{
  "title": "\"European Fiscal Union: A Vision for the Long Run\" By Carlo Cottarelli",
  "publication": "IMF News, November 1, 2012",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp110112",
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  "summary": "Presentation at the November 1-2 Gerzensee Conference.",
  "authors": [
    "Carlo Cottarelli Speech Related Links Switzerland"
  ],
  "publishDate": "2012-11-01",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Purpose and context",
      "content": "- Presentation at the November 1-2 Gerzensee Conference.\n- Relates to the “four presidents” report of June 26 and an interim report published in mid-October; expects a final report in December.\n- Focus: desirable long-run features of a fiscal union for the euro area and short-run steps consistent with that long-run architecture."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Case for a fiscal union: sources of instability",
      "content": "- Two distinct sources of problems within the euro area:\n  - Idiosyncratic shocks (e.g., housing booms in Ireland and Spain; globalization shock affecting Italy and Portugal).\n  - Idiosyncratic policies that amplified vulnerabilities (example: Greece).\n- Greece, 2007:\n  - general government deficit amounted to 7 percent of GDP, well above the SGP ceiling.\n  - available statistics indicated a deficit below 3 percent of GDP.\n  - debt ratio reported at 93 percent of GDP versus an actual 107 percent.\n- Sovereign-bank feedback loops created self-fulfilling market pressures.\n- Ex ante risk sharing is emphasized as paramount to smooth idiosyncratic shocks."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Three pillars for a euro-area fiscal union (long-run architecture)",
      "content": "- Stronger constraints on member state deficits and debt, including public financial management processes.\n- A larger central budget to provide tools for risk sharing and to reduce economic differences across countries.\n- Increased harmonization of non fiscal policies, beginning with a banking union with an appropriate fiscal backstop."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Pillar 1 — Stronger constraints on fiscal policies",
      "content": "- Rationale: prevent unsustainable local fiscal behavior from harming the union.\n- Empirical comparisons:\n  - U.S.: none of the 50 states had an average deficit larger than 1 percent of its GDP over the 3 years prior to the crisis.\n  - Canada: none of the provinces recorded average deficits greater than 2 percent of GDP during 2005-10; most provinces showed deficits of less than 1 percent of GDP.\n- Recent EU measures: strengthening of the fiscal compact, the “six pack” and the forthcoming “two pack.”\n- Structural (not headline) fiscal rules are preferred to allow automatic stabilizers to operate.\n- Implementation challenges and a political question on whether the center should have ex ante veto rights on member fiscal policies.\n- Required preconditions for enforcement:\n  - (i) common accounting standards across member states;\n  - (ii) frequent and timely reporting of fiscal data;\n  - (iii) effective audit arrangements to ensure credibility of reported data.\n- Observed data and reporting problems:\n  - In Germany, Länder use differing accounting standards, producing consolidated statistics with up to a 12-month lag.\n  - In Spain, long reporting lags have frustrated central government detection and corrective action.\n- The new Budget Frameworks Directive emphasizes more regular publication and independent audit, but does not prescribe the accounting standard to be used by the auditor.\n- Proposal: member states should produce accounting information that complies with internationally recognized standards, possibly after a transition period."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Pillar 2 — A larger central budget",
      "content": "- Current EU budget: less than 1 percent of the region’s GDP and focused on agricultural subsidies and structural funds.\n- Roles of a larger central budget:\n  - Provide risk-sharing through centralized spending (e.g., unemployment insurance) and cyclical revenue exposure.\n  - Reduce the risk of idiosyncratic fiscal policies at the state level by centralizing spending responsibilities.\n  - Allow better coordination for common shocks and enable a larger countercyclical response at the union level.\n  - Promote economic convergence by harmonizing incentives and behaviors (example: single unemployment insurance could make labor markets more similar).\n- Alternative risk-sharing mechanism: a rainy day fund with contributions in good times and redistribution to affected countries; pros and cons compared with transferring fiscal functions to the center.\n- Over the longer run, a larger central budget supports the first pillar by lowering likelihood of local imbalances."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Pillar 3 — Harmonizing non fiscal policies (synergies)",
      "content": "- Nonfiscal policies (e.g., labor market policies, banking regulation and resolution) can create idiosyncratic shocks.\n- Harmonization is critical for a monetary and fiscal union and has synergic effects with central budget strengthening (e.g., centralizing unemployment insurance is harder with divergent labor market policies).\n- Banking union elements: common regulation, supervision, deposit insurance and resolution processes; a central backstop is critical to sever sovereign-bank links.\n- The October 12 interim report by the European Council President emphasizes stronger processes for nonfiscal structural reforms and establishment of a banking union; proposals include agreements between individual countries and EU institutions on reforms, possibly with limited, temporary financial support."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Debt centralization and firewalls",
      "content": "- In federations, federal debt typically finances federal deficits; central permanent issuance to finance local deficits is unlikely and would conflict with member financial responsibility.\n- Partial or one-off centralization of debt may be justified as a temporary long-lasting measure to address crises and to kick-start a market for federal securities.\n- Examples of one-off centralization in history: after the American War of Independence; Brazil during the 1990s.\n- Firewall resources (including central bank as lender of last resort) could be temporary but ESM-like structures might become permanent because:\n  - Lower labor mobility in Europe may increase the likelihood that idiosyncratic shocks cause financing problems.\n  - Emergency/crisis financing may thus be necessary; strict conditionality should be preserved so support is not a free good."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Implications for the immediate future (short-run, minimum features)",
