{
  "title": "Uzbekistan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2026 Article IV Mission",
  "publication": "IMF News, April 13, 2026",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/04/13/mcs041326-uzbekistan",
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  "summary": "Uzbekistan’s economy demonstrated remarkable strength in 2025. Driven by robust consumption and investment, real GDP growth reached 7.7 percent, while the unemployment rate declined by 0.7 percentage points to 4.8 percent. Growth was broad based, with services and construction expanding the fastest.",
  "publishDate": "2026-04-13",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Recent developments, outlook, and risks",
      "content": "- Real GDP growth reached 7.7 percent in 2025, driven by robust consumption and investment; unemployment declined by 0.7 percentage points to 4.8 percent.\n- Growth was broad‑based, with services and construction expanding the fastest.\n- Headline CPI inflation declined to 7.3 percent year‑on‑year (y/y) at end‑2025, from 9.8 percent a year earlier; core inflation fell by 1.5 percentage points over the same period.\n- Contributing factors to disinflation: fading effects of the May 2024 energy price increases, a 6.9 percent appreciation of the sum against the U.S. dollar, and an appropriately tight monetary policy stance.\n- Current account deficit narrowed to 3.9 percent of GDP in 2025; international reserves around 13 months of imports.\n- Fiscal deficit declined to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2025, below the 3 percent target.\n- Outlook:\n  - Real GDP growth projected at 6.8 percent in 2026 and around 6 percent in 2027.\n  - Current account deficit forecast to narrow further in 2026, then widen modestly in 2027.\n  - Inflation projected to remain above the CBU’s 5 percent target in 2026 and reach the CBU’s target in 2027.\n- Key risks:\n  - External: impact of the war in the Middle East (duration and intensity), heightened geopolitical tensions, trade disruptions, commodity price volatility, and an uncertain global outlook.\n  - Domestic: pressures for procyclical spending or directed/preferential lending, potential weakening of bank balance sheets, and contingent liabilities from SOEs, SOCBs, and PPPs.\n  - Upside: faster implementation of structural reforms; limited scope for further gains from stronger capital and remittance inflows or higher gold prices given current favorable levels."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Fiscal policy (findings and recommendations)",
      "content": "- Findings:\n  - Better‑than‑budgeted fiscal deficit in 2025.\n  - Budget prudent revenue assumptions, particularly for gold prices.\n- Recommendations:\n  - Minimize within‑year spending increases in 2026 to contain inflationary pressures.\n  - Any Middle East war-related measures should avoid generalized subsidies and price controls; measures should be temporary and targeted to affected vulnerable groups.\n  - Continue efficiency‑enhancing expenditure reforms: rationalize the wage bill, gradually phase out budgetary support to SOEs, implement procurement reforms, consolidate social assistance programs while protecting the most vulnerable.\n  - From the 2027 budget, adopt a ceiling on the nominal non‑mineral primary deficit to strengthen management of volatile mineral revenues, complementing the 3-percent overall deficit target.\n  - Advance a medium‑term revenue strategy to address the decline in the tax‑to‑GDP ratio since 2020 via a balanced mix of tax policy and revenue administration measures:\n    - Policy: increase specific excise tax rates; phase out and not grant new income‑based tax incentives—tax holidays and reduced corporate income tax (CIT) rates; eliminate CIT and non‑statutory customs duty exemptions.\n    - Administration: approve and implement the Tax Administration Reform Strategy 2025–30; implement a customs reform strategy prepared with IMF capacity development support.