{
  "title": "IMF Executive Board Concludes 2019 Article IV Consultation with Kuwait",
  "publication": "IMF News, April 3, 2019",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait",
  "canonical": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait",
  "overlayPath": "/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/index.md",
  "summary": "Growth resumed in 2018, aided by higher oil prices.",
  "publishDate": "2019-04-03",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Growth and external sector",
      "content": "- Growth resumed in 2018, aided by higher oil prices.\n- Hydrocarbon output rose by 1.2 percent in 2018 after contracting a year earlier.\n- Non-oil growth accelerated to 2.5 percent, buoyed by a rebound in confidence and government spending.\n- The current account shifted back into surplus in 2017 and reached an estimated surplus of 12.7 percent of GDP in 2018.\n- Inflation fell to 0.7 percent (a multiyear low) due to falling housing rents, easing food prices, and a strengthening dinar.\n- Current account and external projections and levels from the report:\n  - Current account (percent of GDP): 33.4 (2014); -4.6 (2015); 12.7 (2016); 5.5 (2017); 11.4 (2018); 11.9 (2019 projected); 10.4 (2020 projected); 9.5 (2021 projected).\n  - Total oil and gas exports (billions of U.S. dollars): 97.6 (2014); 48.5 (2015); 41.5 (2016); 49.6 (2017); 65.7 (2018); 58.3 (2019 projected); 59.6 (2020 projected); 60.2 (2021 projected); 60.9 (2022 projected); 62.1 (2023 projected); 63.6 (2024 projected).\n  - Average oil export price (U.S. dollars/barrel): 96.5 (2014); 49.0 (2015); 41.0 (2016); 53.4 (2017); 70.6 (2018); 61.5 (2019 projected); 61.4 (2020 projected); 60.6 (2021 projected); 60.1 (2022 projected).\n  - Crude oil production (millions of barrels/day): 2.87 (2014); 2.86 (2015); 2.95 (2016); 2.70 (2017); 2.74 (2018); 2.79 (2019 projected); 2.93 (2020 projected); 2.99 (2021 projected); 3.05 (2022 projected); 3.11 (2023 projected)."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Fiscal position and financing",
      "content": "- Overall fiscal balance improved due to higher oil revenues and investment income.\n- Underlying fiscal position (non-oil balance less investment income in percent of non-oil GDP) indicates a modest loosening in FY17/18 and FY18/19.\n- Fiscal financing needs remain large when measured as overall balance after compulsory transfers to the Future Generations Fund (FGF) and excluding investment income.\n- Delays in passage of a new debt law have prevented the government from issuing debt since October 2017, forcing draws on the General Reserve Fund assets for financing.\n- Key fiscal figures (percent of GDP unless otherwise noted):\n  - Revenue: 67.4 (2014); 52.3 (2015); 52.8 (2016); 58.9 (2017); 58.6 (2018); 58.0 (2019 projected); 58.7 (2020 projected); 57.2 (2021 projected); 55.8 (2022 projected); 54.6 (2023 projected).\n  - Oil revenue: 51.9 (2014); 35.4 (2015); 34.5 (2016); 38.0 (2017); 43.7 (2018); 40.1 (2019 projected); 39.2 (2020 projected); 37.8 (2021 projected); 36.8 (2022 projected); 35.9 (2023 projected); 35.1 (2024 projected).\n  - Investment income: 10.6 (2014); 13.3 (2015); 14.6 (2016); 16.5 (2017); 13.0 (2018); 13.9 (2019 projected); 14.3 (2020 projected); 14.7 (2021 projected); 13.5 (2022 projected).\n  - Expenditures: 48.8 (2014); 52.7 (2015); 50.8 (2016); 48.3 (2017); 50.5 (2018); 51.0 (2019 projected); 51.7 (2020 projected); 51.1 (2021 projected).\n  - Balance: 18.6 (2014); -0.3 (2015); 12.6 (2016); 8.0 (2017); 7.0 (2018); 6.7 (2019 projected); 5.2 (2020 projected).\n  - Balance (after transfers to FGF and excl. investment income): 2.3 (2014); -17.5 (2015); -17.9 (2016); -12.6 (2017); -5.2 (2018); -10.4 (2019 projected); -11.6 (2020 projected); -12.3 (2021 projected); -13.0 (2022 projected); -13.5 (2023 projected); -13.7 (2024 projected).\n  - Non-oil balance excl. investment income (percent of non-oil GDP): -102.5 (2014); -88.3 (2015); -83.8 (2016); -86.5 (2017); -87.8 (2018); -85.7 (2019 projected); -84.7 (2020 projected); -81.3 (2021 projected); -78.9 (2022 projected); -77.2 (2023 projected); -75.3 (2024 projected).\n  - Total gross debt (calendar year): 10.0 (2014); 20.7 (2015); 14.8 (2016); 17.8 (2017); 21.0 (2018); 26.2 (2019 projected); 31.1 (2020 projected); 34.7 (2021 projected); 38.4 (2022 projected)."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Financial sector and monetary settings",
