## _wp1583 — Natural Resource Rents (percent of GDP) in 2012

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---

### Background and motivation
- Total natural resource rents accounted for 16.2 percent of gross domestic product in SSA countries in 2012.
- Comparative rents by region in 2012:
  - World average: 9.8 percent
  - Middle East & North Africa: 20.9 percent
- Time trend in SSA:
  - Rents increased from 13.0 percent of GDP in 1990 to 17.7 percent in 2010.
- Measurement caveat: World Bank–based rents omit some minerals such as diamonds, uranium, and lithium due to lack of reserve and production-cost data; rents are therefore underestimated for some countries (example: Botswana).

### Stylized facts and comparative development outcomes
- GDP per capita and HDI trajectories (selected averages):
  - SSA countries (44): GDP per capita (current US $) — 1990: 896; 2000: 934; 2010: 2,316.
  - Other countries (130): GDP per capita (current US $) — 1990: 7,187; 2000: 9,555; 2010: 18,019.
  - SSA countries (40): HDI — 1990: 0.39; 2000: 0.41; 2010: 0.46.
  - Other countries (121): HDI — 1990: 0.66; 2000: 0.70; 2010: 0.74.
- Average GDP per capita in 2010 for 44 SSA countries: $2,316.
- Average HDI in SSA countries (2010): 0.46; average HDI in other countries: 0.74.
- Hypothetical comparison groups (44 countries with similar 1990 GDP per capita) show faster GDP and HDI convergence for the comparison group than for SSA countries (referenced Appendix Figure 20).

### Correlates of resource dependence: governance and competitiveness
- Corruption and resource rents in SSA:
  - Linear fitted slope between resource rents and corruption: -0.35 with standard error 0.11; coefficient significant at the 1 percent level.
  - Country examples: Mauritania natural resource rents 49 percent of GDP and Corruption Perceptions Index score 31; Equatorial Guinea rents 48 percent of GDP and corruption score 20.
  - Corruption Perceptions Index scale: 0-100 (0 = highly corrupt; 100 = very clean).
- Competitiveness and resource rents:
  - Global Competitiveness Index slope with natural resource rents: -0.016 with standard error 0.005; coefficient significant at the 1 percent level.
  - Example competitiveness scores (2013-14): Mauritius 4.45; Seychelles 4.10.
- Resource Governance Index (RGI) (2013) — selected averages:
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (17 resource-rich countries): 43.8
  - World average: 50.6
  - OECD average: 87.7
  - RGI examples: Canada 76; Chile 75
- Interpretation: resource curse associated with weaker institutions; higher RGI, higher control of corruption, and higher competitiveness linked with more successful translation of resource revenue into development.

### Resource-rich vs resource-poor SSA country patterns
- Definition: resource-rich countries are those whose average natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP for 1990-2010 is higher than 10 percent.
- Classification among 44 countries:
  - Resource-rich: 20 countries (from Congo, Rep. (62.4 percent) to Sudan (10.4 percent) and Botswana).
  - Resource-poor: 24 countries (from Ghana (9.6 percent) to Mauritius (0.02 percent)).
- Development indicator comparisons (selected):
  - 1980-2000 GDP per capita series:
    - Resource-rich (13): 1980: 805; 1990: 916; 2000: 985.
    - Resource-poor (18): 1980: 628; 1990: 1,008; 2000: 1,294.
  - Gini coefficient increased over time in both groups; growth rate of inequality higher in resource-rich countries.
  - Life expectancy increased in resource-rich countries but remains lower than in resource-poor countries.
- Country contrasts:
  - Nigeria and Angola: large income advantages but poorer performance on other welfare measures (example life expectancy around 46.6 for Nigeria and 45.2 for Angola in referenced period).
  - Resource-poor small countries (Mauritius, Seychelles) show faster economic growth and stronger development outcomes; Corruption Perceptions Index 2012: Mauritius 57; Seychelles 52.

