## The IMF's Role in Asia: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? Remarks by Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, IMF

_IMF News, July 10, 2002_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [The IMF's Role in Asia: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution? Remarks by Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, IMF](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp071002)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp071002/index.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp071002/index.json)
- [Bundle manifest](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp071002/bundle-manifest.json)

## Bibliographic details
- Published: July 10, 2002

---

### Overview and context
- Prepared text for remarks at the Institute of Policy Studies and Singapore Management University Forum, Singapore, July 10, 2002.
- Speaker: Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, International Monetary Fund.
- Central question: Is the IMF part of the problem or part of the solution in East Asia following the Asian crisis?
- Key framing: many changes at the IMF were undertaken in response to lessons learned from the Asian crisis; the institution is attempting to be "part of the solution."

### Causes of the Asian crisis (as presented)
- Crisis resulted from interaction of several factors; academic work (including Professor Tan) cited.
- Criticism identified:
  - Alleged zeal by the U.S. Treasury and the IMF in encouraging opening to short-term foreign capital in the mid-1990s.
  - Entry and hasty exodus of foreign capital into economies whose financial and supervisory structures were ill-equipped.
- IMF response/clarifications:
  - The IMF did not encourage countries to liberalize short-term flows through the banking sector.
  - Many countries liberalized for domestic reasons (example cited: Thailand's desire to become an international financial center).
  - Quote from the Bangkok Post (as cited): "it was the (Thai) Democrat party that opened up the Pandora's box with the establishment of the Bangkok International Banking Facility, a pompous name for a good idea that went wildly wrong."

### IMF operational shortcomings identified during the crisis
- The IMF had issued private warnings ("yellow flags") to Thailand but did not forecast the extent, speed, or virulence of the downturn.
- Almost every aspect of core IMF operations "came in for scrutiny and criticism."
- The IMF "had not kept up with the rapid developments in international capital markets," prompting institutional changes.

### Institutional reforms and surveillance enhancements
- New and strengthened measures implemented:
  - Creation of an International Capital Markets department.
  - Issuance of a quarterly Global Financial Stability Report on risks and vulnerabilities in capital markets.
  - Regular informal dialogue through the Capital Market Consultative Group (CMCG) with internationally-active private institutions; CMCG meetings held in various financial centers, including in Asia.
  - Development of standards and codes to assess countries against international benchmarks.
  - Financial Sector Assessment Program (FSAP), conducted jointly with the World Bank, using outside experts for international peer review.
  - Production of Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs) to enhance coverage of institutional issues: data dissemination, fiscal transparency, monetary and financial policy transparency, and financial sector issues.
- Key statistic on ROSCs:
  - "As of end-March, over 200 ROSC modules had been completed for over 70 countries (including 33 for APEC members), three-fourths of which had been published."

### Crisis resolution framework improvements
- Three-pronged effort to strengthen crisis resolution:
  - Better-informed and more systematic judgments about debt sustainability to decide between major debt restructuring and IMF/other support to restore confidence.
  - Work to establish clearer definitions of conditions for and limits to access to IMF financing; recognition that the IMF "is not a global lender of last resort with the ability to create liquidity by issuing money."
  - Development of ways to facilitate debt restructuring with less destruction of asset values and economic disruption:
    - More ambitious use of collective action clauses; active effort to design model clauses.
    - Complementary proposal by Anne Krueger for a new Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM).

### Regional self-help and cooperation
- Recognition that IMF resources are limited; support for regional mechanisms:
  - Asian initiatives cited: APEC, the Manila Framework Group, ASEAN, and the "Chiang Mai" initiative.
  - These initiatives promote information exchange and policy dialogue as useful complements to global institutions like the IMF.
  - Quote from deputy managing director Mr. Sugisaki (as cited): these efforts "can play a very useful role in helping to foster regional and global financial stability."

