{ "title": "The Debate over Falling Fertility", "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom", "canonical": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom", "overlayPath": "/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.md", "summary": "A decline in global population later this century may threaten human progress, or it may lead to better lives", "sections": [ { "heading": "Summary", "content": "- Global fertility rates have been falling for decades and are reaching historically low levels.\n- World population now exceeds 8 billion and may top 10 billion by 2050, but the momentum of growth is dissipating because of declines in fertility.\n- Over the next 25 years, East Asia, Europe, and Russia will experience significant population declines.\n- Falling fertility creates ambiguous outcomes: risks to innovation, workforce size, and social safety nets versus opportunities from reallocating resources, higher labor force participation, and reduced environmental pressures." }, { "heading": "Fertility rates and population trends", "content": "- In 1950, the global total fertility rate was 5.\n- The 2.1 benchmark is cited for long-term global population stability.\n- Current world fertility rate: 2.24.\n- Projected to drop below 2.1 around 2050.\n- UN agency expects global population to top out at 10.3 billion in 2084.\n- Projections of global population in 2050 range from 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion, with fertility rates between 1.61 and 2.59.\n- During 2000–25, fertility rates declined in every UN region and in every World Bank country income group.\n- Exceptions: Africa and a number of low-income countries on other continents where fertility rates are still 4 or higher.\n- Africa’s share of global population likely to increase from 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050.\n- Over the coming quarter century, 38 nations of more than 1 million people each will probably experience population declines, up from 21 in the past 25 years.\n- Projected absolute population losses over the coming quarter century (selected countries):\n - China: drop of 155.8 million\n - Japan: 18 million\n - Russia: 7.9 million\n - Italy: 7.3 million\n - Ukraine: 7 million\n - South Korea: 6.5 million\n- Average annual rates of population decline (relative terms) expected to be highest at:\n - 0.9 percent in Moldova and in Bosnia and Herzegovina\n - 0.8 percent in Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania\n - 0.7 percent in Latvia and Ukraine\n- In 6 of the 21 countries with average fertility rates of less than 2.1 and fewer births than deaths during 2000–25, immigration prevented depopulation." }, { "heading": "Comparison with historical depopulation episodes", "content": "- Recent and projected patterns differ from historical episodes that were driven mainly by mass migrations and Malthusian mortality shocks (famine, genocide, war, epidemics).\n- Example: Black Death of 1346–53—Western Europe lost upward of a quarter of its population, corresponding to an average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more.\n- By comparison, the population of Moldova has fallen by roughly 1 percent annually since 2000.\n- Ongoing three years of warfare after Moscow’s invasion in February 2022 affect outlooks for Russia and Ukraine." }, { "heading": "Challenges of low fertility", "content": "- Low fertility and depopulation can impede economic and social progress:\n - Fewer workers, savers, and spenders can potentially send an economy into contraction.\n - Shortage of researchers, inventors, scientists, and other people-based sources of innovative ideas could hurt economic progress.\n - Bourgeoning shares of older people can weigh on growth and create long-term care and health spending burdens for prime-age workers.\n - Slow or negative population growth relative to other countries may reduce military might and political clout.\n- Academic concern cited: a 2022 paper by Charles Jones argues low fertility could lead to a drop in the number of new ideas, strangling innovation and resulting in economic stagnation.\n- Low fertility contributes to population aging:\n - In countries experiencing population declines, the share of population ages 65 and older will almost double from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent between 2025 and 2050.\n - In countries whose populations are not shrinking, ages 65 and older will expand from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent over the same period." }, { "heading": "Economic opportunities and countervailing forces", "content": "- Potential positives from fewer children and smaller populations:\n - Less need for spending on housing and childcare, freeing resources for research and development and adoption of advanced technologies.\n - Declines in fertility can stimulate economic growth by driving up labor force participation (especially among women), savings, and capital accumulation.\n - Historical demographic dividend: following the end of the post–World War II baby boom this phenomenon contributed as much as 2–3 percentage points to per capita income growth in many countries.