## 1. Household Budget Shares for Fuel Products

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### Introduction
- Policy challenge: achieve fiscal consolidation without undermining growth and poverty-reduction.
- Core argument:
  - Higher consumption taxes create a trade-off between efficient fiscal consolidation and equity.
  - This trade-off can be substantially mitigated, or even reversed, by reallocating some increased consumption tax revenues to finance expansion of well-targeted social spending.
- Tax side focus: reducing tax subsidies for consumption items with negative environmental and health externalities—fuel, alcohol, and tobacco.
- Spending side focus: expanding and improving targeting of the Public Distribution System (PDS) and the Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA).
- Caveats:
  - Analysis abstracts from central/state revenue distinctions.
  - Results tied to availability of household survey data.
  - Institutional capacity and intergovernmental revenue distribution must be considered before policy implementation.

### Recent fiscal policy in India — key facts and trends
- Historic deficits and FRBM:
  - In fiscal year 2003/04: central government fiscal deficit nearly 4.5 percent of GDP; general government deficit almost 8.5 percent of GDP.
  - FRBM Act target ceiling: 3 percent of GDP for the central government budget deficit.
  - Central government deficit fell below 2.5 percent of GDP in 2007/08.
- Impact of the global financial crisis and stimulus:
  - Fiscal stimulus in 2008 reversed earlier deficit declines.
  - Central deficit peaked at 6.5 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
- Subsequent consolidation and remaining gaps:
  - Central deficit reduced to about 4.5 percent of GDP in 2013/14 (still above 3 percent FRBM ceiling).
  - Much consolidation achieved by cutting capital spending.
  - Additional fiscal consolidation required to meet targets and create space for public investment.
- State fiscal performance:
  - States have generally contained deficits within the 3 percent ceiling.
- Tax-to-GDP ratio trends:
  - Central government tax-to-GDP ratio peaked at about 12 percent of GDP in 2007/08; declined to about 10 percent of GDP in 2013/14.
  - Decline partly reflects decline in excise tax revenues after 2009/10 stimulus.
  - India’s general government tax ratio remains well below peers with similar income.

### Public expenditures, subsidies, and public capital stock
- Subsidies increased from 1.2 percent of GDP in 2005/06 to 2.4 percent of GDP in 2012/13.
- Increase in subsidies largely driven by increasing fuel subsidies.
- Public capital expenditures declined and public capital stock as a share of output fell sharply, more so than in other emerging markets.

### Sin taxes and fuel product taxation — reforms and implications
- Reforms implemented:
  - Gasoline prices deregulated in 2010.
  - Diesel prices deregulated in 2014.
  - Excise duties on petrol and diesel raised on four occasions (most recently in January 2015).
  - Natural gas price formula revised; gas prices revised every six months.
  - LPG subsidies reduced and fixed per cylinder; January 2015: relaunched modified Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme in LPG covering all 676 districts.
- Optimal corrective (Pigouvian) taxes (Parry and others 2014):
  - Diesel: 36 rupees (Rs) per liter.
  - Gasoline: Rs 50 per liter.
- At domestic international prices as of mid-2015, eliminating tax subsidies (including levying Pigouvian taxes) on diesel and gasoline would require:
  - Almost a doubling of the tax on gasoline.
  - A more than fivefold increase in the diesel tax.
  - Result: approximately a doubling of both domestic retail prices.
- Drop in international oil prices in 2014–15 presents an opportunity to increase fuel taxation to raise indirect tax revenues and the overall tax ratio.

### Household budget shares for fuel products (Percent of total household consumption)
- Source: IMF staff estimates based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey.
- Note: Kerosene consumption includes purchases from Fair Price Shops and from the open market. LPG = liquefied petroleum gas.
- Decile | Kerosene | LPG | Petrol | Diesel | Total
  - 1: 1.54 | 0.37 | 0.15 | 0.02 | 2.08
  - 2: 1.24 | 0.63 | 0.39 | 0.01 | 2.28
  - 3: 1.17 | 0.69 | 0.49 | 0.02 | 2.37
  - 4: 1.05 | 0.90 | 0.78 | 0.02 | 2.75
  - 5: 0.92 | 1.13 | 0.96 | 0.03 | 3.04
  - 6: 0.80 | 1.38 | 1.39 | 0.04 | 3.62
  - 7: 0.72 | 1.57 | 1.94 | 0.07 | 4.31
  - 8: 0.59 | 1.88 | 2.60 | 0.10 | 5.17
  - 9: 0.47 | 2.08 | 3.25 | 0.16 | 5.97
  - 10: 0.24 | 1.72 | 4.33 | 0.40 | 6.70
  - Total (all deciles): 0.88 | 1.24 | 1.63 | 0.09 | 3.83
- Key interpretations:
  - Average household spends about 3.8 percent of total consumption on direct consumption of these fuel products.
  - Budget shares range from 2.1 percent for the poorest decile to 6.7 percent for the richest decile.
  - Indirect impacts typically account for more than half of the total impact on households, with percentage impacts similar across income groups.

