## _wp15106 ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [_wp15106](https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15106.pdf) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15106.pdf.md) - [Structured JSON version](/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15106.pdf.json) --- ### Introduction — context and scope - Context: Reserve Balances and Central Bank Balance Sheets - Most emerging market central banks (CBs) have a long history of operating in a context of surplus reserve balances. - CB balance sheets in these markets have commonly been “asset driven” whereby the CB takes on certain assets—in particular, foreign exchange (FX) reserves, lending to government, or in some cases lender of last resort (LOLR) assistance to weak banks—whether to serve policy goals or for lack of choice. - Taking on these assets generates reserve balances in the accounts of commercial banks which exceed the demand for their use; excess reserve balances will tend to depress short-term interest rates (and/or lead to exchange rate pressures). - Sterilization operations used to minimize adverse consequences include: - increasing reserve requirements; - paying interest on excess reserves; - using instruments such as term deposits, reverse repo (or FX swaps); - issuance of central bank (CB) bills. - Advanced Economy Experience Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) - In recent years a number of advanced economy banking systems have moved from a structural deficit of reserve balances to a structural surplus as a result of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). - In Japan, the U.S. and the U.K., CB purchases of securities (Quantitative Easing (QE)) have resulted in substantial balance sheet increases and large excess reserve positions held by commercial banks, while in the euro zone, liquidity provision via lending to banks, in response to the GFC, has also led to excess reserve balances. - And prospectively the euro zone, following an European Central Bank (ECB) decision in January 2015. - Cross-border Capital Flows and Emerging Market Challenges - A surge in cross-border capital flows following the GFC renewed challenges for emerging market CBs in the effective management of reserve balances. - Initial capital outflows drained domestic-currency reserve balances as financial institutions pulled liquidity back to the U.S. and Europe; later, loose monetary policy (notably QE) reignited capital inflows into emerging markets, putting upwards pressure on their domestic currencies and prompting FX intervention that increased domestic-currency reserve balances. - To avoid adverse consequences on financial stability, careful management of such balances is essential. - Note: “reserve balances” refers specifically to commercial banks’ current account balances held at the central bank (the part of “reserve money” that can be directly controlled by the central bank); the paper prefers “reserve balances” over the broader term “liquidity.” - Rationale for Issuing Central Bank Securities - Issuance of CB securities may be an attractive option for effective “liquidity management” as it provides a degree of autonomy to the CB not available with all other instruments. - CB securities represent a market-friendly approach and can be one of the major open market operation (OMO) tools for several CBs. - Other instruments have limitations: - Direct instruments such as reserve requirements act as a tax on financial intermediation via commercial banks unless fully remunerated, and may encourage the growth of non-bank channels (“shadow banking”) with attendant financial stability risks. - Other market-friendly OMOs (sale of government securities, reverse repos, FX swaps) rely on the availability of collateral (or FX) in the CB’s portfolio; CB securities provide autonomy in this respect. - Role in Bond Market Development - CB securities could be used to facilitate bond market development. - When government does not issue sufficient securities in amount or range of maturities to meet market demand for domestic currency credit-risk free assets, CB securities can fill the gap and help establish the benchmark yield curve. - Purpose and Scope of the Paper - The paper summarizes recent cross-country experiences with issuance of CB securities and draws “best practices” to serve as an operational guideline for CBs. - It aims to bridge conceptual and practical aspects of CB securities issuance, covering differing maturities of issuance, investor access, and secondary market trading. - Structure of the paper: - Section II: Stylized facts on CB securities issuance, primarily from a triennial global survey on monetary policy implementation conducted by the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), and discussion of the rationale for issuing CB securities. - Section III: Mechanics of CB securities issuance, drawing on international experience. - Section IV: Policy