## _wp1470 - Section V discusses options for the EMEs to manage the spillovers. Concluding observations

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### Post-crisis monetary policy actions in advanced economies
- Policy-rate and coordinated actions:
  - US Federal Reserve policy rate cut from 5.25 percent in August 2007 to 2.0 percent by April 2008 and reached the zero bound by December 2008; it "remains at that level five years later".
  - ECB reached its lowest rate of 0.25 percent in November 2013.
  - Coordinated reduction of "25-50 basis points" on October 8, 2008 by central banks of six advanced economies.
- Liquidity swap facilities and scale:
  - Fed dollar liquidity lines began December 2007 with the ECB and SNB, extended to another 12 central banks during September-October 2008.
  - Swap facilities exist "with five central banks" at present (Bank of Canada, Bank of England, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, and Swiss National Bank).
  - Fed boosted available liquidity under swap lines from US $ 67 billion in December 2007 to US $ 620 billion in early October 2008; further expanded in mid-October 2008 by removing caps with four major central banks.
  - Amounts availed under swaps peaked at US $ 580 billion (over 25 percent of the Fed’s total assets) in mid-December 2008.
  - In end-October 2013 six central banks converted temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements to standing arrangements "that will remain in place until further notice".
- Unconventional monetary policy (UMP) / QE and balance-sheet expansions:
  - US Fed and BoE "almost quadrupled" their balance sheets between end-2007 and September 2013; SNB also quadrupled its balance sheet.
  - ECB and BoJ balance sheets expanded by around 55 and 87 percent, respectively.
  - As proportion of GDP between Dec-2007 and Dec-2012: ECB nearly doubled to 32 percent of GDP; BoE 26 percent of GDP; US Fed 18 percent of GDP; SNB 84 percent of GDP.
  - Combined balance sheets of the US Fed, ECB, BoE, BoJ and SNB have "more than doubled since end-2007 to US $ 10 trillion as of August 2013."

### Spillovers from advanced-economy monetary policy to EMEs
- Capital flows, exchange rates, volatility and empirical findings:
  - UMP and low short- and long-term interest rates encouraged a "search for yield", producing large capital inflows to EMEs and appreciation pressures; flows remained highly volatile (risk-on / risk-off).
  - Episodes: surge in 2010 interrupted by euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2011; resumption in 2012 interrupted mid-2013 by U.S. tapering concerns.
  - IMF (2013b): global factors explain the bulk of changes in bond flows; purchases of Treasury bonds by the Fed associated with capital outflows from the United States into EMs.
  - World Bank (2014): global factors accounted for about 60 percent of the increase in overall capital inflows to developing countries between 2009 and 2013.
    - "US short-term interest rates, the US UMP (mainly QE1 and QE2), the US yield curve and the VIX index explain 4 percent, 13 percent, 20 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of the increase in capital flows between 2009 and 2013."
  - Portfolio flows to developing-country bond and equity mutual funds are "much more sensitive to push factors" than overall portfolio flows; FDI is relatively insensitive.
- Size and composition of flows and balance-sheet exposures:
  - Foreign investors hold almost US $ 1 trillion of EME sovereign debt; half of this amount (US$ 0.5 trillion) was invested during the 3-year period 2010-12.
  - Debt and bond flows are particularly volatile within portfolio flows.
  - Foreign-currency borrowings by EME corporates increased "by about 50 percent over the past five years" (IMF, 2013c).
- Macroeconomic and financial stability risks:
  - Large inward flows generate nominal and real appreciation, widening current account deficits, credit and asset price booms, higher corporate leverage and foreign-currency exposure.
  - Boom-bust dynamics: appreciation during booms often followed by fast, destabilizing depreciations during reversals (June-August 2013 and Jan-Feb 2014 cited).
  - Push factors (source-country monetary developments) explain surges and reversals better than pull factors.
  - UMPs have facilitated market access for a wider range of sovereign borrowers, including some frontier markets.