### Alcohol and tobacco taxation — institutional setup and health rationale
- Alcohol taxation:
  - Taxed at the state level with an excise duty typically levied at a rate of 10.3 percent.
  - Some states levy sales taxes on intrastate and interstate alcohol sales.
  - Customs duties apply to imported alcoholic products; no central tax applies to domestic manufacturing and sales.
- Tobacco taxation:
  - Central government levies and collects a central sales tax.
  - States impose sales taxes; some states have experimented with penalty tax rates (for example, 67 percent in Rajasthan).
- Public health context:
  - Smoking contributes substantially to noncommunicable disease mortality: in India, one in five adult male deaths and one in twenty adult female deaths at ages 30–69 are due to smoking.
  - Tobacco taxation is viewed as the single most effective policy tool for reducing consumption.
  - The share of retail price accounted for by excises in India is especially low compared with peer countries and well below the 70 percent recommended target level (WHO 2013).
  - Tax increases are also cost-effective for reducing alcohol consumption and heavy drinking episodes; combined taxation magnifies public health benefits.

### Household budget shares for alcohol and tobacco (Percent of total household consumption)
- Source: IMF staff estimates based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey.
- Note: Tobacco includes bidi, cigarettes, leaf tobacco, snuff, hookah, tobacco, cheroot, zarda, kimam, surti, and other tobacco products. Alcohol includes ganja, toddy, country liquor, beer, foreign or refined liquor or wine, and other intoxicants.
- Decile | Tobacco | Alcohol | Total
  - 1: 1.27 | 0.78 | 2.05
  - 2: 1.31 | 0.69 | 1.99
  - 3: 1.29 | 0.68 | 1.97
  - 4: 1.29 | 0.71 | 2.00
  - 5: 1.24 | 0.71 | 1.95
  - 6: 1.26 | 0.79 | 2.05
  - 7: 1.17 | 0.84 | 2.01
  - 8: 1.05 | 0.71 | 1.76
  - 9: 0.94 | 0.73 | 1.67
  - 10: 0.57 | 0.66 | 1.23
  - Total (all deciles): 1.14 | 0.73 | 1.87
- Key interpretations:
  - On average, households allocate 1.87 percent of total consumption to alcohol and tobacco.
  - Tobacco expenditures exceed alcohol expenditures across most income groups.
  - Tobacco share is higher for lower-income groups (about 1.3 percent for bottom quintile) and lower for top quintile (0.75 percent).
  - Alcohol share is broadly similar across income groups (0.66–0.84 percent).

### Transfer programs in India — PDS and MGNREGA
- Peak budget cost of PDS and MGNREGA combined reached around 1.2 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
- Public Distribution System (PDS) / Targeted PDS (TPDS):
  - Operated jointly by central and state governments.
  - Main commodities: wheat, rice, sugar, and kerosene.
  - Card categories and entitlements:
    - APL = 15 kilograms/month; BPL = 35 kilograms/month; AAY = 50 kilograms/month.
  - Coverage and benefit indicators (Possession | Coverage | Benefit level | Benefit share):
    - Total (all deciles): 84.1 | 63.5 | 29.6 | 100
    - Decile 1: 85.1 | 74.5 | 60.0 | 17.5
    - Decile 2: 85.9 | 73.4 | 41.2 | 14.2
    - Decile 3: 85.6 | 76.0 | 33.6 | 12.4
    - Decile 4: 85.9 | 70.2 | 28.9 | 10.2
    - Decile 5: 88.0 | 69.1 | 25.4 | 10.6
    - Decile 6: 86.0 | 62.5 | 22.4 | 8.8
    - Decile 7: 86.1 | 61.6 | 19.3 | 8.2
    - Decile 8: 84.7 | 56.8 | 17.1 | 8.1
    - Decile 9: 81.2 | 49.1 | 12.6 | 6.1
    - Decile 10: 72.8 | 38.2 | 7.3 | 3.8
  - Observations:
    - Only about two-thirds of households report using their cards.
    - Extensive coverage leads to leakage: the top half receives about one-third of benefits.
    - Coverage of poorest groups is incomplete; about one-quarter of the poorest three deciles do not purchase subsidized items.
    - For beneficiaries, benefits can be large (equivalent to half of total household consumption for poorest quintile).
- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA):
  - Enacted September 2005; operational February 2006; fully rolled out by April 2008.
  - Guarantees up to 100 days of unskilled employment per rural household per year.
  - Expenditures about 0.35 percent of GDP in 2012/13 (central government bears 90 percent).
  - Costs breakdown: wage disbursements = 0.25 percent of GDP; materials and administration = 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Participation and targeting indicators (Rural percent | Coverage percent | Benefit level percent of HH consumption | Benefit share percent):
    - Total (all deciles): 68.8 | 24.4 | 10.8 | 100
    - Decile 1: 85.2 | 33.7 | 16.0 | 12.1
    - Decile 2: 81.7 | 31.0 | 12.2 | 11.6
    - Decile 3: 82.7 | 29.5 | 11.6 | 12.1
    - Decile 4: 80.5 | 26.9 | 11.0 | 11.8
    - Decile 5: 80.2 | 25.7 | 9.9 | 11.2
    - Decile 6: 77.1 | 24.9 | 10.1 | 11.8
    - Decile 7: 72.6 | 23.8 | 9.5 | 11.2
    - Decile 8: 65.9 | 19.4 | 8.5 | 8.7
    - Decile 9: 55.1 | 16.6 | 7.4 | 6.7
    - Decile 10: 34.9 | 9.8 | 5.2 | 2.8
  - Observations:
    - About a quarter of rural households participated in 2011/12.
    - The richest half receives slightly more than 40 percent of total benefits (leakage).
    - For lower-income groups, MGNREGA benefits are equivalent to 10–15 percent of annual household consumption.
    - Employment generated is less than the 100-day guarantee but higher than past public works programs; state variation is significant.

