{
  "title": "Japan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2024 Article IV Mission",
  "publication": "IMF News, February 9, 2024",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission",
  "canonical": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission",
  "overlayPath": "/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/index.md",
  "summary": "The Japanese economy continues to recover from the pandemic. Initially driven by cost-push factors, inflation is becoming demand driven with the output gap closed and labor shortages intensifying.",
  "publishDate": "2024-02-09",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Overview",
      "content": "- The Japanese economy continues to recover from the pandemic.\n- Inflation: initially driven by cost-push factors, now becoming demand driven with the output gap closed and labor shortages intensifying.\n- Near-term focus: tighten fiscal policy and wind down unconventional monetary policy, while maintaining financial stability.\n- Medium-term priority: rebuild fiscal buffers, strengthen the fiscal framework, and advance structural reforms, with labor market reforms at the forefront."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Recent developments, outlook, and risks",
      "content": "Findings\n- Output gap: estimated to have closed.\n- Core inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) seems to have peaked at a high level and is becoming demand driven.\n- Measures of underlying inflation show current above-target inflation is broad-based across products and services for the first time in three decades.\n- Wages: rising, albeit less than inflation, amid labor shortages.\nProjections and near-term outlook\n- Growth is projected to decelerate in 2024 due to fading one-off factors that supported 2023 (including a surge in inbound tourism).\n- Japan’s preparedness will help mitigate the economic impact of the Noto Peninsula Earthquake.\n- Core inflation is expected to decline gradually as the effect of higher import prices wanes.\n- A closed output gap and increasing nominal wages will keep core inflation above the two-percent target until the second half of 2025.\n- Primary fiscal deficit: will remain sizable in 2024, reflecting the impact of the latest fiscal stimulus package.\n- Current account surplus: expected to increase in 2024, supported by higher exports and lower import prices.\n- External position: assessed as broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.\nRisks\n- Growth downside risks: slowdown in the global economy, deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, more volatile food and energy prices; domestic risks include continued low real household income growth if inflation outpaces wage growth, more acute labor shortages, and a return to a zero-inflation environment.\n- Growth upside risks: additional recovery of inbound tourism and a stronger global economy.\n- Inflation upside risks: backward-looking inflation expectations and significantly stronger-than-expected wages following the spring wage negotiations.\n- Inflation downside risks: faster decline in global goods and import prices and weaker-than-expected increases in wages in the spring negotiation."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Fiscal policy",
      "content": "Assessments\n- Given a closed output gap and high debt-to-GDP ratio, the large, not-well-targeted fiscal stimulus in the November package was not warranted.\n- The untargeted income tax cut: expected to have a limited impact on growth and to worsen debt dynamics.\n- Energy subsidies: can distort energy consumption and hamper decarbonization; should be replaced with targeted transfers to vulnerable households.\n- Under current policies, public debt-to-GDP ratio will increase steadily in the long term to accommodate age-related spending pressures.\n- Sovereign risk and debt sustainability analysis: gross financing needs are elevated but rollover risks are mitigated by the large domestic investor base and by the debt profile; overall risk of debt distress assessed as moderate.\nPolicy priorities\n- Fiscal consolidation is needed to rebuild fiscal buffers and ensure debt sustainability, underpinned by both revenue and expenditure measures.\n- Limit untargeted transfers with a low fiscal multiplier and phase out energy subsidies while mobilizing revenues to offset additional expenditure.\nRevenue mobilization (options listed)\n- i) unifying and increasing the consumption tax rate;\n- ii) strengthening financial income taxation for high-income earners;\n- iii) reinforcing property taxation by eliminating preferential treatment for residential land;\n- iv) rationalizing allowances and deductions in personal income taxation;\n- v) increasing premiums for social insurance.