{
  "title": "Trade-offs in Bank Resolution",
  "publication": "Staff Discussion Notes, February 9, 2018",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/staff-discussion-notes/issues/2018/02/09/trade-offs-in-bank-resolution-45127",
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  "summary": "This SDN revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes, first by presenting a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Overview",
      "content": "- Title: Trade-offs in Bank Resolution\n- Authors: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz O Igan, Elsie Addo Awadzi, Marc C Dobler, Damiano Sandri\n- Publication type: Staff Discussion Notes\n- Date: February 9, 2018\n- Summary of the note:\n  - Revisits the debate on bank resolution regimes.\n  - Presents a simple model of bank insolvency that transparently describes the trade-off involved between bail-outs, bail-ins, and larger capital buffers.\n  - Looks for empirical evidence to assess the moral hazard consequences of bail-outs and the systemic spillovers from bail-ins."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Model and trade-off analysis",
      "content": "- Core analytical focus:\n  - A simple model of bank insolvency framed to make transparent the trade-offs between:\n    - bail-outs,\n    - bail-ins,\n    - larger capital buffers.\n- Intended analytical goal:\n  - To clarify how different resolution tools interact with incentives and stability outcomes."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Empirical assessment",
      "content": "- Empirical objectives:\n  - Assess the moral hazard consequences of bail-outs.\n  - Assess the systemic spillovers from bail-ins.\n- Methodological note:\n  - The note combines the theoretical model with empirical investigation to evaluate the real-world implications of different resolution regimes."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Subjects and keywords (areas emphasized)",
      "content": "- Subject areas:\n  - Bank resolution\n  - Bank resolution framework\n  - Banking\n  - Financial crises\n  - Financial sector policy and analysis\n  - Financial sector stability\n  - Moral hazard\n  - Spillovers\n- Keywords (explicit):\n  - bail in, bail-in power, bail-in process, bail-in regime, bail-out expectation, bank equity, Bank resolution, Bank resolution framework, bank stakeholder, central bank, equity capital, EU bail-in event, Financial regulation, Financial sector stability, Global, holding company, Moral hazard, public funds, recognition clause, resolution regime, SDN, Spillovers"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Use cases and audience",
      "content": "- Target readership:\n  - Policymakers and regulators concerned with bank resolution regimes.\n  - Researchers studying moral hazard, financial stability, and resolution tool design.\n  - Practitioners evaluating trade-offs among bail-outs, bail-ins, and capital regulation.\n\nStaff Discussion Note: \"Trade-offs in Bank Resolution\", Giovanni Dell'Ariccia et al., February 9, 2018.\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- Staff Discussion Note\n  - Staff Discussion Note (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - Staff Discussion Note (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/staff-discussion-notes/issues/2018/02/09/trade-offs-in-bank-resolution-45127"
    }
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    "Authors: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz O Igan, Elsie Addo Awadzi, Marc C Dobler, Damiano Sandri",
    "Published: February 9, 2018",
    "Series: Staff Discussion Notes",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484341001.006",
    "Title: Trade-offs in Bank Resolution",
    "Authors: Giovanni Dell'Ariccia, Deniz O Igan, Elsie Addo Awadzi, Marc C Dobler, Damiano Sandri",
    "Publication type: Staff Discussion Notes",
    "Date: February 9, 2018",
    "Summary of the note:",
    "Core analytical focus:",
    "Intended analytical goal:",
    "Empirical objectives:",
    "Methodological note:",
    "Subject areas:",
    "Keywords (explicit):",
    "Target readership:",
    "**Staff Discussion Note**"
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