### Distributional impact of tax and transfer reforms — summary findings
- Tax reforms (fuel, alcohol, tobacco) — illustrative simulation basis:
  - Simulations use 2011/12 household survey data and end-2012 domestic retail and international prices for fuel.
  - Raising retail prices to 2012 reference prices equivalents:
    - Petrol: increase by Rs 5 per liter (an 8 percent increase).
    - Diesel: increase by Rs 12 per liter (a 29 percent increase).
    - LPG: increase by Rs 21 per liter (a 70 percent increase).
    - PDS kerosene: increase by Rs 27 per liter (an increase of 181 percent).
    - Market kerosene: increase by Rs 11 per liter (a 35 percent increase).
  - Alcohol and tobacco prices both increased by 10 percent in simulations.
  - Note: Since 2012 administered fuel price changes and international price declines in the second half of 2014 have substantially changed subsidy levels; simulations are illustrative.
- Box 1 aggregate impacts (taxes):
  - Fuel price increases: on average, 3.5 percent decrease in household real incomes (direct and indirect).
    - Fuel impact by decile: ranges from 3.9 percent for the lowest decile to 3.0 percent for top decile.
    - Burden share: top half of the income distribution bears about two-thirds of the total burden.
  - Alcohol: affects less than one-fifth of households; results in less than 0.1 percent decrease in household real incomes; distribution approximately neutral; top half bears about two-thirds of total burden.
  - Tobacco: affects more than half of households; results in slightly more than 0.1 percent decrease in household real incomes; impact regressively distributed, ranging from 0.13 for the lowest decile to 0.06 for the top decile; top half bears about 56 percent of total burden.
  - Combined tax increases: on average, 3.7 percent decrease in household real incomes.
    - Distribution: ranges from 4.1 percent decrease for the lowest decile to 3.1 percent decrease for the highest decile.
    - Overall burden concentrated among higher-income groups: top half bears approximately two-thirds of total burden.
    - Inequality and poverty effects: consumption Gini increases from 0.355 to 0.357; poverty rate increases from 26.3 percent to 29.9 percent.
- Transfer reforms (PDS and MGNREGA):
  - PDS food subsidies simulation:
    - Reform: 20 percent increase in benefits for AAY card holders; 10 percent increase for BPL and APL cardholders.
    - Coverage: benefits nearly two-thirds of the population; coverage ranges from three-quarters for lowest decile to slightly more than one-third for top decile.
    - Income impact: percentage increase in household incomes ranges from 7.5 percent for bottom decile to less than 1 percent for top decile.
    - Distribution: bottom half receives about two-thirds of total increase in spending.
  - MGNREGA public works simulation:
    - Reform: increase employment for households seeking work to a minimum of 75 days/year.
    - Coverage: on average about 7 percent of all households nationally; coverage ranges from 10 percent for bottom decile to 3 percent for top decile.
    - For beneficiaries: nearly 23 percent increase in incomes on average.
    - Distribution: increase in benefits progressively distributed, ranging from 37 percent for bottom decile to 9 percent for top decile; bottom half receives about two-thirds of total increase.
  - Combined transfers (PDS + MGNREGA):
    - On average, combined increase in spending results in a 1.4 percent increase in income for beneficiary households.
    - Distribution: ranges from 5.3 percent increase for bottom decile to 0.2 percent for top decile.
    - Distributional outcomes: bottom half receives about two-thirds of the total increase in spending.
    - Inequality and poverty effects: consumption Gini decreases from 0.355 to 0.316; poverty rate decreases from 26.3 percent to 7.8 percent.

### Combined net effects and targeting improvements
- Combined tax and transfer reforms (net effects):
  - Tax increases average impact: 3.7 percent decrease in household incomes.
  - Transfer increases average impact: 1.4 percent increase in household incomes.
  - Net fiscal savings from combined reforms: equivalent to about 1.6 percent of GDP.
  - Net household impact on average: 2.3 percent decrease in income.
  - Distributional features:
    - Net negative impact is progressively distributed: percentage decrease in incomes much higher for top income deciles, which bear more than three-quarters of the total net burden.
    - Bottom income decile: on average, net gainers.
    - Inequality and poverty: consumption Gini decreases from 0.355 to 0.317; poverty rate decreases from 26.3 percent to 9.8 percent.
  - Key concern: many poor households in the lower part of the distribution still experience net negative impacts due to relative magnitudes of tax and transfer changes and leakage in transfers.
- Targeting improvements (PMT and child allowance simulations):
  - PMT targeting simulation:
    - Eligibility: households in the 50 percent with highest probability of being poor based on PMT score; uniform cash transfer cost equal to PDS reform; MGNREGA days increased to 100 for those with fewer than 100 days.
    - Outcomes:
      - Reallocates spending toward lower-income groups; bottom half receives roughly all transfers.
      - Average household incomes increase in each of the bottom six deciles; losses for top four deciles.
      - Bottom four deciles become net beneficiaries from combined reforms.
  - PMT plus child allowance simulation:
    - Design: uniform transfer to all children under age 16, allocated starting with highest PMT-poverty-probability households until budget exhausted.
    - Outcomes:
      - Substantially increases progressivity and share of benefits to lower-income groups.
      - Provides greater protection to lower-income households against tax increases.
  - Reported aggregate outcomes (examples from Table 7):
    - Panel A and Panel B list aggregate impact as Total 1.5 (impact benefit percent of HH consumption) and Total -1.9 (impact benefit share percent) for “All reforms combined” under the PMT simulations.
  - Practical implication:
    - Improving transfer targeting (PMT; PMT + child allowance) can make lowest-income groups net gainers from revenue-enhancing tax and transfer reforms.

