## Annex

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Annex](https://www.imf.org/en/data/cbt/annex)

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- [Markdown version](/en/data/cbt/annex/index.md)
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### Introduction and purpose
- The CBT is an international code that allows central banks and their stakeholders to map transparency practices of the central bank to international best practices.
- Purpose: to enhance transparency and accountability of the central bank and contribute to policy effectiveness.
- The CBT is not intended as a governance code.
- The Annex presents selected principles from international standards that relate to transparency; the transparency-related principles listed are for information purposes only and do not represent an IMF interpretation, assessment, or guidance.

### Relation to international financial policy standards
- The CBT relies on the following international standards in microprudential supervision, resolution, and financial market infrastructures:
  - Basel Committee on Banking Supervision’s (BCBS) Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.
  - International Association of Insurance Supervisors’ (IAIS) Insurance Core Principles and Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.
  - International Organization of Securities Commissions’ (IOSCO) Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.
  - Financial Stability Board’s (FSB) Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.
  - Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures and IOSCO’s (CPMI‑IOSCO) Principles for Financial Market Infrastructure.
- The Annex is not to be used for assessing compliance with the CBT and does not contain a description of maturity of practices (e.g., core, expanded, or comprehensive) on transparency for supervisors, resolution authorities, and FMI overseers.
- Transparency issues in the Annex will be assessed by respective assessors in banking, insurance, securities, resolution, and financial market infrastructure when they undertake full assessments or prepare technical notes.

### Differences in statement and methodology across standards
- Banking (BCP):
  - Core principles, essential criteria (EC), and additional criteria are contained in one BCBS document.
  - “Essential criteria” should be present to demonstrate compliance; “additional criteria” may be relevant for more sophisticated banking organizations.
- Insurance (ICP):
  - Principle statements (highest level), Standards (key high-level requirements), and Guidance (facilitating understanding; not requirements) are contained in one IAIS document.
- Securities (IOSCO):
  - Principles (P) contained in one document and methodology in another; methodology supports self-assessment or third-party assessment.
- Resolution (FSB Key Attributes, KA):
  - KAs set out core elements for effective resolution regimes; the assessment methodology proposes a set of essential criteria (EC) and explanatory notes (EN).
- Financial Market Infrastructure (PFMI, CPMI‑IOSCO):
  - Principles (P) in one document; disclosure frameworks and assessment methodology in another; two sections: requirements for FMI safety/soundness/efficiency and responsibilities of authorities.

