## Transcript of a Conference Call on Addressing Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring

_IMF News, October 9, 2014_

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## Bibliographic details
- Published: October 9, 2014

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### Overview
- Date and setting: Washington, D.C., Monday, October 6, 2014. Transcript published October 9, 2014.
- Main speaker: Sean Hagan, General Counsel.
- Purpose: Discussion of the staff paper “Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Solving Debt Restructuring,” which was discussed by the Executive Board on October 1, and to explain the Board summing up and staff work program in sovereign debt restructuring.

### Core problem and objective
- Core problem: collective action problems in sovereign debt restructurings, with heightened urgency due to recent New York Court decisions in the context of Argentina.
- Objective of paper: design and promote a market-based, contract-focused framework to reduce holdout incentives and facilitate orderly restructurings.
- Fund role: limited but important — facilitate agreement on clause design and promote their use.

### Contractual reforms under consideration
- Two separate but related provisions:
  - Pari passu provision: proposed modification to address interpretations that enable holdout strategies.
  - Collective Action Clause (CAC) with a new single-limb voting procedure: a collective voting mechanism aggregating votes across all affected series rather than series-by-series.
- Market engagement: staff have been discussing design of these clauses with market participants, issuers, and the official sector for the last 18 months.
- ICMA: a number of ICMA provisions reflect outcomes of those discussions; ICMA endorsement is a key step forward.
- Kazakhstan: issuance of bonds that include both the revised pari passu provision and the single-limb CAC — cited as an important practical implementation.

### Rationale for single-limb voting procedure
- Traditional CACs: operate series by series; a holdout can acquire a blocking position in a specific series and neutralize the CLA for that series, creating inter-creditor equity issues and uncertainty.
- Single-limb CAC: aggregates voting across all affected series so a holdout must acquire a blocking position in the entire aggregated debt stock to neutralize the mechanism.
- Legal effect: collective action clauses shift legal leverage from individual creditors to creditors as a group, increasing creditors-as-a-group control over the process.

### Outstanding stock and jurisdictional risk
- Limitation of contractual approach: applies prospectively to new contracts; outstanding stock remains an issue.
- Jurisdictional focus: primary concern is bonds governed by New York law, which are most directly affected by New York Court decisions. By contrast, bonds governed by English law are considered less vulnerable based on prevailing legal views.
- Stock maturity detail: “almost 40 percent” of New York law-governed debt is noted as maturing beyond 10 years.

### Legal precedent uncertainty stemming from Argentina
- Uncertainty on breadth of precedent: the New York Court of Appeals’ interpretation of the pari passu clause could be read broadly (ratable payment interpretation) or narrowly (requiring specific course of conduct such as legislative measures adopted by Argentina).
- Implications: if construed broadly, significant impact on outstanding stock and future restructurings; if narrow, impact may be limited.
- Future test: copycat litigation in other New York Court cases (e.g., litigation involving Grenada) will help determine how broadly the precedent is applied.
- Policy implication: evolution of litigation will influence whether additional measures (including liability management or legislative options) are considered.

### Market response and signals
- Market has embraced the proposed changes (pari passu modification and single-limb CAC), indicating creditor recognition that these provisions serve creditor interests.
- Kazakhstan’s bond issuance incorporating both features is highlighted as a practical market endorsement.
- Staff assessment: ICMA’s acceptance of the single-limb voting procedure represented a major breakthrough; staff indicate that around 90 percent of discussions with ICMA focused on single-limb voting.

### Policy options and other reforms discussed
- Continued market-based, contractual approach is the Board’s preferred path (absent a change in Board direction).
- Liability management (accelerated turnover of existing stock):
  - Defined as exchanges of existing bonds for new bonds incorporating the new clauses.
  - Current appetite: the paper notes there is currently “no appetite” among issuers or market participants for accelerated turnover, but this could change depending on circumstances.
- Legislative clarification (U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act interpretation):
  - Staff presented a narrowly targeted legislative clarification as a technical option to address outstanding New York law-governed bonds; political feasibility is a separate question for U.S. authorities.
- Creditor committees and engagement: separate but important issue; ICMA has discussed creditor committees, but the Fund’s Board has not yet discussed or taken a position — staff plan to raise this with the Board as part of ongoing workflow.

### Interaction with broader multilateral processes
- UN General Assembly / treaty approach:
  - There is activity at the UN (including proposals from Argentina and some members) to address sovereign debt issues via treaty/convention mechanisms.
  - Past experience: SDRM and other treaty-based approaches lacked sufficient membership support; no change in attitude was evident in recent Board discussions.
  - Fund stance: will continue contractual approach unless Executive Board changes direction.
  - Legal bases differ between UN/treaty options and the Fund’s contractual approach.

### Engagement and outreach
- Forums noted where the topic will be discussed during Annual Meetings week:
  - CSO forum organized jointly with the World Bank (civil society participation).
  - Institute of International Finance (IIF) panel on sovereign debt restructuring.
- Staff participation intended to elicit stakeholder views and promote discussion of the paper’s proposals.

### Key numeric and temporal facts preserved from the transcript
- Dates: Executive Board discussion on October 1; conference call held Monday, October 6, 2014; transcript dated October 9, 2014.
- Time horizon / process metrics:
  - Staff discussed clause design with market participants, issuers, and the official sector for the last 18 months.
  - Staff estimate that almost 40 percent of New York law-governed debt will mature beyond 10 years.
  - Staff estimate that single-limb voting occupied “almost 90 percent” of discussions with ICMA (phrase preserved as in transcript).

### Questions and outstanding points for future consideration
- Breadth of Argentina precedent: awaiting outcomes of copycat litigation to clarify breadth and implications.
- Whether liability management will be pursued more aggressively if precedent proves broad.
- Whether Fund Board will consider legislative avenues (e.g., U.S. clarification) depending on litigation evolution.
- Fund Board consideration of creditor committees and the Fund’s position on sovereign-creditor dialogue structures.

*Transcript of a Conference Call on Addressing Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, October 9, 2014.*

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## References

- [Argentina and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/ARG/index.htm)
- [Republic of Kazakhstan and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/KAZ/index.htm)
- [Transcripts](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2015/09/28/04/54/tr100614_
