The Russian economy is recovering from a two-year recession. Over the
past few years, the authorities have implemented a strong macroeconomic
policy framework, which has reduced uncertainty and helped weather
external shocks. However, Russia’s convergence to advanced economy
income levels has stalled and its weight in the global economy is
shrinking. A wide range of structural issues remains unaddressed and
that is where the authorities need to focus in order to accelerate
growth.
Last year’s high-profile failure of several large private banks
underscores the importance of completing the cleanup of the banking
system. Those failures have expanded the
state’s footprint in the sector, raising questions about the adequacy
of financial statements and underscoring the need to strengthen
supervision further. The fiscal rule has helped to
anchor the fiscal path and shield the economy from disruptive swings in
oil prices. The recovery in oil prices should not delay the much-needed
fiscal adjustment and a growth-friendly shift in the budget.
With inflation below the 4 percent target and a closing output gap, a
continued transition to a neutral monetary policy stance is
appropriate.
The Russian economy medium-term outlook remains weak, despite the
ongoing recovery.
With the projected growth rates, the country would lag behind peers in
Eastern Europe and convergence with advanced economies would not take
place. A combination of factors is at work, including insufficient
infrastructure, an aging population, a large footprint of the state, as
well as governance and institutional weaknesses which have increased
economic concentration and stifled dynamism. In addition, Russia’s
integration in the global economy is progressing slowly, thus weakening
incentives to improve performance and reducing positive spillovers from
foreign technological change. Uncertainty due to geopolitical tensions is
affecting negatively private investment.

The authorities have established a strong macroeconomic policy
framework
, including a prudent fiscal rule, inflation targeting, and a flexible
exchange rate. This will continue to help address uncertainty, which has
increased recently due to renewed geopolitical tensions and turbulence in
emerging markets. However, to accelerate potential growth, the focus has to
shift to structural reforms to boost productivity and the supply of labor
and capital. We welcome the authorities’ plans to boost spending on health,
education, and infrastructure. However, this should be done without
compromising the credibility of the new fiscal rule. Long-delayed
parametric pension reform could help to offset negative demographic trends
at least temporarily. Also, a well-designed and deficit-neutral shift from
social security to consumption taxes could incentivize labor supply, reduce
labor informality, and attract new investment. To accelerate productivity
growth, the authorities would have to persist with their efforts to
strengthen competitiveness, promote trade integration, and diversify
exports.
Boosting growth requires stronger competition in domestic markets, a
leaner state, and a more vibrant private sector.
The footprint of the state, estimated at around a third of the economy,
needs to be reduced, particularly in banking and other sectors with limited
rationale for public ownership. However, sequencing is critical here. The
first step would be to strengthen institutional architecture to avoid
further concentration of economic power after privatization. In particular,
the authorities should enhance competition, including by facilitating
entry/exit. Despite formal procedures to support competition in public
procurement, more can be done to use state purchases to promote market
contestability and the development of SMEs. The authorities should also
strengthen transparency, accountability, and governance standards in the
corporate sector, particularly for SOEs, in order to raise efficiency in
the use of state resources.
The financial sector plays a key role in channeling savings to the most
productive companies.
However, last year’s failure of several large banks has placed a
non-negligible burden on public finances and pointed to significant
shortcomings, such as excessive risk concentration and lending to connected
parties rather than to the most competitive firms. This needs to be
addressed by a renewed effort to close the gaps in bank supervision and
regulation, as well as in the provision of accurate financial statements.
The bank failures also underscored the importance of completing the cleanup
of the banking sector. The supervision of risks should be intensified, with
a focus on related-party lending.
Elements of asset quality reviews have been introduced, but more
efforts are needed to swiftly complete them and to also ensure their
transparency, credibility, and alignment with best international
practices.
Moreover, the Central Bank of Russia (CBR) could strengthen the ex post communication of the rationale behind its bank resolution
decisions. It is also important to have a credible strategy for returning
rehabilitated banks to private hands in a way that is consistent with
increasing competition and improving the allocation of capital.
The fiscal rule shields the economy from fluctuations in oil prices,
which should help to facilitate export diversification.
In addition, it has anchored fiscal policy by providing a credible fiscal
path. Thus, the authorities should resist the temptation to revise the rule
as this could undermine the credibility of the macroeconomic framework.
Fiscal consolidation should continue in line with the rule, in order to
rebuild fiscal buffers which are essential for reducing Russia’s
vulnerability to external shocks. The pace of adjustment over 2018-20 is
appropriate, but its quality could be improved, as it relies excessively on
across-the-board spending freezes which are suboptimal and unsustainable.
Further consolidation of 1-2 percent of GDP is needed over the medium term
to reach a fiscal balance consistent with sharing Russia’s natural
resources with future generations.
There is scope to engineer a growth-friendly shift in spending and
taxes within the confines of the fiscal rule.
To finance increased spending on health, education, and infrastructure, the
authorities could consider re-prioritizing other spending, strengthening
tax compliance, and broadening the tax base by reducing tax expenditures
under VAT and PIT. Also, although expenditure on social assistance is high,
it is too broadly and thinly spread. To have a meaningful impact on
reducing poverty, it needs to be better targeted. Parametric pension reform
could provide some fiscal space as well.
With inflation below the 4 percent target
and a closing output gap
, a continued transition to a neutral monetary policy stance is
appropriate. The current monetary stance is moderately tight,
especially in the context of the ongoing fiscal consolidation. However,
t
he CBR should maintain its gradual and data-driven approach, as inflation
expectations are not yet firmly anchored and external and fiscal risks have
increased. The central bank should continue refining its communication
strategy in order to strengthen its credibility further and reduce inertia
in the formation of inflation expectations.
***
The IMF team thanks the authorities and other interlocutors in the
public and private sectors for their cooperation, open and constructive
discussions, and warm hospitality.