\nHealth expenditure reforms (options listed)\n- i) an increase in copayments for high-income or wealthy seniors;\n- ii) higher usage of generic or over-the-counter drugs;\n- iii) increased adoption of prescription refilling;\n- iv) enhanced preventative medical care;\n- v) more targeted covered services and drugs.\nChildren-related spending\n- Limited evidence that untargeted cash transfers are effective in supporting fertility; enhance efficiency through expansion of childcare facilities and workstyle and labor market reforms to close gender gaps.\nSME support\n- Some pandemic-related measures and subsidies remain; comprehensive assessment needed to rationalize expenditure and improve productivity.\nMedium-term fiscal framework recommendations\n- Strengthen the medium-term fiscal framework as part of the review planned in FY2024.\n  - More realistic assumptions: base fiscal policy planning on realistic assumptions on growth, revenue, and expenditure; consider tasking an independent fiscal council with evaluating macro projections.\n  - Governance of state funds: set a clear exit plan for each state fund; approximately one-third of state funds do not have a specified termination point.\n  - Discipline supplementary budgets: reform the budget process so expansionary supplementary budgets are limited to unexpected large economic shocks."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Monetary policy",
      "content": "Findings\n- Return of sustained inflation reflects: (i) higher inflation expectations for a prolonged period for the first time in decades; (ii) the highest base wage growth since 1995 amid intensifying labor shortages; (iii) a historical high degree of monetary policy accommodation—with a real interest rate much lower than the estimated neutral rate along with balance sheet accommodation.\n- BoJ has been appropriately cautious given Japan’s history of deflation and mixed signals from recent data.\n- BoJ’s recent policy adjustments (allowing 10-year yield to be more flexible) have: (i) helped curb excessive expansion of the BoJ’s JGB purchases and unintended side-effects on bond market functioning; (ii) will support financial institutions’ profitability and stability by potentially reducing incentives for exposure to riskier asset portfolios; (iii) will allow for a smoother exit from unconventional monetary policy in the near future.\nPolicy recommendations\n- The BoJ should consider exiting Yield Curve Control (YCC) and ending Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) now while gradually raising short-term policy rates thereafter.\n  - Exit the YCC and QQE framework: officially exiting would simplify communication; the BoJ could continue to reinvest maturing JGBs to avoid abrupt shifts in bond market conditions and sharp increases in term premiums.\n  - Shift to the short-term policy rate as the main policy instrument: if staff’s baseline inflation forecast bears out, the BoJ should gradually raise the policy rate over its policy horizon (i.e., three years).\n- Approach: gradual and well-communicated to anchor market expectations while keeping monetary policy and financial conditions accommodative and allowing time to confirm incoming data.\nMitigating risks and operational measures\n- The BoJ may need to make state-contingent purchases of JGBs and implement other targeted and temporary measures to ensure sufficient liquidity support for relevant financial markets.\n- A clear and effective communication strategy is key to minimize disruption and outward spillovers to other sovereign debt markets.\n- Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime will help absorb shocks and support monetary policy’s focus on price stability and maintaining an external position in line with fundamentals."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Safeguarding financial stability",
      "content": "Findings\n- Japanese financial system has withstood recent shocks, aided by strong capital and liquidity buffers and policy support.\n- Credit provision to the private sector has remained robust since the pandemic.\n- Key macro-financial risks: abrupt slowdown in global growth, a surge in inflationary pressures leading to higher interest rates and market volatility.\n- Vulnerabilities: sizable holdings by financial institutions of securities under mark-to-market accounting; some banks’ notable foreign currency exposures; signs of overheating in parts of the real estate markets.\nFSAP and resilience\n- Systemic risk analysis (FSAP): financial system broadly resilient but some institutions may be vulnerable under an adverse scenario (low global growth and high inflation).