## IMF Executive Board Approves New Central Bank Transparency Code

_IMF News, July 30, 2020_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [IMF Executive Board Approves New Central Bank Transparency Code](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2020/07/30/pr20258-imf-executive-board-approves-new-central-bank-transparency-code)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/en/news/articles/2020/07/30/pr20258-imf-executive-board-approves-new-central-bank-transparency-code/index.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/en/news/articles/2020/07/30/pr20258-imf-executive-board-approves-new-central-bank-transparency-code/index.json)
- [Bundle manifest](/en/news/articles/2020/07/30/pr20258-imf-executive-board-approves-new-central-bank-transparency-code/bundle-manifest.json)

## Bibliographic details
- Published: July 30, 2020

---

### Overview
- Press Release No. 20/258
- Date: July 30, 2020
- Washington DC: On July 2nd, the Executive Board of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) approved the new IMF Central Bank Transparency Code (CBT).
- The CBT updates the 1999 Monetary and Financial Policies Transparency Code and responds to recommendations from the 2017 Joint Review of the Standards and Codes Initiative.

### CBT framework and development
- The CBT sets out a 5-pillar framework and proposed application of the CBT.
- The CBT principles and detailed practices were developed after extensive consultation with relevant stakeholders.
- Preparation benefited from:
  - Guidance from a High-Level Advisory Panel consisting of eminent former central bank governors and academics.
  - Input from an extensive consultation process with central banks and other relevant international organizations.
- The CBT is intended to provide strong, clear, and detailed guidance to central banks regarding their own transparency.
- The CBT acknowledges trade-offs between transparency and the legitimate need for confidentiality, including in contexts of:
  - Market sensitive issues
  - Financial stability considerations
  - Personal data
- Some Directors saw scope for a broader definition of qualified confidentiality reasons.
- In the context of currency unions, Directors were concerned that publishing voting behavior may have important trade-offs and stressed the CBT should avoid being overly prescriptive.

### Application, scope, and use
- Applicability:
  - The CBT will be applicable, on a voluntary basis, to all IMF members, including less-developed economies.
- Design features:
  - Modular
  - Risk-based
  - Proportional, to take into account country-specific circumstances
- Uses:
  - Tailored diagnostic tool in IMF capacity development
  - Facilitate voluntary use in Financial Sector Assessment Programs
  - Facilitate voluntary use in IMF surveillance, such as Article IV consultations, and in an IMF‑supported program context
- Directors appreciated that descriptions of the range of practices are not intended to be a tool for ranking central banks’ transparency choices and welcomed the revised practice labels.

### Executive Board assessment and views
- Directors broadly endorsed the CBT’s general principles and welcomed the opportunity to consider the staff proposal.
- Key reasons for enhanced transparency noted:
  - Expanded mandates of central banks
  - Unconventional policy actions
  - Complex operations
  - Evolving role in response to the 2008 financial crisis and the COVID‑19 pandemic
- Directors appreciated staff outreach and Advisory Panel contributions, calling the CBT a timely and useful tool to strengthen accountability and ensure more effective policy outcomes and better‑informed dialogue with stakeholders.
- Views on disclosure and caution:
  - Directors broadly endorsed principles and practices related to foreign exchange management.
  - Some Directors called for caution regarding information disclosure in foreign exchange management to avoid limiting central bank flexibility and prevent speculative transactions.
- Pilot reviews and timeline:
  - Directors supported staff carrying out CBT pilot reviews on a voluntary basis and in close cooperation with relevant authorities, ensuring proper representation of Fund membership.
  - Given competing demands on authorities and Fund resources considering the ongoing COVID‑19 crisis, a number of Directors were of the view that the two‑year timeline might need to be reconsidered.
- Use in Fund work:
  - Directors supported the notion that the CBT could serve as a useful diagnostic tool in capacity development.
  - Most Directors thought it could be helpful for Fund surveillance, on a voluntary basis.

### Contact and media
- IMF Communications Department
- MEDIA RELATIONS
- PRESS OFFICER: Randa Elnagar
- Phone: +1 202 623-7100
- Email: MEDIA@IMF.org
- Twitter: @IMFSpokesperson

*Source: IMF press release, July 30, 2020.*

---


## References

- [https://www.imf.org/-/media/images/imf/bios/imfboard.jpg](https://www.imf.org/-/media/images/imf/bios/imfboard.jpg)
- [The Executive Board](https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/eds.aspx)
- [Press Releases](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [IMF Central Bank Transparency Code](https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2020/07/29/The-Central-Bank-Transparency-Code-49619)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2020/07/30/pr20258-imf-executive-board-approves-new-central-bank-transparency-code_