Mongolia: 11 10 10 11 10 13 13 13
  - Philippines: 14 15 15 15 13 11 11 12 12
  - Thailand: 15 15 14 19 19 24 25 25 25
  - Vietnam: 12 14 14 14 24 24 22 23 23
  - ECA: 39 43 47 49 49 50 49 49 48
  - Albania: 83 79 86 85 85 85 85 85 85
  - Armenia: 50 64 64 69 75 80 80 80 80
  - Belarus: 45 45 52 59 64 67 67 65
  - Bulgaria: 69 69 69 69 69 69 65 65 65
  - Croatia: 33 37 46 46 44 44 48 50 52
  - Czech Republic: 55 59 64 67 67 67 64 64 62
  - Poland: 15 15 17 20 20 20 19 18 17
  - Russia: 70 81 81 81 79 79 79 82 82
  - LAC: 37 38 40 41 41 41 42 42 42
  - Argentina: 32 32 32 33 33 33 33 32 32
  - Brazil: 34 35 36 38 37 38 38 39 40
  - Chile: 39 39 45 45 45 43 43 41 41
  - Colombia: 23 28 29 33 33 33 35 40 42
  - Mexico: 43 41 39 40 39 39 40 40 37
  - Panama: 61 63 64 65 69 68 69 70 69
  - Peru: 54 54 64 67 67 67 67 69 69
  - Uruguay: 77 80 80 79 79 79 76 83 78
  - MENA: 29 34 36 37 37 37 37 38 38
  - Bahrain: 58 58 57 60 60 60 67 71 71
  - Egypt: 21 44 52 54 54 54 54 54 54
  - OECD: 22 22 23 23 23 23 24 24 24
  - Australia: 40 40 40 40 40 42 42 39 35
  - Belgium: 39 39 39 40 43 43 43 43 46
  - Canada: 41 41 40 40 39 38 39 37 37
  - France: 55 55 55 54 44
  - Germany: 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14
  - Ireland: 86 86 86 86 86 86 85 84 82
  - Japan: 11 2 11 11 11 12
  - Luxembourg: 96 96 96 96 96 96 95 95
  - Netherlands: 44 44 44 41 42 45 45 43 47
  - New Zealand: 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78 78
  - United Kingdom: 54 54 54 56 57 56 57 58 58
  - United States: 24 24 24 26 28 31 32 33 31
  - OHI: 38 37 37 37 37 37 36 37 38
  - Hong Kong: 76 73 71 70 72 73 73 73 73
  - Singapore: 58 57 57 57 57 55 50 55 55
  - South Asia (selected): India: 9 11 11 12 12 12 12 12; Bangladesh: 33 33 33 33
  - SSA: 42 44 49 52 53 54 54 55 56
  - South Africa: 21 22 22 23 23 24 24 24 24
  - Zambia: 70 70 80 90 92 93 94 94 94
- Note: listings above follow the exact numeric entries as presented in the table excerpts.