\n- Liquidity risks: contained at the system level but some banks could face pressure due to sizable foreign currency exposures.\n- Climate risk: banks have notable exposures to emission intensive sectors but at a system level may be resilient to a transition to net zero emissions by 2050.\nRecommendations to strengthen frameworks\n- Develop a more advanced risk-based approach to bank supervision.\n- Set appropriate minimum liquidity requirements for all banks and tailor capital requirements to individual bank risk profiles.\n- Establish a framework of comprehensive risk-based and proactive supervision for insurers.\n- Strengthen macroprudential framework: clarify the mandate of the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability and expand the macroprudential toolkit.\n- Enhance regulatory and supervisory frameworks for cybersecurity.\n- Subject more banks to recovery and resolution planning requirements.\n- Continue to ensure an effective recovery and resolution (planning) regime for insurers and central clearing counterparties (CCPs) consistent with international standards and guidance.\n- Priority: significantly increase staffing resources to enhance supervision and resolution of financial institutions."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Structural policies",
      "content": "Priority areas\n- Need further structural reforms to support fertility, promote female leaders, advance a more equal society, accelerate startups and innovation, and transition to a green economy; labor market reforms are central.\nSupporting fertility and female labor force participation\n- Expand childcare facilities and resources, particularly for children below the age of two; attract foreign workers (e.g., nursery teachers) to address shortages.\n- Facilitate fathers’ contribution to home/child-care; offer stronger incentives for paternity leave.\n- Reform employment practices: expand telework and flexible working schedules to support women with young children and allow men to share home-care burden.\n- Labor market reforms: reduce labor-market dualism, encourage merit-based promotions, and facilitate job mobility to expand career prospects for women.\nAdvancing a more equal society\n- Market income inequality has increased and is close to the OECD average.\n- Redistributive social transfers have lowered income inequality, but with high public debt limiting scope for broad-based spending, social transfers should be better targeted.\n- Reforms to reduce labor market dualism and remove disincentives in the social security system that limit working hours are more sustainable ways to achieve equality.\nAccelerating startups and innovation\n- Japan’s startup ecosystem has grown but startups tend to be smaller with relatively low venture capital equity funding as a share of GDP.\n- Better access to equity funding, a more flexible labor market, and a shift away from the lifelong employment system could encourage entrepreneurship and dynamic firm entry and exit.\nTransitioning to a green economy\n- Additional policies needed to reach climate targets.\n- Expanding carbon pricing and introducing carbon credits trading are broadly in line with previous staff advice, but further clarifications on planned measures are needed.\n- Protect the vulnerable from distributional effects of carbon pricing.\n- Phase out untargeted subsidies for gas, electricity, and fuel to support the transition.\nContinuing other reforms\n- Continue digitalization and corporate governance reforms: Digital Agency should coordinate public sector digitalization; improve data sharing between central and local governments and standardize local government IT systems to improve targeting of transfers.\n- Ensure effective corporate governance practices and improved disclosure standards.\n- Work actively with international partners to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system.\n- Industrial policies (IP) should be narrow and cautious; avoid favoring domestic producers or creating fragmentation of the global system for trade and investment."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key statistics (selected; values preserved exactly as presented)",
