## _wp16144 - 1. Selected Indicators

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---

### I. Context
- Peru’s fiscal policy evolved over the eighties, nineties, and the commodity boom of the 2000s and has played a crucial stabilization role (Vtyurina, 2015).
- Fiscal retrenchment in the nineties was growth-inducing by bringing stability after hyperinflation and economic mismanagement.
- Public investment has grown significantly while preserving fiscal sustainability, reflected by very low public debt levels (Ross and Peschiera, 2015).
- Deep structural reforms aimed at strengthening fiscal rules, public treasury, and financial and investment management systems have been implemented (Pessoa and others, 2015).
- Private sector investment was crowded-in through the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) framework, but infrastructure projects have often been derailed by bureaucratic and regulatory impediments, lingering weaknesses in the public investment management (PIM) system, and the unfinished decentralization process, leaving a still-large infrastructure gap.
- The fiscal expansion enacted by the Peruvian authorities to the 2014 downturn prompted analysis of the short-term effects of different fiscal expansionary measures on growth.
- With the end of the commodity super cycle and the projected halt in mining investment, Peru’s medium-term growth potential has been revised downward, raising the question of whether to maintain high public investment rates to attract and complement private investment and close the infrastructure gap.
- Maintaining or increasing capital spending will not be effective unless a strong PIM system is in place to obtain the largest bang for the sol invested.

### II. Public investment trends and fiscal levers
- Public and private investment shares:
  - Public investment spending (as percent of GDP): Increased from about 3 percent in the early 2000s to about 6 percent in 2013, before moderating in 2014-15.
  - Private investment (as percent of GDP): Jumped from 14¼ percent to 19¼ percent of GDP over the same period.
- Contribution to growth:
  - Over the last decade, public investment contributed 2¾ percentage points (21 percent) to the average annual growth in total real fixed capital investment of 12¾ percent.
- Local and national spending:
  - Local government spending: Tripled, increasing from less than 1 percent of GDP in 2007 to 2½ percent of GDP in 2013.
  - National and regional fixed investment spending taken together rose from about 1½ percent to 3 percent of GDP.
- Comparative and gap measures:
  - Public investment in Peru rose over the last decade above levels for emerging market economies (EMs) and Latin America and Caribbean countries (LAC), but Peru’s capital stock, including on a per capita basis, still lags behind EMs while being at par with LAC.
  - Peru leads regionally in PPPs and has received high rankings for the quality of its framework.
  - Infrastructure gap estimates (AFIN, 2015): National infrastructure gap around US$160 billion over 2016−25; for the next four years, the gap is about US$70 billion.
  - Deficit areas include energy, telecommunications, transportation, health and education.
- Commodity revenue buffer:
  - Commodity revenue reached above 4 percent of GDP at the height of the cycle, leading to higher transfers and accumulation of buffers, including in the Fiscal Stabilization Fund.

### III. Stimulus measures and fiscal response
- 2008–10 episode:
  - Following growth of 9.8 percent in 2008, activity decelerated sharply in 2009.
  - Mid-2009 Plan for Sustaining Economic Growth, Employment, and Poverty Alleviation in a Global Crisis: fiscal measures equivalent to nearly 4 percent of GDP could be ready for implementation.
  - The substantial fiscal stimulus—mainly for infrastructure and maintenance projects and financial assets—resulted in a fiscal impulse of around 3 percent of GDP over 2008−10 and budget deficits in two of those years.
  - The government began to withdraw the fiscal stimulus once there were clear signs of a robust and sustained recovery of private expenditure in 2010.
- 2014−15 stimulus:
  - Government designed a fiscal stimulus plan equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP, including: higher public investment; maintenance spending at regional and local level; accelerating pass-through from international oil prices to local prices; tax reduction.
  - Resulting fiscal outcomes: overall budget deficit of about 2 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - Composition and execution:
    - Most of the stimulus in 2014−15 came from tax measures―about 30 percent of a 2 percentage point decline in tax revenue came from tax rate reductions.
    - Increase in current spending (in 2014) rather than higher public investment, which was under-executed in both years and dropped significantly in 2015 as percent of GDP.
  - Specific fiscal items reported (percent of GDP, 2014−15):
    - A. Taxes (2015) 0.7
    - B. Net expenditure (2014) 0.3
      - Bonuses and salary increases 0.3
    - C. Expenditure (2015) 0.9
      - Current expenditure 0.1
      - Capital expenditure 0.4
      - Repayment of debt in arrears 0.3
      - Social assistance 0.1
    - Total (A+B+C) 1.9
  - Anti-crisis fiscal measures (2008-09) (percent of GDP):
    - Support to construction sector 0.85
    - Access to drinking water 0.05
    - Support to SMEs and export sector 0.37
    - Public investment 1.37
    - Investment continuity initiative 0.41
    - Key new or accelerated projects (68) 0.28
    - Fund for Regional and Local Public Investment 0.63
    - Other 0.05
    - Social programs and targeted support to workers 0.15
    - Total 4.17