      "content": "- Banking sector indicators reported sound:\n  - Systemwide capital adequacy ratio reached 18 percent in September 2018.\n  - Liquidity ratios were comfortably within regulatory requirements.\n  - Profits rose and asset quality improved, with NPLs net of specific provisions falling to a historical low.\n- Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) actions and effects:\n  - CBK raised the repo rate, a benchmark for deposits, several times but kept the policy lending rate at 3 percent since March 2018.\n  - Bank lending interest rates have risen by less than deposit rates.\n  - Ample liquidity—stemming from deposit growth and government debt redemption in 2018—has supported a credit recovery.\n- Credit developments:\n  - Private sector loans grew 4.1 percent year-on-year in December 2018, driven by household, construction, and oil sector borrowing.\n- Monetary and financial figures:\n  - Net foreign assets (percent change): 3.6 (2014); 8.7 (2015); -3.1 (2016); 5.6 (2017); 7.5 (2018); 6.1 (2019 projected); 6.5 (2020 projected); 6.9 (2021 projected).\n  - Claims on nongovernment sector (percent change): 7.6 (2014); 2.8 (2015); 4.1 (2016); 7.2 (2017); 7.1 (2018); 7.4 (2019 projected).\n  - Kuwaiti dinar 3-month deposit rate (year average; in percent): 0.8 (2014); 1.1 (2015); (2018 based on latest available data noted elsewhere)."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Executive Board Assessment and Directors' recommendations",
      "content": "- Directors' overall view:\n  - Growth is expected to strengthen and the underlying fiscal position to gradually improve over the medium term.\n  - Given oil price volatility and exhaustible oil resources, timely and well-sequenced fiscal and structural reforms are needed to reduce dependence on oil, boost government saving, and create more private sector jobs.\n- Fiscal recommendations:\n  - Undertake deeper fiscal reforms to ensure adequate savings for future generations.\n  - Tackle spending rigidities and increase non-oil revenue while boosting capital outlays to improve infrastructure and raise potential growth.\n  - Address the large public sector wage bill; public sector wages should be gradually aligned with those in the private sector to incentivize nationals to seek private sector opportunities and support competitiveness.\n  - Proceed with the introduction of GCC-wide excises and VAT.\n  - Strengthen fiscal transparency, improve the public procurement framework, and increase spending efficiency to bolster fiscal policy credibility and reduce vulnerability to corruption.\n- Financial sector recommendations:\n  - Implement recommendations of the Financial System Stability Assessment (FSSA).\n  - Enhance the crisis management framework, notably by establishing a special resolution regime for banks and unwinding the blanket guarantee of deposits once preconditions are met.\n  - Strengthen liquidity management, bolster systemic risk oversight, and gradually relax interest ceilings.\n  - Further strengthen the AML/CFT framework.\n- Structural and business environment recommendations:\n  - Implement structural reforms to improve the business environment, support entrepreneurship, and foster productivity.\n  - Ease administrative procedures, facilitate trading across borders, and promote competition.\n  - Create a more enabling environment for SMEs and startups by enhancing access to finance, facilitating participation in public tenders, and training entrepreneurs.\n- Exchange rate and external policy:\n  - Directors concurred that the pegged currency regime remains appropriate, with the peg to a basket of currencies continuing to provide an effective nominal anchor.\n  - Directors noted that the recommended fiscal adjustment would largely close the current account gap over the medium term."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Selected economic indicators and projections (highlights)",
      "content": "- Nominal GDP (market prices, in billions of Kuwaiti dinar): 46 (2014); 34 (2015); 33 (2016); 36 (2017); 43 (2018); 41 (2019 projected); 45 (2020 projected); 47 (2021 projected); 49 (2022 projected); 52 (2023 projected).\n- Nominal GDP (market prices, in billions of U.S. dollars): 163 (2014); 115 (2015); 109 (2016); 120 (2017); 141 (2018); 137 (2019 projected); 143 (2020 projected); 150 (2021 projected); 156 (2022 projected); 172 (2023 projected).\n- Real GDP growth (annual percent change): 0.5 (2014); 0.6 (2015); 2.9 (2016); -3.5 (2017); 1.7 (2018); 2.5 (2019 projected); 2.7 (2020 projected).\n- Real oil GDP: -2.1 (2014); -1.7 (2015); 3.9 (2016); -7.2 (2017); 1.2 (2018); 2.0 (2019 projected).\n- Real non-oil GDP: 4.9 (2014); 4.2 (2015); 1.4 (2016); 2.1 (2017); 3.0 (2018); 3.5 (2019 projected); 3.4 (2020 projected); 3.2 (2021 projected); 3.7 (2022 projected); 4.0 (2023 projected).\n- CPI inflation (average): 3.1 (2014); 1.5 (2015); 0.7 (2016); 4.7 (2017); (multiyear low of 0.7 percent noted for 2018).\n- Exports of goods (billions of U.S. dollars): 104.5 (2014); 54.5 (2015); 46.5 (2016); 55.1 (2017); 71.6 (2018); 64.6 (2019 projected); 66.3 (2020 projected); 67.3 (2021 projected); 68.4 (2022 projected); 70.2 (2023 projected); 72.3 (2024 projected).\n- International reserve assets (billions of U.S. dollars): 32.3 (2014); 28.3 (2015); 31.2 (2016); 33.5 (2017); 37.0 (2018); 37.2 (2019 projected); 38.8 (2020 projected); 41.1 (2021 projected); 43.0 (2022 projected); 45.3 (2023 projected); 47.9 (2024 projected).\n\nIMF Communications Department, Press Release No. 19/104, April 3, 2019 — Executive Board conclusions and selected data as presented in the Article IV consultation with Kuwait.\n\n---\n\n\n References\n\n- Kuwait and the IMF\n- IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet\n- Press Releases\n- PRESS CENTER\n- http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm\n- https://www.imf.org/en/home\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait"