### Research objective and paper organization
- Objective: analyze the impact of natural resource windfalls on standard of living and provide policy implications, especially for SSA countries.
- Welfare measurement follows Jones and Klenow (2010): integrates income (GDP), inequality (Gini), and health (life expectancy).
- Paper organization:
  - Section II: stylized facts
  - Section III: methodology and data
  - Section IV: econometric analysis
  - Section V: policy implications

### Data, methodology overview, and metric construction
- Panel dataset: 130 countries, period 1963-2007.
- Country groups analyzed:
  - whole sample: 130 countries
  - 28 SSA countries
  - nine fragile SSA countries
- Two primary measures:
  - welfare index (consumption-equivalent welfare)
  - resource windfall index (price-based commodity windfall)
- Welfare metric construction:
  - Utility: u(y) = log y.
  - Probability of living to consume = ρ/100 where ρ is life expectancy at birth.
  - If income is log-normal with arithmetic mean µ and SD σ, expected utility: E[u(y)] = log µ − σ^2/2.
  - Consumption-equivalent welfare W(i,t) = (ρ/100) (log µ − σ^2/2).
  - Consumption-equivalent ratio ζ(i,t): consumption adjustment to make a person indifferent between living in the current US (normalized to 1) and country i at time t.
  - Relation to HDI: similar motivation but annual (1963-2007) and includes inequality and life expectancy; HDI available only from 1980 at limited years.
- Data sources:
  - Income: GDP per capita from World Bank (2014); covers 1960-2012.
  - Inequality: Gini from EHII; covers 1963-2007. Conversion to SD of log income via formula preserved from source text.
  - Life expectancy: World Bank (2014); covers 1960-2012.

### Resource windfall index construction
- Index: geometric average of international prices of commodities weighted by time-invariant export shares (average of 1980, 90, 2000) of each commodity in GDP for a country.
- Windfall index Θ(i,t) = Σ_w ω(i,w) Δlog(ComPrice_{w,t}) where ω(i,w) is average export share of commodity w in GDP.
- Commodities included: aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, wood.
- Rationale: price shocks provide variation and are plausibly exogenous; limitation is the index does not capture discovery/quantity shocks.

### Sample composition and summary statistics
- Total number of countries: 130
  - East Asia & Pacific: 14
  - Europe & Central Asia: 40
  - Latin America & Caribbean: 25
  - Middle East & North Africa: 16
  - North America: 2
  - South Asia: 5
  - Sub-Saharan Africa: 28
- Selected sample statistics (Table 3 excerpts):
  - Total (130 countries): Obs. 2,91110.345,850; Mean windfall index 0.0045
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (28 countries): Obs. 4585.721,260; Mean windfall index 0.0055
  - Other continents (102 countries): Obs. 2,45311.214,590; Mean windfall index 0.0043
- Average windfall index in whole sample: 0.0045.
- Average windfall index for SSA countries: 0.0055.
- List of 28 SSA countries in sample: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

### Most and least resource-dependent countries (average size of windfall)
- Most dependent (Avg. size of windfall):
  - Oman 0.11918
  - Angola 0.07518
  - Libya 0.06236
  - Iraq 0.06130
  - Nigeria 0.05978
  - Gabon 0.05787
  - Kuwait 0.05687
  - Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.05470
  - Congo, Rep. 0.05448
  - Qatar 0.04465
- Least dependent (Avg. size of windfall):
  - Iceland <0.00001
  - Jordan <0.00001
  - Nepal <0.00001
  - Bangladesh <0.00001
  - Japan <0.00001
  - Albania 0.00012
  - Seychelles 0.00019
  - United States 0.00019
  - Slovenia 0.00022
  - Senegal 0.00023