### IV. Fiscal multipliers — conceptual points and Peru evidence
- Definition and determinants:
  - A fiscal multiplier (in absolute terms) exceeds one implies a large impact on growth.
  - Determinants include individuals’ marginal propensity to consume; size of automatic stabilizers; whether fiscal expansion triggers interest rate increases; exchange rate regime; sustainability of fiscal accounts.
  - Composition matters: capital spending on average provides an effective impulse in the short and long term; timing and PIM systems matter because capital expenditures take time to design and implement and may be ineffective for timely stabilization.
- Country positioning:
  - Peru fits into the country category with medium-size overall multipliers (0.4-0.6) in the first year of fiscal expansion.
  - Some studies suggest both spending and revenue multipliers are small in EMs, with revenue multipliers higher than spending ones.
- Selected empirical estimates for Peru (short-term; medium-term; by component as reported):
  - Central Reserve Bank of Peru (2012), downturn: 0.24; 0.92 (short-term current; capital spending); 0.49; 1.42 (medium-term)
  - Rossini and others (2012): 0.78; 1.36; -0.44 (short-term current; capital spending; current revenue); 0.52; 2.63; -0.38 (medium-term)
  - Sanchez and Galindo (2013), downturn: 1.3; 0.2 (Government spending; taxes)
  - BBVA bank (2014): 0.55; 0.6; -0.1 (short-term current; capital spending; tax revenue); 0.2; 1.6; -0.2 (medium-term)
  - Ministry of Economy and Finance (2015), downturn: 0.12; 0.55 (short-term Central government current; capital spending); 0.95; 1.69 (medium-term); upturn: 0.13; 0.55 (short-term); 0.82; 1.74 (medium-term) (period 1995Q1:2014Q4)
  - Central Reserve Bank of Peru (2014-15), downturn: 0.93; 1.42; -0.25 (short-term current; capital spending; current revenue); upturn: 0.28; 0.73; 0.00

### V. Empirical methodology and main results (TVAR and GIRFs)
- Model design and data:
  - Threshold vector autoregressive model (TVAR) estimating asymmetric responses across two regimes.
  - Threshold variable: GDP growth, threshold value estimated endogenously at 1.5 percent; quarters with GDP growth above 1.5 percent are upper regime.
  - Data: general government, period from 1995Q2 to 2015Q3.
  - Variables in vector Yt: real revenues, real current expenditures, real capital expenditures, and real GDP growth rates.
  - CPI used as deflator; series used as first difference of the logarithm of their levels; lag structure: time lag d set to 3; model lag length set at 1.
- GIRF implementation specifics:
  - Shock size set at 2 percent; forecasting horizon at 20 quarters; GIRFs incorporate regime switches; a 2-percent positive shock applied to current and capital expenditures and a 2-percent negative shock to revenues.
- Key empirical findings:
  - Nonlinear impacts: effects depend on size, direction and timing with respect to the economic cycle.
  - Capital spending multipliers:
    - One sol in capital spending will increase output by 0.5 soles in the first 4 quarters in the lower regime and slightly less in the upper regime.
    - Cumulative effects after 12 quarters: capital spending multipliers reach to 1.1 in the downturn and to 0.5 in expansion.
  - Current spending multipliers:
    - Found to be not significant in size in both cycles.
    - Explanations: current spending often associated with transfers and one-off bonuses which are intermediated by households’ savings behavior before affecting spending and activity.
  - Policy-relevant interpretation:
    - Historically high informality and low tax-to-GDP ratios point to limited effect of tax cuts on output.
    - Fiscal spending increases, particularly capital spending, are suggested to be more effective stimulus measures, but timing and implementation capacity are critical.
    - Current spending increases may create contingent liabilities and be less nimble.

