## Switzerland: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note on Macroprudential Policy and Real Estate Risks

_IMF Staff Country Reports, November 13, 2025_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Switzerland: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note on Macroprudential Policy and Real Estate Risks](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2025/11/13/switzerland-financial-sector-assessment-program-technical-note-on-macroprudential-policy-571809)

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## Bibliographic details
- Published: November 13, 2025
- Series: IMF Staff Country Reports
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9798229027717.002

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### Institutional setup and mandate shortcomings
- The institutional setup for macroprudential policy in Switzerland is unchanged since the 2019 FSAP.
- The SNB oversees macroprudential matters and makes Countercyclical Capital Buffer (CCyB) proposals but lacks voting power on CCyB decisions.
- Neither the SNB nor FINMA, nor any existing inter-agency committee, hold a formal mandate to recommend adjustments to the Swiss macroprudential toolkit when current tools prove inadequate for addressing systemic risks.
- The absence of a formal mandate to propose toolkit adjustments creates an inaction bias.

### Key findings on governance and risks
- Lack of a formal recommending authority for toolkit adequacy:
  - No entity currently has a formal mandate to recommend changes to macroprudential tools when they are inadequate for addressing systemic risks.
- Decision-making gap in CCyB governance:
  - The SNB can propose CCyB adjustments but does not have voting power on CCyB decisions.
- Consequences identified:
  - An inaction bias that can weaken timely responses to systemic risks, particularly in the real estate and mortgage sectors.

### Policy recommendations
- Establish a dedicated macroprudential committee:
  - The committee should be chaired by the SNB.
  - The committee should discuss and jointly decide on macroprudential policies.
- Roles and expected benefits of the dedicated committee:
  - Improve macroprudential communication.
  - Enhance public accountability for macroprudential decisions.
  - Mitigate inaction risks arising from the current mandate and governance gaps.
  - Advise relevant agencies on the adequacy of the macroprudential toolkit and necessary changes.

### Thematic coverage and subject areas
- Subjects addressed:
  - Countercyclical capital buffers
  - Financial institutions
  - Financial regulation and supervision
  - Financial sector policy and analysis
  - Financial sector stability
  - Loans
  - Macroprudential Policy
  - Mortgages

*Source: International Monetary Fund — Switzerland: Financial Sector Assessment Program-Technical Note on Macroprudential Policy and Real Estate Risks (November 13, 2025).*

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## Content in this bundle

- **Executive Summary**
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_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/cr/issues/2025/11/13/switzerland-financial-sector-assessment-program-technical-note-on-macroprudential-policy-571809_