### Short- and medium-term empirical findings (Panel VAR)
- Specification: Panel VAR with country and time fixed effects; vector [Windfall Index, Welfare Index]; one lag; identification via Cholesky (Windfall first).
- Whole sample (130 countries):
  - A one standard deviation shock to resource windfall leads to about 3.4 standard deviation increase in welfare at the peak.
  - Sub-periods:
    - 1963-1980: welfare increases by 3.6 standard deviation at the peak
    - 1981-2007: welfare increases by 2.5 standard deviation at the peak
  - Component peak responses:
    - GDP increases by 3.8 standard deviation at the peak
    - Gini decreases by 0.2 standard deviation after one standard deviation windfall shock
    - Life expectancy: almost no change (wide confidence interval)
  - Interpretation: short-run decrease in inequality consistent with Dutch disease mechanisms and increased demand for unskilled labor in non-tradable sector.
- Sub-Saharan Africa (28 countries):
  - Welfare increases by 2.7 standard deviation at the peak after a windfall shock.
  - Resource governance index in Sub-Saharan Africa: 43.8; World average: 50.59; OECD average: 87.7.
  - Wider confidence intervals imply results are less precisely estimated; heterogeneity across SSA countries likely.
  - Possible reasons for weaker effect: poor resource management, rent seeking, weak negotiation terms with extractive companies, revenues not spent to benefit public.
- Fragile SSA countries (9 countries):
  - A one standard deviation windfall shock leads to about 1.2 standard deviation increase in welfare in the same period; after one year the response becomes almost zero.
  - Fragile SSA long-run effects are negative (see ARDL results).
  - Interpretation: fragile SSA countries fail to translate resource windfall into sustained standard of living improvements due to weak fiscal institutions, lack of transparency, and rent-seeking.

### Long-term effects (ARDL (p,q) results)
- ARDL estimates (dependent variable: welfare) — selected coefficients and statistical significance:
  - Whole Sample (130 countries)
    - Long-run coefficient: Windfall_{t-1} .7299** (.1282)
    - Long-run coefficient: Welfare_{t-1} -.0299** (.0054)
    - Short-run ∆Windfall_{t-1} .7183** (.0886)
    - Short-run ∆Welfare_{t-1} .1962** (.0203)
  - SSA countries (28 countries)
    - Long-run coefficient: Windfall_{t-1} .4686 (.2861) — positive but not statistically significant
    - Long-run coefficient: Welfare_{t-1} -.0078 (.0127)
    - Short-run ∆Windfall_{t-1} .5684** (.1932)
    - Short-run ∆Welfare_{t-1} .1955** (.0560)
  - Fragile SSA countries (9 countries)
    - Long-run coefficient: Windfall_{t-1} -1.7954 (1.5605) — negative with large standard error
    - Long-run coefficient: Welfare_{t-1} -.2877 (.3903)
    - Short-run ∆Windfall_{t-1} -1.0149 (1.0348)
    - Short-run ∆Welfare_{t-1} -.1460 (.2698)
- Interpretation:
  - Long-run effect of windfall shock is significant and positive in the whole sample (.7299** (.1282)).
  - In SSA, the long-run coefficient is positive but not statistically significant (.4686 (.2861)).
  - In fragile SSA, the long-run effect is negative but imprecisely estimated (-1.7954 (1.5605)).
  - Conclusion: resource booms can be long-run blessings if well managed; evidence consistent with a possible long-run “resource curse” in fragile SSA countries over the last 45 years.

### Empirical patterns: welfare growth and windfalls (selected statistics)
- Average annual welfare growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa: 3.5 percent.
- Middle East and North Africa welfare growth: 10.8 percent (driven mainly by life expectancy improvements).
- On average, resource-rich SSA countries grew at 3.0 percent while resource-poor SSA countries grew at 3.8 percent annually (1970-2000).
- Excluding Zimbabwe, mean growth rate for resource-poor countries increases to 4.9 percent.
- Ten-year averaged panel (1970 and 2000): almost all of 69 countries have positive welfare growth except Zimbabwe.
- Country notes:
  - Zimbabwe: welfare declined due to life expectancy falling from 55.1 to 44.8.
  - Uganda: welfare growth stagnated (Gini and life expectancy in 2000 nearly unchanged from earlier).
- Nigeria example:
  - Oil export share in GDP: 34 percent; shares for cocoa, wood, cotton negligibly less than 0.5 percent.
  - Windfall index peaks at 1973 and 1979 oil crises; falls during the recent great recession.

