## _wp15168

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---

### I. INTRODUCTION
- Provision of high-quality public goods and services in a cost-effective way is presented as a key determinant of long-run economic prosperity.
- No conclusive evidence that higher public spending per se improves long-run growth (see, e.g., Bergh and Henrekson, 2011).
- Quality of institutions—both protection of property rights and quality of public services—determines the public sector’s ability to efficiently provide goods and services that support productivity and economic growth.
- Situates within literature on public sector efficiency and economic performance (Knack and Keefer (1995); Hall and Jones (1999); Acemoglu and others (2001); Evans and Rauch (1999); Angelopoulos and others (2008); Oto-Peralias and Romero-Avila (2012); Rauch and Evans (1999)).

### Rationale for within-country analysis and setting
- Focus on within-country variation to overcome cross-country data comparability issues, small sample sizes, and potential correlations of efficiency measures with other productivity determinants.
- Differences in economic performance across regions within a country are described as large, persistent and widespread (citing Acemoglu and Dell (2010), Gennaioli and others (2013), and Breinlich and others (2014)).
- Italy chosen because:
  - Persistent large differences in public sector efficiency across Italian regions and provinces despite 150 years of common formal institutions since political unification.
  - European Quality of Governance Index indicates Italy has the largest variation between its worst and best performing region in terms of quality of governance among European economies.
  - Example: "it takes more than twice the number of days to get a construction permit in Sicily than in Lombardy (World Bank, Doing Business Indicators, 2012)."
  - Significant differences in per capita output between the North and South, and in measures of labor productivity.

### Empirical strategy
- Exploits variation in objective measures of government efficiency across Italy’s 103 provinces and variation in industry-level dependence on government to test whether public sector inefficiency constrains firm productivity.
- Identifying assumption: government efficiency matters more for firms in industries more dependent on the government.
- Methodological approach:
  - Regression framework interacting government efficiency with government dependence by industry, following Rajan and Zingales (1998) and Pellegrino and Zingales (2014).
  - Interaction controls for all province-level differences that affect firms in all industries similarly, limiting omitted-variable bias.
- Data:
  - Productivity measures for more than 400,000 firms from the Orbis dataset compiled by Bureau van Dijk in 2007.
  - Objective measures of government efficiency computed by Giordano and Tommasino (2013).
  - Government dependence captured by Pellegrino and Zingales (2014).

### Data and measurement
- Public sector efficiency: output-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for five public services in 103 Italian provinces: education, civil justice, health, child care, and waste collection (Giordano and Tommasino (2013)).
  - Health: public health expenditure per capita (age weighted), average 1985–2007; output = change in life expectancy between 1981–83 and 2003–05; control = GDP growth.
  - Education: input = number of teachers per student (2005–06); output = INValSI test scores of 6th and 9th graders (2005–06); control = adult education.
  - Civil justice: input = number of judges per 1,000 new trials in 2006; output = average length of trial in 2006.
  - Child care: input = public expenditure on child care in 2007; output = number of children in day care in 2007; control = quality of service.
  - Waste disposal: input = public expenditure on waste disposal in 2006; outputs = tons of waste collected and % recycled in 2006.
- Public sector efficiency scores (selected figures from Table 2):
  - ITALIA average score: 0.75 (Health), 0.87 (Education), 0.24 (Judicial system), 0.42 (Daycare), 0.76 (Waste disposal), Average 0.59.
  - Macro-region averages: North-west Average 0.62; North-east Average 0.64; Centre Average 0.63; South Average 0.54.
- Firm-level data: Orbis database for 2007 (about 650,000 firms raw; final sample about 450,000 firms after cleaning).
  - Orbis coverage: firms in database account for roughly 70 percent of gross value added, and 75 percent of the total wage bill of Italy’s nonfinancial corporations.
- Firm productivity measures used:
  - Operating revenue / costs of employees
  - Gross value added (GVA) / costs of employees
  - Operating revenue per worker
  - GVA per worker
  - Operating revenue (log)
  - Return on assets (EBIT / total assets)
- Sectoral dependence on government:
  - Pellegrino and Zingales (2014) index based on percentage of sector news mentioning government/regulation in Factiva over 2000–12.
  - Alternative measure using share of sector output sold to government via input-output tables used as robustness check.