### VI. Quality, efficiency, and Public Investment Management (PIM)
- Implementation and execution:
  - Implementation of planned public investment spending has improved over time but remains well below 100 percent, especially at regional and local levels.
  - Fixed public investment spending is about 80 percent of budgeted amounts—up 13 percentage points from 2007 (MEF 2016).
  - Decentralization created many new jurisdictions with relatively inexperienced capital spending administrative units.
- Infrastructure quality and competitiveness:
  - Peru’s infrastructure quality improved from 2007 but remains below its trading partners; dropped by 7 spots to 112th place out of 140 countries for quality of overall infrastructure (World Economic Forum), and is 17th of 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- PIE-X and PIMA findings:
  - PIE-X indicates substantial scope for improving public investment efficiency.
    - Survey-based indicators: efficiency gap of 28 comparing to the average of 19 for LAC and EMs.
    - Physical indicator measure: Peru lags significantly (54 versus 39 for peers).
  - PIM Assessment (PIMA) survey-based ranking: Peru compares relatively well to other EMs and selected LAC countries and excels in several categories across planning, allocation, and implementation institutions.

### VII. Planning, monitoring, and subnational challenges
- Planning and resource allocation:
  - Peru scores "exceptionally well" in planning (categories 1-5); more modest in resource allocation (categories 6-10).
  - Weaknesses in multi-year budgeting:
    - Budget approved yearly; Peru does not publish projections of capital spending beyond the budget year.
    - No multiyear targets/ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry or program.
    - Projections of total cost of major capital projects are published but not presented with annual projections over a three-to-five year horizon.
    - No official record exists regarding commitments in future years from signed public investment contracts.
  - Peru publishes projections of fiscal accounts on a three-year basis in the MEF’s Macroeconomic Framework report but these are not binding beyond the budget year.
- Project implementation and monitoring:
  - Strengths: designated staff for implementation plans; monitoring of public assets through comprehensive asset surveys.
  - Weaknesses: project appropriations approved by congress on a one-year basis with unspent appropriations lapsing; cash flow forecasts not prepared or updated regularly; commitment ceilings not provided timely; cash release delays; limited public access to procurement information; only some large projects subject to external audit.
  - SNIP could be updated more timely, especially on municipal project execution stages.
- Sub-national framework and decentralization:
  - Decentralization started in 2002 and is not yet complete.
  - Revenue sources for subnational governments: transfers from the national government, license fees (canons), and royalties from commodity-related operations.
  - Public investment spending by local governments accounts for more than 45 percent of total public investment in Peru.
  - Investment concentration: a small group of local governments receive enormous resources from license fees and royalties, leading to financing preceding capacity and resulting in suboptimal projects, wasted outlays, slow execution rates, idle balances, and alleged corruption.
  - Human resource challenges: deep and frequent employee turnover after elections and human resource limitations have led to capital spending shortfalls, especially in the last two years.
  - Corruption effects: investigations (2013–14) of several regional leaders led to worse investment execution at the local level by about 14 percent, on average, during 2014-2015 (MEF, 2016).
- Central government responses:
  - Creation of a Special Investment Monitoring Unit (EESI).
  - Formation of 110 investment committees in all three levels of government.
  - Training and technical assistance for regional and local officials; modernization of procurement procedures.

### VIII. Fiscal context, scenarios, and key quantitative findings
- Fiscal impulse in 2015:
  - Weighting revenue and spending impulses by their multipliers, the impact of the fiscal impulse on the economy in 2015 was a negative 0.3 percent.
  - Had capital spending been executed as budgeted in 2015, real output growth would have been higher by 0.1 percentage point of GDP.
- Investment and growth scenario:
  - Increasing investment to 6-6.5 percent of GDP could result in about 2-percentage-points increase in output growth.
- Debt and fiscal sustainability:
  - Net debt at 7 percent of GDP.
  - To stabilize debt below 30 percent (starting from 2021), the budget would have to run primary balances of about 0.5 percent of GDP because the interest rate paid on the public debt is expected to be somewhat above nominal trend economic growth, unless potential GDP growth rises significantly.
- Corruption-investment linkage:
  - Investment execution worsening by about 14 percent, on average, during 2014-2015 linked to corruption investigations in 2013–14.

