{
  "title": "Fiscal Arrangements in Federations: Four Lessons for Europe",
  "publication": "IMF Blog, February 25, 2015",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2015/02/25/fiscal-arrangements-in-federations-four-lessons-for-europe",
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  "summary": "Publication: \"Designing a European Fiscal Union: Lessons from the Experience of Fiscal Federations\" (Routledge).",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Overview and purpose",
      "content": "- Publication: \"Designing a European Fiscal Union: Lessons from the Experience of Fiscal Federations\" (Routledge).\n- Author of page summary: Martine Guerguil.\n- Date: February 25, 2015.\n- Scope: Examines the experience of 13 federal states to inform debate on whether the European Union needs closer fiscal integration and a stronger fiscal center.\n- Core questions addressed by the book:\n  - What is the role of centralized fiscal policies in federations, and hence the size, features, and functions of the central budget?\n  - What institutional arrangements are used to coordinate fiscal policy between the federal and subnational levels?\n  - What are the links between federal and subnational debt, and how have subnational financing crises been handled, when they occurred?"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Four salient features and comparative findings",
      "content": "- Central budget size and stabilizing role\n  - Unlike federations, the EU’s budget is extremely small and nearly entirely dependent on transfers from its members.\n  - Even in highly decentralized federations, the large size of the central budget, with its own taxing capacity, allows it to play an important stabilizing role (see Chart 1).\n  - Conclusion: The European Union has no economically-meaningful center and fiscal risk-sharing is nearly non existent; it remains to be seen whether this arrangement can survive as a permanent EU feature or whether a stronger form of fiscal centralization will be required.\n\n- Fiscal discipline mechanisms\n  - The European Union is long on institutions but short on shared policy instruments.\n  - Because it opted for a small central budget, the EU relies much more than existing federations on an extensive set of institutional arrangements to ensure fiscal discipline (see Chart 2).\n  - This reliance raises significant enforcement, and thus credibility, challenges that will need to be addressed.\n\n- Shared debt practices\n  - Shared debt is rarely seen in federations.\n  - Some euro-area proposals, such as common debt issuance and self-standing lending facilities for crisis support, are not a permanent feature of federations, although they have played a role in the early life of federations.\n\n- Influence of subnational financial crises on institutional design\n  - Subnational financial crises have often, but not always, shaped fiscal responsibility sharing arrangements in federations.\n  - The role and size of the central government in federations reflects a combination of historical circumstances and social and political preferences.\n  - Example contrasts:\n    - The most decentralized federations are often those where states were independent entities before the establishment of the federation—cases that may be more relevant for the European Union.\n    - A succession of severe and protracted sub-national financial crises led to the introduction of substantial constraints on local budgets in a previously relatively decentralized federation like Brazil.\n  - Implication: The current crisis in the euro area may influence the future shape of the union beyond the resolution of the financing crisis itself."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Implications and outlook for Europe",
      "content": "- The concrete experiences of federations illuminate decisions and trade-offs the European Union will likely face.\n- Given challenging economic and political circumstances in Europe, a prompt, well-articulated response may be impractical, but federation experiences will be informative for future choices.\n\nSource: Fiscal Arrangements in Federations: Four Lessons for Europe, February 25, 2015.\n\n---\n\n\n References\n\n- https://www.imf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/fadbook-blog-chart-1-rev.jpg\n- https://www.imf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/fadbook-blog-chart-2-rev.jpg\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2015/02/25/fiscal-arrangements-in-federations-four-lessons-for-europe"
    }
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    "Authors: Martine Guerguil",
    "Published: February 25, 2015",
    "Publication: \"Designing a European Fiscal Union: Lessons from the Experience of Fiscal Federations\" (Routledge).",
    "Author of page summary: Martine Guerguil.",
    "Date: February 25, 2015.",
    "Scope: Examines the experience of 13 federal states to inform debate on whether the European Union needs closer fiscal integration and a stronger fiscal center.",
    "Core questions addressed by the book:",
    "Central budget size and stabilizing role",
    "Fiscal discipline mechanisms",
    "Shared debt practices",
    "Influence of subnational financial crises on institutional design",
    "The concrete experiences of federations illuminate decisions and trade-offs the European Union will likely face.",
    "Given challenging economic and political circumstances in Europe, a prompt, well-articulated response may be impractical, but federation experiences will be informative for future choices.",
    "[https://www.imf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/fadbook-blog-chart-1-rev.jpg](https://www.imf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/fadbook-blog-chart-1-rev.jpg)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/fadbook-blog-chart-2-rev.jpg](https://www.imf.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/fadbook-blog-chart-2-rev.jpg)"
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