Washington, DC: The Republic of the Marshall Islands (RMI) is recovering after
COVID-induced lockdowns in FY2020-21
[1]and a contraction in the fisheries
sector in FY2022.Real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 4.5
percent in FY2022, reflecting the sale of a fishing vessel by a domestic
operator, which significantly reduced fishery production. Excluding the
sector, real GDP expanded by 4.2 percent, signaling a recovery in domestic
demand was underway, though its strength was diminished by the temporary
re-imposition of lockdowns in August 2022 as well as supply chain
disruptions. Inflation picked up in 2H 2022 due to higher food and fuel
prices and supply chain issues, reaching 6 percent by September 2022. As a
result of these developments, and a decline in COVID-related grants, the
current account surplus narrowed from 22.6 percent of GDP in FY2021 to 8.2
percent in FY2022.
Growth is expected to turn positive in FY2023, with real GDP projected
to increase by 3 percent.
The fisheries sector continues to be impacted by the westward migration of
tuna but there are tentative signs that transshipment activity is picking
up: the number of vessels in Majuro port increased significantly in May
2023, almost equaling arrivals recorded between January and April. The
non-fisheries sector benefited from the revival of donor-financed
construction activities and investment associated with preparations for the
Micronesian Games in 2024. Inflation is expected to moderate to 3 percent
in FY2023 as declining global commodity prices, particularly for fuel, are
expected to alleviate price pressures. However, the continuing
underperformance of fisheries exports and higher import volumes are
expected to offset lower import prices, causing the current account surplus
to decline further to 5.1 percent of GDP.
The
outlook is subject to heightened uncertainty, and risks are mostly on
the downside.
On the domestic front, the volatility in fishing revenues and copra output
could impact economic growth and the current account. Copra production
could be impacted by the onset of El Niño weather phenomenon, which is
associated with lower rainfalls, particularly in the northern islands. The
launch or revival of FinTech initiatives could have adverse implications
for the RMI’s access to the global financial system and payments networks.
On the external front, the RMI is exposed to global commodity price
volatility: a sharp increase in fuel and food prices can have an immediate
and significant impact on domestic inflation. A deeper-than-expected
slowdown in major trading partners could adversely impact exports and the
inflow of workers’ remittances while the suspension of air cargo services
due to the grounding of Asia Pacific Airlines in early 2023 demonstrated
the RMI’s ongoing vulnerability to sudden supply chain disruptions.
Fiscal performance in FY2023 is expected to be in line with the budget.
With the economic rebound, tax collection should recover while fishing
licenses and transshipment revenues are projected to improve from a low
base. Despite pressures on spending owing to still-high fuel prices and
subsidies to support state-owned enterprises (SOEs), overall expenditure is
expected to keep pace with revenues to ensure the budget stays broadly
within the balanced budget rule under the Fiscal Responsibility and Debt
Management Act.
A new Compact of Free Association agreement would significantly
strengthen the fiscal and external positions, but large investment
needs call for an early start on fiscal reforms.
Reports suggest that the RMI could benefit from a significant increase in
financial support under a new Compact agreement with the United States over
20 years starting in FY2024. Nevertheless, even if a new agreement is
reached, there are large financing needs, particularly to support necessary
investment in infrastructure and climate adaptation, as well as to improve
the provision of education and healthcare. Further, the likelihood of more
frequent and severe weather events such as storms and droughts in the
future call for the accumulation of fiscal buffers to support disaster
management, and relief and recovery efforts.
To meet these challenges, there needs to be a reprioritization of
expenditure away from recurrent spending to capital investments while
increasing revenues.
The subsidies provided to SOEs, some of which are intended to be channeled
to households, should be gradually reduced and replaced by targeted
assistance to the most vulnerable. There also needs to be strict control on
other elements of current spending, particularly on administration costs.
Expenditure management is expected to benefit from the modernization of the
government’s financial management and information system (FMIS), which
would also allow for better transparency and enable timely audits of
government bodies. On the revenue side, there is an urgent need to
diversify and strengthen revenue collection. The ongoing work to modernize
the Customs revenue management system is welcome and has the potential to
improve revenue collection and provide important and timely data on
imports. Revenue administration reforms such as strengthening filling and
payment activities, improving arrears collections, and improving internal
processes to better identify and manage risks should make the system more
efficient and improve the investment climate. We welcome the ongoing public
financial management reform program, which is the overarching umbrella
under which the authorities aim to make progress on many of the areas
highlighted above. On tax policy, there are a number of pending reforms
including setting up a revenue authority, and implementing taxes on net
profits, excises and consumption that are awaiting adoption that could
improve revenue performance over the medium term.
If a
new Compact agreement cannot be reached, undertaking structural fiscal
reforms becomes even more urgent.
In the near term, the fiscal pressures from a delay in finalizing a new
agreement can be managed through drawings on the Compact Trust Fund (CTF).