guidance and the ingredients and preparations required for CB securities issuance. ### Stylized facts on CB securities issuance (Section V concludes) - Prevalence and legal framework - Over one third of the world’s CBs have been issuing securities to undertake OMO (ISIMP). - In the most recent (2013) survey 42 CBs indicated that they issue securities. - The survey covers 125 countries. - CBs in Asia and the Western Hemisphere have been more likely to issue CB securities (2013). - Issuance is much less common among low income countries (LICs). - Based on the Central Bank Legislation database (2013), most CBs are allowed by law to issue securities (74 percent of total). Out of those permitted, just over half (55 percent of that subset) do so. - CBs issuing securities tend to have a bigger balance sheet as a percent of GDP (as of 2013 sample illustrated). - Maturities and yield-curve relationships - Sample of 24 countries (data availability) shows residual maturities of CB securities range from four days (Azerbaijan) to 5 years (Chile) with a mode of around one month (as of end-July 2014). - For a sample of 11 countries (as of July 2014), the relationship between volume outstanding and the spread between 3-month and 1-year benchmark yields shows: the lower the spread (flatter yield curve), the more securities CBs will issue. ### Why central banks issue securities (purposes and drivers) - Liquidity management: CB securities primarily absorb excess reserves arising from monetary financing, FX purchases, or liquidity support to banks. - Substitution and complementarity: - CB securities generally serve as substitutes for reserve requirements or the use of government securities in OMOs to manage liquidity. - CB securities complement market-based OMO tools such as repo and FX swaps. - CB securities tend not to substitute for very short-term sterilization tools (overnight repo/swaps or overnight deposits) which are used to fine-tune liquidity and transmit the monetary policy signal. - Market development: some CBs design issuance to foster domestic bond market development (examples: HKMA, BOK, BOT). - Other purposes: issuance may be used for non-standard objectives (e.g., Bank Negara Malaysia issued securities to raise funding for bank recapitalization in 1997; Bank of England has issued FX securities to fund FX reserves). ### How central banks issue securities — operational features - Choice between government (treasury) or central bank bills - Trade-off between cost and autonomy: if draining surplus liquidity implies continuing loss for the CB, fiscal issuance may be more appropriate; but government unwillingness to bear costs or give CB discretion can constrain operations. - Example: Reserve Bank of India acted as agent for government issuing treasury bills/cash management bills to drain liquidity with proceeds kept in a Market Stabilization Scheme Account (until 2011). - Maturities - CB securities usually cover the shorter segment of the yield curve; residual maturities in sample range from four days to 5 years, mode around one month. - Structural excess liquidity may call for longer-term CB bonds (examples: Chile up to 20-year index-linked; Korea up to 2-year; Thailand up to 3-year). - Longer maturity issuance can help develop a benchmark yield curve when government supply is insufficient. - Coordination with government debt management unit is crucial to ensure aggregate issuance consistency and meet market demand. Government should generally have priority in bond issuance. - Counterparties and participation - Broad participation increases competition and improves pricing but raises administrative costs and potential payment/settlement strain. - Out of 42 central banks reported issuing securities, 11 auction securities only to commercial banks, while the rest have a wider group of counterparties. - Ceilings for bids are typically set in the range of 20–30 percent (not uniformly used). Minimum bid sizes and non-competitive bids are common tools. - Auction types - Two main types: multiple-price (each successful bidder pays their bid) and single-price (uniform price = cutoff). CBs use both types. - Some CBs use fixed-price auctions when issuing to transmit the policy signal (e.g., Riksbank, National Bank of Poland). - Multiple-price auctions can reduce sterilization costs and encourage competition but may create a "winner’s curse." Single-price auctions may better support wide participation and policy-guided short-term pricing. - Table of country examples (2013) lists tenors and auction styles (multiple- and single-price) — sample entries include Angola, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan POC, Thailand, Vietnam. (Information as of 2013.) - Types of securities - Generally discount or fixed-coupon. A few CBs issue index-linked or floating coupon bonds (Chile inflation-indexed; Thailand floating coupon linked to BIBOR). - Retail saving bonds have been used (BOT, Bank