### Policy implications and suggested research directions
- Main policy messages:
  - Key challenge: translate revenue from resource windfall into sustainable growth.
  - Resource windfalls could improve welfare in the short-run and long-run if well-managed.
  - Resource booms could contribute to lowering inequality in the short-run via increased demand for unskilled labor in non-tradable sectors and/or improved government transfers.
  - Strong institutions and good governance are important for achieving better growth outcomes following resource booms.
- Observed problems in SSA:
  - Resource-rich SSA countries have experienced less benefit from windfalls in both short run and long run, plausibly due to poor natural resource management and weak institutions.
  - Fragile states commonly exhibit poor quality of budget institutions and low fiscal spaces.
- Suggested areas for future research:
  - Determine whether decreases in inequality after resource booms are due to Dutch disease effects or improved government transfers.
  - Further assess public expenditure in SSA countries and the role of fiscal policy following resource booms.
  - Explore analytic tools (e.g., Interaction Panel VAR suggested by Towbin and Weber (2013)) to decompose and identify institutional dimensions driving heterogeneity in outcomes.

*Source: Excerpt from _wp1583 (methodology, data, analysis, and policy implications).*

### 1. Natural Resource Rents (percent of GDP) in 2012 __________________________________ 5

### _wp1583 - 1. Natural Resource Rents (percent of GDP) in 2012 __________________________________ 5

### Background and motivation
- Total natural resource rents accounted for 16.2 percent of gross domestic product in SSA countries in 2012 (Figure 1).
- Comparative rents by region in 2012:
  - World average: 9.8 percent
  - Middle East & North Africa: 20.9 percent
- Time trend in SSA:
  - Rents increased from 13.0 percent of GDP in 1990 to 17.7 percent in 2010 (Figure 2).
- After the 2000s energy crisis and recent oil discoveries, natural resource booms contributed significantly to increases in government revenue in SSA.
- Caveat on measurement: World Bank-based rents omit some minerals such as diamonds, uranium, and lithium due to lack of reserve and production-cost data; rents are therefore underestimated for some countries (example: Botswana).

### Stylized facts and comparative development outcomes
- GDP per capita and HDI trajectories (selected averages):
  - SSA countries (44): GDP per capita (current US $) — 1990: 896; 2000: 934; 2010: 2,316.
  - Other countries (130): GDP per capita (current US $) — 1990: 7,187; 2000: 9,555; 2010: 18,019.
  - SSA countries (40): HDI — 1990: 0.39; 2000: 0.41; 2010: 0.46.
  - Other countries (121): HDI — 1990: 0.66; 2000: 0.70; 2010: 0.74.
- Average GDP per capita in 2010 for 44 SSA countries: $2,316 (about one-eighth of the average for other countries).
- Average HDI in SSA countries (2010): 0.46; average HDI in other countries: 0.74.
- Hypothetical comparison groups constructed (44 countries with similar 1990 GDP per capita) show faster GDP and HDI convergence for the comparison group than for SSA countries (referenced Appendix Figure 20).

### Correlates of resource dependence: governance and competitiveness
- Corruption and resource rents in SSA:
  - Linear fitted slope between resource rents and corruption: -0.35 with standard error 0.11; coefficient significant at the 1 percent level.
  - Country examples: Mauritania natural resource rents 49 percent of GDP and Corruption Perceptions Index score 31; Equatorial Guinea rents 48 percent of GDP and corruption score 20.
  - Corruption Perceptions Index scale: 0-100, where 0 means perceived as highly corrupt and 100 means perceived as very clean.
- Competitiveness and resource rents:
  - Global Competitiveness Index slope with natural resource rents: -0.016 with standard error 0.005; coefficient significant at the 1 percent level.
  - Example competitiveness scores (2013-14): Mauritius 4.45; Seychelles 4.10.
- Resource Governance Index (RGI) (2013) — selected averages:
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (17 resource-rich countries): 43.8
  - World average: 50.6
  - OECD average: 87.7
  - RGI examples: Canada 76; Chile 75
- Interpretation: resource curse is associated with weaker institutions; strong institutions and governance (higher RGI, higher control of corruption, higher competitiveness) are linked with more successful translation of resource revenue into development.