### Debate on international monetary coordination: scope and feasibility
- Divergent perspectives and institutional constraints:
  - Conventional view: gains from international monetary policy coordination are small; monetary policy should be rules-based.
  - Counterarguments: rules-based policies still create spillovers via capital flows, exchange rates, commodity and asset prices; non-linear abrupt adjustments pose financial stability risks.
  - Proposals for formal coordination (e.g., an International Monetary Policy Committee) face central-bank skepticism; informal forums (BIS, G-20, G-7, Jackson Hole) are currently the principal discussion venues.
  - Leading central banks (e.g., Bernanke, Bean) express skepticism or agnosticism about the magnitude/sign of spillovers; Fed historically adopted "benign neglect" for international dimensions since the 1970s.
  - IMF and BIS could foster understanding through surveillance and analysis, but IMF neutrality and governance concerns (quota reform progress slow) limit consensus.
- Empirical ambiguity:
  - Studies produce mixed results on whether UMPs are net beneficial for EMEs: some models suggest offsetting effects (currency appreciation vs. stronger AE demand), while other work finds negative cross-border spillovers depending on channels and strength.

### Management options available to EMEs (policy toolkit)
- Core policy emphasis:
  - EMEs should continue prudent macroeconomic management given that advanced-economy monetary policy remains domestically oriented.
  - Priority areas: capital account management, management of exchange rate volatility, and domestic monetary and fiscal prudence.
- Capital account management and controls:
  - Calibrated, well-sequenced opening and active management of capital flows; capital controls potentially useful and sometimes long-lasting.
  - Evidence: EMEs with greater inflow restrictions fared better during the NAFC.
  - Critique of common indices (Chinn-Ito, Quinn): conceptual flaws (can remain unchanged for decades and miss intra-year fine-tuning).
  - Welfare-theory strand (Korinek, 2011; Farhi and Werning, 2013) supports temporary subsidies/taxes on flows ("lean against the wind"); structural interest-rate differentials imply measures on debt flows may need to be long lasting.
  - IMF (2012) proposes a framework recognizing benefits and risks of flows, sees some role for capital controls but treats these as temporary and a secondary recourse.
  - Paper criticizes the IMF view as inconsistent in endorsing prolonged UMPs in advanced economies while treating sustained EME currency intervention negatively.
- Liquidity backstops, RFAs, and reserve adequacy:
  - EMEs relied on foreign exchange reserves during June-August 2013 in the absence of AE swap facilities.
  - IMF precautionary facilities remain stigmatized; Fund’s forward commitment capacity was "around SDR 270 billion (as of end-2013)" raising adequacy questions for large EMEs (example: Mexican FCL around SDR 47 billion).
  - Growing interest in RFAs: Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (size US$ 240 billion), EFSF/ESM (combined lending capacity Euro 700 billion), BRICS proposed a currency arrangement for US $ 100 billion, and proliferating bilateral swaps among EMEs.
  - RFAs provide an additional instrument but efficacy remains to be tested; many RFAs are tied to IMF arrangements above certain thresholds.
- Recommended policy mix (judicious combination):
  - Maintain flexible exchange rates while containing excessive volatility via:
    - Judicious capital account management (especially on debt flows).
    - Appropriate foreign exchange intervention.
    - Adequate precautionary foreign exchange reserves.
  - Complement with prudent monetary and fiscal policies, continued development of domestic financial markets, and active financial regulation.

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Empirical synthesis:
  - Aggressive UMP since 2008 in advanced economies lowered short- and long-term interest rates, encouraged large but volatile capital flows to EMEs, and complicated macroeconomic management in EMEs through boom-bust cycles (notable episodes: 2010-11 and mid-2013).
  - Claims that UMPs are net positive globally are empirically ambiguous.
- Two possible paths for addressing spillovers:
  - International coordination: advanced-economy central banks recognize and internalize spillovers from unconventional policies; IMF analytical work could foster understanding and initiate discussions on coordination forms.
  - Unilateral EME management: absent recognition/coordination, EMEs must manage spillovers themselves via the policy mix described above (capital account management, FX intervention, reserves, prudent macro policies).
- Additional proposals and cautions:
  - Explore standing mutual swap facilities between reserve-currency central banks and significant EMEs (with risk mitigation measures, for example using EME holdings of reserve-currency sovereign debt as collateral).
  - Increasing communication and transparent availability of liquidity facilities could curb volatility and reduce need for defensive EME actions; availability of swap facilities could encourage larger boom-period capital flows but overall effect expected to be positive for the global economy.
  - Uncoordinated policy actions by both advanced economies and EMEs risk potential fragmentation of global financial markets; greater international monetary coordination is urged to avoid that outcome.