### Main results
- Linear correlations (Table 4): provinces with more efficient public spending have higher firm productivity on average; effect larger in construction (high government dependence) than in basic metals (low government dependence).
- Baseline interaction estimates (Table 5): GovEff * GovDependence coefficients (standard errors in brackets) — all statistically significant:
  - Output per employee cost: 17.864 *** [4.540]
  - GVA per employee cost: 8.061 *** [1.268]
  - Output per worker: 15.862 *** [4.231]
  - GVA per worker: 5.908 *** [1.443]
  - Log Output: 6.361 [4.171]
  - ROA: 0.342 ** [0.164]
- Economic magnitudes (examples preserved from text):
  - An electrical equipment firm (just below the upper quartile of dependence) in a province in the upper quartile of public efficiency produces 13 percent more output per euro spent on salaries than the same firm in a province in the lower quartile of public efficiency.
  - Equivalent figures: gross value added per euro spent on salaries 5.8 percent; output 4.5 percent; output per worker 11 percent; value added per worker 4.2 percent; return on assets 25 bps higher.
- Dummy-based presentation (Table 6): being in a province with above-median public efficiency and in a sector with above-median government dependence increases:
  - Output per employee cost by 11.3 percent.
  - GVA per employee cost by 4.3 percent.
  - Output per worker by 12.6 percent.
  - GVA per worker by 5.7 percent.
  - Log Output by 8.6 percent.
  - ROA by 0.5 percent (50 bps).

### Robustness checks
- Results hold when using firm data from 2008, 2009, or 2010 while using public sector efficiency measured in 2007.
- Alternative government dependence measure (share of sales to government from input-output tables) yields similar effects (Panel D).
- Regional average measures of public sector efficiency (Panel E) produce similar results.
- Alternative proxy for government quality: regional European Quality of Governance Index (2010 and 2013) — cross-sectional and time-series evidence support that government ineffectiveness constrains firm productivity (Panels F and G).
- Re-sampling weights to adjust Orbis representativeness (Panel H) produce even stronger estimates.
- Additional firm-level controls (leverage, share of tangible assets, firm age) and Industry × Firm Size fixed effects do not alter results (Panel I).

### Heterogeneity by firm type and level of government
- Firm age and size (Table 7):
  - Effects are larger for young firms (incorporated since 2005) than for older firms.
  - Effects are larger for micro firms (1-9 workers) and for large firms (more than 250 workers).
- Level of government (Tables 8–9):
  - Local government efficiency (child care, waste collection, health) interaction estimates:
    - Local GovEff*GovDependence = 7.350 ** [2.969] for output per employee cost.
    - Local GovEff*GovDependence = 3.924 *** [1.070] for GVA per employee cost.
  - Central government efficiency (education, civil justice) interaction estimates:
    - Central GovEff*GovDependence = 18.099 *** [5.070] for output per employee cost.
    - Central GovEff*GovDependence = 5.906 ** [2.318] for GVA per employee cost.
  - Conclusion: efficiency of both central and local governments matters; in some specifications, improving central services (education and justice) yields effects up to twice as large as improving decentralized services.

### Italy’s productivity slowdown and role of public sector efficiency
- Labor productivity (real GDP per hour worked) increased 3.5 percent since Italy adopted the euro in 1999.
- Total factor productivity (TFP) fell by a cumulative 7.5 percent since 1999.
- A wide productivity gap has emerged between Italy and most OECD economies.
- Italy’s public sector described as “one of the lowest ranked among OECD economies,” with poor performance documented in governance indicators.
- Central study finding: public sector inefficiency at the provincial level contributes to lower firm productivity; efficiency in the provision of services at national level matters more for productivity than services provided by local governments.