      "content": "- Continue tightening state-level budget constraints; implementation is critical.\n- Favor short-run solutions consistent with long-term architecture:\n  - Strengthen the central budget starting with resources to backstop the banking union or to centralize risk-sharing mechanisms.\n  - Euro area infrastructure investment projects could proceed ahead of full centralization of other spending policies; if deficit financed, these activities could lead to issuance of (joint and several) euro area debt.\n- Establish stronger processes to promote nonfiscal structural reforms (consistent with the October 12 interim report) and finalize establishment of a banking union.\n- Distinguish explicitly between temporary crisis solutions and long-run institutional features to improve political acceptability."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Conclusions",
      "content": "- Crisis showed that a monetary union is at risk when member economies are very different and adequate risk-sharing processes are absent.\n- Economic differences were exacerbated by coordination failures producing idiosyncratic fiscal and non fiscal policies (insufficient fiscal discipline, opacity of fiscal accounts for flows and stocks, unreformed labor markets, lack of productivity growth and competition).\n- Recommendation: More Europe, not less Europe, is needed to reduce idiosyncrasies and imbalances across countries while improving sharing of the residual risk.\n\nBy Carlo Cottarelli, Director, Fiscal Affairs Department, International Monetary Fund\n\n---\n\n\n References\n\n- Switzerland and the IMF\n- Spain and the IMF\n- United States and the IMF\n- Speeches\n- https://www.imf.org/external/np/bio/eng/ccot.htm\n- PRESS CENTER\n- https://www.imf.org/en/home\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp110112"
    }
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    "[Structured JSON version](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp110112/index.json)",
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    "Authors: Carlo Cottarelli Speech Related Links Switzerland",
    "Published: November 1, 2012",
    "Presentation at the November 1-2 Gerzensee Conference.",
    "Relates to the “four presidents” report of June 26 and an interim report published in mid-October; expects a final report in December.",
    "Focus: desirable long-run features of a fiscal union for the euro area and short-run steps consistent with that long-run architecture.",
    "Two distinct sources of problems within the euro area:",
    "Greece, 2007:",
    "Sovereign-bank feedback loops created self-fulfilling market pressures.",
    "Ex ante risk sharing is emphasized as paramount to smooth idiosyncratic shocks.",
    "Stronger constraints on member state deficits and debt, including public financial management processes.",
    "A larger central budget to provide tools for risk sharing and to reduce economic differences across countries.",
    "Increased harmonization of non fiscal policies, beginning with a banking union with an appropriate fiscal backstop.",
    "Rationale: prevent unsustainable local fiscal behavior from harming the union.",
    "Empirical comparisons:",
    "Recent EU measures: strengthening of the fiscal compact, the “six pack” and the forthcoming “two pack.”",
    "Structural (not headline) fiscal rules are preferred to allow automatic stabilizers to operate.",
    "Implementation challenges and a political question on whether the center should have ex ante veto rights on member fiscal policies.",
    "Required preconditions for enforcement:",
    "Observed data and reporting problems:",
    "The new Budget Frameworks Directive emphasizes more regular publication and independent audit, but does not prescribe the accounting standard to be used by the auditor.",
    "Proposal: member states should produce accounting information that complies with internationally recognized standards, possibly after a transition period.",
    "Current EU budget: less than 1 percent of the region’s GDP and focused on agricultural subsidies and structural funds.",
    "Roles of a larger central budget:",
    "Alternative risk-sharing mechanism: a rainy day fund with contributions in good times and redistribution to affected countries; pros and cons compared with transferring fiscal functions to the center.",
    "Over the longer run, a larger central budget supports the first pillar by lowering likelihood of local imbalances.",
    "Nonfiscal policies (e.g., labor market policies, banking regulation and resolution) can create idiosyncratic shocks.",
    "Harmonization is critical for a monetary and fiscal union and has synergic effects with central budget strengthening (e.g., centralizing unemployment insurance is harder with divergent labor market policies).",
    "Banking union elements: common regulation, supervision, deposit insurance and resolution processes; a central backstop is critical to sever sovereign-bank links.",
    "The October 12 interim report by the European Council President emphasizes stronger processes for nonfiscal structural reforms and establishment of a banking union; proposals include agreements between individual countries and EU institutions on reforms, possibly with limited, temporary financial support.",
    "In federations, federal debt typically finances federal deficits; central permanent issuance to finance local deficits is unlikely and would conflict with member financial responsibility.",
    "Partial or one-off centralization of debt may be justified as a temporary long-lasting measure to address crises and to kick-start a market for federal securities.",
    "Examples of one-off centralization in history: after the American War of Independence; Brazil during the 1990s.",
    "Firewall resources (including central bank as lender of last resort) could be temporary but ESM-like structures might become permanent because:",
    "Continue tightening state-level budget constraints; implementation is critical.",
    "Favor short-run solutions consistent with long-term architecture:",
    "Establish stronger processes to promote nonfiscal structural reforms (consistent with the October 12 interim report) and finalize establishment of a banking union.",
    "Distinguish explicitly between temporary crisis solutions and long-run institutional features to improve political acceptability.",
    "Crisis showed that a monetary union is at risk when member economies are very different and adequate risk-sharing processes are absent.",
    "Economic differences were exacerbated by coordination failures producing idiosyncratic fiscal and non fiscal policies (insufficient fiscal discipline, opacity of fiscal accounts for flows and stocks, unreformed labor markets, lack of productivity growth and competition).",
    "Recommendation: More Europe, not less Europe, is needed to reduce idiosyncrasies and imbalances across countries while improving sharing of the residual risk.",
    "[Switzerland and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/CHE/index.htm)",
    "[Spain and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/ESP/index.htm)",
    "[United States and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/USA/index.htm)",
    "[Speeches](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/external/np/bio/eng/ccot.htm](https://www.imf.org/external/np/bio/eng/ccot.htm)",
    "[PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)"
  ],
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