\n    - Prevent accumulation of VAT refund arrears and resolve the existing stock; roll out the VAT invoice risk assessment system to facilitate prompt automatic payment of validated claims.\n  - Strengthen fiscal institutions:\n    - Advance automation of treasury processes for timely budget execution reports.\n    - Publish tax expenditures alongside the budget.\n    - Tighten the annual cap on PPP commitments, standardize PPP contract provisions, strengthen the Ministry of Economy and Finance’s information base and enforcement authority over PPPs.\n    - Enhance SOE risk disclosure in budget documents."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Monetary and exchange rate policy",
      "content": "- Findings:\n  - CBU held the policy rate at 14 percent since March 2025, maintaining strongly positive real interest rates.\n  - Pace of disinflation slowed recently; core inflation edged up to 6.3 percent y/y at end‑February.\n  - Exchange rate flexibility increased in April 2025.\n- Recommendations:\n  - Monetary policy should remain firmly focused on reducing inflation to the CBU’s 5 percent target.\n  - Keep policy stance sufficiently tight; further tightening warranted if core inflation and inflation expectations do not resume a downward trend.\n  - Strengthen monetary transmission through an expanded set of liquidity management instruments, enhanced liquidity forecasting, and clearer communication.\n  - Maintain increased exchange rate flexibility to strengthen shock‑absorption capacity, safeguard international reserves, encourage FX hedging, and facilitate the transition toward inflation targeting."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Financial sector policy",
      "content": "- Findings:\n  - Persistent underperformance by state‑owned commercial banks (SOCBs); decision to broaden asset quality reviews to all SOCBs; alignment of non‑performing loan measurement with international standards.\n  - Macroprudential measures adopted to contain risks, including from microlending.\n  - Exemptions from borrower‑based measures currently cover about 15 percent of loans.\n- Recommendations:\n  - Accelerate reform and privatization of SOCBs, adhering to international best practices:\n    - Preparatory steps: accurate asset quality reporting; strengthen corporate governance and risk‑management frameworks.\n    - Use transparent procedures and competitive bidding to attract strategic investors.\n    - Define clear KPIs, robust performance monitoring, and full accounting and risk‑based separation of commercial and non‑commercial lending.\n    - Take timely corrective actions for underperforming SOCBs, restructure or resolve non‑viable banks.\n    - Reconsider plans to retain systemic SOCBs as policy banks due to financial stability risks and budgetary costs.\n  - Timely implement 2025 FSAP recommendations; government adoption of the FSAP Roadmap recommended.\n  - Key FSAP priorities: phase out and improve transparency of directed/preferential lending; safeguard the CBU’s operational independence; ensure accurate asset classification; strengthen solvency stress testing.\n  - Ensure credible restructuring plans before any potential capital support to SOCBs.\n  - Phase out exemptions from borrower‑based measures and extend such measures to loans under government programs.\n  - Address risks from foreign‑exchange lending to unhedged borrowers, particularly with increased exchange rate flexibility.\n  - Pursue financial inclusion without compromising stability: avoid interest rate ceilings; strengthen banking sector competition; expand access to credit information; improve banks’ credit screening; modernize payment systems and digital infrastructure; foster economies of scale; enhance financial literacy and consumer protection."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Structural and governance reforms",