      "content": "- Nominal GDP: US$ 4,256 Billion (2022)\n- GDP per capita: US$ 34,005 (2022)\n- Population: 125 Million (2022)\n- Quota: SDR 30.8 billion (2022)\n- Real GDP growth (2020): -4.1\n- Real GDP growth (2021): 2.6\n- Real GDP growth (2022): 1.0\n- Real GDP growth (2023): 1.9\n- Real GDP growth (2024): 0.8\n- Domestic demand (2020): -3.3\n- Private consumption (2020): -4.4\n- Gross Private Fixed Investment (2020): -5.4\n- Business investment (2020): -4.9\n- Residential investment (2020): -7.7\n- Government consumption (2020): 2.4\n- Public investment (2020): 3.5\n- Output Gap (2020): -2.9\n- Headline CPI inflation (2021): 3.3\n- GDP deflator (2021): 4.0\n- GDP deflator (2022): 3.0\n- Government revenue (2020): 35.5\n- Government revenue (2021): 36.4\n- Government revenue (2022): 37.6\n- Government revenue (2023): 36.5\n- Government revenue (2024): 35.8\n- Government expenditure (2020): 44.5\n- Government expenditure (2021): 42.5\n- Government expenditure (2022): 41.9\n- Government expenditure (2023): 42.1\n- Government expenditure (2024): 42.2\n- Government expenditure (2025): 39.5\n- Overall Balance (2020): -9.1\n- Overall Balance (2021): -6.1\n- Overall Balance (2022): -5.6\n- Overall Balance (2023): -6.4\n- Overall Balance (2024): -3.0\n- Primary balance (2020): -8.4\n- Primary balance (2021): -5.5\n- Primary balance (2022): -3.9\n- Primary balance (2023): -6.3\n- Primary balance (2024): -2.8\n- Structural primary balance (2020): -7.5\n- Structural primary balance (2021): -4.8\n- Public debt, gross (2020): 258.3\n- Public debt, gross (2021): 253.9\n- Public debt, gross (2022): 248.7\n- Public debt, gross (2023): 251.7\n- Public debt, gross (2024): 251.6\n- Public debt, gross (2025): 250.2\n- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2020): 151.8\n- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2021): 155.0\n- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2022): 159.4\n- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2023): 154.3\n- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2024): 153.5\n- Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2025): 153.8\n- Current account balance (2020, in billions of USD): 149.9\n- Current account balance (2021, in billions of USD): 196.4\n- Current account balance (2022, in billions of USD): 84.5\n- Current account balance (2023, in billions of USD): 148.4\n- Current account balance (2024, in billions of USD): 160.1\n- Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2020): 3.9\n- Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2021): 2.0\n- Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2022): 3.7\n- Trade balance (2020, in billions of USD): 26.6\n- Trade balance (2021, in billions of USD): 16.4\n- Trade balance (2022, in billions of USD): -117.5\n- Trade balance (2023, in billions of USD): -50.7\n- Trade balance (2024, in billions of USD): -24.4\n- Trade balance (2025, in billions of USD): -30.4\n- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2020, in billions of USD): 630.6\n- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2021, in billions of USD): 749.2\n- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2022, in billions of USD): 751.8\n- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2023, in billions of USD): 708.0\n- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2024, in billions of USD): 733.9\n- Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2025, in billions of USD): 768.7\n- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2020, in billions of USD): 604.0\n- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2021, in billions of USD): 732.7\n- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2022, in billions of USD): 869.4\n- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2023, in billions of USD): 758.7\n- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2024, in billions of USD): 758.3\n- Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2025, in billions of USD): 799.1\n- Energy imports (2020, in billions of USD): 89.1\n- Energy imports (2021, in billions of USD): 127.8\n- Energy imports (2022, in billions of USD): 195.5\n- Energy imports (2023, in billions of USD): 162.2\n- Energy imports (2024, in billions of USD): 155.1\n- Energy imports (2025, in billions of USD): 146.1\n- Change in reserves (2020, in billions of USD): 10.9\n- Change in reserves (2021, in billions of USD): 62.8\n- Change in reserves (2022, in billions of USD): -47.4\n- Change in reserves (2023, in billions of USD): 11.5\n- Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1348.2 (2020)\n- Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1356.2 (2021)\n- Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1178.3 (2022)\n- Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2020): 106.8\n- Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2021): 109.8\n- Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2022): 131.5\n- Yen/euro rate (period average, 2020): 121.9\n- Yen/euro rate (period average, 2021): 129.9\n- Yen/euro rate (period average, 2022): 138.6\n- Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2020): 75.3\n- Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2021): 73.5\n- Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2022): 62.0\n- Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2020): 77.3\n- Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2021): 70.7\n- Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2022): 61.0\n- Population Growth (2020): -0.4\n- Old-age dependency (2020): 48.3\n- Old-age dependency (2021): 48.7\n- Old-age dependency (2022): 48.9\n- Old-age dependency (2023): 49.3\n- Old-age dependency (2024): 49.8\n- Old-age dependency (2025): 50.3\n\nIMF staff concluding statement, Japan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2024 Article IV Mission (February 8, 2024).