However, this is not sustainable over the longer term given the limited
resources in the CTF: under a scenario with largely static revenue
collection and significant but incomplete expenditure adjustment, the
fiscal balance will slip into a persistent and widening deficit, resulting
in an increase in borrowing. Under this scenario, the Debt Sustainability
Analysis shows that RMI will remain at high risk of debt
distress—highlighting the need to contain debt, including through a more
ambitious fiscal consolidation supported by structural reforms.
Several FinTech initiatives pose risks to financial integrity of the
RMI.
The global understanding of, and capacity to, adequately monitor and
regulate new activities such as stablecoins and new entities such as
Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are still evolving, even in
high-capacity jurisdictions. Hence, the enactment of the DAO Act and the
move to start registration of DAOs, and the potential launch of a
stablecoin in the RMI are especially concerning given the capacity
constraints and questions regarding the understanding of the authorities to
adequately regulate and supervise these initiatives. As such, it is
advisable to adopt a cautious approach toward these and other FinTech
initiatives. Work to identify and implement adequate safeguards for DAOs is
welcome. However, these measures are likely to take time to formulate,
particularly as there is not yet a consensus on best practice globally to
draw from. In the interim, the authorities should consider imposing a
moratorium on the registration of DAOs until the monitoring framework can
be set up. While the caution in proceeding with past FinTech initiatives is
welcome and has helped contain risks to the RMI’s financial integrity, the
authorities are encouraged to further limit these risks by expeditiously
enacting the SOV Repeal Bill and withdrawing the Digital Economic Zone for
Rongelap Atoll (DEZRA) Bill.
A Monetary Authority (MA), designed with the specific needs and
characteristics of the RMI in mind, can strengthen financial
development and inclusion and safeguard financial stability.
In the RMI context, a MA could usefully focus on strengthening oversight of
the financial system, develop a domestic interbank payments and clearance
system and work to improve financial inclusion. Further, a MA could act as
the government’s financial agent to ensure the government is able to meet
its obligations and efficiently use its resources, and hold and manage
international reserves, thereby improving access external liquidity to
enable international transactions to proceed smoothly. That said, even a
narrowly focused MA will be challenging to set up given the capacity
constraints, which underscores the need to make its policy priorities clear
at the outset to reduce operational risks.
The RMI risks losing its remaining US dollar correspondent banking
relationship unless risks to financial integrity framework can be
effectively mitigated.
Efforts should notably include strengthening the AML/CFT regime in line
with recommendations issued by the Asia Pacific Group on Money Laundering
upon completion of its evaluation of RMI’s AML/CFT framework and its
effectiveness. In addition to caution around FinTech initiatives, the
authorities should ensure that risks around the offshore services sector
are adequately mitigated. Instituting a strong AML/CFT framework and
ensuring its effective implementation should be complemented with efforts
to strengthen the financial regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and
other onshore financial institutions. These would increase the confidence of
foreign financial institutions to build and maintain financial ties with
the RMI.
Addressing climate-related challenges would address risks and open new
opportunities for more sustainable and inclusive growth.
RMI is highly vulnerable to the impacts of climate change, such as rising
sea levels, ocean inundation and more frequent extreme weather events like
droughts and storms. The authorities’ climate adaptation priorities, as set
out in the 10-year National Strategic Plan, to improve the resilience of
infrastructure, address vulnerability of built environments, and safeguard
water and food supplies, are appropriate. The preparation of the National
Adaptation Plan (NAP), which had been delayed due to the pandemic, should
be completed in 2023 as planned. A well-articulated NAP would be important
to prepare for these impacts and transition to climate resilience, identify
critical climate investments and attract the needed external financing.
Given the significant effort needed to prepare climate investment proposals
for donors’ consideration, the authorities should aim to build a pipeline
of climate projects that can be taken to donors as a package and
sequentially implemented as financing is secured. Consideration should be
given to setting up a dedicated climate finance unit in the government to
manage the pipeline from project identification, financing through to
implementation. A dedicated unit overseeing a multiyear investment program
would also help the authorities recruit, train and retain the skilled staff
needed to oversee project identification and implementation. Investing in
renewable energy can helpfully lower fuel imports and operating costs. The
deployment of smaller scale renewable energy infrastructure such as rooftop
solar, together with distributed grids and storage, can also support the
electrification of sparsely populated atolls, thereby spreading the fruits
of economic development more widely.
Disaster preparedness remains a critical area for further work.
The National Disaster Management Office has an appropriately wide-ranging
mandate to provide early warnings about impending disasters, coordinate
disaster response when they occur and support awareness and preparedness in
quieter times. We welcome the ongoing efforts to integrate the various
pieces of the legislative framework in disaster management and recovery,
including the Disaster Assistance Act and the Contingency Fund Act, with a
view to streamline the disaster management framework and make it more
effective.
Land availability remains the most important impediment to investment
and economic development.