### Conclusions and policy recommendations
- Core conclusions:
  - Increasing consumption taxes on goods with negative externalities (fuel, alcohol, tobacco) is an efficient way to raise revenue but tends to be regressive in isolation.
  - Reallocating some revenue to expanded PDS and MGNREGA can substantially offset regressive tax impacts because these transfers are strongly progressive under current designs.
  - Improved targeting (PMT, child-targeted transfers) can further protect the poorest and increase progressivity, potentially making low-income groups net beneficiaries from combined reforms.
- Policy recommendations (implicit from analysis):
  - Use revenue from sin/consumption taxes with negative externalities to finance expanded, better-targeted social programs.
  - Improve transfer targeting (proxy means testing; demographic tagging such as child allowance) to reduce leakage to higher-income groups and protect lower-income households from tax increases.
  - Address targeting inefficiencies to increase the likelihood that fiscal consolidation through revenue-enhancing reforms will be equitable.
  - Consider intergovernmental revenue distribution and institutional capacity when designing and implementing reforms.

*Source: Excerpts and tables from IMF staff analysis based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey and related simulations (content unit: _wp15152).*

### 1. Household Budget Shares for Fuel Products .........................................................................7

### 1. Household Budget Shares for Fuel Products

### Introduction
- Continued fiscal consolidation in India is widely recognized (Kelkar, Rajaraman, and Misra 2012).
- Key policy challenge: achieve fiscal consolidation without undermining growth and poverty-reduction efforts.
- Fiscal consolidation should be achieved through expansion of the consumption tax base and accompanied by a reallocation of public spending toward public investment and social spending (Mundle, Bhanumurthy, and Das 2011; Tapsoba 2014).
- Core argument of the paper:
  - Although higher consumption taxes create a classical trade-off between efficient fiscal consolidation and equity objectives, this trade-off can be substantially mitigated, or even reversed, by reallocating some of the increased consumption tax revenues to finance expansion of well-targeted social spending.
- Scope and focus:
  - Tax side: potential for efficiently expanding the consumption tax base through reduction of tax subsidies for consumption items with negative environmental and health externalities—fuel, alcohol, and tobacco.
  - Spending side: focus on two key social programs— the Public Distribution System (PDS) and the Employment Guarantee Scheme (MGNREGA).
- Caveats highlighted by the authors:
  - Discussion largely abstracts from the distinction between central and state revenues.
  - Choice of social programs examined reflects both availability of household survey data and their relative importance in the social safety net.
  - Caution advised before translating findings into specific policy recommendations; need to consider revenue distribution between center and states, other safety net components, and institutional capacity to implement reforms.

### Recent fiscal policy in India — key facts and trends
- Historic deficits and FRBM:
  - In fiscal year 2003/04:
    - Central government fiscal deficit reached nearly 4.5 percent of GDP.
    - General government deficit was almost 8.5 percent of GDP.
  - The Fiscal Responsibility and Budget Management (FRBM) Act set a target ceiling of 3 percent of GDP for the central government budget deficit.
  - Central government deficit fell below 2.5 percent of GDP in 2007/08.
- Impact of the global financial crisis and stimulus:
  - Fiscal stimulus measures in 2008 (increased spending and tax cuts) reversed earlier deficit declines.
  - Central deficit more than doubled and reached a peak of 6.5 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
- Subsequent consolidation and remaining gaps:
  - Renewed fiscal consolidation reduced the central deficit to about 4.5 percent of GDP in 2013/14, still above the FRBM ceiling of 3 percent of GDP.
  - Much of the fiscal consolidation has been achieved by cutting capital spending.
  - Conclusion: substantial additional fiscal consolidation is required to attain the fiscal deficit target, create fiscal space for growth-enhancing public investment, and rebuild fiscal buffers.
- State fiscal performance:
  - Indian states have had more success containing their deficits to within the 3 percent ceiling.
- Tax-to-GDP ratio trends:
  - Central government tax-to-GDP ratio peaked at about 12 percent of GDP in 2007/08.
  - It declined to about 10 percent of GDP in 2013/14.
  - Decline in central tax ratio partly reflects the decline in excise tax revenues, due in part to sizable reduction in indirect tax rates as a component of the 2009/10 stimulus package.
  - General government tax ratio declined but exhibited renewed upward trend beginning in 2010/11.
  - India’s general government tax ratio is well below levels observed in many countries with similar levels of income.