*Source: _wp1470 - Section V discusses options for the EMEs to manage the spillovers. Concluding observations (PDF content provided).*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp1470 - References

### I. INTRODUCTION — context and background
- Since the onset of the North Atlantic financial crisis (NAFC) in 2008, central banks in the US and the other major advanced economies have pursued highly accommodative monetary policy, including through unconventional policy actions.
- Policy rates have been near zero in these economies for almost five years, and both short-term and long-term interest rates have touched historic lows.
- These low interest rates encouraged the search for yield and consequently, large amounts of capital flowed out from these reserve-currency economies to emerging market economies (EMEs), complicating EME macroeconomic management.
- Capital flows to EMEs are volatile; volatility re-emerged during May-August 2013 when the US Federal Reserve first hinted at possible tapering from its unconventional monetary policy (UMP) and again in January 2014 after tapering began.
- The May 2013 announcement of tapering led to large capital outflows from major EMEs, sudden and large currency depreciations, and heightened crisis fears; however, stronger macroeconomic and financial policies and buffers built by EMEs over the prior decade helped avoid a full-blown financial crisis.
- The tapering episode hurt EMEs’ near-term growth prospects and illustrated potential vulnerabilities in the international monetary system.

### II. International coordination, regulatory response, and institutional developments
- Pre-NAFC orthodoxies challenged:
  - The pre-NAFC view that central banks should be one-objective one-instrument institutions (focus on price stability using short-term interest rates) has been weakened by the 2008 crisis.
  - There is greater recognition of synergies when central banks are entrusted with monetary policy and financial regulation; central bank institutional set-up is being re-designed (examples cited: Bank of England, European Central Bank, US Federal Reserve).
- International financial regulatory cooperation:
  - Basel I, II and III standards are noted outcomes of decades of international cooperation.
  - G-20 Leaders (Washington Summit, November 15, 2008) agreed on closer macroeconomic cooperation to restore growth, avoid negative spillovers, and support EMEs and developing countries.
  - The G-20 constituted four working groups with objectives including Enhancing Sound Regulation and Strengthening Transparency; Reinforcing International Cooperation and Promoting Integrity in Financial Markets; Reform of the IMF; Reform of the World Bank and other Multilateral Development Banks.
- Establishment and role of the Financial Stability Board (FSB):
  - The FSB was established in April 2009 in response to the November 2008 G-20 call for larger membership of the Financial Stability Forum.
  - The FSB coordinates national financial authorities and international standard setting bodies to develop and promote implementation of effective regulatory, supervisory and other financial sector policies.
- G-20 pledges and IMF resource increases:
  - At the G-20 London Summit (April 2009), Leaders agreed to treble IMF resources to US$ 750 billion, support a new SDR allocation of US$ 250 billion, at least US$ 100 billion of additional lending capacity for multilateral development banks, and to ensure US$ 250 billion of support for trade finance.
  - G-20 initiatives led to an additional US$ 450 billion of resources for the IMF through bilateral borrowings in 2012.
  - Delay in ratification of the 2010 quota and governance reforms caused the Fund to depend increasingly on borrowed resources; quota and voting shares of many dynamic EMEs are lower than their relative economic weights, raising governance and surveillance concerns.
- Overall assessment:
  - G-20 led initiatives have improved international economic and financial coordination since the NAFC and played a critical role in stabilizing the global economy and avoiding a repeat of the 1930s Great Depression.