Negara Malaysia) but are small-volume, high-administrative-cost, and generally illiquid. ### General guidelines (four building blocks) - Allocation of OMO instruments - Separate forecasts for short-term (cyclical) and long-term (structural) liquidity are needed. - Short-term changes handled by repo/reverse repo/deposits; structural surplus by CB securities. - Instrument maturity distribution should reflect different segments of demand (example ranges: Deposit/Lending Facilities – Overnight; Term Deposit/Collateralized Loan – 1 day, 7 days, 14 days, 1 month; Repo/Reverse repo – 1 day, 7 days, 14 days, 1 month; FX Swap – Overnight – 12 months; CB securities – 3 months onwards). - Monthly liquidity forecasts and advance auction schedules are recommended. - Planning issuance - Assess liquidity conditions, government bond supply, secondary objectives, and investor demand; coordinate with government issuance plan. - Announce auction schedules in advance; a broad issuance plan covering the next year may be announced before year-end, with narrower volumes announced monthly or at least a day before auctions. - Schedule auctions consistent with redemptions and government calendar to ease payment system pressures. - Auction conduct - Adopt a 'rules-based' or 'constrained-discretion' approach to cut-off pricing; unconstrained discretion risks market uncertainty. - CBs may retain discretion to eliminate extreme outliers or to overallot under certain conditions; definitions of outliers should be as rules-based as possible (e.g., bids deviating from the weighted average by X percent). - Avoid using discretion to influence long-term market rates except in clear QE or market anomaly situations. - Announce auction results within half an hour to an hour; public announcements should include aggregate bidding volume, amount allocated, bid-coverage ratio, cutoff price, and publishing the weighted average price of successful bids. - Post-auction assessment - Use auction metrics (bidding volume, bid-cover ratio, rates) to gauge primary market conditions and inform subsequent issuance strategy. - Assess auction outcomes within the broader liquidity management framework to improve forecasting and instrument allocation. ### Conclusion — key takeaways - CB securities are issued mainly to absorb excess liquidity and complement other short-term market-based liquidity management tools. - Recipients of large capital inflows (some countries in Asia and Latin America) are more likely to issue CB securities due to sterilization needs and sufficient market development. - Inflation targeting countries are more inclined to issue CB securities; low-income countries are least likely due to high administrative costs and lack of market infrastructure. - Operational practices vary, but maturities concentrate at the shorter segment of the yield curve, with exceptions where excess liquidity is structural and government bond supply is insufficient. - Coordination with government issuance plans and clear planning, auction, and post-auction procedures provide best-practice guidance for CB securities issuance. ### Annex I. List of Countries Included in ISIMP (2013) - Islamic State of Afghanistan - Albania - Algeria - Angola - Argentina - Armenia - Australia - Azerbaijan - Bahamas - The Belarus - Belize - Bhutan - Bolivia - Bosnia and Herzegovina - Botswana - Brazil - Brunei Darussalam - Bulgaria - Burundi - Cambodia - Canada - Central African Monetary Union - Chile - China - Colombia - Comoros - Democratic Republic of Congo - Costa Rica - Croatia - Czech Republic - Denmark - Djibouti - Dominican Republic - Eastern Caribbean Central Bank - Ecuador - Egypt - Ethiopia - Euro Area - Fiji - Georgia - Guatemala - Guyana - Honduras - Hungary - Iceland - India - Indonesia - Islamic Republic of Iran - Iraq - Israel - Japan - Jamaica - Jordan - Kazakhstan - Kenya - Republic of Korea - Republic of Korea - Republic of Korea - Kosovo - Kuwait - Latvia - Lebanon - Lesotho - Liberia - Lithuania - Madagascar - Malawi - Malaysia - Maldives - Mauritania - Mauritius - Mexico - Mongolia - Montenegro - Morocco - Mozambique - Myanmar - Namibia - Nepal - New Zealand - Nicaragua - Nigeria - Oman - Pakistan - Paraguay - Peru - Philippines - Poland - Qatar - Romania - Russian Federation - Rwanda - American Samoa - Saudi Arabia - Republic of Serbia - Seychelles - Sierra Leone - Singapore - Solomon Islands - South Africa - South Sudan - Sri Lanka - Suriname - Swaziland - former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - Sweden - Switzerland - Tanzania - Thailand - Timor-Leste - Democratic Republic of Trinidad and Tobago - Tunisia - Turkey - Uganda - Ukraine - United Arab Emirates - United Kingdom - United States - Uruguay - Uzbekistan - Vanuatu - Venezuela - Vietnam - Republic of Yemen - Zambia - Guyana - Oman *Source: _wp15106 - Introduction; Section V concludes; Annex I. List of Countries Included in ISIMP (2013).