The complexity of RMI’s traditional land ownership system, which has deep
cultural roots and has been codified into legislation, has made it
difficult to acquire and develop land, which in turn makes it difficult for
both the government and the private sector to invest. Moreover, rising sea
levels, coastal erosion and inward migration has led to urban sprawl and
the inefficient use of the land. As a first step, it would be useful to
clarify how to designate public land in the RMI, particularly reclaimed
land. Efforts to diversify the economic base, either by investing in higher
value-added activities in fisheries and copra, or in exploring new
industries and markets such as tourism, could boost growth and living
standards. These will require access to land but also the availability of
critical infrastructure including power, water, and modern
telecommunications services. The National Investment Policy Statement
helpfully identifies both the priority areas to promote public investment
and impediments that need to be addressed. We encourage the authorities to
strengthen the investment climate and to support private sector
development.
The mission would like to thank the authorities and counterparts in
public enterprises, the private sector and development partners for
frank and engaging discussions.
[1]
Fiscal year refers to the year ending September.
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Table. Republic of the Marshall Islands—Selected
Economic and Financial Indicators, FY2019—FY20281
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Nominal GDP: US$ million 261 (FY 2022)
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GDP per capita: US$ 6,294 (FY 2022)
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Population: 42,418 (FY 2021)
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Quota: SDR 4.90 million
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FY 2019
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FY 2020
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FY 2021
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FY 2022
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FY 2023
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FY 2024
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FY2025
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FY2026
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FY2027
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FY2028
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Prel.
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Proj.
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Real sector
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Real GDP (percent change)
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10.3
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-2.9
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1.0
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-4.5
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3.0
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2.0
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1.8
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1.5
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1.5
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1.5
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Consumer prices (percent change, average)
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-0.1
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-0.7
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2.2
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3.2
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3.0
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2.6
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2.0
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2.0
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2.0
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2.0
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Consumer prices (percent change, end of
period)
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0.3
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-0.3
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1.7
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4.4
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3.0
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2.5
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2.0
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2.0
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2.0
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2.0
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Central government finances (in percent
of GDP)
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Revenue and grants
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64.0
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70.7
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70.4
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66.4
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65.2
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64.9
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60.4
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58.7
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55.5
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54.2
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Total domestic revenue
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33.0
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31.7
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28.7
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31.3
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30.9
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42.0
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41.2
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41.3
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41.3
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41.4
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Grants
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31.0
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39.0
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41.7
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35.0
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34.3
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22.9
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19.2
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17.4
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14.2
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12.8
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Expenditure
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65.8
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68.2
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70.2
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65.7
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65.1
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64.0
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60.9
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58.9
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56.8
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56.0
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Expense
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63.2
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62.2
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63.3
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59.4
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54.4
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53.6
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52.4
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51.9
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51.7
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51.0
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Net acquisition of nonfinancial assets
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2.6
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5.9
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6.8
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6.3
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10.6
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10.4
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8.6
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7.0
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5.1
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5.0
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Net lending/borrowing
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-1.8
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2.5
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0.2
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0.7
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0.1
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0.9
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-0.5
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-0.2
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-1.3
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-1.8
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Compact Trust Fund (in millions of US$; end
of period)
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434.7
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514.4
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668.9
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567.6
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621.1
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620.9
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622.5
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623.7
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624.3
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624.4
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Balance of payments (in percent of GDP)
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Current account balance
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-31.3
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15.0
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22.6
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8.2
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5.1
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3.5
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1.6
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-0.3
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-2.6
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-4.2
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Goods and services balance
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-79.3
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-37.2
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-24.9
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-33.1
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-31.4
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-33.8
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-34.0
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-35.8
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-37.1
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-38.3
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Primary income
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21.4
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18.9
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9.7
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11.1
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12.2
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23.5
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22.3
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22.1
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21.9
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21.7
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Of which: fishing license fee
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10.4
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8.6
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7.1
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6.7
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7.6
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7.7
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7.7
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7.6
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7.6
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7.6
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Secondary income
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26.6
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33.3
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37.7
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30.2
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24.2
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13.7
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13.2
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13.4
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12.6
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12.3
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Of which: compact current grants
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16.0
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14.8
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12.7
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12.2
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12.7
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3.5
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3.4
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3.4
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3.3
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3.3
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Of which: other budget and
off-budget grants
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10.4
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18.2
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24.7
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18.4
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11.1
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10.0
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9.6
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9.9
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9.2
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9.1
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Current account excluding current grants
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-16.4
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-24.2
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-20.2
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0.0
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-2.0
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-4.0
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-6.3
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-3.7
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-5.9
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-7.5
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External PPG debt (in millions of US$; end
of period) 2
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67.5
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61.2
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55.6
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62.2
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65.9
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74.5
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85.6
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97.5
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110.7
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129.1
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External PPG debt (Percent of GDP; end of
period) 2
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29.1
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25.4
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21.6
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23.8
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23.8
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25.7
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28.5
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31.3
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34.4
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38.7
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Memorandum item:
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Nominal GDP (in millions of US$)
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231.9
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240.6
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257.5
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261.2
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276.8
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289.6
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300.6
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311.1
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322.0
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333.3
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Sources: RMI authorities; and IMF staff
estimates and projections.
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1Fiscal year ending September 30.
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2Assumption is that RMI will
receive its MDBs financial assistance in a
mix of grants and loans.
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