### Macroeconomic implications and policy-relevant magnitudes
- If public sector efficiency rose to the frontier in all provinces:
  - Firm productivity (output per euro spent on salaries) could increase by up to 22 percent in the sectors that depend the most on the public sector.
  - Gross value added per employee costs could rise from 2 to 10 percent.
  - For the average firm, output would expand by 3 percent.
- Comparison with financial development:
  - Raising public sector efficiency to the frontier yields substantially larger increases in firm labor productivity than raising local financial development to the level of the most financially developed province.

### Policy considerations
- Prioritize reforms that increase public sector efficiency at both central and local levels, especially in education and civil justice, given their sizable impact on firm productivity.
- Target improvements where government-dependent sectors and firm types (young firms, micro and large firms) are concentrated to maximize productivity gains.
- Consider regional and provincial tailoring of public sector reforms given pronounced north-south disparities in efficiency and productivity.

*Source: IMF staff analysis based on Giordano and Tommasino (2013), Pellegrino and Zingales (2014), Orbis firm data (2007), and accompanying tables and figures from the provided document.*

### References .............................................................................................................

### _wp15168 - References

### I. INTRODUCTION
- The provision of high-quality public goods and services in a cost-effective way is presented as a key determinant of long-run economic prosperity. The paper notes there is no conclusive evidence that higher public spending per se improves long-run growth (see, e.g., Bergh and Henrekson, 2011).
- The quality of institutions—understood as both the extent of the government’s protection of property rights and the quality of public services—determines the public sector’s ability to efficiently provide goods and services that support productivity and economic growth.
- The paper situates itself within literature examining public sector efficiency and economic performance, citing work including Knack and Keefer (1995); Hall and Jones (1999); Acemoglu and others (2001); Evans and Rauch (1999); Angelopoulos and others (2008); Oto-Peralias and Romero-Avila (2012); Rauch and Evans (1999).

### Rationale for within-country analysis and setting
- The paper focuses on within-country variation to overcome methodological challenges of cross-country studies: cross-country data comparability, small sample sizes, and potential correlation of efficiency measures with other productivity determinants.
- Differences in economic performance across regions within a country are described as large, persistent and widespread (citing Acemoglu and Dell (2010), Gennaioli and others (2013), and Breinlich and others (2014)).
- Italy is chosen as the empirical setting due to:
  - Persistent large differences in public sector efficiency across Italian regions and provinces despite 150 years of common formal institutions since political unification.
  - The European Commission’s European Quality of Governance Index indicates Italy has the largest variation between its worst and best performing region in terms of quality of governance among European economies.
  - Example given: "it takes more than twice the number of days to get a construction permit in Sicily than in Lombardy (World Bank, Doing Business Indicators, 2012)."
  - Significant differences in per capita output between the North and South of the country, and in measures of labor productivity.

### Empirical strategy
- The paper exploits variation in objective measures of government efficiency across Italy’s 103 provinces and variation in industry-level dependence on government to examine whether public sector inefficiency constrains firm productivity.
- Identifying assumption: the efficiency of government matters more for firms in industries more dependent on the government.
- Methodological approach:
  - Use a regression framework that interacts government efficiency with government dependence by industry, following the approach pioneered by Rajan and Zingales (1998) and used by Pellegrino and Zingales (2014).
  - This interaction approach controls for all differences across Italy’s provinces that affect firms in all industries similarly, helping limit omitted-variable bias.
- Data:
  - Productivity measures for more than 400,000 firms from the Orbis dataset compiled by Bureau van Dijk in 2007.
  - Objective measures of government efficiency computed by Giordano and Tommasino (2013).
  - Government dependence captured by Pellegrino and Zingales (2014).

### Key findings (as reported in the text)
- The (in)efficiency of public service provision is found to be an important determinant of firm productivity in Italy; the effect is described as both statistically and economically significant.
- The text begins to provide a quantitative example: "For example, for a firm in a sector with above median dependence on government, being in a province with above median public efficiency increases output per euro spent on salaries by" — the source text is truncated at this point and does not provide the concluding numeric value.

*Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15168.pdf*

### 11.3 percent. Furthermore, we find that efficiency in the provision of services at national

### _wp15168 - 11.3 percent. Furthermore, we find that efficiency in the provision of services at national

### Italy’s productivity slowdown and role of public sector efficiency
- Labor productivity (real GDP per hour worked) increased 3.5 percent since Italy adopted the euro in 1999.
- Total factor productivity (TFP) fell by a cumulative 7.5 percent since 1999.
- A wide productivity gap has emerged between Italy and most OECD economies.
- Italy’s public sector is described as “one of the lowest ranked among OECD economies,” with poor performance documented in governance indicators (Figure 2).
- The study’s central finding: public sector inefficiency at the provincial level contributes to lower firm productivity; efficiency in the provision of services at national level matters more for productivity than services provided by local governments.

### Data and measurement
- Public sector efficiency: objective measures from Giordano and Tommasino (2013) using output-oriented Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) for five public services in 103 Italian provinces: education, civil justice, health, child care, and waste collection.
  - Health: public health expenditure per capita (age weighted), average 1985–2007; output = change in life expectancy between 1981–83 and 2003–05; control = GDP growth.
  - Education: input = number of teachers per student (2005–06); output = INValSI test scores of 6th and 9th graders (2005–06); control = adult education.
  - Civil justice: input = number of judges per 1,000 new trials in 2006; output = average length of trial in 2006.
  - Child care: input = public expenditure on child care in 2007; output = number of children in day care in 2007; control = quality of service.
  - Waste disposal: input = public expenditure on waste disposal in 2006; outputs = tons of waste collected and % recycled in 2006.
- Public sector efficiency scores range by region in Table 2 (examples preserved from source):
  - ITALIA average score: 0.75 (Health), 0.87 (Education), 0.24 (Judicial system), 0.42 (Daycare), 0.76 (Waste disposal), Average 0.59.
  - Macro-region averages: North-west Average 0.62; North-east Average 0.64; Centre Average 0.63; South Average 0.54.
- Firm-level data: Orbis database for 2007 (about 650,000 firms raw; final sample about 450,000 firms after cleaning).
  - Orbis coverage: firms in database account for roughly 70 percent of gross value added, and 75 percent of the total wage bill of Italy’s nonfinancial corporations.
- Firm productivity measures used:
  - Operating revenue / costs of employees
  - Gross value added (GVA) / costs of employees
  - Operating revenue per worker
  - GVA per worker
  - Operating revenue (log)
  - Return on assets (EBIT / total assets)
- Sectoral dependence on government: Pellegrino and Zingales (2014) index based on percentage of sector news mentioning government/regulation in Factiva over 2000–12; alternative measure using share of sector output sold to government via input-output tables used as robustness check.

### Empirical strategy
- Identification: Rajan and Zingales (1998) style interaction: sectors more dependent on government services should be more affected by provincial variation in public sector efficiency.
- Estimation: firm-level regressions (2007) with province fixed effects, sector fixed effects (658 sectors, 4-digit NACE Revision 2), firm-size controls, and standard errors clustered at the province level.
- Key estimated interaction: GovEff * GovDependence; coefficient β captures effect of higher public sector efficiency on firm productivity.

### Main results
- Linear correlations (Table 4): provinces with more efficient public spending have higher firm productivity on average; effect is larger in construction (high government dependence) than in basic metals (low government dependence).
- Baseline interaction estimates (Table 5): GovEff*GovDependence coefficients (standard errors in brackets) — all statistically significant:
  - Output per employee cost: 17.864 *** [4.540]
  - GVA per employee cost: 8.061 *** [1.268]
  - Output per worker: 15.862 *** [4.231]
  - GVA per worker: 5.908 *** [1.443]
  - Log Output: 6.361 [4.171]
  - ROA: 0.342 ** [0.164]
- Economic magnitudes (examples preserved from text):
  - An electrical equipment firm (just below the upper quartile of dependence) in a province in the upper quartile of public efficiency produces 13 percent more output per euro spent on salaries than the same firm in a province in the lower quartile of public efficiency.
  - Equivalent figures: gross value added per euro spent on salaries 5.8 percent; output 4.5 percent; output per worker 11 percent; value added per worker 4.2 percent; return on assets 25 bps higher.
- Dummy-based presentation (Table 6): being in a province with above-median public efficiency and in a sector with above-median government dependence increases:
  - Output per employee cost by 11.3 percent.
  - GVA per employee cost by 4.3 percent.
  - Output per worker by 12.6 percent.
  - GVA per worker by 5.7 percent.
  - Log Output by 8.6 percent.
  - ROA by 0.5 percent (50 bps).