### Analytical approach and implications for policy
- Demonstrated potential: design of taxes and transfers can simultaneously:
  - Increase fiscal space;
  - Improve efficiency of the tax system; and
  - Contribute to lowering poverty and income inequality.
- Specific reform avenues emphasized:
  - Reduce tax subsidies for fuel, alcohol, and tobacco to expand the consumption tax base efficiently.
  - Reallocate increased consumption tax revenues to expand well-targeted social spending, particularly via PDS and MGNREGA.
  - Improve the efficiency of social spending to enhance distributional outcomes.
- Limitations to bear in mind for policymaking:
  - Intergovernmental revenue distribution (center vs. states) implications are not fully modeled.
  - Results are illustrative and tied to availability of household survey data for distributional analysis.
  - Institutional capacity and the design of other safety-net components need consideration before policy implementation.

*Source: Excerpt from IMF working paper (content unit: _wp15152 - 1. Household Budget Shares for Fuel Products).*

### 4. Public Capital Stock in India and Emerging Markets

### 4. Public Capital Stock in India and Emerging Markets

### Public expenditures, subsidies, and public capital stock
- Subsidies have increased from 1.2 percent of GDP in 2005/06 to 2.4 percent of GDP in 2012/13.
- The increase in subsidies has been largely driven by increasing fuel subsidies.
- Public capital expenditures have declined and stagnated, reflected in a declining stock of public capital as a share of output; the fall is much sharper than that observed in other emerging market economies.

### Sin taxes in India — overview
- Focus items: fuel, alcohol, and tobacco.
- There is ample room to generate more revenue from higher taxation of these consumption items that generate large negative externalities.

### Fuel product taxation — reforms and implications
- Historically, retail prices for petrol, kerosene, diesel, and LPG were controlled.
- Reforms implemented:
  - Gasoline prices deregulated in 2010.
  - Diesel prices deregulated in 2014.
  - Excise duties on petrol and diesel raised on four occasions (most recently in January 2015).
  - Natural gas price formula revised; gas prices raised with provision to revise prices every six months.
  - LPG subsidies reduced and fixed on a per cylinder basis.
  - January 2015: relaunched modified Direct Benefit Transfer Scheme in LPG covering all 676 districts.
- Optimal corrective (Pigouvian) taxes (Parry and others 2014):
  - Diesel: 36 rupees (Rs) per liter.
  - Gasoline: Rs 50 per liter.
- At domestic international prices as of mid-2015, eliminating tax subsidies (including levying Pigouvian taxes) on diesel and gasoline would require:
  - Almost a doubling of the tax on gasoline.
  - A more than fivefold increase in the diesel tax.
  - Result: approximately a doubling of both domestic retail prices.
- Drop in international oil prices in 2014–15 presents an opportunity to increase fuel taxation to raise indirect tax revenues and the overall tax ratio.

### Household budget shares for fuel products (Percent of total household consumption)
- Source: IMF staff estimates based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey.
- Note: Kerosene consumption includes purchases from Fair Price Shops and from the open market. LPG = liquefied petroleum gas.
- Decile | Kerosene | LPG | Petrol | Diesel | Total
  - 1: 1.54 | 0.37 | 0.15 | 0.02 | 2.08
  - 2: 1.24 | 0.63 | 0.39 | 0.01 | 2.28
  - 3: 1.17 | 0.69 | 0.49 | 0.02 | 2.37
  - 4: 1.05 | 0.90 | 0.78 | 0.02 | 2.75
  - 5: 0.92 | 1.13 | 0.96 | 0.03 | 3.04
  - 6: 0.80 | 1.38 | 1.39 | 0.04 | 3.62
  - 7: 0.72 | 1.57 | 1.94 | 0.07 | 4.31
  - 8: 0.59 | 1.88 | 2.60 | 0.10 | 5.17
  - 9: 0.47 | 2.08 | 3.25 | 0.16 | 5.97
  - 10: 0.24 | 1.72 | 4.33 | 0.40 | 6.70
  - Total (all deciles): 0.88 | 1.24 | 1.63 | 0.09 | 3.83
- Key interpretations:
  - On average, households spend about 3.8 percent of total consumption on direct consumption of these fuel products.
  - Budget shares range from 2.1 percent for the poorest income decile to 6.7 percent for the richest decile.
  - Indirect impacts (higher prices for other goods and services due to higher fuel and distribution costs) typically account for more than half of the total impact on households, with percentage impacts similar across income groups.

### Alcohol and tobacco taxation — institutional setup and health rationale
- Alcohol taxation:
  - Taxed at the state level with an excise duty typically levied at a rate of 10.3 percent.
  - Some states levy sales taxes on both intrastate and interstate sales of alcohol.
  - Customs duties on imported alcoholic products; no central tax applies to domestic manufacturing and sales.
- Tobacco taxation:
  - Central government levies and collects a central sales tax.
  - States impose sales taxes on tobacco products; some states have experimented with penalty tax rates (for example, 67 percent in Rajasthan).
- Public health context:
  - Smoking is a key driver of the recent rise in annual deaths from noncommunicable diseases in low- and middle-income countries.
  - In India, one in five adult male deaths and one in twenty adult female deaths at ages 30–69 are due to smoking.
  - Tobacco taxation is widely viewed as the single most effective policy tool for reducing tobacco consumption.
  - The share of retail price accounted for by excises in India is especially low compared with peer countries and well below the 70 percent recommended target level (WHO 2013).
  - Tax increases are also cost-effective for reducing alcohol consumption and heavy drinking episodes, especially in young people.
  - Since smoking and drinking are often complementary, public health benefits from taxing both alcohol and tobacco are magnified.