### IX. PIM reform recommendations (summary)
- Adopt a multi-year budget to guarantee full execution of multi-year investments and provide documentation on scheduled commitments, especially in public investment.
- Improve cash flow management to minimize project implementation delays.
- Design an Information System to integrate planning, budgeting and investment over the project cycle.
- Monitor all major projects during implementation for annual project costs and physical progress, and conduct and publish external ex-post audits.
- Centralize assessment and selection of investment projects and decentralize their execution.
- Update SNIP more timely, especially on municipal project execution stages.
- Develop a national infrastructure strategy.
- Revisit assignment of natural resource revenues through more transparent and equitable transfer mechanisms.
- Strengthen subnational capacity and consider merging jurisdictions or reallocating resources away from low-capacity districts to seek efficiency gains.
- Provide continued central government support (training, technical assistance, monitoring) to sustain local investment levels.

### X. Appendix — data and robustness
- Model ordering and threshold:
  - Changes in real revenues ordered first, followed by changes in current and capital spending, and real GDP growth.
  - Threshold selected endogenously keeping a minimum of 35 percent observations in each regime.
- Variable transformations and stationarity:
  - First differences of logarithms used (dlog values); unit root tests on transformed variables do not indicate non-stationary series.
  - ADF Unit Root Test statistics (t-statistic, p-value):
    - Revenue: t-statistic -8.76, p-value 0.0000
    - Capital Expenditure: t-statistic -11.25, p-value 0.0001
    - Current Expenditure: t-statistic -9.065, p-value 0.0000
    - GDP: t-statistic -6.448, p-value 0.0000
- GIRF results:
  - Fiscal multipliers are non-linear and statistically significant.
  - Multipliers for government consumption are generally smaller than multipliers for capital spending.
  - Consumption multipliers disappear faster and tend to be higher for the lower regime than the upper regime.
  - Positive shocks to capital spending can reach cumulative responses above 1 by 12 quarters in the future for the lower regime and are much smaller during upturns where they are below 0.6.
  - Confidence bands in non-linear models confirm robustness for shocks in current and capital spending and revenues.

*Source: _wp16144 - 1. Selected Indicators (extracted content).*

### 1. Selected Indicators .................................................................................................

### _wp16144 - 1. Selected Indicators

### I. CONTEXT
- Peru’s fiscal policy evolved over the eighties, nineties, and the commodity boom of the 2000s and has played a crucial stabilization role (Vtyurina, 2015).
- Fiscal retrenchment in the nineties was growth-inducing by bringing stability after hyperinflation and economic mismanagement.
- Public investment has grown significantly while preserving fiscal sustainability, reflected by very low public debt levels (Ross and Peschiera, 2015).
- Deep structural reforms aimed at strengthening fiscal rules, public treasury, and financial and investment management systems have been implemented (Pessoa and others, 2015).
- Private sector investment was crowded-in through the Public-Private Partnership (PPP) framework, but infrastructure projects have often been derailed by bureaucratic and regulatory impediments, lingering weaknesses in the public investment management (PIM) system, and the unfinished decentralization process, leaving a still-large infrastructure gap.
- The fiscal expansion enacted by the Peruvian authorities to the 2014 downturn prompted analysis of the short-term effects of different fiscal expansionary measures on growth.
- With the end of the commodity super cycle and the projected halt in mining investment, Peru’s medium-term growth potential has been revised downward, raising the question of whether to maintain high public investment rates to attract and complement private investment and close the infrastructure gap.
- Maintaining or increasing capital spending will not be effective unless a strong PIM system is in place to obtain the largest bang for the sol invested.

### II. PUBLIC INVESTMENT TRENDS AND FISCAL LEVERS
Findings on investment dynamics and composition:
- Public investment spending (as percent of GDP):
  - Increased from about 3 percent in the early 2000s to about 6 percent in 2013, before moderating in 2014-15.
- Private investment (as percent of GDP):
  - Jumped from 14¼ percent to 19¼ percent of GDP over the same period.
- Contribution to growth in total real fixed capital investment:
  - Over the last decade, public investment contributed 2¾ percentage points (21 percent) to the average annual growth in total real fixed capital investment of 12¾ percent.
- Local government spending:
  - Tripled, increasing from less than 1 percent of GDP in 2007 to 2½ percent of GDP in 2013.
  - National and regional fixed investment spending taken together rose from about 1½ percent to 3 percent of GDP.
- Comparative positions:
  - Public investment in Peru rose over the last decade above levels for emerging market economies (EMs) and Latin America and Caribbean countries (LAC), but Peru’s capital stock, including on a per capita basis, still lags behind EMs while being at par with LAC.
  - Peru leads regionally in PPPs and has received high rankings for the quality of its framework.
- Infrastructure gap estimates (AFIN, 2015):
  - National infrastructure gap around US$160 billion over 2016−25.
  - For the next four years, the gap is about US$70 billion.
  - Deficit areas include energy, telecommunications, transportation, health and education.
- Commodity revenues:
  - Although not as large as in large single commodity producers, at the height of the cycle commodity revenue reached above 4 percent of GDP, leading to higher transfers and accumulation of buffers, including in the Fiscal Stabilization Fund.