### Robustness checks
- Results hold when using firm data from 2008, 2009, or 2010 while using public sector efficiency measured in 2007.
- Alternative government dependence measure (share of sales to government from input-output tables) yields similar effects (Panel D).
- Regional average measures of public sector efficiency (Panel E) produce similar results.
- Alternative proxy for government quality: regional European Quality of Governance Index (2010 and 2013) — cross-sectional and time-series evidence support that government ineffectiveness constrains firm productivity (Panels F and G).
- Re-sampling weights to adjust Orbis representativeness (Panel H) produce even stronger estimates.
- Additional firm-level controls (leverage, share of tangible assets, firm age) and Industry × Firm Size fixed effects do not alter results (Panel I).

### Heterogeneity by firm type and level of government
- Firm age and size (Table 7):
  - Effects are larger for young firms (incorporated since 2005) than for older firms.
  - Effects are larger for micro firms (1-9 workers) and for large firms (more than 250 workers).
- Level of government (Tables 8–9):
  - Local government efficiency (child care, waste collection, health) effect: Local GovEff*GovDependence = 7.350 ** [2.969] for output per employee cost; 3.924 *** [1.070] for GVA per employee cost.
  - Central government efficiency (education, civil justice) effect: Central GovEff*GovDependence = 18.099 *** [5.070] for output per employee cost; 5.906 ** [2.318] for GVA per employee cost.
  - Conclusion: efficiency of both central and local governments matters; in some specifications, improving central services (education and justice) yields effects up to twice as large as improving decentralized services.

### Macroeconomic implications and policy-relevant magnitudes
- If public sector efficiency rose to the frontier in all provinces:
  - Firm productivity (output per euro spent on salaries) could increase by up to 22 percent in the sectors that depend the most on the public sector.
  - Gross value added per employee costs could rise from 2 to 10 percent.
  - For the average firm, output would expand by 3 percent.
- Comparison with financial development:
  - Raising public sector efficiency to the frontier yields substantially larger increases in firm labor productivity than raising local financial development to the level of the most financially developed province (Figure 6).

### Policy considerations (implied by findings)
- Prioritize reforms that increase public sector efficiency at both central and local levels, especially in education and civil justice, given their sizable impact on firm productivity.
- Target improvements where government-dependent sectors and firm types (young firms, micro and large firms) are concentrated to maximize productivity gains.
- Consider regional and provincial tailoring of public sector reforms given pronounced north-south disparities in efficiency and productivity.

*Source: IMF staff analysis based on Giordano and Tommasino (2013), Pellegrino and Zingales (2014), Orbis firm data (2007), and accompanying tables and figures from the provided document.*