      "content": "- State‑owned enterprises (SOEs):\n  - Findings: Most SOEs operate in competitive sectors; private firms have documented efficiency advantages.\n  - Recommendations:\n    - Privatize profitable SOEs in competitive sectors; liquidate non‑viable SOEs with support for affected workers.\n    - For SOEs in strategic or non‑competitive sectors, address corporate governance weaknesses and soft budget constraints:\n      - Clarify ownership policies with explicit market‑based rates of return.\n      - Ensure transparent appointment and evaluation of supervisory boards.\n      - Prohibit non‑commercial activities unless fully compensated through the budget.\n      - Increase private sector participation.\n      - Ensure compliance with international auditing and financial reporting standards.\n    - Ensure the National Investment Fund has a clear mandate, operational autonomy, and adequate capacity to restructure SOEs and attract institutional investors.\n- Governance, labor, and climate:\n  - Recommendations:\n    - Enact and effectively implement legislation on whistleblower protection and asset declaration.\n    - Labor market reforms to address low female labor force participation, high informality, and skill mismatches.\n    - Integrate climate objectives into public investment management to enhance energy efficiency, decarbonization, and climate adaptation.\n    - Strengthen market regulation and competition: activate sector regulators, eliminate exclusive rights in key sectors, and complete WTO‑related reforms."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Selected economic indicators (2023–2027)",
      "content": "- Real GDP growth (percent change): 6.3 (2023); 6.7 (2024); 7.7 (2025 Est.); 6.8 (2026 Proj.); 6.0 (2027)\n- Nominal GDP (in trillions of Sum): 1,262 (2023); 1,535 (2024); 1,850 (2025 Est.); 2,154 (2026 Proj.); 2,465 (2027)\n- GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars): 2,922 (2023); 3,232 (2024); 3,846 (2025 Est.); 4,528 (2026 Proj.); 4,957 (2027)\n- Population (in millions): 36.8 (2023); 37.5 (2024); 38.2 (2025 Est.); 38.9 (2026 Proj.); 39.7 (2027)\n- Consumer price inflation (end of period, annual percent change): 8.8 (2023); 9.8 (2024); 7.3 (2025 Est.); 5.0 (2026 Proj.)\n- GDP deflator (annual percent change): 13.9 (2023); 14.1 (2024); 11.9 (2025 Est.); 9.0 (2026 Proj.); 8.0 (2027)\n- Current account balance (percent of GDP): -7.3 (2023); -4.7 (2024); -3.9 (2025 Est.); -3.2 (2026 Proj.); -3.6 (2027)\n- External debt (percent of GDP): 50.8 (2023); 53.1 (2024); 54.2 (2025 Est.); 51.8 (2026 Proj.); 49.5 (2027)\n- Exchange rate (in sums per U.S. dollar; end of period): 12,339 (2023); 12,920 (2024); 12,025 (2025 Est.)\n- Real effective exchange rate (ave 2015=100, decline = depreciation): 59.9 (2023); 56.9 (2024); 58.7 (2025 Est.)\n- Consolidated budget revenues (percent of GDP): 25.6 (2023); 25.2 (2024); 27.2 (2025 Est.); 28.2 (2026 Proj.); 27.7 (2027)\n- Consolidated budget expenditures (percent of GDP): 30.2 (2023); 28.1 (2024); 29.3 (2025 Est.); 29.7 (2026 Proj.)\n- Consolidated budget balance (percent of GDP): -4.6 (2023); -3.0 (2024); -2.1 (2025 Est.); -1.5 (2026 Proj.); -2.0 (2027)\n- Adjusted revenues (percent of GDP): 24.8 (2023); 24.2 (2024); 25.7 (2025 Est.); 26.7 (2026 Proj.); 26.3 (2027)\n- Adjusted expenditures (percent of GDP): 28.6 (2023); 27.4 (2024); 27.5 (2025 Est.)\n- Adjusted fiscal balance (percent of GDP): -3.8 (2023); -1.6 (2024); -0.7 (2025 Est.); -1.1 (2026 Proj.)\n- Policy-based lending (percent of GDP): 0.8 (2023); 0.9 (2024); 0.5 (2025 Est.)\n- Public debt (percent of GDP): 30.7 (2023); 30.9 (2024);  (2025 Est. value not listed)\n- Reserve money (percent change): 4.9 (2023); 9.5 (2024); 23.2 (2025 Est.); 11.0 (2026 Proj.)\n- Broad money (percent change): 12.2 (2023); 30.6 (2024); 36.6 (2025 Est.); 18.4 (2026 Proj.); 15.4 (2027)\n- Credit to the economy (percent change): 14.0 (2023); 15.3 (2024); 16.7 (2025 Est.); 15.7 (2026 Proj.)\n\nSource: Uzbekistan: Staff Concluding Statement of the 2026 Article IV Mission (April 13, 2026), IMF staff.\n\n---\n\n\n References\n\n- Republic of Uzbekistan and the IMF\n- IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet\n- Mission Concluding Statements\n- PRESS CENTER\n- https://www.imf.org/en/home\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/news/articles/2026/04/13/mcs041326-uzbekistan"