### Resource-rich vs resource-poor SSA country patterns
- Definition: resource-rich countries are those whose average natural resource rents as a percentage of GDP for 1990-2010 is higher than 10 percent (Figure 7).
- Classification and counts (as described):
  - Among the 44 countries, 20 (from Congo, Rep. (62.4 percent) to Sudan (10.4 percent) and Botswana) are categorized as resource-rich.
  - The remaining 24 countries (from Ghana (9.6 percent) to Mauritius (0.02 percent)) are categorized as resource-poor.
- Development indicator comparisons (selected):
  - For 1980-2000, GDP per capita series (resource-rich vs resource-poor):
    - Resource-rich countries (13): 1980: 805; 1990: 916; 2000: 985.
    - Resource-poor countries (18): 1980: 628; 1990: 1,008; 2000: 1,294.
  - Gini coefficient and life expectancy trends:
    - Gini coefficient increased over time in both groups; the growth rate of inequality has been higher in resource-rich countries.
    - Life expectancy has increased in resource-rich countries but remains lower than in resource-poor countries.
- Country contrasts:
  - Nigeria and Angola (large oil producers) exhibit large income advantages but poorer performance on other welfare measures (higher Gini coefficients, lower life expectancy — example life expectancy around 46.6 for Nigeria and 45.2 for Angola in referenced period).
  - Resource-poor small countries (Mauritius, Seychelles) show faster economic growth and stronger development outcomes, associated with stronger institutions and lower perceived corruption (Corruption Perceptions Index 2012: Mauritius 57; Seychelles 52).

### Research objective and methodology overview
- Objective of the paper: analyze the impact of natural resource windfalls on standard of living and provide policy implications, especially for SSA countries.
- Welfare measurement approach: follows Jones and Klenow (2010) to measure welfare across countries and time using income (GDP), inequality (Gini coefficient), and health (life expectancy).
- Paper organization (as given):
  - Section II: stylized facts
  - Section III: methodology and data
  - Section IV: econometric analysis
  - Section V: policy implications

*Source: _wp1583 - 1. Natural Resource Rents (percent of GDP) in 2012 (extracted content).*

### 48.8 for Nigeria (from EHII, 10-year moving average) and 58.6 (from World Bank, 2000 Data).

### _wp1583 - 48.8 for Nigeria (from EHII, 10-year moving average) and 58.6 (from World Bank, 2000 Data).

### III. METHODOLOGY AND DATA — overview
- Panel dataset: 130 countries, period 1963-2007.
- Three country groups analyzed:
  - whole sample: 130 countries
  - 28 SSA countries
  - nine fragile SSA countries
- Two primary measures:
  - welfare index (consumption-equivalent welfare)
  - resource windfall index (price-based commodity windfall)

### Welfare metric construction (consumption-equivalent welfare)
- Conceptual basis: expected utility for a person living a year in a country, uncertain about survival and income.
- Utility assumptions and formulae:
  - log utility function: u(y) = log y.
  - Probability of living to consume = ρ/100 where ρ is life expectancy at birth.
  - If income is log-normal with arithmetic mean µ and SD σ, expected utility:
    - E[u(y)] = log µ − σ^2/2
  - Consumption-equivalent welfare for country i at time t, W(i,t), is:
    - W(·) = (ρ/100) (log µ − σ^2/2)
  - Consumption-equivalent ratio ζ(i,t) is the consumption adjustment to make the fictitious person indifferent between living in the current US (normalized to 1) and country i at time t.
- Relationship to HDI:
  - Consumption-equivalent metric is motivated similarly to HDI but is annual (1963-2007) and includes income, inequality, and life expectancy.
  - HDI is available only from 1980 (and at limited years thereafter).
- Data sources for components:
  - Income: GDP per capita from World Bank (2014); dataset covers 1960-2012, 236 countries, 9,944 observations.
  - Inequality: Gini from Estimated Household Income Inequality Data Set (EHII) of the University of Texas Inequality Project; covers 1963-2007, 149 countries, 3,872 observations.
    - To convert Gini to SD of log income: σ = 2 Φ^{-1} ( (Gini/√2) + 1 ) − 1  (as described with reference to Aitchison and Brown (1957); original formula text preserved).
  - Life expectancy: World Bank (2014); covers 1960-2012, 238 countries, 11,969 observations.
- Empirical observation:
  - Welfare growth rate is strongly related to GDP growth, but GDP growth tends to underestimate improvement in standard of living because equality and life expectancy also improved.
  - In ten-year averaged comparison (around 1970 and 2000), all 69 countries have positive welfare growth except Zimbabwe.