### III. STIMULUS MEASURES AND FISCAL RESPONSE
- Historical fiscal response:
  - Following growth of 9.8 percent in 2008, activity decelerated sharply in 2009 due to the global financial crisis.
  - In mid-2009, the government announced the Plan for Sustaining Economic Growth, Employment, and Poverty Alleviation in a Global Crisis, presenting a set of fiscal measures equivalent to nearly 4 percent of GDP that could be ready for implementation if conditions warranted.
  - The substantial fiscal stimulus—mainly for infrastructure and maintenance projects and financial assets—resulted in a fiscal impulse of around 3 percent of GDP over 2008−10 and budget deficits in two of those years.
- Subsequent withdrawal:
  - The government began to withdraw the fiscal stimulus once there were clear signs of a robust and sustained recovery of private expenditure in 2010.
- Fiscal stance in the early 2010s:
  - In response to global environment changes starting in 2012, the authorities targeted a reduction in the budget surplus, which declined to around 1 percent of GDP in 2013 and turned to nearly balance in [text ends].

### IV. ORGANIZATION OF THE PAPER (as presented)
- Section II: Background on public investment trends and recent fiscal stimulus measures.
- Section III: Overview of studies on fiscal multipliers.
- Section IV and Annex 1: Results from the econometric analysis of the effect of fiscal policy measures on output.
- Section V: Discussion of weaknesses in executing capital spending, including at a local level, and assessment of Peru’s capital spending efficiency and the PIM system.
- Section VI: Conclusions with recommendations.

_Italic: Source: _wp16144 - 1. Selected Indicators (extracted content). _

### 2014. In addition, in mid-2014, when it

### _wp16144 - 2014. In addition, in mid-2014, when it

### Fiscal stimulus in 2014−15: composition and fiscal outcomes
- Government designed a fiscal stimulus plan equivalent to about 3 percent of GDP to boost aggregate demand, including:
  - higher public investment,
  - maintenance spending at regional and local level,
  - accelerating pass-through from international oil prices to local prices,
  - tax reduction (Table 3).
- Resulting fiscal outcomes:
  - overall budget deficit of about 2 percent of GDP in 2015.
  - most of the stimulus in 2014−15 came from tax measures―about 30 percent of a 2 percentage point decline in tax revenue came from tax rate reductions.
  - increase in current spending (in 2014) rather than higher public investment, which was under-executed in both years and dropped significantly in 2015 as percent of GDP.
- Specific fiscal items reported (percent of GDP, 2014−15):
  - A. Taxes (2015) 0.7
  - B. Net expenditure (2014) 0.3
    - Bonuses and salary increases 0.3
  - C. Expenditure (2015) 0.9
    - Current expenditure 0.1
    - Capital expenditure 0.4
    - Repayment of debt in arrears 0.3
    - Social assistance 0.1
  - Total (A+B+C) 1.9
- Anti-crisis fiscal measures (2008-09) listed in Table 3 (percent of GDP):
  - Support to construction sector 0.85
  - Access to drinking water 0.05
  - Support to SMEs and export sector 0.37
  - Public investment 1.37
  - Investment continuity initiative 0.41
  - Key new or accelerated projects (68) 0.28
  - Fund for Regional and Local Public Investment 0.63
  - Other 0.05
  - Social programs and targeted support to workers 0.15
  - Total 4.17