### Appendix Table 2 — Percentage of foreign bank assets among total bank assets, by country (selected entries and totals)
- TOTAL: 13 13 13 13 13 13 12 12 11 10
- Selected country-year entries as presented:
  - EAP: 44 54 44 33 3
  - Cambodia: 36 39 61 62 61 59 58 59 ..
  - China: .... 2 2 2 2 2 1
  - Indonesia: 23 16 24 22 23 23 24 24 27
  - Korea (South): 16 13 12 13 12 12 11 8 7
  - Malaysia: 17 17 18 17 17 17 17 17 18
  - Philippines: 12 11 11 11 11 11 ..
  - Thailand: 32 57 66 66 68
  - Vietnam: .. 2 2 2 4 5 5 4
  - ECA: 42 43 43 42 40 36 34 31 29
  - Albania: .... 93 94 92 90 90 90 81
  - Armenia: 56 62 60 64 71 84 84 83 85
  - Bosnia-Herzegovina: 87 90 91 92 92 88 89 88 88
  - Bulgaria: 76 77 77 98 82 82 79 73 70 62
  - Croatia: 92 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90
  - Czech Republic: 83 84 85 84 83 83 82 81 85
  - Estonia: 100 99 99 99 99 99 99 97 97
  - Russia: 71 01 11 13 11 10 10 10 8
  - Poland: 76 77 77 76 78 75 73 72 76
  - LAC: 38 36 34 35 29 28 27 26 25
  - Argentina: 27 26 27 28 28 24 29 27 ..
  - Brazil: 23 25 24 22 21 18 17 17 16 ..
  - Chile: ...... 42 37 37 35 33 32 0
  - Colombia: 20 17 14 12 11 11 10 13 15
  - Mexico: 83 81 78 75 73 73 74 71 70
  - Panama: 38 47 52 55 64 71 71 67 ..
  - Peru: 49 48 49 51 49 49 51 49 51
  - Uruguay: 75 87 74 74 85 55 57 55 54 92
  - MENA: 15 17 19 17 17 17 16 16 18
  - Bahrain: 67 65 65 69 65 55 55 52 52
  - Egypt: 12 21 25 25 25 24 24 23 21
  - OECD: 11 11 11 12 12 12 11 11 10 9
  - Australia: .. 45 43 32 22
  - Austria: 23 19 27 29 26 26 23 23 26 ..
  - Belgium: 13 13 13 14 49 46 48 46 47
  - Canada: 44 44 45 44 43 43 3
  - Denmark: 20 19 17 17 20 20 18 17 18
  - Finland: 72 85 85 84 82 85 88 85 84
  - France: 55 66 66 66 65
  - Germany: 24 14 11 12 12 12 11 11 11 12
  - Ireland: 38 41 40 38 35 36 35 40 38 40
  - Italy: 13 76 66 66 66
  - Luxembourg: 99 99 99 95 95 94 94 93 93
  - Netherlands: 79 10 23 11 86 4
  - New Zealand: .. 99 97 97 96 95 94 95 94
  - United Kingdom: 12 12 13 19 15 15 15 15 14
  - United States: 21 21 22 18 19 19 16 14 14 10
  - OHI: 48 45 43 42 42 43 36 37 39
  - Hong Kong: 92 91 91 91 92 92 92 92 92
  - Singapore: .. 10 10 37 6
  - SSA: 28 31 32 32 31 31 33 33 33
  - Angola: 48 49 50 52 54 53 54 54 ..
  - Botswana: 94 94 94 93 89 87 83 79 78
  - Burkina Faso: 79 80 76 100 100 100 100 100 ....
  - Madagascar: 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
  - Mozambique: 99 99 100 100 99 99 99 99 98 96
  - Zambia: 69 70 70 88 99 100 100 99 99 99
- Note: Foreign bank asset share is only reported when asset information is available in Bankscope for more than 60 percent of the banks active in the country in that year. Due to the substantial number of banks with missing asset information in 2013 we use the 2012 information in the paper.

### Appendix Table 3 — Variable definitions and sources (selected definitions as presented)
- Growth local lending: Logdifference between 2007 and 2012 of the sum of loans provided by foreign banks from home country i active in host country j.
- Growth cross-border lending: Logdifference between 2007 and 2012 of cross-border loans held by banks from home country i to firms in country j.
- Exit: Dummy that is one if all banks from home country i active in 2007 in host country j seized their operations in the host country by end 2012, zero when the home country remained present.
- Asset growth by foreign banks: Logdifference between 2007 and 2012 of the sum of assets held by foreign banks from home country i active in host country j.
- Home/host crisis: Dummy which is one if the home/host country experienced a banking crisis in at least one year between 2008 and 2012.
- Home/host GDP/cap: Gross domestic product per capita in current USD in home/host country (2007).
- Home foreign presence: Assets held by foreign banks from home country i divided by total bank assets in host country j (2007).
- Host growth real GDP: Logdifference between 2007 and 2012 of gross domestic product measured at constant 2005 US dollars.
- Distance: Distance in km between home country i and host country j according to the great circle distance formula (in log).
- Host foreign presence (all): Assets held by all foreign banks active in host country j divided by total bank assets in host country j (2007).
- Entry: Dummy that is one if at least one foreign bank from home country i newly entered host country j by 2012, zero if there was no investment from home country i in host country j in both 2007 and 2012.

*Source: Claessens and Van Horen (2014); Bankscope; World Development Indicators, World Bank; Laeven and Valencia (2012); CIA World Factbook (2005).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp14197.pdf_