\n\n---\n\n\n References\n\n- Japan and the IMF\n- IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet\n- Mission Concluding Statements\n- PRESS CENTER\n- https://www.imf.org/en/home\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission"
    }
  ],
  "bullets": [
    "[Markdown version](/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/index.md)",
    "[Structured JSON version](/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/index.json)",
    "[Bundle manifest](/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/bundle-manifest.json)",
    "Published: February 9, 2024",
    "The Japanese economy continues to recover from the pandemic.",
    "Inflation: initially driven by cost-push factors, now becoming demand driven with the output gap closed and labor shortages intensifying.",
    "Near-term focus: tighten fiscal policy and wind down unconventional monetary policy, while maintaining financial stability.",
    "Medium-term priority: rebuild fiscal buffers, strengthen the fiscal framework, and advance structural reforms, with labor market reforms at the forefront.",
    "Output gap: estimated to have closed.",
    "Core inflation (excluding fresh food and energy) seems to have peaked at a high level and is becoming demand driven.",
    "Measures of underlying inflation show current above-target inflation is broad-based across products and services for the first time in three decades.",
    "Wages: rising, albeit less than inflation, amid labor shortages.",
    "Growth is projected to decelerate in 2024 due to fading one-off factors that supported 2023 (including a surge in inbound tourism).",
    "Japan’s preparedness will help mitigate the economic impact of the Noto Peninsula Earthquake.",
    "Core inflation is expected to decline gradually as the effect of higher import prices wanes.",
    "A closed output gap and increasing nominal wages will keep core inflation above the two-percent target until the second half of 2025.",
    "Primary fiscal deficit: will remain sizable in 2024, reflecting the impact of the latest fiscal stimulus package.",
    "Current account surplus: expected to increase in 2024, supported by higher exports and lower import prices.",
    "External position: assessed as broadly in line with the level implied by medium-term fundamentals and desirable policies.",
    "Growth downside risks: slowdown in the global economy, deepening geoeconomic fragmentation, more volatile food and energy prices; domestic risks include continued low real household income growth if inflation outpaces wage growth, more acute labor shortages, and a return to a zero-inflation environment.",
    "Growth upside risks: additional recovery of inbound tourism and a stronger global economy.",
    "Inflation upside risks: backward-looking inflation expectations and significantly stronger-than-expected wages following the spring wage negotiations.",
    "Inflation downside risks: faster decline in global goods and import prices and weaker-than-expected increases in wages in the spring negotiation.",
    "Given a closed output gap and high debt-to-GDP ratio, the large, not-well-targeted fiscal stimulus in the November package was not warranted.",
    "The untargeted income tax cut: expected to have a limited impact on growth and to worsen debt dynamics.",
    "Energy subsidies: can distort energy consumption and hamper decarbonization; should be replaced with targeted transfers to vulnerable households.",
    "Under current policies, public debt-to-GDP ratio will increase steadily in the long term to accommodate age-related spending pressures.",
    "Sovereign risk and debt sustainability analysis: gross financing needs are elevated but rollover risks are mitigated by the large domestic investor base and by the debt profile; overall risk of debt distress assessed as moderate.",
    "Fiscal consolidation is needed to rebuild fiscal buffers and ensure debt sustainability, underpinned by both revenue and expenditure measures.",
    "Limit untargeted transfers with a low fiscal multiplier and phase out energy subsidies while mobilizing revenues to offset additional expenditure.",
    "i) unifying and increasing the consumption tax rate;",
    "ii) strengthening financial income taxation for high-income earners;",