### Background on fiscal multipliers: conceptual points and evidence for Peru
- Definition and interpretation:
  - A fiscal multiplier (in absolute terms) exceeds one implies a large impact on growth.
  - A spending multiplier greater than one indicates boosting public spending as a share of GDP raises output by more than the initial spending increase.
  - A revenue multiplier lower than -1 implies that raising the ratio of taxes to GDP by 1 percent causes GDP to decline by more than 1 percent.
- Determinants of multiplier size include:
  - individuals’ marginal propensity to consume,
  - size of automatic stabilizers,
  - whether fiscal expansion triggers interest rate increases,
  - exchange rate regime (fixed exchange rate increases multipliers),
  - sustainability of fiscal accounts.
- Composition matters: capital spending on average provides an effective impulse in the short and long term; timing and PIM systems matter because capital expenditures take time to design and implement and may be ineffective for timely stabilization.
- Estimates for emerging markets (EMs) and Peru:
  - Peru fits into the country category with medium-size overall multipliers (0.4-0.6) in the first year of fiscal expansion.
  - Some studies suggest both spending and revenue multipliers are small in EMs, with revenue multipliers higher than spending ones.
- Selected empirical estimates of fiscal multipliers for Peru (short-term; medium-term; by component as reported in Table 4):
  - Central Reserve Bank of Peru (2012), downturn: 0.24; 0.92 (short-term current; capital spending); 0.49; 1.42 (medium-term)
  - Rossini and others (2012): 0.78; 1.36; -0.44 (short-term current; capital spending; current revenue); 0.52; 2.63; -0.38 (medium-term)
  - Sanchez and Galindo (2013), downturn: 1.3; 0.2 (Government spending; taxes)
  - BBVA bank (2014): 0.55; 0.6; -0.1 (short-term current; capital spending; tax revenue); 0.2; 1.6; -0.2 (medium-term)
  - Ministry of Economy and Finance (2015), downturn: 0.12; 0.55 (short-term Central government current; capital spending); 0.95; 1.69 (medium-term)
    - upturn: 0.13; 0.55 (short-term); 0.82; 1.74 (medium-term) (period 1995Q1:2014Q4)
  - Central Reserve Bank of Peru (2014-15), downturn: 0.93; 1.42; -0.25 (short-term current; capital spending; current revenue); upturn: 0.28; 0.73; 0.00

### Methodology and main empirical results (TVAR approach)
- Model and data:
  - Used a threshold vector autoregressive model (TVAR) to estimate asymmetric responses of growth to discretionary fiscal changes across two regimes (lower-growth and higher-growth).
  - Threshold variable: GDP growth, threshold value estimated endogenously at 1.5 percent; quarters with GDP growth above 1.5 percent are upper regime.
  - Data: general government, period from 1995Q2 to 2015Q3.
  - Variables in vector Yt: real revenues, real current expenditures, real capital expenditures, and real GDP growth rates.
  - Consumer price index used as deflator; data seasonally adjusted (except series already adjusted); series used as first difference of the logarithm of their levels.
  - Lag structure: time lag d set to 3 (Tsay test statistical significance at 90 percent confidence level); model lag length set at 1 (Schwarz information criterion).
  - Threshold estimation: maximum likelihood optimized by grid search; threshold selected at value that maximizes likelihood.
- Key empirical findings:
  - Evidence of nonlinear impact of fiscal policy on output: effects depend on size, direction and timing with respect to the economic cycle.
  - Capital spending multipliers:
    - One sol in capital spending will increase output by 0.5 soles in the first 4 quarters in the lower regime and slightly less in the upper regime.
    - Cumulative effects after 12 quarters: capital spending multipliers reach to 1.1 in the downturn and to 0.5 in expansion.
  - Current spending multipliers:
    - Found to be not significant in size in both cycles — more conservative than other studies.
    - Reasons offered: current spending often associated with transfers (fairly flat in Peru) and one-off bonuses which, like tax cuts, are intermediated by households’ savings behavior before affecting household spending and economic activity.
  - Policy-relevant interpretation:
    - Historically high informality and low tax-to-GDP ratios in Peru point to limited effect of tax cuts on output.
    - Fiscal spending increases, particularly capital spending, are suggested to be more effective stimulus measures, but timing and implementation capacity are critical.
    - Current spending increases may create contingent liabilities (difficulty of reversing public wage increases) and be less nimble in changing economic conditions.

### Quality, efficiency, and public investment management (PIM)
- Implementation and execution:
  - Implementation of planned public investment spending has improved over time but remains well below 100 percent, especially at regional and local levels.
  - Fixed public investment spending is about 80 percent of budgeted amounts—up 13 percentage points from 2007 (MEF 2016).
  - Decentralization created many new jurisdictions with relatively inexperienced capital spending administrative units.
- Infrastructure quality and competitiveness:
  - Peru’s infrastructure quality improved from 2007 but remains below its trading partners; dropped by 7 spots to 112th place out of 140 countries for quality of overall infrastructure (World Economic Forum), and is 17th of 22 countries in Latin America and the Caribbean.
- Public Investment Efficiency Indicator (PIE-X) findings:
  - PIE-X estimates the relationship between public capital stock and indicators of access to and quality of infrastructure assets.
  - PIE-X for Peru indicates substantial scope for improving public investment efficiency.
  - Survey-based indicators: Peru compares fairly well with other LAC countries and EMs (efficiency gap of 28 comparing to the average of 19 for LAC and EMs).
  - Physical indicator measure: Peru lags significantly (54 versus 39 for peers).
- Public Investment Management System (PIM) assessment:
  - On the PIM Assessment (PIMA) survey-based ranking across 15 institutions for planning, allocation, and implementation of public investment, Peru compares relatively well to other EMs and selected LAC countries and excels in several categories.
  - The assessment evaluates institutions such as Fiscal Rules; National & Sectoral Planning; Central-Local Coordination; Management of PPPs; Company Regulation; Multiyear Budgeting; Budget Comprehensiveness; Budget Unity; Project Appraisal; Project Selection; Protection of Investment; Availability of Funding; Transparency of Execution; Project Management.

