## Moving to Complexity

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Moving to Complexity](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2024/06/moving-to-complexity-harold-james)

## Other formats

- [Markdown version](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2024/06/moving-to-complexity-harold-james/index.md)
- [Structured JSON version](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2024/06/moving-to-complexity-harold-james/index.json)
- [Bundle manifest](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2024/06/moving-to-complexity-harold-james/bundle-manifest.json)

## Bibliographic details
- Authors: HAROLD JAMES
- Published: June 3, 2024

---

### Bretton Woods: original vision and early constraints
- 1944 United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference (Bretton Woods) framed a political vision: prosperity and peace are "indivisible" (Henry Morgenthau Jr.).
- Institutional mechanism: rule on the exchange rate backed by an IMF conceived as a "credit cooperative, or an insurance mechanism."
- Intellectual foundation: interpretation of the Great Depression as arising from unhindered capital movement ("hot money flows"); Articles of Agreement provided for continued maintenance of capital controls even during transition to trade liberalization.
- Early deviations from founders' intent:
  - The Soviet Union decided not to ratify the Articles of Agreement.
  - IMF was excluded from the Marshall Plan.
  - IMF only "sprang into life" after the 1956 mix of security and financial crisis (Suez Crisis).

### Remaking of the system and the IMF’s evolving roles
- 1960s: debates over reserve adequacy and liquidity; reform plans proliferated.
- 1970s: breakdown of the par value system coincided with oil producers' push to raise prices and exert political leverage; IMF responded with the Oil Facilities to support developing economies.
- 1982: sovereign debt crisis (most pronounced in Latin America) led the IMF to act as a lender of last resort and coordinator of rescue packages requiring banks to be "bailed in."
- 1994–95 Mexican peso crisis:
  - Characterized by "very diversified foreign holders" and rapid withdrawal of funds.
  - IMF lacked sufficient resources as sole lender of last resort; Mexico received "$20 billion from the Exchange Stabilization Fund."
  - Reinforced reliance on large sums of new money rather than a sovereign bankruptcy mechanism.
- Late 1990s and 2000s:
  - Asian crisis of 1997–98 required mixtures of IMF and bilateral funding.
  - June 1995 G7 Halifax communiqué called on IMF to set benchmarks and timely publication of key economic and financial data.
  - IMF created the Monetary and Capital Markets Department in 2001 and launched the biannual Global Financial Stability Report.
- Fragmentation and multilayered governance:
  - Surveillance and crisis management spread across multiple institutions; IMF applied Basel Committee methodologies; regional arrangements such as the Chiang Mai Initiative (2000) and ASEAN surveillance evolved.
  - Financial Stability Forum (FSF) created after Asian crisis; in 2009 FSF strengthened and renamed Financial Stability Board (FSB).
  - 2009 G20 London summit transferred authority from central banks running FSF to a wider group of governments controlling the FSB.
- 2012: Integrated Surveillance Decision moved to "joining up" bilateral and multilateral surveillance; increased emphasis on spillover reports.

### Key findings on risk, linkages, and blind spots
- Source diversity of shocks:
  - Threats to stability "can come from anywhere"; IMF had limited focus on advanced economies prior to the 2007–08 crisis (no Financial Sector Assessment Programs for the US and the UK).
  - IMF staff simulation at end-2006 anticipated central and eastern European capital market crises (example: Hungary in 2008).
- Linkages and opacity:
  - The extent of threats depends on linkages that are often "difficult to determine in advance."
  - Critique after 2008: IMF Independent Evaluation Office found the Fund had "fallen short" because of "a high degree of groupthink; intellectual capture; and a general mindset that a major financial crisis in large advanced economies was unlikely."
  - Microprudential vs. macroprudential disconnect: supervisors (Basel Committee) could see individual "trees"; global approach could see the "woods" but not investigate trees—Articles of Agreement exempt governments from providing data about specific corporations.
- Long-term challenges producing immediate threats:
  - Climate change (Anthropocene) is a "major and increasingly difficult challenge" that requires prompt action.
  - Measurement and data on costs are "essential to building a consensus" for solutions; GDP-centric metrics are ill-suited to biosphere valuation ("when it comes to thinking about the biosphere, GDP is a drain rather than an asset").
- Security and geopolitics:
  - Security challenges lead to financial destabilization; the Bretton Woods symmetry between IMF/World Bank and the UN Security Council was broken when the Soviet Union did not join.
  - 2022 Russia attack on Ukraine produced a new IMF program modality: agreements with countries "at war" and modified financing assurance programs addressing "exceptionally high uncertainty" and requiring bilateral creditor assurances for debt relief.

### Policy implications and recommendations
- Strengthen measurement and data:
  - Provide accurate measurement of long-term and biosphere-related costs to move issues from abstract concern to actionable policy.
- Enhance surveillance scope and coordination:
  - Continue integrating bilateral and multilateral surveillance and expand focus to advanced economies and systemic linkages.
  - Improve information flows between microprudential supervisors (who "see the individual trees") and global institutions (that "see the woods").
- Adapt crisis tools and mandates:
  - Recognize limits of traditional rescue mechanisms in the face of large capital markets; explore mechanisms beyond large-scale new-money bailouts, including clearer frameworks for sovereign debt resolution.
- Account for security-induced economic risk:
  - Design financial programs and assurances that explicitly take into account the peculiarities of countries facing conflict and "exceptionally high uncertainty."
- Manage multi-institutional complexity:
  - Accept that risk management is multi-institutional (IMF, World Bank, regional arrangements, FSB, G20) and focus on coordination, clear mandates, and timely publication of key economic and financial data.

*Harold James, Moving to Complexity, F&D Magazine, June 2024.*

---

## Content in this bundle

- **Moving to Complexity**
  - [Moving to Complexity (Markdown version)](/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2024/06/james-june24.pdf.md){rel="alternate" type="text/markdown"}
  - [Moving to Complexity (PDF)](/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2024/06/james-june24.pdf){rel="external" type="application/pdf"}

---

_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2024/06/moving-to-complexity-harold-james_