### References

### _wp15168 - References

### Institutions, Governance, and Quality of Government
- Acemoglu, D. Johnson, S. and Robinson, J.A., 2001, “The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation,” American Economic Review, Vol. 91(5), pp. 1369–1401.
- Acemoglu, D. and Dell, M., 2010, “Productivity Differences between and within Countries,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, Vol. 2(1), pp. 169–88.
- Chong A., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2014, “Letter Grading Government Efficiency,” Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 12(2), pp. 277–299.
- La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R., 1999, “The Quality of Government,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 15(1), pp. 222–79.
- Rodrik, D., Subramanian, A. and Trebbi, F., 2004, “Institutions Rule: The Primacy of Institutions Over Geography and Integration in Economic Development,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 9(2), pp. 131–165.
- Knack, S., and Keefer, P, 1995, “Institutions and Economic Performance: Cross-Country Tests Using Alternative Institutional Measures,” Economics and Politics, Vol. 7, pp. 207–227.
- Esposito, G., Lanau, S. and Pompe, S., 2013, “Judicial System Reform in Italy—A Key to Growth,” IMF Working Paper 14/32 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Charron, N., Lapuento, V. and Dijkstra, L., 2014, “Regional Governance Matters: Quality of Government within European Union Member States,” Regional Studies, Vol. 48(1), pp. 68–90.
- Gennaioli N. La Porta, R., Lopez De Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2014, “Growth in Regions,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 19(3), pp. 259–309.
- Rodríguez-Pose, A. and Di-Cataldo, M., 2015, “Quality of Government and Innovative Performance in the Regions of Europe,” Journal of Economic Geography, forthcoming.

### Public Sector Efficiency, Government Size, and Fiscal Institutions
- Afonso, A., Schuknecht, L. and Tanzi, V., 2005, “Public Sector Efficiency: An International Comparison,” Public Choice, Vol. 123(3), pp. 321–347.
- Angelopoulos, K., Philippopoulos, A. and Tsionas, E., 2008, “Does Public Sector Efficiency Matter? Revisiting the Relation Between Fiscal size and Economic Growth in a World Sample,” Public Choice, Vol. 137(1), pp. 245–278.
- Bergh, A. and Henrekson, M., 2011, “Government Size And Growth: A Survey And Interpretation of the Evidence,” Journal of Economic Surveys, Vol. 25(5), pp. 872–897.
- Borge, L. E., Falch, T., and Tvomo, P., 2008, “Public Sector Efficiency: The Roles of Political and Budgetary Institutions, Fiscal Capacity, and Democratic Participation,” Public Choice, Vol. 136, pp. 475–495.
- Giordano, R. and Tommasino, P., 2013, “Public Sector Efficiency and Political Culture,” FinanzArchiv, Vol. 69(3), pp. 256–288.
- Oto-Peralías, D. and Romero-Ávila D., 2012, “Tracing the Link between Government Size and Growth: The Role of Public Sector Quality,” Kyklos, Vol. 66 (2), pp. 229–255.
- Report on the Commissioner for the Spending Review, 2014.
- European Commission, 2008, Public Finances in EMU, European Economy No. 10/2008, (European Commission, Brussels).

### Judicial System, Legal Institutions, and Business Environment
- Chemin, M., 2009, “The Impact of the Judiciary on Entrepreneurship: Evaluation of Pakistan’s Access to Justice Programme,” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 93(1–2), pp. 114–125.
- Chemin, M., 2013, “Does Court Speed Shape Economic Activity? Evidence from a Court Reform in India,” Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Vol. 28(3), pp. 460–485.
- Giacomelli, S. and Menon, C., 2013, “Firm Size and Judicial Efficiency: Evidence From the Neighbour’s Court,” Bank of Italy Working Paper 898.
- Giacomelli, S. and Tonello, M., 2015, “Measuring the Performance of Local Governments: Evidence from Mystery Calls,” Bank of Italy, mimeo.
- Esposito, G., Lanau, S. and Pompe, S., 2013, “Judicial System Reform in Italy—A Key to Growth,” IMF Working Paper 14/32 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).