### Household budget shares for alcohol and tobacco (Percent of total household consumption)
- Source: IMF staff estimates based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey.
- Note: Tobacco category includes bidi, cigarettes, leaf tobacco, snuff, hookah, tobacco, cheroot, zarda, kimam, surti, and other tobacco products. Alcohol category includes ganja, toddy, country liquor, beer, foreign or refined liquor or wine, and other intoxicants.
- Decile | Tobacco | Alcohol | Total
  - 1: 1.27 | 0.78 | 2.05
  - 2: 1.31 | 0.69 | 1.99
  - 3: 1.29 | 0.68 | 1.97
  - 4: 1.29 | 0.71 | 2.00
  - 5: 1.24 | 0.71 | 1.95
  - 6: 1.26 | 0.79 | 2.05
  - 7: 1.17 | 0.84 | 2.01
  - 8: 1.05 | 0.71 | 1.76
  - 9: 0.94 | 0.73 | 1.67
  - 10: 0.57 | 0.66 | 1.23
  - Total (all deciles): 1.14 | 0.73 | 1.87
- Key interpretations:
  - On average, households allocate nearly 1.9 percent of total consumption expenditures to alcohol and tobacco.
  - Across most income groups, tobacco expenditures exceed alcohol expenditures.
  - Alcohol share is similar across income groups (0.66–0.84 percent).
  - Tobacco share is higher for lower-income groups (about 1.3 percent for bottom quintile) and lower for top quintile (0.75 percent).

### Transfer programs in India — PDS and MGNREGA
- Peak budget cost of PDS and MGNREGA combined reached around 1.2 percent of GDP in 2009/10.
- Public Distribution System (PDS) / Targeted PDS (TPDS):
  - Operated jointly by central and state governments.
  - Central government (Food Corporation of India) handles procurement, storage, transportation, and bulk allocation.
  - States handle allocation, eligibility identification, ration cards, and Fair Price Shops supervision.
  - Main commodities: wheat, rice, sugar, and kerosene.
  - Eligibility determined by comparing monthly household income to poverty line; three card categories: APL, BPL, AAY.
  - Entitlements: APL = 15 kilograms/month; BPL = 35 kilograms/month; AAY = 50 kilograms/month.
  - Subsidized “issue prices” vary across states and cardholders.
- PDS performance and targeting:
  - Coverage of ration cards is very high: possession of a ration card (percent) total = 84.1; coverage (percent) total = 63.5; benefit level (percentage of household consumption) total = 29.6; benefit share (percent) = 100.
  - Decile-level PDS indicators (Possession | Coverage | Benefit level | Benefit share):
    - 1: 85.1 | 74.5 | 60.0 | 17.5
    - 2: 85.9 | 73.4 | 41.2 | 14.2
    - 3: 85.6 | 76.0 | 33.6 | 12.4
    - 4: 85.9 | 70.2 | 28.9 | 10.2
    - 5: 88.0 | 69.1 | 25.4 | 10.6
    - 6: 86.0 | 62.5 | 22.4 | 8.8
    - 7: 86.1 | 61.6 | 19.3 | 8.2
    - 8: 84.7 | 56.8 | 17.1 | 8.1
    - 9: 81.2 | 49.1 | 12.6 | 6.1
    - 10: 72.8 | 38.2 | 7.3 | 3.8
  - Observations:
    - Only about two-thirds of households report using their cards.
    - Extensive coverage leads to leakage of benefits to non-poor households; the top half of the income distribution receives about one-third of all benefits.
    - Coverage of lower-income groups is incomplete; about one-quarter of the poorest three income deciles do not purchase subsidized items.
    - For beneficiaries, benefits can be large (equivalent to half of total household consumption for poorest quintile).
- Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA):
  - Enacted September 2005; operational February 2006.
  - Guarantees up to 100 days of unskilled employment per rural household per year.
  - Now covers all rural districts (rolled out fully as of April 2008).
  - Benefits paid on a piece-rate basis at agricultural minimum wage; wages paid fully in cash and deposited directly into post office or bank accounts.
  - Program expenditures amounted to about 0.35 percent of GDP in 2012/13.
    - Central government bears 90 percent of costs.
    - Costs breakdown: wage disbursements = 0.25 percent of GDP; materials and administrative structure = 0.1 percent of GDP.
  - Participation and targeting:
    - About a quarter of rural households participated in 2011/12.
    - Decile-level MGNREGA indicators (Rural percent | Coverage percent | Benefit level percent of HH consumption | Benefit share percent):
      - 1: 85.2 | 33.7 | 16.0 | 12.1
      - 2: 81.7 | 31.0 | 12.2 | 11.6
      - 3: 82.7 | 29.5 | 11.6 | 12.1
      - 4: 80.5 | 26.9 | 11.0 | 11.8
      - 5: 80.2 | 25.7 | 9.9 | 11.2
      - 6: 77.1 | 24.9 | 10.1 | 11.8
      - 7: 72.6 | 23.8 | 9.5 | 11.2
      - 8: 65.9 | 19.4 | 8.5 | 8.7
      - 9: 55.1 | 16.6 | 7.4 | 6.7
      - 10: 34.9 | 9.8 | 5.2 | 2.8
      - Total (all deciles): 68.8 | 24.4 | 10.8 | 100
    - The richest half of the national population receives slightly more than 40 percent of total benefits, indicating leakage to non-poor households.
    - For lower-income groups, MGNREGA benefits are equivalent to 10–15 percent of annual household consumption.
    - Employment generated under MGNREGA is less than the 100-day guarantee but higher than under past public works programs; variation across states is significant.