    "iii) reinforcing property taxation by eliminating preferential treatment for residential land;",
    "iv) rationalizing allowances and deductions in personal income taxation;",
    "v) increasing premiums for social insurance.",
    "i) an increase in copayments for high-income or wealthy seniors;",
    "ii) higher usage of generic or over-the-counter drugs;",
    "iii) increased adoption of prescription refilling;",
    "iv) enhanced preventative medical care;",
    "v) more targeted covered services and drugs.",
    "Limited evidence that untargeted cash transfers are effective in supporting fertility; enhance efficiency through expansion of childcare facilities and workstyle and labor market reforms to close gender gaps.",
    "Some pandemic-related measures and subsidies remain; comprehensive assessment needed to rationalize expenditure and improve productivity.",
    "Strengthen the medium-term fiscal framework as part of the review planned in FY2024.",
    "Return of sustained inflation reflects: (i) higher inflation expectations for a prolonged period for the first time in decades; (ii) the highest base wage growth since 1995 amid intensifying labor shortages; (iii) a historical high degree of monetary policy accommodation—with a real interest rate much lower than the estimated neutral rate along with balance sheet accommodation.",
    "BoJ has been appropriately cautious given Japan’s history of deflation and mixed signals from recent data.",
    "BoJ’s recent policy adjustments (allowing 10-year yield to be more flexible) have: (i) helped curb excessive expansion of the BoJ’s JGB purchases and unintended side-effects on bond market functioning; (ii) will support financial institutions’ profitability and stability by potentially reducing incentives for exposure to riskier asset portfolios; (iii) will allow for a smoother exit from unconventional monetary policy in the near future.",
    "The BoJ should consider exiting Yield Curve Control (YCC) and ending Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) now while gradually raising short-term policy rates thereafter.",
    "Approach: gradual and well-communicated to anchor market expectations while keeping monetary policy and financial conditions accommodative and allowing time to confirm incoming data.",
    "The BoJ may need to make state-contingent purchases of JGBs and implement other targeted and temporary measures to ensure sufficient liquidity support for relevant financial markets.",
    "A clear and effective communication strategy is key to minimize disruption and outward spillovers to other sovereign debt markets.",
    "Japan’s flexible exchange rate regime will help absorb shocks and support monetary policy’s focus on price stability and maintaining an external position in line with fundamentals.",
    "Japanese financial system has withstood recent shocks, aided by strong capital and liquidity buffers and policy support.",
    "Credit provision to the private sector has remained robust since the pandemic.",
    "Key macro-financial risks: abrupt slowdown in global growth, a surge in inflationary pressures leading to higher interest rates and market volatility.",
    "Vulnerabilities: sizable holdings by financial institutions of securities under mark-to-market accounting; some banks’ notable foreign currency exposures; signs of overheating in parts of the real estate markets.",
    "Systemic risk analysis (FSAP): financial system broadly resilient but some institutions may be vulnerable under an adverse scenario (low global growth and high inflation).",
    "Liquidity risks: contained at the system level but some banks could face pressure due to sizable foreign currency exposures.",
    "Climate risk: banks have notable exposures to emission intensive sectors but at a system level may be resilient to a transition to net zero emissions by 2050.",
    "Develop a more advanced risk-based approach to bank supervision.",
    "Set appropriate minimum liquidity requirements for all banks and tailor capital requirements to individual bank risk profiles.",
    "Establish a framework of comprehensive risk-based and proactive supervision for insurers.",
    "Strengthen macroprudential framework: clarify the mandate of the Council for Cooperation on Financial Stability and expand the macroprudential toolkit.",
    "Enhance regulatory and supervisory frameworks for cybersecurity.",
    "Subject more banks to recovery and resolution planning requirements.",
    "Continue to ensure an effective recovery and resolution (planning) regime for insurers and central clearing counterparties (CCPs) consistent with international standards and guidance.",
