## Uruguay: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission

_IMF News, September 19, 2025_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Uruguay: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2025 Article IV Mission](https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/09/19/cs-091925-uruguay-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission)

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## Bibliographic details
- Published: September 19, 2025

---

### Mission overview and context
- Mission leader: Mr. Raphael Espinoza; visit: September 8-19, 2025.
- Key recent developments:
  - Agriculture: Following a severe drought in 2023, agricultural production expanded significantly in 2024, sustaining growth around potential and contributing to narrowing the current account deficit to -1 percent of GDP.
  - Exchange rates and tourism: Substantial real appreciation of the Argentinian’s currency in 2024 contributed to improving the external position and fueled inbound tourism in early 2025.
  - Labor market: With the output gap closing, the unemployment rate ticked down, and real wages are growing in line with productivity.
  - Fiscal: The fiscal deficit of the central government including social security (CG-BPS) increased in 2024 to 3.2 percent of GDP, necessitating activation of the fiscal rule’s escape clause.
  - Reserves: International reserves are ample and reached a level equivalent to 11½ months of imports at end-August 2025.
  - Inflation and monetary policy: Inflation fell to 4.2 percent in August 2025, below the BCU target, after the BCU raised its policy rate three times in response to a peso depreciation at end-2024 and later cut rates in July and August 2025 as inflation declined.
  - External and market access: Uruguay maintains favorable access to financial markets, supported by investment-grade credit ratings and sovereign spreads that are currently at historic lows and are the lowest in the region.
  - Political context: A new administration took over in March 2025 with an agenda balancing inclusive growth and macroeconomic stability; new government guidelines for the regular round of wage negotiations were issued in July 2025.

### Outlook and risks
- Growth projections:
  - 2025: 2.5 percent
  - 2026: 2.4 percent
- Inflation outlook:
  - Projected to consolidate around the target of 4.5 percent, enabling gradual easing of monetary policy conditional on domestic context and inflation expectations.
- Current account:
  - Expected to widen slightly to 1.7 percent of GDP in the medium term.
- Risk assessment:
  - Downside risks: international trade policy and commodity price shocks, regional uncertainty, climate shocks.
  - Mitigants: ample liquidity buffers, long debt maturities, favorable borrowing conditions, increasing share of domestic debt issuances.
  - Financial system risks: contained due to low credit-to-GDP ratio, liquid and well-capitalized banks, ample FX reserves and a limited sovereign-banking nexus.
  - Upside risks: strong agricultural harvests, favorable commodity prices, new trade agreements, access to new markets and investments, stronger-than-expected structural reform effects.

### Stability and growth policies

#### Fiscal policy — findings and recommendations
- Near-term dynamics:
  - CG-BPS deficit projected to increase to 4.1 percent of GDP in 2025 (3.7 including cuarentones), 0.9 percentage points above the 2024 deficit.
  - Increase attributed mainly to postponed expenditures from 2024, advance tax payments, and recent spending commitments.
  - Fiscal stance described as mildly pro-cyclical in 2025 amid a nearly closed output gap.
- Medium-term plan and projections:
  - Proposed five-year budget aims to reduce the deficit and stabilize debt below the new prudential debt anchor.
  - Structural primary balance pathway: improve from -1.5 percent of GDP in 2025 and 2026 to 0.1 percent of GDP in 2029.
  - Net debt: stabilize below the prudential debt anchor at around 63 percent of GDP, up from 58 percent of GDP in 2024.
- Risks to the plan:
  - Macroeconomic and international tax environment, implementation delays, and spending pressures.
- Recommended further actions:
  - Raise the CG-BPS primary balance progressively to around ½ percent of GDP by 2029.
  - Policy options include reducing tax incentives, moderating the wage bill, and improving the efficiency of spending.
- Fiscal framework reform:
  - Support for proposed enhancements: binding fiscal rule targets anchored to a prudential net debt/GDP ratio, corrective mechanisms for slippages, greater autonomy and expanded mandate for the Fiscal Council.
  - Importance of adequate operationalization and meeting fiscal rule targets to secure reputational benefits.
  - Ongoing social dialogue expected to yield social protection/social security proposals by April 2026; ensure proposals are consistent with sustainability of social spending.