### Resource windfall index (price-based)
- Index construction:
  - Geometric average of international prices of various commodities weighted by time-invariant export shares (average of 1980, 90, 2000) of each commodity in GDP for a given country (following Arezki et al., 2011).
  - Windfall index for country i in year t: Θ(i,t) = Σ_w ω(i,w) Δlog(ComPrice_{w,t}) where ω(i,w) is average export share of commodity w in GDP and ComPrice_{w,t} is global price of commodity w in year t.
- Commodities included (per authors): aluminum, beef, coffee, cocoa, copper, cotton, gold, iron, maize, oil, rice, rubber, sugar, tea, tobacco, wheat, wood.
- Rationale for price-based index:
  - Price shocks provide more variation and are plausibly exogenous compared with quantity (export size) shocks which can be endogenous.
  - Limitation: price-based index does not capture windfalls from discovery of new resources (quantity shocks); quantity shocks are more persistent and may not immediately translate into revenue.

### Data analysis and empirical patterns
- Dataset coverage and observations:
  - Consumption-equivalent metrics available annually 1963-2007.
  - EHII Gini data limits sample period for inequality.
- Summary empirical findings presented in the source:
  - Average annual welfare growth rate in Sub-Saharan Africa: 3.5 percent.
  - Middle East and North Africa welfare growth: 10.8 percent (driven mainly by life expectancy improvements).
  - On average, resource-rich SSA countries have grown at 3.0 percent while resource-poor SSA countries have grown at 3.8 percent annually (1970-2000).
  - Excluding Zimbabwe, mean growth rate for resource-poor countries increases to 4.9 percent.
  - For 1970-2000 ten-year averaged panel of 69 countries (including 11 SSA countries), almost all countries lie above the 45-degree line when comparing welfare growth to GDP growth, indicating GDP growth underestimates welfare improvement.
  - Specific country notes:
    - Zimbabwe: welfare declined due to life expectancy falling from 55.1 to 44.8.
    - Uganda: welfare growth stagnated (Gini and life expectancy in 2000 nearly unchanged from earlier).
- Example: Nigeria
  - Commodity export structure: oil export share in GDP is 34 percent; shares for cocoa, wood, cotton are negligibly less than 0.5 percent.
  - Windfall index behavior for Nigeria shows peaks at 1973 oil crisis and 1979 energy crisis, and a fall during the recent great recession (windfall index plotted 1961-2013 in source).
- Figures and tables referenced (content preserved in source):
  - Figure comparisons: consumption-equivalent welfare vs. HDI (2005), welfare growth vs. GDP growth (1970-2000), welfare and GDP growth rates by continent, annual welfare growth for SSA countries.
  - Table 1: comparison of Consumption-equivalent metrics and HDI (construction, variables, frequency).
  - Table/appendix: list of commodity prices (UNCTAD data), use of real (constant US$) prices.

### IV. Econometric analysis — sample statistics (excerpt)
- Dataset for econometric work: 130 countries over 45 years, 1963-2007; includes 28 SSA countries.
- Empirical summary (partial):
  - Sample statistics show welfare has increased over time; average growth rate is 9.6 percent overall, but SSA countries have grown less than other continents (Table 3 referenced).