    "Priority: significantly increase staffing resources to enhance supervision and resolution of financial institutions.",
    "Need further structural reforms to support fertility, promote female leaders, advance a more equal society, accelerate startups and innovation, and transition to a green economy; labor market reforms are central.",
    "Expand childcare facilities and resources, particularly for children below the age of two; attract foreign workers (e.g., nursery teachers) to address shortages.",
    "Facilitate fathers’ contribution to home/child-care; offer stronger incentives for paternity leave.",
    "Reform employment practices: expand telework and flexible working schedules to support women with young children and allow men to share home-care burden.",
    "Labor market reforms: reduce labor-market dualism, encourage merit-based promotions, and facilitate job mobility to expand career prospects for women.",
    "Market income inequality has increased and is close to the OECD average.",
    "Redistributive social transfers have lowered income inequality, but with high public debt limiting scope for broad-based spending, social transfers should be better targeted.",
    "Reforms to reduce labor market dualism and remove disincentives in the social security system that limit working hours are more sustainable ways to achieve equality.",
    "Japan’s startup ecosystem has grown but startups tend to be smaller with relatively low venture capital equity funding as a share of GDP.",
    "Better access to equity funding, a more flexible labor market, and a shift away from the lifelong employment system could encourage entrepreneurship and dynamic firm entry and exit.",
    "Additional policies needed to reach climate targets.",
    "Expanding carbon pricing and introducing carbon credits trading are broadly in line with previous staff advice, but further clarifications on planned measures are needed.",
    "Protect the vulnerable from distributional effects of carbon pricing.",
    "Phase out untargeted subsidies for gas, electricity, and fuel to support the transition.",
    "Continue digitalization and corporate governance reforms: Digital Agency should coordinate public sector digitalization; improve data sharing between central and local governments and standardize local government IT systems to improve targeting of transfers.",
    "Ensure effective corporate governance practices and improved disclosure standards.",
    "Work actively with international partners to strengthen the rules-based multilateral trading system.",
    "Industrial policies (IP) should be narrow and cautious; avoid favoring domestic producers or creating fragmentation of the global system for trade and investment.",
    "Nominal GDP: US$ 4,256 Billion (2022)",
    "GDP per capita: US$ 34,005 (2022)",
    "Population: 125 Million (2022)",
    "Quota: SDR 30.8 billion (2022)",
    "Real GDP growth (2020): -4.1",
    "Real GDP growth (2021): 2.6",
    "Real GDP growth (2022): 1.0",
    "Real GDP growth (2023): 1.9",
    "Real GDP growth (2024): 0.8",
    "Domestic demand (2020): -3.3",
    "Private consumption (2020): -4.4",
    "Gross Private Fixed Investment (2020): -5.4",
    "Business investment (2020): -4.9",
    "Residential investment (2020): -7.7",
    "Government consumption (2020): 2.4",
    "Public investment (2020): 3.5",
    "Output Gap (2020): -2.9",
    "Headline CPI inflation (2021): 3.3",
    "GDP deflator (2021): 4.0",
    "GDP deflator (2022): 3.0",
    "Government revenue (2020): 35.5",
    "Government revenue (2021): 36.4",
    "Government revenue (2022): 37.6",
    "Government revenue (2023): 36.5",
    "Government revenue (2024): 35.8",
    "Government expenditure (2020): 44.5",
    "Government expenditure (2021): 42.5",
    "Government expenditure (2022): 41.9",
    "Government expenditure (2023): 42.1",
    "Government expenditure (2024): 42.2",
    "Government expenditure (2025): 39.5",
    "Overall Balance (2020): -9.1",
    "Overall Balance (2021): -6.1",
    "Overall Balance (2022): -5.6",
    "Overall Balance (2023): -6.4",
    "Overall Balance (2024): -3.0",
    "Primary balance (2020): -8.4",
    "Primary balance (2021): -5.5",
    "Primary balance (2022): -3.9",
    "Primary balance (2023): -6.3",
    "Primary balance (2024): -2.8",
    "Structural primary balance (2020): -7.5",
    "Structural primary balance (2021): -4.8",
    "Public debt, gross (2020): 258.3",
    "Public debt, gross (2021): 253.9",
    "Public debt, gross (2022): 248.7",
    "Public debt, gross (2023): 251.7",
    "Public debt, gross (2024): 251.6",
    "Public debt, gross (2025): 250.2",
    "Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2020): 151.8",
    "Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2021): 155.0",