    }
  ],
  "bullets": [
    "[Markdown version](/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/index.md)",
    "[Structured JSON version](/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/index.json)",
    "[Bundle manifest](/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/bundle-manifest.json)",
    "Published: April 3, 2019",
    "Growth resumed in 2018, aided by higher oil prices.",
    "Hydrocarbon output rose by 1.2 percent in 2018 after contracting a year earlier.",
    "Non-oil growth accelerated to 2.5 percent, buoyed by a rebound in confidence and government spending.",
    "The current account shifted back into surplus in 2017 and reached an estimated surplus of 12.7 percent of GDP in 2018.",
    "Inflation fell to 0.7 percent (a multiyear low) due to falling housing rents, easing food prices, and a strengthening dinar.",
    "Current account and external projections and levels from the report:",
    "Overall fiscal balance improved due to higher oil revenues and investment income.",
    "Underlying fiscal position (non-oil balance less investment income in percent of non-oil GDP) indicates a modest loosening in FY17/18 and FY18/19.",
    "Fiscal financing needs remain large when measured as overall balance after compulsory transfers to the Future Generations Fund (FGF) and excluding investment income.",
    "Delays in passage of a new debt law have prevented the government from issuing debt since October 2017, forcing draws on the General Reserve Fund assets for financing.",
    "Key fiscal figures (percent of GDP unless otherwise noted):",
    "Banking sector indicators reported sound:",
    "Central Bank of Kuwait (CBK) actions and effects:",
    "Credit developments:",
    "Monetary and financial figures:",
    "Directors' overall view:",
    "Fiscal recommendations:",
    "Financial sector recommendations:",
    "Structural and business environment recommendations:",
    "Exchange rate and external policy:",
    "Nominal GDP (market prices, in billions of Kuwaiti dinar): 46 (2014); 34 (2015); 33 (2016); 36 (2017); 43 (2018); 41 (2019 projected); 45 (2020 projected); 47 (2021 projected); 49 (2022 projected); 52 (2023 projected).",
    "Nominal GDP (market prices, in billions of U.S. dollars): 163 (2014); 115 (2015); 109 (2016); 120 (2017); 141 (2018); 137 (2019 projected); 143 (2020 projected); 150 (2021 projected); 156 (2022 projected); 172 (2023 projected).",
    "Real GDP growth (annual percent change): 0.5 (2014); 0.6 (2015); 2.9 (2016); -3.5 (2017); 1.7 (2018); 2.5 (2019 projected); 2.7 (2020 projected).",
    "Real oil GDP: -2.1 (2014); -1.7 (2015); 3.9 (2016); -7.2 (2017); 1.2 (2018); 2.0 (2019 projected).",
    "Real non-oil GDP: 4.9 (2014); 4.2 (2015); 1.4 (2016); 2.1 (2017); 3.0 (2018); 3.5 (2019 projected); 3.4 (2020 projected); 3.2 (2021 projected); 3.7 (2022 projected); 4.0 (2023 projected).",
    "CPI inflation (average): 3.1 (2014); 1.5 (2015); 0.7 (2016); 4.7 (2017); (multiyear low of 0.7 percent noted for 2018).",
    "Exports of goods (billions of U.S. dollars): 104.5 (2014); 54.5 (2015); 46.5 (2016); 55.1 (2017); 71.6 (2018); 64.6 (2019 projected); 66.3 (2020 projected); 67.3 (2021 projected); 68.4 (2022 projected); 70.2 (2023 projected); 72.3 (2024 projected).",
    "International reserve assets (billions of U.S. dollars): 32.3 (2014); 28.3 (2015); 31.2 (2016); 33.5 (2017); 37.0 (2018); 37.2 (2019 projected); 38.8 (2020 projected); 41.1 (2021 projected); 43.0 (2022 projected); 45.3 (2023 projected); 47.9 (2024 projected).",
    "[Kuwait and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/KWT/index.htm)",
    "[IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/imf-surveillance)",
    "[Press Releases](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)",
    "[PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)",
    "[http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm](http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/misc/qualifiers.htm)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)"
  ],
  "alternates": {
    "markdown": "/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/index.md",
    "json": "/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/index.json",
    "bundleManifest": "/en/news/articles/2019/04/03/pr19104-kuwait-imf-executive-board-concludes-2019-article-iv-consultation-with-kuwait/bundle-manifest.json"
  },
  "generatedAtUtc": "2026-09-25T22:38:11.323Z"
}