## The Debate over Falling Fertility ## Source details **Canonical URL:** [The Debate over Falling Fertility](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom) ## Other formats - [Markdown version](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.md) - [Structured JSON version](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/index.json) - [Bundle manifest](/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom/bundle-manifest.json) ## Bibliographic details - Authors: DAVID E BLOOM, MICHAEL KUHN, KLAUS PRETTNER - Published: June 2, 2025 --- ### Summary - Global fertility rates have been falling for decades and are reaching historically low levels. - World population now exceeds 8 billion and may top 10 billion by 2050, but the momentum of growth is dissipating because of declines in fertility. - Over the next 25 years, East Asia, Europe, and Russia will experience significant population declines. - Falling fertility creates ambiguous outcomes: risks to innovation, workforce size, and social safety nets versus opportunities from reallocating resources, higher labor force participation, and reduced environmental pressures. ### Fertility rates and population trends - In 1950, the global total fertility rate was 5. - The 2.1 benchmark is cited for long-term global population stability. - Current world fertility rate: 2.24. - Projected to drop below 2.1 around 2050. - UN agency expects global population to top out at 10.3 billion in 2084. - Projections of global population in 2050 range from 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion, with fertility rates between 1.61 and 2.59. - During 2000–25, fertility rates declined in every UN region and in every World Bank country income group. - Exceptions: Africa and a number of low-income countries on other continents where fertility rates are still 4 or higher. - Africa’s share of global population likely to increase from 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050. - Over the coming quarter century, 38 nations of more than 1 million people each will probably experience population declines, up from 21 in the past 25 years. - Projected absolute population losses over the coming quarter century (selected countries): - China: drop of 155.8 million - Japan: 18 million - Russia: 7.9 million - Italy: 7.3 million - Ukraine: 7 million - South Korea: 6.5 million - Average annual rates of population decline (relative terms) expected to be highest at: - 0.9 percent in Moldova and in Bosnia and Herzegovina - 0.8 percent in Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania - 0.7 percent in Latvia and Ukraine - In 6 of the 21 countries with average fertility rates of less than 2.1 and fewer births than deaths during 2000–25, immigration prevented depopulation. ### Comparison with historical depopulation episodes - Recent and projected patterns differ from historical episodes that were driven mainly by mass migrations and Malthusian mortality shocks (famine, genocide, war, epidemics). - Example: Black Death of 1346–53—Western Europe lost upward of a quarter of its population, corresponding to an average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more. - By comparison, the population of Moldova has fallen by roughly 1 percent annually since 2000. - Ongoing three years of warfare after Moscow’s invasion in February 2022 affect outlooks for Russia and Ukraine. ### Challenges of low fertility - Low fertility and depopulation can impede economic and social progress: - Fewer workers, savers, and spenders can potentially send an economy into contraction. - Shortage of researchers, inventors, scientists, and other people-based sources of innovative ideas could hurt economic progress. - Bourgeoning shares of older people can weigh on growth and create long-term care and health spending burdens for prime-age workers. - Slow or negative population growth relative to other countries may reduce military might and political clout. - Academic concern cited: a 2022 paper by Charles Jones argues low fertility could lead to a drop in the number of new ideas, strangling innovation and resulting in economic stagnation. - Low fertility contributes to population aging: - In countries experiencing population declines, the share of population ages 65 and older will almost double from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent between 2025 and 2050. - In countries whose populations are not shrinking, ages 65 and older will expand from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent over the same period. ### Economic opportunities and countervailing forces - Potential positives from fewer children and smaller populations: - Less need for spending on housing and childcare, freeing resources for research and development and adoption of advanced technologies. - Declines in fertility can stimulate economic growth by driving up labor force participation (especially among