\n - A population’s productive characteristics (health and education) matter more than size for knowledge creation and innovation.\n - Falling fertility combined with rising education can lead to human capital formation and long-term increases in prosperity (as argued by Oded Galor).\n - Population decline may reduce environmental pressures: land, air, and water pollution; climate change; deforestation; and loss of biodiversity." }, { "heading": "Adaptation, policy options, and restructuring", "content": "- Key questions for policymakers: under what circumstances to address declining fertility, and which measures to implement.\n- Observations:\n - There is nothing intrinsically wrong with an economy expanding or shrinking along with its population, but side effects may be problematic.\n - Effective fertility policies are notoriously difficult to design and implement.\n - Falling birth rates may reflect societal preferences that could be accepted; the policy focus may then be on mitigating side effects.\n- Policy responses implemented or considered in some countries:\n - South Korea: recently reported a rise in fertility rates for the first time in nine years.\n - China: abolished its one-child policy.\n - Japan: introduced flexible work arrangements.\n - Several European countries: overhauling social security systems to ensure sustainability.\n- Family-friendly policies that could encourage increased fertility (noted caveats: more children create economic strains and an expanded workforce takes two decades to materialize):\n - Tax breaks for larger families\n - Extended and more flexible parental leave policies\n - Public or subsidized private childcare\n - Subsidies for infertility treatment\n - Policies to enable better balance between work and family responsibilities\n- Additional policy levers to offset depopulation effects:\n - Adjustments to migration policies\n - Expansion of education access and quality to enhance innovation capacity\n - Retirement policy changes, such as raising the age of retirement, to forestall workforce shrinkage by removing disincentives to working longer\n - Combining policies (family, education, health, retirement) may be stronger than isolated measures\n - Robust investments in health and education of youths and prime-age adults to enable productive work well past traditional retirement ages\n- Policymakers must consider the evolving work landscape:\n - Digitalization, robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence will affect job types, job performance, social interactions at work, and potentially fertility levels and patterns." }, { "heading": "Key statistics (exact figures preserved)", "content": "- Global total fertility rate in 1950: 5\n- Current world fertility rate: 2.24\n- Benchmark for long-term global population stability: 2.1\n- Projected drop below 2.1: around 2050\n- UN population peak projection: 10.3 billion in 2084\n- 2050 population projection range: 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion\n- Corresponding fertility projection range: between 1.61 and 2.59\n- Africa fertility in some countries: 4 or higher\n- Africa share of global population: 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050\n- Number of nations 1 million likely to experience population declines over coming quarter century: 38 (up from 21 in past 25 years)\n- Projected population losses (selected):\n - China: 155.8 million\n - Japan: 18 million\n - Russia: 7.9 million\n - Italy: 7.3 million\n - Ukraine: 7 million\n - South Korea: 6.5 million\n- Average annual population decline rates (select countries):\n - 0.9 percent: Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina\n - 0.8 percent: Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania\n - 0.7 percent: Latvia and Ukraine\n- Aging shares:\n - In countries experiencing population declines: ages 65+ from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent (2025–2050)\n - In countries not shrinking: ages 65+ from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent (2025–2050)\n- Historical comparison:\n - Black Death (1346–53): average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more\n - Moldova’s decline since 2000: roughly 1 percent annually\n- Demographic dividend contribution to per capita income growth after baby boom: as much as 2–3 percentage points\n\nArticle: The Debate over Falling Fertility, DAVID E. BLOOM, MICHAEL KUHN, KLAUS PRETTNER, June 2025. F&D Magazine. Contributions noted from Ravi Sadhu.