## IMF Survey : IMF Loan to Stabilize Cyprus’s Financial System, Restore Growth

_IMF News, May 17, 2013_

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## Bibliographic details
- Published: May 17, 2013

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### Program and financing
- Executive Board approved a €1 billion ($1.33 billion) loan over three years under the IMF’s Extended Fund Facility.
- The loan is part of a combined financing package with the European Stability Mechanism amounting to €10 billion.
- Purpose: stabilize the financial sector and set public finances on a sustainable path.

### Causes of the crisis
- Oversized banking sector: reached over eight times the country’s GDP.
- Risky bank exposures included loans to an overheating domestic real estate sector, Greek residents, and investments in domestic and Greek government bonds.
- Heavy reliance on large and volatile foreign deposits.
- Greek recession and Greek debt restructuring worsened bank balance sheets.
- By mid-2012, banks were severely undercapitalized.
- Due diligence in early 2013 revealed capital needs of close to 60 percent of GDP to cover existing and future losses and a buffer for shocks.
- Government fiscal weaknesses: lax fiscal policies, high deficits, and public debt rising to over 85 percent of GDP at the end of 2012.
- Government loss of market access since mid-2011 contributed to market confidence waning and deposit outflows.

### Bank resolution approach and burden sharing
- Direct recapitalization through the European Stability Mechanism was not available.
- Resolution and restructuring of troubled banks with participation of unsecured bank creditors (including depositors) was selected as the economically sound alternative.
- Rationale:
  - Avoid overburdening taxpayers and adding unsustainable public debt.
  - Achieve burden sharing and minimize fiscal costs associated with bank resolution and recapitalization.
  - Deal with banking sector problems upfront while maintaining debt sustainability.
- Acknowledged trade-offs: this approach had higher risks but limited fiscal fallout.

### Capital controls
- Temporary restrictions on withdrawals and capital controls were introduced after a two-week closure of the banking system during bank resolution.
- Purpose: prevent massive deposit outflows.
- Strategy: gradually remove restrictions and restore normal payment flows while ensuring banks have enough liquidity.
- Several relaxations already implemented, largely focused on domestic transactions to facilitate business operations.
- Remaining restrictions expected to be gradually relaxed as confidence returns.

### Debt sustainability and fiscal policy
- The bank-resolution approach reduced contingent liabilities onto the state and resulted in a lower debt burden than full public recapitalization would have implied.
- Debt sustainability depends on full and timely implementation of program policies.
- Fiscal consolidation: government implementing an ambitious consolidation of seven percent of GDP over the next three years to reduce the fiscal deficit.
- The program includes measures to protect vulnerable groups by targeting social spending and allows time for economic recovery before additional fiscal measures.

### Growth outlook, business model adjustment, and risks
- Macroeconomic baseline conservatively accounts for:
  - Fiscal multiplier effects on consumption and investment.
  - Behavioral effects from banking sector policy actions (participation of uninsured domestic depositors in recapitalization costs, downsizing of the banking sector, temporary payment restrictions, linkages with related business service sectors).
  - Experiences of other countries that have undergone banking crises.
- Medium-term structural adjustment: Cyprus expected to become less reliant on financial services and to benefit from:
  - Low corporate tax rate, favorable double-taxation treaties, well-educated labor force, common law system, strong institutions, relatively low structural barriers to growth.
  - Expected support for service sectors—legal, accounting and consulting services, and tourism—which will drive medium-term growth.
  - Upside potential from prospect of exploitation of sizeable gas reserves over the longer run.
- Significant macroeconomic uncertainties and risks remain given:
  - Resolution of two large banks, imposition of capital controls, and the need to adapt the business model.

*IMF Survey, May 17, 2013*

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## Content in this bundle

- [Cr13125pdf (PDF)](/-/media/websites/imf/imported/external/pubs/ft/scr/2013/_cr13125pdf.pdf){rel="external" type="application/pdf"}

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## References

- [https://www.imf.org/en/News/country-focus](https://www.imf.org/en/News/country-focus)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [IMF Country Focus](https://www.imf.org/en/news/country-focus)
- [IMF analysis of Europe’s financial system](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/CAR031513A.htm)
- [The IMF and Europe](http://www.imf.org/external/region/eur/index.aspx)
- [Europe’s banking union](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/CAR021313A.htm)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/socar051713a_