### Core transparency-related themes and selected principles
- Legal framework and mandate
  - BCP1: Responsibilities, Objectives and Powers — an effective system of banking supervision has clear responsibilities and Objectives and a suitable Legal Framework to provide necessary legal Powers.
  - ICP1: Objectives, Powers and Responsibilities of the Supervisor — Primary legislation should clearly define authority, Objectives (including to protect policyholders; promote the maintenance of a fair, safe and stable insurance market; contribute to financial stability), and Powers.
  - KA2: The Legal Framework should identify one or more resolution authorities and provide a clear Mandate; where multiple authorities exist, identify a lead authority and clear allocation of Objectives, Functions and Powers.
- Autonomy and operational independence
  - BCP2 EC1, EC2, EC6: Operational Independence, accountability, governance, transparent appointment/removal processes, and financing that does not undermine Autonomy.
  - ICP2 (ICP2.1, ICP2.1.1, ICP2.1.2, ICP2.3, ICP2.3.1, ICP2.3.2, ICP2.3.3): Supervisor should be operationally independent, financed in a manner that does not undermine Independence, with transparent appointment/dismissal procedures and disclosure of governing body composition and remuneration mechanisms.
  - KA2 EC2.3, EN2(d): Resolution authority should be operationally independent with safeguards such as transparent appointment procedures and statutory constraints.
- Decision-making arrangements and accountability
  - BCP2 EC1: Operational Independence, accountability and governance prescribed in legislation and publicly disclosed.
  - KA2 EC2.4: Resolution authority is accountable through a transparent framework for discharge of duties.
  - IOSCO P2: Regulator should be operationally independent and accountable; accountability implies periodic public reporting and transparency in process and conduct.
- Communication, confidentiality, and public disclosure
  - BCP3: Laws/regulations provide a framework for cooperation and collaboration reflecting the need to protect confidential information.
  - ICP2.0.4, ICP2.7, ICP2.8.1: Transparency reinforces accountability; supervisors should publish information consistent with confidentiality requirements and protect confidential information by legislation.
  - IOSCO P2: Confidential and commercially sensitive information must be respected and safeguarded.
  - PFMI Responsibility C (P4.3.2): Authorities should publicly disclose their regulatory, supervisory, and oversight policies with respect to FMIs; materials should be readily available.
- Instruments, powers, and supervisory tools
  - BCP1 EC6: Supervisors have the power to take timely corrective action; impose sanctions; revoke licenses; cooperate to achieve orderly resolution, including triggering resolution where appropriate.
  - ICP4, ICP10: Licensing requirements and preventive, corrective measures and sanctions should be clear, objective, consistent, and publicly disclosed.
  - KA3 (EN3(e), EN3(f)(iii), EN3(r)): Resolution authorities should have a broad range of resolution Powers, exercisable without shareholder/creditor consent where necessary, and legal certainty and transparency for bridge institutions and other measures.
  - PFMI Responsibility A (P4.1.2): Authorities should publicly disclose criteria used to identify FMIs subject to regulation, supervision, and oversight.
- Coverage and access to information
  - BCP4 EC5: Publish a current list of licensed banks, including branches of foreign banks, in an Easily accessible way.
  - ICP4.7, ICP4.7.1, ICP4.7.2: Publish a complete list of licensed insurance legal entities and the scope/conditions of licenses where they affect the public.
  - BCP28 EC5 and ICP24.5, ICP24.5.1, ICP24.5.2: Supervisors should regularly publish aggregate information and data/statistics on sectors to facilitate public understanding and market discipline; provide access to sufficiently detailed data directly or via others.
  - KA1 EC1.1: Resolution regime scope and circumstances are clearly defined in the Legal Framework.
  - KA2 EC2.7: Resolution authority should have unimpeded access to firms where material for resolution planning and implementation.
- Coverage of FMIs and application of principles
  - PFMI P1.20 and Responsibility D (P4.4.1): Presumption that all CSDs, SSSs, CCPs, and TRs are systemically important; authorities should adopt CPSS‑IOSCO Principles and apply them to systemically important payment systems, CSDs, SSSs, CCPs, and TRs; if an FMI is not considered systemically important, authorities should disclose the name and rationale.
- Coordination: domestic and international cooperation
  - BCP3, ICP25, IOSCO D ¶14: Laws/regulations should provide frameworks for cooperation with domestic and foreign supervisors, including information‑sharing mechanisms that protect confidentiality.
  - KA2 EC2.1 and related text: Where multiple resolution authorities exist, roles and responsibilities should be clearly defined and coordinated; identify lead authority when authorities in same jurisdiction resolve entities of the same group.
  - KA7 (7.4, 7.5, 7.6): Treatment of creditors and ranking in insolvency should be transparent and expedited processes should exist to give effect to foreign resolution measures; resolution authorities should have capacity in law to share information subject to confidentiality.
  - PFMI Responsibility E (P4.5.1, P4.5.2, P4.5.3, P4.5.10): Authorities should cooperate domestically and internationally, inform relevant authorities about cross‑border FMIs, and provide advance notification of pending material regulatory changes and adverse events that may affect other authorities.
- Accountability and reporting for resolution authorities
  - KA2 EC2.4 and EN2(e): Resolution authority should be accountable through a transparent framework including procedures for internal/external review and the periodic publication of reports on resolution actions and policies; public reports may include case-specific reports once a resolution has concluded, but operational resolution plans or resolvability assessment results of individual banks need not be disclosed.

### Selected references cited in the Annex (years preserved)
- “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2012.
- “The Basel Framework.” Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2020.
- “Insurance Core Principles and Common Framework for the Supervision of Internationally Active Insurance Groups.” International Association of Insurance Supervisors, 2019.
- “Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.” International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017.
- “Methodology for assessing implementation of the IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities Regulation.” International Organization of Securities Commissions, 2017.
- “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions.” Financial Stability Board, 2014.
- “Key Attributes Assessment Methodology for the Banking Sector.” Financial Stability Board, 2016.
- “Public Disclosures on Resolution Planning and Resolvability - Discussion Paper for Public Consultation.” Financial Stability Board, 2019.
- “Principles on Bail‑in Execution.” Financial Stability Board, 2018.
- “Recovery and Resolution Planning for Systemically Important Financial Institutions: Guidance on Developing Effective Resolution Strategies.” Financial Stability Board, 2013.
- “Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI).” CPMI‑IOSCO, 2012.
- “Key Standards for Sound Financial Systems; Financial Regulation and Supervision.” Financial Stability Board, 2020.
- Financial Sector Assessment Program, IMF/World Bank, 2020.

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## References

- [Introduction](https://www.imf.org/en/Data/CBT/introduction)
- [Principles](https://www.imf.org/en/Data/CBT/principles)
- [Practices](https://www.imf.org/en/Data/CBT/practices)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/data/cbt/annex_