### Regional Growth, Productivity, and Firm-Level Evidence
- Breinlich, H. Ottaviano, G. I. P. and Temple, J. R.W., 2014, “Regional Growth and Regional Decline,” in Handbook of Economic Growth, ed. by Aghion, P. and Durlauf, S. N. (Elsevier).
- Barone G. and Cingano, F., 2011, “Service Regulation and Growth: Evidence from OECD Countries,” Economic Journal, Vol. 121(555), pp. 931–957.
- Brasili, A. and Federico, L., 2008, “Recent Developments in Productivity and the Role of Entrepreneurship in Italy: An Industry View", Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol. 98(2), pp. 179–214.
- D’Alfonso, E., 2010, “The Italian Financial Development and the Regional Impact on Growth,” Working Paper No. 3 (UniCredit and Universities).
- Daveri, F., and Parisi, M. L., 2010, “Experience, Innovation and Productivity - Empirical Evidence from Italy's Slowdown,” CESifo Working Paper No. 3123 (CESifo Group, Munich).
- Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L., 2004, “Does Local Financial Development Matter?” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 119, pp. 929–69.
- Ciriaci, D., and Palma, D., 2008, “The role of knowledge-based supply specialisation for competitiveness: A spatial econometric approach”, Papers in Regional Science, Vol. 87(3), pp. 453–475.
- Gennaioli N. La Porta, R., Lopez De Silanes, F. and Shleifer, A., 2014, “Growth in Regions,” Journal of Economic Growth, Vol. 19(3), pp. 259–309.

### Management, Organizational Practices, and Firm Performance
- Bloom, N., Sadun, R., and Reenen, J. V., 2008, “Measuring and Explaining Management Practices in Italy,” Rivista di Politica Economica, Vol. 98(2), pp. 15–56.
- Bandiera, O., Guiso, L., Prat, A., and Sadun, R., 2010, “Italian Managers: Fidelity or Performance?”, in The Ruling Class: Management and Politics in Modern Italy, ed. by Boeri, T., Prat,A., and Merlo, A. (Oxford University Press, Oxford).
- Idson, T. and Oi, W., 1999, “Workers are More Productive in Large Firms,” American Economic Review, Vol. 89, No. 2, pp. 104–108.
- Barra, C., Destefanis, S. and Lavadera, G., 2013, “Financial Development and Economic Growth: Evidence from Highly Disaggregated Italian Data,” CSEF Working Paper No. 346.

### Education, Health, and Public Spending Efficiency
- Hakkinen, U., and Joumard, I., 2007, “Cross-Country Analysis of Efficiency in OECD Healthcare Sectors: Options for Research,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 554.
- Sutherland, D., Price, R., Joumard, I., and Nicq, C., 2007, “Performance Indicators for Public Spending Efficiency in Primary and Secondary Education,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 546.
- Verhoeven, M., Gunnarsson, V., and Carcillo, S., 2007, “Education and Health in G7 Countries: Achieving Better Outcomes with Less Spending,” IMF Working Paper No. 267 (Washington: International Monetary Fund).
- Hoxby, C., 2000, “The Effects Of Class Size On Student Achievement: New Evidence From Population Variation,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. 115(4), pp. 1239–1285.

### Finance, Capital Flows, and Macroeconomic Context
- Rajan, R. and Zingales, L., 1998, “Financial Dependence and Growth,” American Economic Review, Vol. 88, No. 3, pp. 559–86.
- Tong, H. and Wei, S.-J., 2011, “The Composition Matters: Capital Inflows and Liquidity Crunch During a Global Economic Crisis,” Review of Financial Studies, Vol. 24, No. 6, pp. 2023–52.
- International Monetary Fund, 2014, Italy: Selected Issues, IMF Country Report No. 14/284 (Washington).
- Gal, P., 2013, “Measuring Total Factor Productivity at the Firm Level Using OECD-ORBIS,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1049.

### Methodology, Measurement, and Technology Adoption
- Skinner, J. and Staiger, D., 2007, “Technology Adoption from Hybrid Corn to Beta-Blockers,” in Hard-to-Measure Goods and Services: Essays in Honor of Zvi Griliches, pp. 545–570 (National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.).
- Sutherland, D., Price, R., Joumard, I., and Nicq, C., 2007, “Performance Indicators for Public Spending Efficiency in Primary and Secondary Education,” OECD Economics Department Working Papers No. 546.
- Gal, P., 2013, “Measuring Total Factor Productivity at the Firm Level Using OECD-ORBIS,” OECD Economics Department Working Paper No. 1049.

*References list from _wp15168 - References (source PDF).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/_wp15168.pdf_