* ### Introduction ........................................................................................................... ### Introduction ### Context: Reserve Balances and Central Bank Balance Sheets - Most emerging market central banks (CBs) have a long history of operating in a context of surplus reserve balances. - CB balance sheets in these markets have commonly been “asset driven” whereby the CB takes on certain assets—in particular, foreign exchange (FX) reserves, lending to government, or in some cases lender of last resort (LOLR) assistance to weak banks—whether to serve policy goals or for lack of choice. - Taking on these assets generates reserve balances in the accounts of commercial banks which exceed the demand for their use; excess reserve balances will tend to depress short-term interest rates (and/or lead to exchange rate pressures). - Sterilization operations used to minimize adverse consequences include: - increasing reserve requirements; - paying interest on excess reserves; - using instruments such as term deposits, reverse repo (or FX swaps); - issuance of central bank (CB) bills. ### Advanced Economy Experience Since the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) - In recent years a number of advanced economy banking systems have moved from a structural deficit of reserve balances to a structural surplus as a result of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). - In Japan, the U.S. and the U.K., CB purchases of securities (Quantitative Easing (QE)) have resulted in substantial balance sheet increases and large excess reserve positions held by commercial banks, while in the euro zone, liquidity provision via lending to banks, in response to the GFC, has also led to excess reserve balances. - And prospectively the euro zone, following an European Central Bank (ECB) decision in January 2015. ### Cross-border Capital Flows and Emerging Market Challenges - A surge in cross-border capital flows following the GFC renewed challenges for emerging market CBs in the effective management of reserve balances. - Initial capital outflows drained domestic-currency reserve balances as financial institutions pulled liquidity back to the U.S. and Europe; later, loose monetary policy (notably QE) reignited capital inflows into emerging markets, putting upwards pressure on their domestic currencies and prompting FX intervention that increased domestic-currency reserve balances. - To avoid adverse consequences on financial stability, careful management of such balances is essential. - Note: “reserve balances” refers specifically to commercial banks’ current account balances held at the central bank (the part of “reserve money” that can be directly controlled by the central bank); the paper prefers “reserve balances” over the broader term “liquidity.” ### Rationale for Issuing Central Bank Securities - Issuance of CB securities may be an attractive option for effective “liquidity management” as it provides a degree of autonomy to the CB not available with all other instruments. - CB securities represent a market-friendly approach and can be one of the major open market operation (OMO) tools for several CBs. - Other instruments have limitations: - Direct instruments such as reserve requirements act as a tax on financial intermediation via commercial banks unless fully remunerated, and may encourage the growth of non-bank channels (“shadow banking”) with attendant financial stability risks. - Other market-friendly OMOs (sale of government securities, reverse repos, FX swaps) rely on the availability of collateral (or FX) in the CB’s portfolio; CB securities provide autonomy in this respect. ### Role in Bond Market Development - CB securities could be used to facilitate bond market development. - When government does not issue sufficient securities in amount or range of maturities to meet market demand for domestic currency credit-risk free assets, CB securities can fill the gap and help establish the benchmark yield curve. ### Purpose and Scope of the Paper - The paper summarizes recent cross-country experiences with issuance of CB securities and draws “best practices” to serve as an operational guideline for CBs. - It aims to bridge conceptual and practical aspects of CB securities issuance, covering differing maturities of issuance, investor access, and secondary market trading. - Structure of the paper: - Section II: Stylized facts on CB securities issuance, primarily from a triennial global survey on monetary policy implementation conducted by the IMF’s Monetary and Capital Markets Department (MCM), and discussion of the rationale for issuing CB securities. - Section III: Mechanics of CB securities issuance, drawing on international experience. - Section IV: Policy guidance and the ingredients and preparations required for CB securities issuance. *Source: _wp15106 - Introduction* ### Section V concludes. ### _wp15106 - Section V concludes. ### Stylized facts on central bank