## Transcript of a Panel Discussion on the Role and Governance of the IMF: Further Reflections on Reform

_IMF News, October 12, 2008_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Transcript of a Panel Discussion on the Role and Governance of the IMF: Further Reflections on Reform](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr081012)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr081012/index.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr081012/index.json)
- [Bundle manifest](/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr081012/bundle-manifest.json)

## Bibliographic details
- Published: October 12, 2008

---

### Context and setting
- Event: Per Jacobsson panel discussion, Washington, D.C., October 12, 2008.
- Panelists: Stanley Fischer (via telephone), Trevor Manuel, Jean Pisani‑Ferry, Raghuram Rajan. Moderated by Andrew Crockett.
- Purpose: Re-examine the IMF’s appropriate role, effectiveness, governance, surveillance, lending conditionality, and possible redesign given the 2008 financial crisis and longer-term shifts in the global economy.

### Assessment of IMF relevance and credibility
- Historic adaptability:
  - The Fund was credited with promoting the removal of exchange restrictions for "a quarter of a century or so" after its foundation and later with helping member countries manage periodic payments difficulties as financial integration advanced.
- Recent performance and perception:
  - Views ranged from the Fund being "remote" or "irrelevant" to having "regained intellectual credibility."
  - The Fund’s Global Financial Stability Report (GFSR) was cited as having foreseen and warned about many developments leading to the crisis.
  - Evidence of regained intellectual credibility includes accurate assessments in the GFSR (April 2007; April 2008) relative to other official institutions.
  - Counterpoint: the Fund was seen as failing to exercise visible leadership and to influence major countries decisively.
- Ownership, voice and representation:
  - External governance (voice and representation) was flagged as fundamental to ownership and Fund resonance with global decision‑makers.
  - The distribution of influence within the Fund was noted as needing reform; the trend that formerly dominant powers would become less dominant was emphasized.

### Surveillance, exchange rates, and multilateral consultation
- Surveillance shortcomings:
  - The Fund’s recent surveillance, particularly on the U.S. and China exchange rate issues, was criticized as having missed opportunities to influence major‑country policies.
  - The 2007 decision on exchange rate surveillance was cited as weakening Fund credibility because it was perceived as unable to resist U.S. pressures.
- Financial sector surveillance tools:
  - FSAPs (Financial Sector Assessment Program) were praised as "excellent"; the U.S.’s refusal to invite an FSAP was highlighted as a missed opportunity to identify incoherent supervision structures.
- Multilateral surveillance and consultations:
  - Multilateral consultations were described as innovative but not delivering substantial results; the Fund has struggled to translate multilateral surveillance into binding or effective international policy change.
  - The Fund’s role as an independent public voice and broker in multilateral discussions was emphasized as important, but difficult when major shareholders prefer exclusive clubs.

### Role relative to other international bodies; coordination and leadership
- Proliferation of forums:
  - The Financial Stability Forum (FSF), BIS, Basel Committee, IOSCO and other bodies have become central; FSF was described as an effective, loosely structured convenor despite lacking formal legal apparatus.
  - Major shareholders often prefer addressing issues in smaller, exclusive clubs (FSF, G‑7) rather than strengthening the IMF’s formal role.
- Proposed positioning:
  - Suggested evolution for the IMF: act as a Secretariat or an intellectual repository that provides expertise, fosters intellectual coherence across groupings, and plays a coordinating role without necessarily supplanting specialized bodies.
  - Need for closer cooperation between the Fund and FSF/BIS, and stronger backing from industrial country members to enable the Fund to play a larger role in financial stability.

