{
  "title": "Transcript of a Conference Call with a Senior IMF Official on Greece and AIP",
  "publication": "IMF News, June 22, 2017",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2017/06/22/tr061517-transcript-of-a-conference-call-with-a-senior-imf-official-on-greece-and-aip",
  "canonical": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2017/06/22/tr061517-transcript-of-a-conference-call-with-a-senior-imf-official-on-greece-and-aip",
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  "summary": "Date of publication: June 22, 2017",
  "publishDate": "2017-06-22",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Context and procedural decision",
      "content": "- Date of publication: June 22, 2017\n- The Managing Director told the Eurogroup she was ready to go to the IMF Executive Board and recommend approval in principle (AIP) of a new IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for Greece.\n- AIP is described as an unusual procedure, used in the 1980s in similar stalemate situations.\n- Rationale for pursuing AIP now:\n  - Signals that the IMF believes Greek policies are on the right track and worthy of IMF support.\n  - Allows movement forward without compromising the debt relief requirements ultimately needed to release IMF resources.\n  - Provides Greece and its creditors breathing space to avoid a cash crunch next month and supports Euro area and Greek financial stability."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Debt relief, creditor dynamics, and timing",
      "content": "- Current status:\n  - Significant movement by European creditors has occurred over recent months, including \"additional measures and additional specifications\" referenced in the Eurogroup statement.\n  - However, the IMF does not yet have \"enough on the debt relief side to meet the debt sustainability requirements of the program.\"\n- Creditor complexity:\n  - The Greek case involves \"17 creditors\" operating in a currency union, making provision of debt relief inherently difficult because of moral hazard concerns and bailout risks.\n  - The IMF characterizes the remaining issues as a political contest requiring more time for convergence among European partners.\n- On deadlines:\n  - Past uses of AIP sometimes included deadlines but not always; reference made to the 1980s practice and the Argentina case.\n  - The IMF has not decided whether to propose a deadline in this instance; the Managing Director will decide what to recommend to the Board.\n  - The Senior IMF Official indicated that in the present context a hard deadline may not help resolution because outstanding issues concern underlying assumptions, instruments, and uncertainty treatment that require time to work through."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Program design, access, and purpose of IMF engagement",
      "content": "- Document and Board timetable:\n  - The Managing Director will put together the staff report for the Board. Documents were expected to be finalized \"in the next week or so.\"\n  - There is a clearance procedure and \"a couple of weeks to consult the capitals\" after issuance to the Executive Board. The Managing Director anticipated this would take the process into July.\n- Financial magnitude and modality:\n  - When the request for AIP for use of Fund resources is put to the Board there will be an amount; it \"has not been finalized yet.\"\n  - The Managing Director said in the press conference that it would be \"well within the IMF’s normal access limits,\" not exceptional, precautionary, and she mentioned a figure of up to US$2b to offer a magnitude.\n  - Characterization of the arrangement: precautionary—member not required to draw but could do so at any time; IMF terms may be less favorable than ESM terms, so Greece might choose to draw or substitute if desired.\n- Purpose of IMF involvement:\n  - Principal objective was not to gain additional leverage but to signal IMF support, help articulate a focused macroeconomic policy agenda in the Fund’s own format, and provide breathing space for creditor convergence while avoiding an immediate cash crisis.\n  - The IMF’s engagement leverages its expertise in crisis management and macroeconomic program design and is consistent with a catalytic financing role and burden sharing in past crises."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Debt sustainability, market reaccess, and exit prospects",
      "content": "- The IMF’s conditional stance:\n  - The IMF maintains it will require a debt relief package sufficient to declare Greek debt sustainable before releasing IMF resources.\n  - The Fund will continue to push its long-run assumptions used in debt sustainability assessments.\n- On market reaccess and program success:\n  - The Senior IMF Official stated: if the IMF did not believe there was a good chance of concluding the program next August with Greece in a sustainable position and ready to return to markets, it would not pursue this route.\n  - Targeted end of ESM Program / durable exit objective: August 2018."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Political dynamics and catalytic effects",
      "content": "- Interaction with Eurogroup and Germany:\n  - The IMF notes the debate over debt relief is primarily a political process within the Eurogroup; many members support a rigorous debt relief package.\n  - The Senior IMF Official argued that coming onboard with AIP does not change the IMF’s conditions for providing resources and does not remove the IMF’s push for sufficient debt relief.\n- Use of deadlines as catalyst:\n  - The official expressed skepticism that a hard deadline would necessarily facilitate resolution in this context, contrasting it with the 1980s \"chicken and egg\" situations where deadlines were catalytic because creditor coordination could only follow IMF approval.\n  - The official acknowledged that impending payments (e.g., July payments) have been a motivator for action in recent months."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Operational and media details",
      "content": "- Contact: IMF Communications Department, MEDIA RELATIONS, Phone: +1 202 623-7100, Email: MEDIA@IMF.org\n- Ground rules: The briefing was on the record with attributions to a Senior IMF Official.\n\nTranscript of a Conference Call with a Senior IMF Official on Greece and AIP, June 22, 2017 — IMF Communications Department\n\n---\n\n\n References\n\n- Argentina and the IMF\n- Germany and the IMF\n- Greece and the IMF\n- Transcripts\n- PRESS CENTER\n- Managing Director told the Euro group this afternoon\n- approval in principle\n- https://www.imf.org/en/home\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2017/06/22/tr061517-transcript-of-a-conference-call-with-a-senior-imf-official-on-greece-and-aip"
    }
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    "[Markdown version](/en/news/articles/2017/06/22/tr061517-transcript-of-a-conference-call-with-a-senior-imf-official-on-greece-and-aip/index.md)",
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    "Published: June 22, 2017",
    "Date of publication: June 22, 2017",
    "The Managing Director told the Eurogroup she was ready to go to the IMF Executive Board and recommend approval in principle (AIP) of a new IMF Stand-By Arrangement (SBA) for Greece.",
    "AIP is described as an unusual procedure, used in the 1980s in similar stalemate situations.",
    "Rationale for pursuing AIP now:",
    "Current status:",
    "Creditor complexity:",
    "On deadlines:",
    "Document and Board timetable:",
    "Financial magnitude and modality:",
    "Purpose of IMF involvement:",
    "The IMF’s conditional stance:",
    "On market reaccess and program success:",
    "Interaction with Eurogroup and Germany:",
    "Use of deadlines as catalyst:",
    "Contact: IMF Communications Department, MEDIA RELATIONS, Phone: +1 202 623-7100, Email: MEDIA@IMF.org",
    "Ground rules: The briefing was on the record with attributions to a Senior IMF Official.",
    "[Argentina and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/ARG/index.htm)",
    "[Germany and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/DEU/index.htm)",
    "[Greece and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/GRC/index.htm)",
    "[Transcripts](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)",
    "[PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)",
    "[Managing Director told the Euro group this afternoon](https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2017/06/15/pr17225-imf-lagarde-to-propose-approval-in-principle-of-new-stand-by-arrangement-for-greece)",
    "[approval in principle](https://www.imf.org/en/About/FAQ/approval-in-principle)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)"
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