securities issuance - Over one third of the world’s CBs have been issuing securities to undertake OMO (ISIMP). - In the most recent (2013) survey 42 CBs indicated that they issue securities. - The survey covers 125 countries. - CBs in Asia and the Western Hemisphere have been more likely to issue CB securities (2013). - Issuance is much less common among low income countries (LICs). - Based on the Central Bank Legislation database (2013), most CBs are allowed by law to issue securities (74 percent of total). Out of those permitted, just over half (55 percent of that subset) do so. - CBs issuing securities tend to have a bigger balance sheet as a percent of GDP (as of 2013 sample illustrated). - Sample of 24 countries (data availability) shows residual maturities of CB securities range from four days (Azerbaijan) to 5 years (Chile) with a mode of around one month (as of end-July 2014). - For a sample of 11 countries (as of July 2014), the relationship between volume outstanding and the spread between 3-month and 1-year benchmark yields shows: the lower the spread (flatter yield curve), the more securities CBs will issue. ### Why central banks issue securities (purposes and drivers) - Liquidity management: CB securities primarily absorb excess reserves arising from monetary financing, FX purchases, or liquidity support to banks. - Substitution and complementarity: - CB securities generally serve as substitutes for reserve requirements or the use of government securities in OMOs to manage liquidity. - CB securities complement market-based OMO tools such as repo and FX swaps. - CB securities tend not to substitute for very short-term sterilization tools (overnight repo/swaps or overnight deposits) which are used to fine-tune liquidity and transmit the monetary policy signal. - Market development: some CBs design issuance to foster domestic bond market development (examples: HKMA, BOK, BOT). - Other purposes: issuance may be used for non-standard objectives (e.g., Bank Negara Malaysia issued securities to raise funding for bank recapitalization in 1997; Bank of England has issued FX securities to fund FX reserves). ### How central banks issue securities — operational features - Choice between government (treasury) or central bank bills: - Trade-off between cost and autonomy: if draining surplus liquidity implies continuing loss for the CB, fiscal issuance may be more appropriate; but government unwillingness to bear costs or give CB discretion can constrain operations. - Example: Reserve Bank of India acted as agent for government issuing treasury bills/cash management bills to drain liquidity with proceeds kept in a Market Stabilization Scheme Account (until 2011). - Maturities: - CB securities usually cover the shorter segment of the yield curve; residual maturities in sample range from four days to 5 years, mode around one month. - Structural excess liquidity may call for longer-term CB bonds (examples: Chile up to 20-year index-linked; Korea up to 2-year; Thailand up to 3-year). - Longer maturity issuance can help develop a benchmark yield curve when government supply is insufficient. - Coordination with government debt management unit is crucial to ensure aggregate issuance consistency and meet market demand. Government should generally have priority in bond issuance. - Counterparties and participation: - Broad participation increases competition and improves pricing but raises administrative costs and potential payment/settlement strain. - Out of 42 central banks reported issuing securities, 11 auction securities only to commercial banks, while the rest have a wider group of counterparties. - Ceilings for bids are typically set in the range of 20–30 percent (not uniformly used). Minimum bid sizes and non-competitive bids are common tools. - Auction types: - Two main types: multiple-price (each successful bidder pays their bid) and single-price (uniform price = cutoff). CBs use both types. - Some CBs use fixed-price auctions when issuing to transmit the policy signal (e.g., Riksbank, National Bank of Poland). - Table of country examples (2013) lists tenors and auction styles (multiple- and single-price) — sample entries include Angola, China, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Indonesia, Malaysia, Peru, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan POC, Thailand, Vietnam. (Information as of 2013.) - Multiple-price auctions can reduce sterilization costs and encourage competition but may create a "winner’s curse." Single-price auctions may better support wide participation and policy-guided short-term pricing. - Types of securities: - Generally discount or fixed-coupon. A few CBs issue index-linked or floating coupon bonds (Chile inflation-indexed; Thailand floating coupon linked to BIBOR). - Retail saving bonds have been used (BOT, Bank Negara Malaysia) but are small-volume, high-administrative-cost, and generally illiquid. ### General guidelines (four