### III. Monetary policy coordination — debate and practice
- Conventional wisdom and G-20 stance:
  - Traditional view: central banks focus on domestic inflation and output objectives; international coordination provides no net benefit.
  - Saint Petersburg G-20 Leaders Declaration (September 5-6, 2013) stated: “Monetary policy will continue to be directed towards domestic price stability and supporting the economic recovery according to the respective mandates of central banks”, while being “mindful of the risks and unintended negative side effects of extended periods of monetary easing. We recognize that strengthened and sustained growth will be accompanied by an eventual transition toward the normalization of monetary policies. Our central banks have committed that future changes to monetary policy settings will continue to be carefully calibrated and clearly communicated”.
- Examples of partial coordination:
  - Activation of swap lines by the US Federal Reserve with central banks in major advanced economies and a few select emerging markets after the NAFC is cited as an example of some coordination; motivation appears to have been to address drying up liquidity in advanced economies rather than UMP spillovers to EMEs.
  - Historical examples: the Plaza and Louvre Accords (1985 and 1987) illustrated coordinated intervention to depreciate the US dollar.
- Forums for discussion among central bankers:
  - BIS bi-monthly meetings of central bank governors and periodic deputy governors’ meetings are major forums.
  - G-20, G-7, and conferences such as the annual Jackson Hole conference provide opportunities for exchange but focus mostly on analytical issues.
- Divergent views on responsibility for EME volatility:
  - Rajan (2014a) argues US should worry about effects of its policies on the rest of the world and calls for cooperation; Eichengreen (2014) suggests the Fed negotiate permanent dollar swap facilities with major EMEs.
  - Buiter (2014) and others support the view that Fed policies have significant spillovers.
  - Opposing view (e.g., Prasad, 2014; Rodrik, 2014): volatility in EMEs stems from failures of domestic policies, and expecting major financial centers to adjust policies for others is unrealistic; EMEs voluntarily embraced financial globalization and could have protected themselves from excess capital flows.

### IV. Scope and purpose of the paper
- The paper examines:
  - Monetary policies in major advanced economies since 2007 and the extent of coordination among major central banks (Section II).
  - Spillovers from advanced economy monetary policies to EMEs, focusing on capital flow and exchange rate channels and implications for EMEs (Section III).
  - The scope and feasibility for international monetary coordination (Section IV).
- Noted observation:
  - “International policy coordination is like the Loch Ness monster – much discussed, but rarely seen” (Blanchard, Ostry and Ghosh, 2013).

*Source: _wp1470 - References .............................................................................................................*

### Section V discusses options for the EMEs to manage the spillovers. Concluding observations

### _wp1470 - Section V discusses options for the EMEs to manage the spillovers. Concluding observations

### Post-crisis monetary policy actions in advanced economies
- Conventional policy rates:
  - US Federal Reserve policy rate cut from 5.25 percent in August 2007 to 2.0 percent by April 2008 and reached the zero bound by December 2008; it "remains at that level five years later" (text).
  - ECB reached its lowest rate of 0.25 percent in November 2013.
  - On October 8, 2008 there was a coordinated reduction of "25-50 basis points" in policy interest rates by central banks of six advanced economies.
- Liquidity swap facilities:
  - Federal Reserve entered US dollar liquidity lines beginning December 2007 with the ECB and SNB, extended to another 12 central banks during September-October 2008.
  - Swap facilities exist "with five central banks" at present (Bank of Canada, Bank of England, European Central Bank, Bank of Japan, and Swiss National Bank).
  - Fed boosted available liquidity under swap lines from US $ 67 billion in December 2007 to US $ 620 billion in early October 2008; further expanded in mid-October 2008 by removing caps with four major central banks.
  - Amounts availed under swaps peaked at US $ 580 billion (over 25 percent of the Fed’s total assets) in mid-December 2008.
  - In end-October 2013 six central banks decided to convert temporary bilateral liquidity swap arrangements to standing arrangements "that will remain in place until further notice".
- Unconventional monetary policy (UMP) / quantitative easing (QE):
  - US Fed and BoE "almost quadrupled" their balance sheets between end-2007 and September 2013; SNB also quadrupled its balance sheet.
  - ECB and BoJ balance sheets expanded by around 55 and 87 percent, respectively.
  - As proportion of GDP between Dec-2007 and Dec-2012: ECB nearly doubled to 32 percent of GDP; BoE 26 percent of GDP; US Fed 18 percent of GDP; SNB 84 percent of GDP.
  - Combined balance sheets of the US Fed, ECB, BoE, BoJ and SNB have "more than doubled since end-2007 to US $ 10 trillion as of August 2013."