*Source: IMF staff estimates and Ministry of the Economy and Finance data as presented in the provided content.*

### 15. Monitoring of

### 15. Monitoring of Assets

### Planning and Resource Allocation
- Peru scores "exceptionally well" in the area of planning (categories 1-5), with fiscal rules that allow planning for resources including public investment, use of clear and realistic priorities and cost estimates, certainty about funding from the central government, sustainable sub-national borrowing, PPP management that supports project selection, and regulation of infrastructure companies to promote open and competitive markets.
- Peru scores more modestly in resource allocation (categories 6-10).
- Multi-year budgeting weakness:
  - The budget is approved on a yearly basis; Peru does not publish projections of capital spending beyond the budget year.
  - There are no multiyear targets/ceilings on capital expenditure by ministry or program.
  - Projections of the total cost of major capital projects are published but not presented together with annual projections over a three-to-five year horizon.
  - No official record exists regarding commitments in future years from signed public investment contracts.
  - Lack of absorption capacity generates work abandonment and unplanned project modifications, particularly at the sub-national level.
- Peru does well in budget comprehensiveness: all public investment is authorized by the legislature and disclosed in the budget recommendation.
- Note: Peru publishes projections of fiscal accounts on a three-year basis in the MEF’s Macroeconomic Framework report but these are not binding beyond the budget year.

### Project Implementation and Monitoring
- Strengths:
  - Designated staff to prepare implementation plans.
  - Monitoring of public assets through comprehensive asset surveys conducted regularly by the government.
- Weaknesses:
  - Project appropriations are approved by congress on a one-year basis; unspent appropriations of capital lapse at the end of the year (with a few exceptions).
  - Cash flow forecasts are not prepared or updated regularly.
  - Ministries/agencies are not provided with commitment ceilings in a timely manner.
  - Cash for project outlays is sometimes released with delays, leading to setbacks in project implementation.
  - Public access to procurement information is limited; only some large projects are subject to external audit.
- SNIP (national planning system) could be updated more timely, especially with information on the stage of project execution at the municipal level.

### Sub-national Framework
- Decentralization process started in 2002 and is not yet complete; decentralization poses challenges for Peru’s Public Investment Management (PIM).
- Revenue sources for subnational governments: transfers from the national government, license fees (canons), and royalties from commodity-related operations.
- Public investment spending by local governments accounts for more than 45 percent of total public investment in Peru.
- Spending decentralization is tied to local services (public sanitation, parks and gardens, local roads).
- Investment spending concentration:
  - A small group of local governments receive enormous resources from license fees and royalties, without consideration of spending responsibilities or capacity.
  - Financing has come before capacity, leading to suboptimal project choices, wasted outlays, slow execution rates, buildup of idle balances in the banking system, and alleged corruption.
- Human resource challenges:
  - Deep and frequent employee turnover after elections and human resource limitations have led to capital spending shortfalls, especially in the last two years.
- Corruption effects:
  - Recent corruption investigations (2013–14) of several regional leaders led to worse investment execution at the local level by about 14 percent, on average, during 2014-2015 (MEF, 2016).
- Central government responses:
  - Creation of a Special Investment Monitoring Unit (EESI) to facilitate implementation of investment projects and monitor obstacles.
  - Formation of 110 investment committees in all three levels of government to prioritize strategic project portfolios and modernize procurement procedures.
  - Training for regional and local officials on standards and methodology for project formulation and evaluation; technical assistance in implementation and operation of budgetary systems, investment and procurement; and tools for integrated management of investment projects.