building blocks) - Allocation of OMO instruments: - Separate forecasts for short-term (cyclical) and long-term (structural) liquidity are needed. - Short-term changes handled by repo/reverse repo/deposits; structural surplus by CB securities. - Instrument maturity distribution should reflect different segments of demand (example ranges: Deposit/Lending Facilities – Overnight; Term Deposit/Collateralized Loan – 1 day, 7 days, 14 days, 1 month; Repo/Reverse repo – 1 day, 7 days, 14 days, 1 month; FX Swap – Overnight – 12 months; CB securities – 3 months onwards). - Monthly liquidity forecasts and advance auction schedules are recommended. - Planning issuance: - Assess liquidity conditions, government bond supply, secondary objectives, and investor demand; coordinate with government issuance plan. - Announce auction schedules in advance; a broad issuance plan covering the next year may be announced before year-end, with narrower volumes announced monthly or at least a day before auctions. - Schedule auctions consistent with redemptions and government calendar to ease payment system pressures. - Auction conduct: - Adopt a 'rules-based' or 'constrained-discretion' approach to cut-off pricing; unconstrained discretion risks market uncertainty. - CBs may retain discretion to eliminate extreme outliers or to overallot under certain conditions; definitions of outliers should be as rules-based as possible (e.g., bids deviating from the weighted average by X percent). - Avoid using discretion to influence long-term market rates except in clear QE or market anomaly situations. - Announce auction results within half an hour to an hour; public announcements should include aggregate bidding volume, amount allocated, bid-coverage ratio, cutoff price, and publishing the weighted average price of successful bids. - Post-auction assessment: - Use auction metrics (bidding volume, bid-cover ratio, rates) to gauge primary market conditions and inform subsequent issuance strategy. - Assess auction outcomes within the broader liquidity management framework to improve forecasting and instrument allocation. ### Conclusion — key takeaways - CB securities are issued mainly to absorb excess liquidity and complement other short-term market-based liquidity management tools. - Recipients of large capital inflows (some countries in Asia and Latin America) are more likely to issue CB securities due to sterilization needs and sufficient market development. - Inflation targeting countries are more inclined to issue CB securities; low-income countries are least likely due to high administrative costs and lack of market infrastructure. - Operational practices vary, but maturities concentrate at the shorter segment of the yield curve, with exceptions where excess liquidity is structural and government bond supply is insufficient. - Coordination with government issuance plans and clear planning, auction, and post-auction procedures provide best-practice guidance for CB securities issuance. *Source: _wp15106 - Section V concludes.* ### Annex I. List of Countries Included in ISIMP (2013) ### Annex I. List of Countries Included in ISIMP (2013) ### Countries included (as listed) - Islamic State of Afghanistan - Albania - Algeria - Angola - Argentina - Armenia - Australia - Azerbaijan - Bahamas - The Belarus - Belize - Bhutan - Bolivia - Bosnia and Herzegovina - Botswana - Brazil - Brunei Darussalam - Bulgaria - Burundi - Cambodia - Canada - Central African Monetary Union - Chile - China - Colombia - Comoros - Democratic Republic of Congo - Costa Rica - Croatia - Czech Republic - Denmark - Djibouti - Dominican Republic - Eastern Caribbean Central Bank - Ecuador - Egypt - Ethiopia - Euro Area - Fiji - Georgia - Guatemala - Guyana - Honduras - Hungary - Iceland - India - Indonesia - Islamic Republic of Iran - Iraq - Israel - Japan - Jamaica - Jordan - Kazakhstan - Kenya - Republic of Korea - Republic of Korea - Republic of Korea - Kosovo - Kuwait - Latvia - Lebanon - Lesotho - Liberia - Lithuania - Madagascar - Malawi - Malaysia - Maldives - Mauritania - Mauritius - Mexico - Mongolia - Montenegro - Morocco - Mozambique - Myanmar - Namibia - Nepal - New Zealand - Nicaragua - Nigeria - Oman - Pakistan - Paraguay - Peru - Philippines - Poland - Qatar - Romania - Russian Federation - Rwanda - American Samoa - Saudi Arabia - Republic of Serbia - Seychelles - Sierra Leone - Singapore - Solomon Islands - South Africa - South Sudan - Sri Lanka - Suriname - Swaziland - former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - Sweden - Switzerland - Tanzania - Thailand - Timor-Leste - Democratic Republic of Trinidad and Tobago - Tunisia - Turkey - Uganda - Ukraine - United Arab Emirates - United Kingdom - United States - Uruguay - Uzbekistan - Vanuatu - Venezuela - Vietnam - Republic of Yemen - Zambia - Guyana - Oman *Annex I. List of Countries Included in ISIMP (2013).* --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15106.pdf_