## IMF Survey : IMF Explores Ways to Strengthen Response to Sovereign Debt Distress

_IMF News, June 20, 2014_

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**Canonical URL:** [IMF Survey : IMF Explores Ways to Strengthen Response to Sovereign Debt Distress](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sopol062014a)

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## Bibliographic details
- Published: June 20, 2014

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### Overview
- Publication date: June 20, 2014.
- Purpose: Review preliminary ideas to make the IMF’s exceptional access lending framework more flexible to minimize costs of sovereign debt crises for debtors, creditors, and the international financial system.
- Context: Follow-up to an earlier Board discussion in May 2013 and modifications to the framework made in 2010 in the context of the Eurozone crisis.

### Key proposed reforms and policy rationale
- Broaden the range of debt operations that can underpin IMF financing beyond the current binary choice of a bailout or upfront debt reduction.
- Introduce “debt reprofiling” as a new option:
  - Creditors asked to extend maturities for a limited period without reduction in principal or coupon.
  - Reprofiling would be used only in certain circumstances and accompanied by a credible adjustment program and IMF liquidity support.
- Reduce reliance on the “systemic exemption” (created in 2010) by using reprofiling and more calibrated tools to address contagion risks.
- Preserve IMF’s ability to provide large-scale financing without restructuring when there are no significant concerns regarding debt sustainability.

### Debt reprofiling: mechanics, benefits, and constraints
- Mechanics:
  - Market-based operation in which sovereign’s creditors amend instrument terms to extend maturities.
  - Collective action clauses in bonds to be relied upon to address collective action problems.
  - Official creditors expected to maintain exposure through maturity extensions or new financing.
- Benefits argued:
  - Less costly to creditors than debt reduction.
  - Less disruptive to financial markets and hence less contagious.
  - Conserves resources that would otherwise be paid out to creditors during a program; savings can finance a less constrained adjustment path.
  - May reduce the overall size of the financing package and speed return to market access.
  - If reprofiling fails and a later debt reduction is needed, a broader creditor base may reduce the haircut for remaining creditors.
- Constraints and safeguards:
  - Reprofiling would be accompanied by a credible adjustment program and IMF liquidity support.
  - Minimum participation thresholds (example given: “once, say, 90 percent of creditors have agreed to participate”) would be set before IMF financial support is conditioned on creditor participation.

### When reprofiling would be appropriate (scenarios)
- If the country still has market access on reasonable terms:
  - No debt operation required; IMF lending can address temporary liquidity shortages.
- If the country has lost market access:
  - Determine whether loss is due to temporary market sentiment shifts or fundamental debt sustainability concerns.
  - If debt sustainability indicators meet the “high probability” threshold, lend without debt reduction.
  - If loss of access appears linked to sustainability concerns, reprofiling may be appropriate.
- Upfront debt reduction reserved for cases where debt is clearly unsustainable at the outset.

### Debt sustainability assessment and discretion
- The IMF uses a framework introduced the previous year for market-accessing countries that examines:
  - Debt-to-GDP ratio.
  - Debt-service profile over the next few years relative to the size of the economy.
  - Currency composition of the debt.
  - Nature of the creditor base.
  - Empirically based thresholds indicating higher risk of a debt crisis.
- Application requires judgment; discretion remains necessary to decide whether a member’s debt situation is clearly sustainable, clearly unsustainable, or uncertain.
- Once the IMF judges where a member falls on the sustainability spectrum, the framework guides whether restructuring is called for and what type.

### Creditor support, collective action, and legal considerations
- Creditor engagement:
  - Consultations with creditors and explanations of assumptions underpinning the debt sustainability analysis are necessary to obtain support.
  - Collective action clauses (present in most—but not all—bonds) will be relied upon.
  - Official creditors expected to maintain exposure via maturity extensions or new financing.
- Legal and market obstacles:
  - The recent US Supreme Court ruling regarding Argentina may exacerbate collective action problems for all forms of debt restructuring, including reprofiling.
  - The IMF is exploring market-based contractual modifications for future bond issuances; progress to be discussed in a forthcoming paper.

### Implementation path and next steps
- The work is preliminary; the Executive Board agreed the IMF could pursue these ideas further.
- Follow-up work: another paper expected later in the year or early next year, based on further analysis and consultations with market participants and other stakeholders on impact and feasibility.

*IMF Survey, June 20, 2014.*

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## Content in this bundle

- [052214apdf (PDF)](/-/media/websites/imf/imported/external/np/pp/eng/2014/_052214apdf.pdf){rel="external" type="application/pdf"}
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## References

- [https://www.imf.org/en/News/country-focus](https://www.imf.org/en/News/country-focus)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [Policy](https://www.imf.org/en/news/search)
- [Press release](http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2014/pr14294.htm)
- [IMF and sovereign debt](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2013/POL052313A.htm)
- [Assessing public debt](http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2014/POL032714A.htm)
- [earlier Board discussion](http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pn/2013/pn1361.htm)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sopol062014a_