### Macroeconomic policy advice—fiscal and monetary guidance
- Fiscal policy:
  - Example: Thailand in July 1997 had a huge and growing current account deficit ("more than 8 percent of GDP") and large, unrecognized fiscal liabilities to recapitalize the financial system.
  - IMF initially recommended a "roughly-unchanged fiscal position" for Thailand; once crisis scope became evident, IMF-supported programs featured large budget deficits, including increased spending on social safety net programs.
  - Post-crisis fiscal advice emphasizes allowing automatic stabilizers to work and shielding vulnerable segments of the population.
- Monetary policy debate:
  - IMF position: a temporary increase in interest rates may be necessary to restore financial stability during a crisis; this view has supporters and detractors.
  - Quoted perspectives:
    - Larry Summers: trade-off between raising interest rates to restore external confidence and providing liquidity for financial repair; "a classic problem of a single instrument and multiple targets."
    - Rudi Dornbusch: "investors will take confidence and bring money back when they see fiscal conservatism and high interest rates. Do that for a few months and you are on the right track."
    - Michael Mussa (cited): advocates of lowering interest rates at crisis onset are smoking something "not entirely legal".
    - Ken Rogoff (current chief economist at time of remarks) contributed vigorously to the debate.
  - Professional consensus (as characterized): "the costs of letting the exchange rate go are much higher than that of a temporary increase in interest rates."
  - Conclusion: issue remains unsettled and requires honest debate and closer empirical work.

### Conditionality reform
- Criticisms from Asian policymakers about the extent and intrusiveness of conditions attached to IMF-supported programs:
  - Example: Philippines—"20 IMF programs in the last 40 years" and the 1998 program had "over 100 conditions in 8 areas"; some conditions were critical, others better handled by multilateral development banks.
  - Indonesia example: certain structural measures "could have been postponed until our head was above water" (quote from Mr. Boediono).
- IMF responses:
  - Movement toward streamlining conditionality: fewer and less intrusive conditions limited to areas critical to program goals.
  - Exploration of "outcomes-based conditionality": disbursement tied to attainment of certain outcomes to reduce micro-management and give governments flexibility in policy choices.
  - Effort to make programs flexible enough to allow countries choice in achieving agreed goals, invoking Deng Tsiao-Ping's advice: "it does not matter whether the cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice."
- Process of review:
  - Conditionality review involved open debate: conferences in Tokyo and elsewhere, invitations for comments through IMF website, reliance on staff experience and Executive Board judgment.

### Conclusions and characterizations
- The IMF acknowledges missteps and surprises during the Asian crisis and has taken multiple steps to reform surveillance, crisis prevention, and crisis resolution.
- Reforms are recent and ongoing; they have not "transformed the IMF's way of doing business completely" but indicate a significant institutional effort to be part of the solution to Asia's challenges.
- Emphasis on measuring risks, better debt-sustainability analysis, clearer financing-access rules, regional cooperation, improved conditionality, and continued debate on monetary policy during crises.

*Prepared text for remarks at the Institute of Policy Studies and Singapore Management University Forum, Singapore, July 10, 2002 — Thomas C. Dawson, Director, External Relations Department, International Monetary Fund.*

---

## Content in this bundle

- [071701pdf (PDF)](/-/media/websites/imf/imported/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/collab/_071701pdf.pdf){rel="external" type="application/pdf"}

---

## References

- [Philippines and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/PHL/index.htm)
- [Singapore and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/SGP/index.htm)
- [Thailand and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/THA/index.htm)
- [United States and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/USA/index.htm)
- [Conditionality](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/sheets/2023/imf-conditionality)
- [Reports on the Observance of Standards and Codes (ROSCs)](https://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp)
- [Speeches](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/sem/071001at.htm](https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/sem/071001at.htm)
- [http://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/sem/071001bo.htm](https://www.imf.org/external/np/pdr/cond/2001/eng/sem/071001bo.htm)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp071002_