### Spillovers from advanced-economy monetary policy to EMEs
- Capital flows, exchange rates, and volatility:
  - UMP and low short- and long-term interest rates in advanced economies encouraged a "search for yield", producing large capital inflows to EMEs and appreciation pressures on EME currencies; flows remained highly volatile (risk-on / risk-off).
  - Episodes: surge in 2010 interrupted by euro area sovereign debt crisis in 2011; resumption in 2012 interrupted mid-2013 by U.S. tapering concerns.
  - Empirical findings cited:
    - IMF (2013b): global factors explain the bulk of changes in bond flows; purchases of Treasury bonds by the Fed associated with capital outflows from the United States into EMs.
    - World Bank (2014): global factors (US interest rates, risk and the UMPs) accounted for about 60 percent of the increase in overall capital inflows to developing countries between 2009 and 2013.
      - More specifically, "US short-term interest rates, the US UMP (mainly QE1 and QE2), the US yield curve and the VIX index explain 4 percent, 13 percent, 20 percent and 26 percent, respectively, of the increase in capital flows between 2009 and 2013."
    - Portfolio flows to developing-country bond and equity mutual funds are "much more sensitive to push factors" than overall portfolio flows; FDI is relatively insensitive.
  - Size and composition of flows:
    - Foreign investors hold almost US $ 1 trillion of EME sovereign debt; half of this amount (US$ 0.5 trillion) was invested during the 3-year period 2010-12.
    - Within portfolio flows, debt and bond flows are highlighted as particularly volatile.
- Macroeconomic and financial stability risks:
  - Large inward flows generate nominal and real appreciation, widening current account deficits, credit and asset price booms, higher corporate leverage and foreign-currency exposure.
  - Foreign-currency borrowings by EME corporate increased "by about 50 percent over the past five years" (IMF, 2013c).
  - Boom-bust dynamics: appreciation during booms often followed by fast, destabilizing depreciations during reversals (June-August 2013 and Jan-Feb 2014 cited).
  - Empirical evidence suggests push factors (source-country monetary developments) explain surges and reversals better than pull factors.
  - UMPs have facilitated market access for a wider range of sovereign borrowers, including some frontier markets (examples cited in text).

### Debate on international monetary coordination: scope and feasibility
- Divergent views summarized:
  - Conventional view (e.g., Taylor): gains from international monetary policy coordination are small; monetary policy should be rules-based.
  - Counterarguments: even rules-based policies create spillovers via capital flows, exchange rates, commodity and asset prices; non-linear abrupt adjustments pose financial stability risks.
- Institutional and political constraints:
  - Proposals such as an International Monetary Policy Committee (Eichengreen et al., 2011) face skepticism from central bankers who see limited control and argue informal forums already exist.
  - Leading central banks (e.g., Bernanke, Bean) express skepticism or agnosticism about the magnitude/sign of spillovers; Fed historically adopted "benign neglect" for international dimensions since the 1970s.
  - The IMF and BIS are identified as impartial surveyors that could foster understanding through surveillance and analysis, but concerns exist about IMF neutrality and governance (quota reform progress slow).
- Empirical ambiguity:
  - Studies produce mixed results on whether UMPs are net beneficial for EMEs: some models/simulations suggest offsetting effects (currency appreciation vs. stronger AE demand), while other work finds negative cross-border spillovers depending on channels and strength.

