## Institutional Arrangements for Fintech Regulation and Supervision

_FinTech Notes, January 10, 2020_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Institutional Arrangements for Fintech Regulation and Supervision](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fintech-notes/issues/2020/01/09/institutional-arrangements-for-fintech-regulation-and-supervision-48809)

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## Bibliographic details
- Authors: Charles R Taylor, Christopher Wilson, Eija Holttinen, Anastasiia Morozova
- Published: January 10, 2020
- Series: FinTech Notes
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513520308.063

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### Overview
- Fintech developments are reshaping mandates within existing regulatory architecture.
- Financial sector agencies commonly have multiple policy objectives, most often reflecting prudential, conduct, and financial stability objectives.
- Some financial sector agencies are also allocated responsibility for enhancing competition and innovation.
- Countries differ in how they balance promoting fintech development and regulating fintech, leading to variation in institutional emphasis and resource allocation.
- Conflicts of interest from dual roles (development vs. supervision) are sometimes managed through:
  - legally established prioritization of objectives, or
  - establishment of separate internal reporting lines for supervision and development.

### Key findings
- Fintech is treated as a means to achieve multiple policy objectives with varying emphasis across countries, including:
  - accelerating development,
  - spurring financial inclusion,
  - promoting competition and efficiency in the provision of financial services.
- Differences in emphasis affect institutional structures, including allocation of staff resources.
- Dual roles within agencies can create conflicts of interest that require explicit management mechanisms.

### Policy and institutional implications
- Agencies with combined mandates need clear mechanisms to manage potential conflicts between promoting fintech and supervising it.
- Possible institutional arrangements include:
  - legal prioritization of objectives to resolve conflicts of interest, and
  - separate internal reporting lines to insulate supervision from development functions.
- Balancing innovation promotion and regulatory objectives may require resource reallocation and organizational design changes tailored to country-specific priorities.

### Publication and bibliographic identifiers (selected)
- Authors: Charles R Taylor, Christopher Wilson, Eija Holttinen, Anastasiia Morozova
- Date: January 10, 2020
- Pages: 19
- Volume: 2019
- Issue: 002
- Series: FinTech Notes No. 2019/002
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513520308.063
- ISBN: 9781513520308
- ISSN: 2664-5912

*Charles R Taylor, Christopher Wilson, Eija Holttinen, and Anastasiia Morozova. "Institutional Arrangements for Fintech Regulation and Supervision", FinTech Notes 2020, 002 (2019), accessed 9/21/2026, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781513520308.063.*

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## Content in this bundle

- **Executive Summary vii**
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  - [Executive Summary vii (PDF)](/-/media/files/publications/ftn063/2019/english/ftnea2019002.pdf){rel="external" type="application/pdf"}

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/fintech-notes/issues/2020/01/09/institutional-arrangements-for-fintech-regulation-and-supervision-48809_