### Distributional impact of tax and transfer reforms — summary points
- Increasing taxes on fuel, alcohol, and tobacco is an efficient way to create fiscal space but raises consumer prices and reduces real household incomes.
- Distributional impacts depend on:
  - Magnitude and composition of reforms.
  - How increased prices translate into direct and indirect effects on household consumption.
- Illustrative simulation basis:
  - Simulations use 2011/12 household survey data and end-2012 domestic retail and international prices for fuel.
  - Raising retail prices to 2012 reference prices is equivalent to:
    - Petrol: increase by Rs 5 per liter (an 8 percent increase).
    - Diesel: increase by Rs 12 per liter (a 29 percent increase).
    - LPG: increase by Rs 21 per liter (a 70 percent increase).
    - PDS kerosene: increase by Rs 27 per liter (an increase of 181 percent).
    - Market kerosene: increase by Rs 11 per liter (a 35 percent increase).
  - Prices for alcohol and tobacco are both increased by 10 percent to reflect higher taxation.
- Note: Since 2012, administered retail fuel price increases and decreases in international oil prices (during the second half of 2014) have substantially decreased fuel subsidies; the simulations are illustrative of reform impacts rather than reflecting the current situation in India as of the date of the source.

*Source: IMF staff calculations and analysis as presented in the referenced chapter.*

### Box 1. Progressivity, Regressivity, and Targeting Effectiveness

### Box 1. Progressivity, Regressivity, and Targeting Effectiveness

### Definitions: Progressivity, Regressivity, and Targeting Effectiveness
- Progressivity and Regressivity:
  - A transfer is progressively (regressively) distributed across households if, as a share of household income, it increases (decreases) with the level of household income.
  - A tax is progressively (regressively) distributed across households if, as a share of household income, it decreases (increases) with the level of household income.
  - Whether a tax or transfer is progressive or regressive depends on the underlying distribution of household income (example: India reference is the distribution in Figure 1 based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey).
- Targeting effectiveness:
  - Captures how effectively a transfer reaches the lowest income groups.
  - Commonly evaluated by the share of transfers received by lower-income groups (or the share “leaking” to higher-income groups).
  - Often gauged by comparing benefit shares to groups’ population shares (reflects a universal/uniform untargeted “helicopter drop” reference).

### Impact of Tax Reforms (fuel, alcohol, tobacco)
- Aggregate and distributional impacts:
  - On average, fuel price increases result in a 3.5 percent decrease in household real incomes (includes direct and indirect effects).
  - Fuel impact by decile: ranges from 3.9 percent for the lowest income decile to 3.0 percent for the top decile.
  - Burden share: the top half of the income distribution bears about two-thirds of the total burden from fuel reforms.
- Alcohol and tobacco:
  - Alcohol: affects less than one-fifth of households; results in a less than 0.1 percent decrease in household real incomes from higher alcohol prices; distribution approximately neutral across income groups; top half of income distribution bears about two-thirds of the total burden.
  - Tobacco: affects more than half of households; results in a slightly more than 0.1 percent decrease in household real incomes from higher tobacco prices; impact is regressively distributed, ranging from 0.13 for the lowest income decile to 0.06 for the top decile; top half of income distribution bears about 56 percent of the total burden.
- Combined tax increases:
  - On average, combined tax increases result in a 3.7 percent decrease in household real incomes.
  - Distribution: ranges from 4.1 percent decrease for the lowest income decile to 3.1 percent decrease for the highest income decile.
  - Overall burden concentrated among higher-income groups: the top half bears approximately two-thirds of the total burden.
  - Inequality and poverty effects: consumption Gini increases from 0.355 to 0.357; poverty rate increases from 26.3 percent to 29.9 percent.
- Reform specifics (notes from Table 5):
  - Reform 1 (energy): price changes include PDS kerosene increased by Rs 27/liter (price gap of 181 percent); non-PDS kerosene increased by Rs 11/liter (price gap of 35 percent); LPG increased by Rs 21/liter (price gap of 70 percent); petrol increased by Rs 5/liter (price gap of 8 percent); diesel increased by Rs 12/liter (price gap of 29 percent).
  - Reforms 2 and 3: increase tobacco and alcohol prices by 10 percent.
  - Coverage refers to the percentage of households affected by the reform.

