The Role of State-Contingent Debt Instruments in Sovereign Debt Restructurings

Author/Editor:

Charles Cohen ; S. M. Ali Abbas ; Myrvin Anthony ; Tom Best ; Peter Breuer ; Hui Miao ; Alla Myrvoda ; Eriko Togo

Publication Date:

November 19, 2020

Electronic Access:

Free Download. Use the free Adobe Acrobat Reader to view this PDF file

Disclaimer: This Staff Discussion Note represents the views of the authors and does not necessarily represent IMF views or IMF policy. The views expressed herein should be attributed to the authors and not to the IMF, its Executive Board, or its management. Staff Discussion Notes are published to elicit comments and to further debate.

Summary:

The COVID-19 crisis may lead to a series of costly and inefficient sovereign debt restructurings. Any such restructurings will likely take place during a period of great economic uncertainty, which may lead to protracted negotiations between creditors and debtors over recovery values, and potentially even relapses into default post-restructuring. State-contingent debt instruments (SCDIs) could play an important role in improving the outcomes of these restructurings.

Series:

Staff Discussion Notes No. 2020/006

Subject:

Frequency:

occasional

English

Publication Date:

November 19, 2020

ISBN/ISSN:

9781513556482/2617-6750

Stock No:

SDNEA2020006

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