## Money Laundering Poses a Risk to Financial Sector Stability

_IMF Blog, September 4, 2023_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Money Laundering Poses a Risk to Financial Sector Stability](https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2023/09/04/money-laundering-poses-a-risk-to-financial-sector-stability)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/en/blogs/articles/2023/09/04/money-laundering-poses-a-risk-to-financial-sector-stability/index.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/en/blogs/articles/2023/09/04/money-laundering-poses-a-risk-to-financial-sector-stability/index.json)
- [Bundle manifest](/en/blogs/articles/2023/09/04/money-laundering-poses-a-risk-to-financial-sector-stability/bundle-manifest.json)

## Bibliographic details
- Authors: Pierre Bardin, Antoine Bouveret, Grace Jackson, Maksym Markevych
- Published: September 4, 2023

---

### Cross-border threats and scope
- Cross-border financial crime is here to stay.
- Criminals exploit the globally connected financial system to move illicit funds across borders and evade capture, protecting wealth derived from tax evasion, corruption, and drug trafficking.
- No financial institution or country is immune; money laundering scandals caused bank collapses and shocked countries.
- Society bears the cost through an erosion of trust in the integrity of the financial system, often leading taxpayers to subsidize failing banks and limiting customer access to credit.
- The rise of crypto assets is a parallel borderless trend, offering speedy global transfers attractive to criminals.

### IMF partnership and technical assistance
- IMF staff partnered with eight Nordic and Baltic countries—Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, and Sweden—in a first-of-its-kind anti-money laundering technical assistance project.
- The project’s findings: combatting money laundering is beyond the capacity of any single nation—and countries must innovate together to find a solution.
- IMF staff is constantly expanding the toolkit to help Fund members focus on cross-border illicit flows using machine learning technologies and data analysis.
- Examples where this analysis features: Singapore 2022 Article IV consultation and UK 2022 FSAP.

### Tracking criminal proceeds and analytical tools
- Tools are used to scrutinize financial movements, gain insights into the global landscape, and identify indicators of potential macro-critical money laundering scenarios.
- Collaborating with the Nordic-Baltic countries, these tools improved understanding of unusual financial flows warranting scrutiny and enhanced countries' ability to screen potential illicit financial flows and focus on emerging threats.
- Collaboration allows countries to identify and connect seemingly disconnected cross-border money laundering and terrorism financing threats.
- Following the money includes considering countries chosen by criminals for cleaning illicit gains, enabling anti-money laundering agencies to enhance scrutiny of unusual transactions passing through their financial systems that originate in high-risk jurisdictions.

### Financial stability impact and contagion dynamics
- Examining data related to regional money laundering cases reveals a telling pattern:
  - Banks grappling with financial integrity concerns suffered sharp stock price drops.
  - Banks experienced elevated perceived credit risks.
  - Banks saw declines in deposits affecting their liquidity.
- Money laundering shocks triggered equity price declines and heightened the cost of insuring against a corporate default, as shown by credit default swap prices.
- Regional impact: substantial spillover effects affected other key regional banks, indicating a contagion dynamic between the affected banks and their counterparts.
- The Fund’s focus on macroeconomics and the link between financial stability and financial integrity risks is well established; the Nordic-Baltic project further expands efforts to better quantify the financial stability impact of money laundering shocks.

### Supervisory findings and recommendations
- Banks, as main gatekeepers of the financial system, must prevent and detect money laundering; criminals find banks alluring due to their extensive cross-border networks, interbank ties, and products and services that open themselves up to the risk of money laundering.
- National anti-money laundering efforts focus primarily on domestic risks and often lag.
- Bank regulators play a crucial role, but often don’t make the best use of limited resources, and divergent approaches hamper effective global collaboration.
- With a global supervisory mechanism lacking, supervisors need to broaden their perspective, scrutinizing non-resident risks and inter-border laundering countermeasures.
- Recommendations at both country and regional levels include:
  - Greater cross-border data collection to better understand and mitigate risks.
  - Use of technological solutions to analyze cross-border transaction data and create a regional picture for targeted supervisory efforts, including multi-country initiatives.
  - Exchange of data on money laundering incidents.
  - Deeper examination of the need for banks to bolster capital reserves against associated losses.
  - Vigilant monitoring of newer entrants to international finance, such as crypto asset service providers, with risk-adjusted scrutiny and cross-border cooperation.

### Policy takeaway
- Stronger international collaboration and innovation are required to curb cross-border illicit proceeds.
- Continued analysis of financial integrity’s impact on stability can fortify the global financial system against money laundering shocks.
- The Nordic-Baltic region’s narrative serves as a cautionary tale: “Invest in preventive and mitigating measures before the scandal is at your doorstep.”
- Presently, the commitment to prevent money laundering in the region is a priority at the highest levels of the different governments concerned.

*Blog overseen by Chady El-Khoury; reflects contributions from Alexander Malden, Santiago Texidor Mora, and Indulekha Thomas, with assistance from Grant Riekenberg. Pierre Bardin, Antoine Bouveret, Grace Jackson, Maksym Markevych — September 4, 2023.*

---


## References

- [anti-money laundering technical assistance project](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2023/09/01/Nordic-Baltic-Regional-Report-Technical-Assistance-Report-Nordic-Baltic-Technical-538762?cid=bl-com-1EUREA2023003)
- [cross-border illicit flows](https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2023/Fight-against-money-laundering-and-terrorism-financing)
- [Singapore 2022 Article IV](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/07/20/Singapore-2022-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-the-521048)
- [Financial Sector Assessment Program](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/fssa)
- [UK
2022 FSAP](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2022/02/22/United-Kingdom-Financial-Sector-Assessment-Program-Financial-System-Stability-Assessment-513442)
- [well established across our work](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2019/02/04/pp101718-2018-review-of-the-funds-aml-strategy)
- [Euro Area Article IV](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/CR/Issues/2023/07/18/Euro-Area-Policies-2023-Article-IV-Consultation-Press-Release-Staff-Report-and-Statement-by-536724)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/blogs/articles/2023/09/04/money-laundering-poses-a-risk-to-financial-sector-stability_