women), savings, and capital accumulation. - Historical demographic dividend: following the end of the post–World War II baby boom this phenomenon contributed as much as 2–3 percentage points to per capita income growth in many countries. - A population’s productive characteristics (health and education) matter more than size for knowledge creation and innovation. - Falling fertility combined with rising education can lead to human capital formation and long-term increases in prosperity (as argued by Oded Galor). - Population decline may reduce environmental pressures: land, air, and water pollution; climate change; deforestation; and loss of biodiversity. ### Adaptation, policy options, and restructuring - Key questions for policymakers: under what circumstances to address declining fertility, and which measures to implement. - Observations: - There is nothing intrinsically wrong with an economy expanding or shrinking along with its population, but side effects may be problematic. - Effective fertility policies are notoriously difficult to design and implement. - Falling birth rates may reflect societal preferences that could be accepted; the policy focus may then be on mitigating side effects. - Policy responses implemented or considered in some countries: - South Korea: recently reported a rise in fertility rates for the first time in nine years. - China: abolished its one-child policy. - Japan: introduced flexible work arrangements. - Several European countries: overhauling social security systems to ensure sustainability. - Family-friendly policies that could encourage increased fertility (noted caveats: more children create economic strains and an expanded workforce takes two decades to materialize): - Tax breaks for larger families - Extended and more flexible parental leave policies - Public or subsidized private childcare - Subsidies for infertility treatment - Policies to enable better balance between work and family responsibilities - Additional policy levers to offset depopulation effects: - Adjustments to migration policies - Expansion of education access and quality to enhance innovation capacity - Retirement policy changes, such as raising the age of retirement, to forestall workforce shrinkage by removing disincentives to working longer - Combining policies (family, education, health, retirement) may be stronger than isolated measures - Robust investments in health and education of youths and prime-age adults to enable productive work well past traditional retirement ages - Policymakers must consider the evolving work landscape: - Digitalization, robotics, automation, and artificial intelligence will affect job types, job performance, social interactions at work, and potentially fertility levels and patterns. ### Key statistics (exact figures preserved) - Global total fertility rate in 1950: 5 - Current world fertility rate: 2.24 - Benchmark for long-term global population stability: 2.1 - Projected drop below 2.1: around 2050 - UN population peak projection: 10.3 billion in 2084 - 2050 population projection range: 8.9 billion to more than 10 billion - Corresponding fertility projection range: between 1.61 and 2.59 - Africa fertility in some countries: 4 or higher - Africa share of global population: 19 percent in 2025 to 26 percent in 2050 - Number of nations >1 million likely to experience population declines over coming quarter century: 38 (up from 21 in past 25 years) - Projected population losses (selected): - China: 155.8 million - Japan: 18 million - Russia: 7.9 million - Italy: 7.3 million - Ukraine: 7 million - South Korea: 6.5 million - Average annual population decline rates (select countries): - 0.9 percent: Moldova and Bosnia and Herzegovina - 0.8 percent: Albania, Bulgaria, and Lithuania - 0.7 percent: Latvia and Ukraine - Aging shares: - In countries experiencing population declines: ages 65+ from 17.3 percent to 30.9 percent (2025–2050) - In countries not shrinking: ages 65+ from 3.2 percent to 5.5 percent (2025–2050) - Historical comparison: - Black Death (1346–53): average annual rate of population decline of 4 percent or more - Moldova’s decline since 2000: roughly 1 percent annually - Demographic dividend contribution to per capita income growth after baby boom: as much as 2–3 percentage points *Article: The Debate over Falling Fertility, DAVID E. BLOOM, MICHAEL KUHN, KLAUS PRETTNER, June 2025. F&D Magazine. Contributions noted from Ravi Sadhu.* --- ## Content in this bundle - **The Debate over Falling Fertility** - [The Debate over Falling Fertility (Markdown version)](/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf.md){rel="alternate" type="text/markdown"} - [The Debate over Falling Fertility (PDF)](/-/media/files/publications/fandd/article/2025/06/bloom.pdf){rel="external" type="application/pdf"} --- _Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fandd/issues/2025/06/the-debate-over-falling-fertility-david-bloom_