#### Monetary policy — findings and recommendations
- Institutional development:
  - Appointment of the first BCU president without political affiliation noted as advancing de facto central bank independence.
- Strategy and stance:
  - Commitment to bring inflation to the target of 4.5 percent underpinned by contractionary monetary policy, enhanced central bank communication, and support from budget and collective bargaining guidelines.
  - Monetary policy stance described as appropriately contractionary; real interest rate is above the real neutral rate given lower inflation expectations.
  - Recent declines in the policy rate justified by declining inflation and inflation expectations.
- Communication and framework:
  - Continue emphasizing that the inflation target is 4.5 percent with a tolerance range to anchor expectations.
  - Exchange rate: should continue serving as a shock absorber; FX interventions limited to disorderly market conditions.
- De-dollarization and independence:
  - BCU began revamping its de-dollarization strategy; first legislative proposal focuses on increasing competition in the deposit market in local currency.
  - To align de jure independence with regional peers, Board appointments should follow best international practices, including fixed terms not overlapping with the electoral cycle.

#### Financial sector — findings and recommendations
- System soundness:
  - Banking system: well capitalized, highly liquid and profitable.
  - Capital ratios: almost twice the minimum regulatory requirement.
  - Private credit: 31 percent of GDP, although it has increased by 10 percent of GDP since 2010.
  - Housing-related financial stability risks: low.
- Risks and mitigants:
  - Dollarization heightens FX credit and liquidity risks, mitigated by low household indebtedness, moderate and mostly hedged corporate debt, and ample FX reserves.
- Regulatory and supervisory agenda:
  - Authorities committed to strengthening regulation and supervision; regulation of digital asset services providers has improved and the regulatory perimeter has expanded.
  - Superintendency of Financial Services (SSF) should continue implementing its roadmap to strengthen the risk-based supervisory framework.
  - Planned initiatives aim at improving data management and reporting within financial supervision.
  - Macroprudential Policy Committee should be leveraged to strengthen the macroprudential framework.
  - New National Strategy for Combating Money Laundering and ongoing regulatory efforts expected to enhance the AML/CFT framework’s effectiveness and alignment with FATF standards.
- Financial development and policy recommendations:
  - Greater access to credit in local currency and de-dollarization would support growth and contribute to macroeconomic stability.
  - Improve access to credit for creditworthy firms—particularly SMEs—while maintaining prudent lending standards and regulatory reforms to foster a level playing field.

#### Structural policies — findings and recommendations
- Growth potential and reform priorities:
  - Structural reforms are key to boosting economic potential after a period of slow growth.
  - Identified gaps: infrastructure, trade facilitation, entry barriers and regulatory bottlenecks, market concentration, human capital, and access to credit.
  - Government measures announced: cut red tape, open new export markets, modernize institutions and fiscal incentives for investment, export promotion, and innovation; allocate more resources to human capital, attract foreign talent, and tackle insecurity.
- Specific recommendations:
  - Intensify reforms: simplify business creation, licensing and taxation; enhance competition policy; improve education quality and reduce school dropouts.
  - Reform incentive frameworks in SOEs to better align wages with productivity; ensure efficient allocation of resources and cost-reflective pricing in SOEs.
  - Develop financial mechanisms for climate change adaptation.
- Technology and labor market:
  - Uruguay gaining regional recognition in innovation and Artificial Intelligence (AI); recommended actions include closing digital gaps and promoting equitable and ethical AI integration into education and industry.
  - Support programs for workers at risk from AI disruption.
- Labor market challenges and policy directions:
  - Challenges: limited flexibility, high youth unemployment, and an aging population.
  - While institutions have contributed to stability and relatively low inequality, firms perceive hiring and wage-setting practices as restrictive.
  - Recommendations: introduce measures to account for firm heterogeneity in hiring and wage-setting, monitor employment effects of new wage agreements for the young and low-skilled, encourage labor force participation, and facilitate integration of migrants.

### Closing
- The IMF team thanked the Uruguayan authorities for their hospitality and collaboration during the Article IV mission to Montevideo between September 8-19, 2025.

*IMF staff concluding statement, September 19, 2025.*

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## References

- [Uruguay and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/URY/index.htm)
- [IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/imf-surveillance)
- [Mission Concluding Statements](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)
- [PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)
- [https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2025/09/19/cs-091925-uruguay-staff-concluding-statement-of-the-2025-article-iv-mission_