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    "Published: April 13, 2026",
    "Real GDP growth reached 7.7 percent in 2025, driven by robust consumption and investment; unemployment declined by 0.7 percentage points to 4.8 percent.",
    "Growth was broad‑based, with services and construction expanding the fastest.",
    "Headline CPI inflation declined to 7.3 percent year‑on‑year (y/y) at end‑2025, from 9.8 percent a year earlier; core inflation fell by 1.5 percentage points over the same period.",
    "Contributing factors to disinflation: fading effects of the May 2024 energy price increases, a 6.9 percent appreciation of the sum against the U.S. dollar, and an appropriately tight monetary policy stance.",
    "Current account deficit narrowed to 3.9 percent of GDP in 2025; international reserves around 13 months of imports.",
    "Fiscal deficit declined to 2.1 percent of GDP in 2025, below the 3 percent target.",
    "Outlook:",
    "Key risks:",
    "Findings:",
    "Recommendations:",
    "Findings:",
    "Recommendations:",
    "Findings:",
    "Recommendations:",
    "State‑owned enterprises (SOEs):",
    "Governance, labor, and climate:",
    "Real GDP growth (percent change): 6.3 (2023); 6.7 (2024); 7.7 (2025 Est.); 6.8 (2026 Proj.); 6.0 (2027)",
    "Nominal GDP (in trillions of Sum): 1,262 (2023); 1,535 (2024); 1,850 (2025 Est.); 2,154 (2026 Proj.); 2,465 (2027)",
    "GDP per capita (in U.S. dollars): 2,922 (2023); 3,232 (2024); 3,846 (2025 Est.); 4,528 (2026 Proj.); 4,957 (2027)",
    "Population (in millions): 36.8 (2023); 37.5 (2024); 38.2 (2025 Est.); 38.9 (2026 Proj.); 39.7 (2027)",
    "Consumer price inflation (end of period, annual percent change): 8.8 (2023); 9.8 (2024); 7.3 (2025 Est.); 5.0 (2026 Proj.)",
    "GDP deflator (annual percent change): 13.9 (2023); 14.1 (2024); 11.9 (2025 Est.); 9.0 (2026 Proj.); 8.0 (2027)",
    "Current account balance (percent of GDP): -7.3 (2023); -4.7 (2024); -3.9 (2025 Est.); -3.2 (2026 Proj.); -3.6 (2027)",
    "External debt (percent of GDP): 50.8 (2023); 53.1 (2024); 54.2 (2025 Est.); 51.8 (2026 Proj.); 49.5 (2027)",
    "Exchange rate (in sums per U.S. dollar; end of period): 12,339 (2023); 12,920 (2024); 12,025 (2025 Est.)",
    "Real effective exchange rate (ave 2015=100, decline = depreciation): 59.9 (2023); 56.9 (2024); 58.7 (2025 Est.)",
    "Consolidated budget revenues (percent of GDP): 25.6 (2023); 25.2 (2024); 27.2 (2025 Est.); 28.2 (2026 Proj.); 27.7 (2027)",
    "Consolidated budget expenditures (percent of GDP): 30.2 (2023); 28.1 (2024); 29.3 (2025 Est.); 29.7 (2026 Proj.)",
    "Consolidated budget balance (percent of GDP): -4.6 (2023); -3.0 (2024); -2.1 (2025 Est.); -1.5 (2026 Proj.); -2.0 (2027)",
    "Adjusted revenues (percent of GDP): 24.8 (2023); 24.2 (2024); 25.7 (2025 Est.); 26.7 (2026 Proj.); 26.3 (2027)",
    "Adjusted expenditures (percent of GDP): 28.6 (2023); 27.4 (2024); 27.5 (2025 Est.)",
    "Adjusted fiscal balance (percent of GDP): -3.8 (2023); -1.6 (2024); -0.7 (2025 Est.); -1.1 (2026 Proj.)",
    "Policy-based lending (percent of GDP): 0.8 (2023); 0.9 (2024); 0.5 (2025 Est.)",
    "Public debt (percent of GDP): 30.7 (2023); 30.9 (2024);  (2025 Est. value not listed)",
    "Reserve money (percent change): 4.9 (2023); 9.5 (2024); 23.2 (2025 Est.); 11.0 (2026 Proj.)",
    "Broad money (percent change): 12.2 (2023); 30.6 (2024); 36.6 (2025 Est.); 18.4 (2026 Proj.); 15.4 (2027)",
    "Credit to the economy (percent change): 14.0 (2023); 15.3 (2024); 16.7 (2025 Est.); 15.7 (2026 Proj.)",
    "[Republic of Uzbekistan and the IMF](http://www.imf.org/external/country/UZB/index.htm)",
    "[IMF Policy Advice -- A Factsheet](https://www.imf.org/en/about/factsheets/imf-surveillance)",
    "[Mission Concluding Statements](https://www.imf.org/en/news/searchnews)",
    "[PRESS CENTER](http://presscenter.imf.org/)",
    "[https://www.imf.org/en/home](https://www.imf.org/en/home)"
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