\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- The Debate over Falling Fertility\n - The Debate over Falling Fertility (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n - The Debate over Falling Fertility (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom" } ], "bullets": [ "[Markdown version](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.md)", "[Structured JSON version](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.json)", "[Bundle manifest](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/bundle-manifest.json)", "Authors: DAVID E BLOOM, MICHAEL KUHN, KLAUS PRETTNER", "Published: June 2, 2025", "Global fertility rates have been falling for decades and are reaching historically low levels.", "World population now exceeds 8 billion and may top 10 billion by 2050, but the momentum of growth is dissipating because of declines in fertility.", "Over the next 25 years, East Asia, Europe, and Russia will experience significant population declines.", "Falling fertility creates ambiguous outcomes: risks to innovation, workforce size, and social safety nets versus opportunities from reallocating resources, higher labor force participation, and reduced environmental pressures.", "In 1950, the global total fertility rate was 5.", "The 2.1 benchmark is cited for long-term global population stability.", "Current world fertility rate: 2.24.", "Projected to drop below 2.1 around 2050.", "UN agency expects global population to top out at 10.3 billion in 2084.", "Projections of global population in 2050 range from 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion, with fertility rates between 1.61 and 2.59.", "During 2000–25, fertility rates declined in every UN region and in every World Bank country income group.", "Exceptions: Africa and a number of low-income countries on other continents where fertility rates are still 4 or higher.", "Africa’s share of global population likely to increase from 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050.", "Over the coming quarter century, 38 nations of more than 1 million people each will probably experience population declines, up from 21 in the past 25 years.", "Projected absolute population losses over the coming quarter century (selected countries):", "Average annual rates of population decline (relative terms) expected to be highest at:", "In 6 of the 21 countries with average fertility rates of less than 2.1 and fewer births than deaths during 2000–25, immigration prevented depopulation.", "Recent and projected patterns differ from historical episodes that were driven mainly by mass migrations and Malthusian mortality shocks (famine, genocide, war, epidemics).", "Example: Black Death of 1346–53—Western Europe lost upward of a quarter of its population, corresponding to an average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more.", "By comparison, the population of Moldova has fallen by roughly 1 percent annually since 2000.", "Ongoing three years of warfare after Moscow’s invasion in February 2022 affect outlooks for Russia and Ukraine.", "Low fertility and depopulation can impede economic and social progress:", "Academic concern cited: a 2022 paper by Charles Jones argues low fertility could lead to a drop in the number of new ideas, strangling innovation and resulting in economic stagnation.", "Low fertility contributes to population aging:", "Potential positives from fewer children and smaller populations:", "Key questions for policymakers: under what circumstances to address declining fertility, and which measures to implement.", "Observations:", "Policy responses implemented or considered in some countries:", "Family-friendly policies that could encourage increased fertility (noted caveats: more children create economic strains and an expanded workforce takes two decades to materialize):", "Additional policy levers to offset depopulation effects:", "Policymakers must consider the evolving work landscape:", "Global total fertility rate in 1950: 5", "Current world fertility rate: 2.24", "Benchmark for long-term global population stability: 2.1", "Projected drop below 2.1: around 2050", "UN population peak projection: 10.3 billion in 2084", "2050 population projection range: 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion", "Corresponding fertility projection range: between 1.61 and 2.59", "Africa fertility in some countries: 4 or higher", "Africa share of global population: 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050", "Number of nations >1 million likely to experience population declines over coming quarter century: 38 (up from 21 in past 25 years)", "Projected population losses (selected):", "Average annual population decline rates (select countries):", "Aging shares:", "Historical comparison:", "Demographic dividend contribution to per capita income growth after baby boom: as much as 2–3 percentage points", "**The Debate over Falling Fertility**" ], "related": [ { "title": "The Debate over Falling Fertility", "role": "document", "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf", "summary": { "path": "/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf.md", "mime": "text/markdown" }, "binary": { "path": "/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf", "mime": "application/pdf" } } ], "alternates": { "markdown": "/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.md", "json": "/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.json", "bundleManifest": "/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/bundle-manifest.json" }, "generatedAtUtc": "2026-09-15T19:57:07.764Z" }