### Management options available to EMEs (Section V focus)
- Core policy emphasis:
  - EMEs should continue prudent macroeconomic management given that advanced-economy monetary policy remains domestically oriented.
  - Priority areas: capital account management, management of exchange rate volatility, and domestic monetary and fiscal prudence.
- Capital account management:
  - Empirical literature and institutional views stress calibrated, well-sequenced opening and active management of capital flows, with capital controls potentially useful and sometimes long-lasting.
  - Key arguments and evidence:
    - Episodes of booms in capital flows often precede crises; EMEs with greater inflow restrictions fared better during the NAFC.
    - Indices used in some studies (Chinn-Ito, Quinn) have conceptual flaws: they can remain unchanged for decades and miss intra-year fine-tuning of measures.
    - A new welfare-theory strand (Korinek, 2011; Farhi and Werning, 2013) supports temporary subsidies/taxes on flows ("lean against the wind") to smooth flow-driven cycles; but the paper argues that structural interest-rate differentials imply measures on debt flows may need to be long lasting.
  - IMF position: the Fund proposes a framework recognizing benefits and risks of flows, sees some role for capital controls but views these as temporary and a secondary recourse (IMF, 2012).
  - Counterpoints: the paper criticizes the IMF view as inconsistent in endorsing prolonged UMPs in advanced economies while treating sustained EME currency intervention with opprobrium.
- Liquidity backstops and regional financing arrangements (RFAs):
  - EMEs relied on foreign exchange reserves during June-August 2013 in the absence of AE swap facilities; IMF precautionary facilities remain stigmatized and the Fund’s forward commitment capacity was "around SDR 270 billion (as of end-2013)" raising questions about adequacy for large EMEs (example: Mexican FCL around SDR 47 billion).
  - Growing interest in RFAs: Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (size US$ 240 billion), EFSF/ESM (combined lending capacity Euro 700 billion), BRICS proposed a currency arrangement for US $ 100 billion, and proliferating bilateral swaps among EMEs.
  - RFAs provide an additional instrument but their efficacy remains to be tested; many RFAs are tied to IMF arrangements above certain thresholds.
- Recommended policy mix for EMEs (text guidance):
  - Maintain flexible exchange rates while containing excessive volatility via:
    - Judicious capital account management (especially on debt flows).
    - Appropriate foreign exchange intervention.
    - Adequate precautionary foreign exchange reserves.
  - Complement with prudent monetary and fiscal policies, continued development of domestic financial markets, and active financial regulation.

### Conclusions and policy implications
- Empirical summary:
  - Aggressive UMP since 2008 in advanced economies lowered short- and long-term interest rates, encouraged large but volatile capital flows to EMEs, and complicated macroeconomic management in EMEs through boom-bust cycles (notable episodes: 2010-11 and mid-2013).
  - Claims that UMPs are net positive globally are empirically ambiguous.
- Two possible paths highlighted:
  - International coordination: requires advanced-economy central banks to recognize and internalize spillovers from unconventional policies; IMF analytical work could foster understanding and initiate discussions on coordination forms.
  - Unilateral EME management: absent recognition/coordination, EMEs must manage spillovers themselves via the policy mix described above (capital account management, FX intervention, reserves, prudent macro policies).
- Additional proposals and cautions:
  - Explore standing mutual swap facilities between reserve-currency central banks and significant EMEs (with risk mitigation measures, for example using EME holdings of reserve-currency sovereign debt as collateral).
  - Increasing communication and transparent availability of liquidity facilities could curb volatility and reduce need for defensive EME actions, though availability of swap facilities could encourage larger boom-period capital flows; overall effect expected to be positive for the global economy.
- Final caution:
  - Uncoordinated policy actions by both advanced economies and EMEs risk potential fragmentation of global financial markets; greater international monetary coordination is urged to avoid that outcome.

*Source: _wp1470 - Section V discusses options for the EMEs to manage the spillovers. Concluding observations (PDF content provided).*

---


_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2014/_wp1470.pdf_
