Inflation Targeting and the Legacy of High Inflation
IMF Working Papers, April 11, 2025
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Bibliographic details
- Authors: Luis Ignacio Jácome, Nicolas E Magud, Samuel Pienknagura, Martin Uribe
- Published: April 11, 2025
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229008761.001
Summary findings
- Inflation targeting (IT) has reached 35 years as a key institutional monetary framework for central banks.
- Stark differences exist among inflation targeting countries in the conduct of monetary policy.
- The legacy of a high inflation history is identified as a preponderant factor behind heterogeneity in monetary policy conduct.
- A credibility puzzle is documented: the strength of a central bank’s monetary policy response to deviations from the inflation target remains broadly unchanged even as central banks gain credibility over time.
- Key conclusion: a country’s inflationary past casts a long and persistent shadow on central banks.
Model and theoretical contributions
- The paper proposes a model that departs from existing IT workhorse models by:
- Adding path-dependence to a forward-looking model.
- Allowing for potentially imperfect central bank credibility.
- Theoretical results:
- Achieving low inflation (hitting the target) requires more aggressive monetary policy when individuals’ past inflationary experiences shape their inflation expectation formation.
- Hitting the inflation target is costlier from an output point of view under such path-dependent expectation formation.
Empirical evidence
- Empirical findings support the need for the two theoretical additions (path-dependence in expectations and imperfect credibility).
- Countries that experienced a high level of inflation before adopting the IT regime tend to respond more aggressively to deviations of inflation expectations from the central bank’s target.
- Evidence is consistent with a persistent influence of past inflation on current central bank behavior.
Policy implications and interpretation
- Central banks in countries with a history of high inflation may need to implement more aggressive policy responses to stabilize inflation expectations.
- The output costs of returning inflation to target can be higher where agents’ expectations incorporate past high inflation episodes.
- Strengthening central bank credibility over time does not necessarily reduce the aggressiveness of monetary policy responses to inflation-expectation deviations, highlighting a credibility puzzle policymakers should consider.
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