### Fiscal Context and Growth Strategy
- With the end of the commodity super cycle, Peru needs a new engine for growth, potentially non-mining investment and exports.
- Peru’s low tax burden provides fiscal space for increasing public capital spending to improve infrastructure and competitiveness through better fiscal revenue collection.
- Higher public investment would complement and encourage private sector investment if efficient and fiscally sustainable; further PIM reforms and decentralization changes would contribute to greater efficiency.
- Infrastructure stocks have stagnated and are not considered of high quality despite increased investment and improved frameworks.

### Key Quantitative Findings and Scenarios
- Fiscal impulse in 2015:
  - Weighting revenue and spending impulses by their multipliers, the impact of the fiscal impulse on the economy in 2015 was a negative 0.3 percent.
  - Had capital spending been executed as budgeted in 2015, real output growth would have been higher by 0.1 percentage point of GDP.
- Investment target and long-term growth:
  - Increasing investment to 6-6.5 percent of GDP could result in about 2-percentage-points increase in output growth.
- Debt and fiscal sustainability:
  - Net debt at 7 percent of GDP.
  - To stabilize debt below 30 percent (starting from 2021), the budget would have to run primary balances of about 0.5 percent of GDP because the interest rate paid on the public debt is expected to be somewhat above nominal trend economic growth, unless potential GDP growth rises significantly.
- Corruption-investment linkage:
  - Investment execution worsening by about 14 percent, on average, during 2014-2015 linked to corruption investigations in 2013–14.

### Enhancements in Public Investment Management (PIM) — Summary of Recommendations
- PIM recommendations:
  - Adopt a multi-year budget with the objective of guaranteeing full execution of multi-year investments, including documentation on scheduled commitments, especially in public investment.
  - Improve cash flow management to minimize project implementation delays.
  - Design an Information System to integrate planning, budgeting and investment over the project cycle.
  - Monitor all major projects during implementation for annual project costs and physical progress, and conduct and publish external ex-post audits.
  - Centralize the assessment and selection of investment projects and decentralize their execution.
  - While information is available on total project cost and amount invested to date, update SNIP more timely, especially on municipal project execution stages.
  - Develop a national infrastructure strategy.
- Decentralization recommendations:
  - Revisit the assignment of natural resource revenues through more transparent and equitable transfer mechanisms.
  - Strengthen efficiency of subnational investment and service delivery through further capacity building initiatives.
  - Consider merging jurisdictions and reallocate resources away from low-capacity districts to avoid waste and seek efficiency from economies of scale.
  - Central government support (training, technical assistance, monitoring) to sustain investment levels at the local level.

### Appendix: Data and Methodology — Model and Multipliers
- Model ordering and threshold:
  - In the model, changes in real revenues were ordered first, followed by changes in current and capital spending, and real GDP growth.
  - The threshold value is selected endogenously over a search of possible values while keeping a minimum of 35 percent observations in each regime.
- Variable transformations:
  - Results of first differences of the logarithm (dlog values) were used for total revenues, current expenditures, capital expenditures, and real GDP.
  - Unit root tests on transformed variables do not indicate non-stationary series.
- Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs):
  - GIRFs implemented for a 2 percent shock with forecasting horizon set at 20 quarters and allowing regime switches.
  - A 2-percent positive shock was applied to current and capital expenditures and a 2-percent negative shock to revenues.
- GIRF results summary:
  - Fiscal multipliers are non-linear and statistically significant.
  - Multipliers for government consumption are generally smaller than multipliers for capital spending.
  - Consumption multipliers disappear faster and tend to be higher for the lower regime than the upper regime.
  - Positive shocks to capital spending can reach cumulative responses above 1 by 12 quarters in the future for the lower regime and are much smaller during upturns where they are below 0.6.
  - Confidence bands in non-linear models confirm robustness for shocks in current and capital spending and revenues.
- ADF Unit Root Test statistics (t-statistic, p-value):
  - Revenue: t-statistic -8.76, p-value 0.0000
  - Capital Expenditure: t-statistic -11.25, p-value 0.0001
  - Current Expenditure: t-statistic -9.065, p-value 0.0000
  - GDP: t-statistic -6.448, p-value 0.0000
- GIRF implementation specifics:
  - Shock size set at 2 percent; forecasting horizon at 20 quarters.
  - GIRFs incorporate regime switches; responses depend on regime and timing.

*Source: IMF staff analysis in "15. Monitoring of Assets" (excerpt).*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/-/media/websites/imf/imported-full-text-pdf/external/pubs/ft/wp/2016/_wp16144.pdf_