*Source: Excerpt from _wp1583 (methodology, data, and data analysis sections).*

### 5.7 percent, much lower than other continents’ growth rate, 11.2 percent. Average windfall

### _wp1583 - 5.7 percent, much lower than other continents’ growth rate, 11.2 percent. Average windfall

### Sample composition and summary statistics
- Total number of countries in sample: 130
  - East Asia & Pacific: 14
  - Europe & Central Asia: 40
  - Latin America & Caribbean: 25
  - Middle East & North Africa: 16
  - North America: 2
  - South Asia: 5
  - Sub-Saharan Africa: 28
- Table 3 sample statistics (Annual Welfare Growth Rate; Windfall Index)
  - Total (130 countries): Obs. 2,91110.345,850; Mean windfall index 0.0045
  - Sub-Saharan Africa (28 countries): Obs. 4585.721,260; Mean windfall index 0.0055
  - Other continents (102 countries): Obs. 2,45311.214,590; Mean windfall index 0.0043
- Average windfall index in the whole sample: 0.0045 (positive because commodity prices have increased over time)
- Average windfall for SSA countries: 0.0055 (SSA countries more exposed to natural resource shocks than other countries)
- List of the 28 SSA countries in sample: Angola, Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Rep., Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Seychelles, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

### Most and least resource-dependent countries (average size of windfall)
- Most dependent countries (Avg. size of windfall)
  - Oman 0.11918
  - Angola 0.07518
  - Libya 0.06236
  - Iraq 0.06130
  - Nigeria 0.05978
  - Gabon 0.05787
  - Kuwait 0.05687
  - Iran, Islamic Rep. 0.05470
  - Congo, Rep. 0.05448
  - Qatar 0.04465
- Least dependent countries (Avg. size of windfall)
  - Iceland <0.00001
  - Jordan <0.00001
  - Nepal <0.00001
  - Bangladesh <0.00001
  - Japan <0.00001
  - Albania 0.00012
  - Seychelles 0.00019
  - United States 0.00019
  - Slovenia 0.00022
  - Senegal 0.00023

### Methodology for short- and medium-term effects
- Model: Panel VAR specification with country and time fixed effects
  - Vector of variables ܻ
௜,௧ specified as [Windfall Index, Welfare Index]
  - One year lag used (only first lag coefficients significant up to 5 lags)
  - Identification: Cholesky decomposition with ordering Windfall Index first, Welfare Index second
  - Groups analyzed: (i) whole sample (130 countries), (ii) Sub-Saharan African countries (28 countries), (iii) fragile SSA countries (9 countries)
  - Fragile classification: state fragility index >= 17
- Notes on data and identification
  - Windfall index treated as exogenous to domestic conditions
  - Windfall index balanced; welfare index unbalanced at annual frequency
  - Missing years in welfare index acknowledged; annual frequency used for power and short/medium-term policy implications

### Short- and medium-term empirical findings
- Whole sample (130 countries)
  - A one standard deviation shock to resource windfall leads to about 3.4 standard deviation increase in welfare at the peak.
  - Sub-period robustness:
    - 1963-1980: welfare increases by 3.6 standard deviation at the peak after a shock
    - 1981-2007: welfare increases by 2.5 standard deviation at the peak
  - Components (peak responses):
    - GDP increases by 3.8 standard deviation at the peak
    - Gini coefficient decreases by 0.2 standard deviation after one standard deviation windfall shock
    - Life expectancy: almost no change (wide confidence interval)
  - Interpretation: short-run decrease in inequality consistent with Dutch disease mechanisms and increased demand for unskilled labor in non-tradable sector
- Sub-Saharan Africa (28 countries)
  - Welfare increases by 2.7 standard deviation at the peak after a windfall shock (lower than 3.4 for whole sample)
  - Resource governance index in Sub-Saharan Africa: 43.8
  - World average resource governance index: 50.59
  - OECD average resource governance index: 87.7
  - Wider confidence intervals: cannot statistically rely solely on positive point estimates; heterogeneity across SSA countries likely
  - Possible reasons for weaker effect: relatively poor resource management, rent seeking, poor negotiation terms with extractive companies, revenues not spent to benefit public
- Fragile SSA countries (9 countries)
  - Welfare response is temporary and small: a one standard deviation windfall shock leads to about 1.2 standard deviation increase in welfare in the same period; after one year the response becomes almost zero
  - Fragile SSA long-run effects are negative (see ARDL results below)
  - Interpretation: fragile SSA countries fail to translate resource windfall into standard of living improvements; weak fiscal institutions, lack of transparency, and rent-seeking behavior reduce effectiveness