    "Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2022): 159.4",
    "Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2023): 154.3",
    "Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2024): 153.5",
    "Non-financial corporate debt in percent of GDP (2025): 153.8",
    "Current account balance (2020, in billions of USD): 149.9",
    "Current account balance (2021, in billions of USD): 196.4",
    "Current account balance (2022, in billions of USD): 84.5",
    "Current account balance (2023, in billions of USD): 148.4",
    "Current account balance (2024, in billions of USD): 160.1",
    "Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2020): 3.9",
    "Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2021): 2.0",
    "Current account balance (percent of GDP, 2022): 3.7",
    "Trade balance (2020, in billions of USD): 26.6",
    "Trade balance (2021, in billions of USD): 16.4",
    "Trade balance (2022, in billions of USD): -117.5",
    "Trade balance (2023, in billions of USD): -50.7",
    "Trade balance (2024, in billions of USD): -24.4",
    "Trade balance (2025, in billions of USD): -30.4",
    "Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2020, in billions of USD): 630.6",
    "Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2021, in billions of USD): 749.2",
    "Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2022, in billions of USD): 751.8",
    "Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2023, in billions of USD): 708.0",
    "Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2024, in billions of USD): 733.9",
    "Exports of goods, f.o.b. (2025, in billions of USD): 768.7",
    "Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2020, in billions of USD): 604.0",
    "Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2021, in billions of USD): 732.7",
    "Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2022, in billions of USD): 869.4",
    "Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2023, in billions of USD): 758.7",
    "Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2024, in billions of USD): 758.3",
    "Imports of goods, f.o.b. (2025, in billions of USD): 799.1",
    "Energy imports (2020, in billions of USD): 89.1",
    "Energy imports (2021, in billions of USD): 127.8",
    "Energy imports (2022, in billions of USD): 195.5",
    "Energy imports (2023, in billions of USD): 162.2",
    "Energy imports (2024, in billions of USD): 155.1",
    "Energy imports (2025, in billions of USD): 146.1",
    "Change in reserves (2020, in billions of USD): 10.9",
    "Change in reserves (2021, in billions of USD): 62.8",
    "Change in reserves (2022, in billions of USD): -47.4",
    "Change in reserves (2023, in billions of USD): 11.5",
    "Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1348.2 (2020)",
    "Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1356.2 (2021)",
    "Total reserves minus gold (in billions of US$): 1178.3 (2022)",
    "Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2020): 106.8",
    "Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2021): 109.8",
    "Yen/dollar rate (period average, 2022): 131.5",
    "Yen/euro rate (period average, 2020): 121.9",
    "Yen/euro rate (period average, 2021): 129.9",
    "Yen/euro rate (period average, 2022): 138.6",
    "Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2020): 75.3",
    "Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2021): 73.5",
    "Real effective exchange rate (ULC-based, 2010=100; 2022): 62.0",
    "Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2020): 77.3",
    "Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2021): 70.7",
    "Real effective exchange rate (CPI-based, 2010=100; 2022): 61.0",
    "Population Growth (2020): -0.4",
    "Old-age dependency (2020): 48.3",
    "Old-age dependency (2021): 48.7",
    "Old-age dependency (2022): 48.9",
    "Old-age dependency (2023): 49.3",
    "Old-age dependency (2024): 49.8",
    "Old-age dependency (2025): 50.3",
    "[Japan and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/JPN/index.htm)",
    "[IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/imf-surveillance)",
    "[Mission Concluding Statements](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)",
    "[PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)"
  ],
  "alternates": {
    "markdown": "/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/index.md",
    "json": "/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/index.json",
    "bundleManifest": "/en/news/articles/2024/02/08/mcs020824-japan-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2024-article-iv-mission/bundle-manifest.json"
  },
  "generatedAtUtc": "2026-09-26T02:44:35.140Z"
}