### Impact of Transfer Reforms (PDS food subsidies and MGNREGA)
- Food subsidies (PDS) simulation:
  - Reform: 20 percent increase in benefits for AAY ration card holders; 10 percent increase for BPL and APL cardholders.
  - Coverage: benefits nearly two-thirds of the population; share of households benefiting ranges from three-quarters for the lowest income decile to slightly more than one-third for the top income decile.
  - Income impact: percentage increase in household incomes is progressively distributed, ranging from 7.5 percent for the bottom income decile to less than 1 percent for the top decile.
  - Distribution: bottom half of income distribution receives about two-thirds of the total increase in spending.
- MGNREGA public works simulation:
  - Reform: increase employment for all households that reported seeking work to a minimum of 75 days per year.
  - Coverage and impacts: on average, about 7 percent of all households nationally benefit; coverage ranges from 10 percent for the bottom income decile to 3 percent for the top decile.
  - For beneficiaries, impact is large: nearly 23 percent increase in incomes for beneficiary households on average.
  - Distribution: increase in benefits is progressively distributed, ranging from 37 percent for the bottom income decile to 9 percent for the top decile; bottom half receives about two-thirds of the total increase in benefits.
- Combined transfers (PDS + MGNREGA):
  - On average, combined increase in spending results in a 1.4 percent increase in income for beneficiary households.
  - Distribution: ranges from 5.3 percent increase for the bottom income decile to 0.2 percent for the top income decile.
  - Distributional outcomes: bottom half receives about two-thirds of the total increase in spending.
  - Inequality and poverty effects: consumption Gini decreases from 0.355 to 0.316; poverty rate decreases from 26.3 percent to 7.8 percent.

### Combined Impact of Tax and Transfer Reforms (net effects)
- Aggregate fiscal and household impacts:
  - Tax increases average impact: 3.7 percent decrease in household incomes.
  - Transfer increases average impact: 1.4 percent increase in household incomes.
  - Net fiscal savings from the tax and transfer reforms: equivalent to about 1.6 percent of GDP.
  - Net household impact on average: 2.3 percent decrease in income.
- Distributional features of the net impact:
  - Net negative impact is progressively distributed: percentage decrease in incomes being much higher for the top income deciles, which bear more than three-quarters of the total net burden.
  - Bottom income decile: on average, net gainers from the reforms.
  - Inequality and poverty: consumption Gini decreases from 0.355 to 0.317; poverty rate decreases from 26.3 percent to 9.8 percent.
- Key concern:
  - Many poor households in the lower part of the income distribution experience net negative impacts due to the relative magnitude of tax and transfer changes and inefficiencies (leakage) in transfers.

### Targeting Improvements and Simulations (Table 7: Proxy Means Test and Child Allowance)
- Proxy Means Test (PMT) targeting simulation:
  - Eligibility: households in the 50 percent with highest probability of being poor based on PMT score; uniform cash transfer set to cost exactly the same as PDS reform simulated earlier.
  - MGNREGA adjustment: number of work days increased to 100 per year for those with fewer than 100 days (slightly higher total expenditure).
  - Outcomes:
    - More effective targeting reallocates spending toward lower-income groups and away from higher-income groups.
    - Results in an increase in average household incomes in each of the bottom six income deciles, and losses for households in the top four deciles.
    - Bottom half of the income distribution receives roughly all transfers.
    - Bottom four income deciles become net beneficiaries from combined tax and transfer reforms; higher-income deciles are net losers.
- PMT plus child allowance simulation:
  - Design: uniform transfer given to all children under age of 16 years, starting with households with highest PMT poverty probability and incorporating more households until budget exhausted.
  - Outcomes:
    - Substantially increases progressivity of transfers and share of benefits going to lower-income groups.
    - Provides greater protection to lower-income households against tax increases.
- Table 7 reported impacts (examples of decile outcomes under PMT simulations):
  - Panel A (PMT with uniform household transfers): aggregate impact listed as Total 1.5 (impact benefit percent of HH consumption) and Total -1.9 (impact benefit share percent) for “All reforms combined”.
  - Panel B (PMT with child allowance): aggregate impact listed as Total 1.5 (impact benefit percent of HH consumption) and Total -1.9 (impact benefit share percent) for “All reforms combined”.
  - (Detailed per-decile numeric cells are provided in the source tables and reflect redistributed benefits and net impacts across deciles under the two PMT simulations.)
- Practical implication:
  - Improving transfer targeting (PMT; PMT + child allowance) can make the lowest-income groups net gainers from revenue-enhancing tax and transfer reforms.

### Conclusions (policy-relevant findings)
- Trade-off and policy options:
  - Increasing consumption taxes on goods with negative consumption externalities (fuel, alcohol, tobacco) improves tax efficiency but yields regressive impacts on household income shares.
  - Reallocating some resulting fiscal resources to expanded social spending (PDS and MGNREGA) can substantially offset regressive tax impacts because transfers are strongly progressive.
  - Under existing program designs, expansion of PDS and MGNREGA can make the net incidence of tax and transfer reforms progressive.
  - Further substantial gains are possible if increased social spending is accompanied by improved transfer targeting efficiency (e.g., PMT, child-targeted transfers).
- Policy recommendation summary (implicit from analysis):
  - Use revenue from sin/consumption taxes with negative externalities to finance expanded, better-targeted social programs.
  - Improve transfer targeting (proxy means testing, demographic tagging such as child allowance) to reduce leakage to higher-income groups and protect lower-income households from tax increases.
  - Recognize that targeting inefficiencies undermine protection for poor households; addressing these inefficiencies increases the likelihood that fiscal consolidation through revenue-enhancing reforms will be equitable.

*Source: Box 1. Progressivity, Regressivity, and Targeting Effectiveness (excerpts and figures) from the IMF staff analysis based on the 2011/12 Indian National Sample Survey and the Employment Unemployment Survey.*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15152.pdf_