### Lending facilities, conditionality, and financing
- Lending toolkit and contingent instruments:
  - Board reluctance toward contingent credit lines was criticized; the recommendation was to support actual use of these instruments rather than circumscribing them into ineffectiveness.
- Conditionality:
  - Conditionality remains essential but should focus primarily on macroeconomic policy and structural issues critical to macro performance, "not least in the financial sector."
- Financing and burden sharing:
  - Anticipation of increased demand: "There will be more IMF programs in the months ahead."
  - Enhanced financing and possible intermediation role:
    - If IMF resources become stretched, the panel raised the prospect of reallocating global reserves or intermediate financing from surplus countries (Japan, emerging markets) through the IMF.
    - Options mentioned include revisiting SDR (Special Drawing Rights) issuance and reallocation as a mechanism to generate global liquidity.

### Root causes of the crisis and policy implications
- Macro vs. micro debate:
  - Crisis drivers were characterized as both macro (global demand imbalance; persistent U.S. current account deficit) and micro (financial innovation, regulatory failures, export of low‑quality assets).
  - U.S. policy response was criticized for being "behind the curve"—misdiagnosing liquidity/solvency and timing of interventions.
- Global imbalances:
  - China’s exchange rate policy and massive reserve accumulation facilitated prolonged U.S. deficits; the Fund’s exchange rate surveillance could not overcome political limits to influence China and the United States.
- Need for an independent global voice:
  - The Fund should be more candid and independent—even with large shareholders—to influence policies in systemically important countries; current governance and financing dynamics inhibit such candor.

### Institutional design and governance reform proposals
- If designing afresh:
  - Even if starting from scratch, the institution would resemble the IMF’s core purpose: "to promote international monetary cooperation through a permanent institution which provides the machinery for consultation and collaboration on international monetary problems."
  - Desired features: different vote and power distribution reflecting changing economic weight, greater financing capacity, and a highly professional staff.
- Near‑term governance actions:
  - Accelerate agreed changes that reduce dominance of formerly dominant powers and complete ongoing quota/voice reforms "in a much shorter period."
  - Consider formalizing the Fund’s Secretariat role vis‑à‑vis other groupings and strengthen the Fund’s mandate to perform broad macroeconomic and financial surveillance.
- Practical institutional steps suggested by panelists:
  - Restore Fund mandate over macroeconomic policy framework in surveillance (i.e., change the most recent surveillance decision).
  - Treat IMF surveillance results seriously by all countries, including those demanding surveillance of others.
  - Support and operationalize contingent credit lines and other crisis‑prevention lending instruments.
  - Strengthen system‑wide surveillance (e.g., World Economic Outlook (WEO) style analyses) and integrate macro and financial sector assessments.

### Emerging‑market perspective and crisis management implications
- Inversion of center and periphery:
  - Emerging markets have stronger reserves, better institutions, and improved policy frameworks compared with the past; the crisis highlights that core countries can become sources of contagion.
- IMF as insurer and protector of peripheral countries:
  - The IMF may play an urgent role "to protect the countries at the periphery from the consequences of a storm at the center."
  - Credibility of IMF programs and professional monitoring can remain attractive to countries seeking market confidence, reducing the viability of non‑IMF substitutes in serious crises.

### Concluding takeaways
- The crisis underscores enduring needs:
  - A central, credible international monetary institution capable of candid surveillance, effective coordination across bodies, and an adequate lending toolkit remains essential.
- Political economy constraints:
  - Major shareholders’ reluctance to cede influence constrains the Fund’s effectiveness; practical progress requires both internal reforms (governance, voice) and external buy‑in (industrial country support for a stronger IMF role).
- Outlook:
  - Anticipated increase in IMF programs and potential for greater reliance on the Fund for crisis assistance if it can harness enhanced financing, preserve professional credibility, and assert a more independent public voice.

*Transcript of a Panel Discussion on the Role and Governance of the IMF: Further Reflections on Reform, October 12, 2008.*

---


## References

- [India and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/IND/index.htm)
- [Iceland and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/ISL/index.htm)
- [Japan and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/JPN/index.htm)
- [Russian Federation and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/RUS/index.htm)
- [United States and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/USA/index.htm)
- [Conditionality](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/sheets/2023/imf-conditionality)
- [IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/imf-surveillance)
- [Transcripts](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr081012_
