Willing coalitions
Europe’s strategic objective is clear: to support Ukraine while building deterrence against Russia. But Europe struggles to translate national commitments into a coherent unified approach. Credible deterrence requires more than the sum of national efforts. It demands coordinated procurement, integrated planning, and shared capabilities. On March 2, President Emmanuel Macron said in a pivotal speech that France’s vital interests could not be confined to its national territory, and that an attack on a European ally might trigger a French nuclear response. This is a significant shift, but a declaration by one leader does not substitute for a common institutional architecture.
To build that architecture, Europe must overcome deep structural obstacles: long-standing national defense traditions and incompatible standards that make switching to common weapons systems costly; industrial nationalism and entrenched special interests; and persistent concerns about fiscal transfers and moral hazard.
One concrete solution is the European Defence Mechanism, a proposed intergovernmental body open to all European democracies, including the UK and Ukraine, with three core functions: joint procurement and financing, ownership of shared strategic enablers such as satellites and air defense systems, and enforcement of a defense single market. Armin Steinbach and coauthors show how this mechanism would sidestep EU rules that preserve national sovereignty over defense and allow greater integration of defense policy and industry.
But credible defense also requires real command authority. For Europe to be capable of conducting high-intensity operations independently of the US, it will need its own command structure—and eventually a European army with unified command, procurement, and doctrine. To get there, Europe must avoid division.
External actors have clear incentives to split the continent into zones of influence and support nationalist movements that weaken cohesion. The difficulty is structural. The European project was conceived as a peace project, designed to reconcile internal differences and institutionalize compromise. It was not built to defend itself against aggression, whether from without or within.
The difficulty of acting collectively within the current EU framework is illustrated by the €90 billion Ukraine support package approved by the European Council in December 2025. Although it was structured to prevent opposition, Hungary still found a way of delaying it, at least until April’s elections led to a change of government. The episode shows how Europe’s institutional architecture remains vulnerable to capture by a single member state despite the political will to act among a large group of members.
In the short term, progress may depend on coalitions of the willing. A core group of member states could create momentum by pressing ahead with defense integration, procurement coordination, and operational planning. Other more cautious members may choose to join later.
A great moderating power
Ultimately, a stronger Europe is good not only for itself, but for the world. In the era of globalization, Europe overestimated the power of values and underestimated the value of power, to borrow Carney’s formulation. Europe stands for the former: a level playing field, a multilateral order, and open markets. But values without power are fragile.
Many of the world’s nearly 200 nations do not wish to align fully with either of the two rival superpower poles. A Europe that acts as a third pole—capable of projecting strength while serving as a moderating and stabilizing force—would be in the interest of Europe and the broader international system. That role cannot be played by a self-described middle power. Europe must recognize that it is large, capable, and consequential—and act accordingly.