### Long-term effects (ARDL (p,q) results)
- Model: ARDL (p,q) with country and time fixed effects; short-run coefficients (β) and long-run coefficients (θ)
- Table 5: ARDL estimation results (dependent variable: welfare)
  - Whole Sample (130 countries)
    - Long-run coefficient: Welfare_{t-1} -.0299** (.0054)
    - Long-run coefficient: Windfall_{t-1} .7299** (.1282)
    - Short-run coefficients:
      - ∆Welfare_{t-1} .1962** (.0203)
      - ∆Windfall_{t-1} .7183** (.0886)
    - Intercept -.1067 (.0576)
    - Country FE: Y; Time FE: Y
  - SSA countries (28 countries)
    - Long-run coefficient: Welfare_{t-1} -.0078 (.0127)
    - Long-run coefficient: Windfall_{t-1} .4686 (.2861)
    - Short-run coefficients:
      - ∆Welfare_{t-1} .1955** (.0560)
      - ∆Windfall_{t-1} .5684** (.1932)
    - Intercept .0103 (.1534)
    - Country FE: Y; Time FE: Y
  - Fragile SSA countries (9 countries)
    - Long-run coefficient: Welfare_{t-1} -.2877 (.3903)
    - Long-run coefficient: Windfall_{t-1} -1.7954 (1.5605)
    - Short-run coefficients:
      - ∆Welfare_{t-1} -.1460 (.2698)
      - ∆Windfall_{t-1} -1.0149 (1.0348)
    - Intercept -2.8143 (4.1546)
    - Country FE: Y; Time FE: Y
  - Note: ** and * represent statistical significance at 1 percent and 5 percent levels, respectively.
- Interpretation
  - Long-run effect of windfall shock is significant and positive only in the whole sample (.7299** (.1282))
  - In SSA countries, long-run coefficient positive but not statistically significant (.4686 (.2861))
  - In Fragile SSA countries, long-run effect negative but with large standard error (-1.7954 (1.5605))
  - Conclusion: resource boom can be a long-run blessing if well managed; evidence of possible long-run “resource curse” in fragile SSA countries over the last 45 years

### Policy implications and suggested research directions
- Main policy messages
  - A key challenge for resource-rich SSA countries is to translate revenue from resource windfall into sustainable growth.
  - Resource windfalls could improve welfare in both the short-run and the long-run if well-managed.
  - Resource booms could contribute to lowering inequality in the short-run, potentially via increases in demand for unskilled workers in the non-tradable sector and/or improved government transfers.
  - Strong institutions and good governance are important for achieving better growth outcomes following resource booms.
- Observed problems in SSA
  - Resource-rich SSA countries have experienced less benefit from windfalls in both short run and long run, plausibly due to poor natural resource management and weak institutions.
  - Fragile states commonly have bad quality of budget institutions and low fiscal spaces.
- Suggested areas for future research
  - Investigate whether decreases in inequality after resource booms are due to Dutch disease effects or improved government transfers.
  - Further assess public expenditure in SSA countries and the role of fiscal policy following resource booms.
  - Explore analytic tools (e.g., Interaction Panel VAR suggested by Towbin and Weber (2013)) to decompose and identify specific policy or institutional dimensions driving heterogeneity in outcomes.

*Sources: Authors’ calculation with World Bank, EIHH, UNCTAD and NBER-UN data; content extracted from the supplied PDF chapter.*

### REFERENCES

### _wp1583 - REFERENCES

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### Books, reports, and indexes
- Revenue Watch Institute (2013): “The 2013 Resource Governance Index,” New York.
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- Schwab, Klaus (2013): “The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014: Full Data Edition,” World Economic Forum.
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- World Bank (2010): Yes Africa Can: Success Stories From a Dynamic Continent, Washington, DC, © World Bank.
- World Bank (2011): The Changing Wealth of Nations: Measuring Sustainable Development in the New Millennium, Washington, DC, © World Bank.
- World Bank (2014): World Development Indicators 2014, Washington, DC, © World Bank.

*Source: _wp1583 - REFERENCES*

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