{
  "title": "Resolution Funding: Who Pays When Financial Institutions Fail?",
  "publication": "Technical Notes and Manuals, August 16, 2018",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/tnm/issues/2018/08/16/resolution-funding-who-pays-when-financial-institutions-fail-46124",
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  "summary": "A key element of the international reform agenda since the Global Financial Crisis has been to strengthen resolution regimes and make government bailouts the last, not first, resort.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary",
      "content": "- A key element of the international reform agenda since the Global Financial Crisis has been to strengthen resolution regimes and make government bailouts the last, not first, resort.\n- A new international standard prescribes a range of tools, powers, and funding arrangements needed to resolve “any financial institution that could be systemically significant or critical if it fails.”\n- The standard recommends having resolution funding arrangements set up in advance, “so that authorities are not constrained to rely on public ownership or bail-out funds as a means of resolving firms.”\n- The standard leaves open significant flexibility with respect to the arrangements that would provide the resources authorities will need to carry out effective resolution.\n- This paper offers a framework for weighing the relative advantages of different resolution funding options that could meet the standard.\n- The paper presents the main developments to date and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different options."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Framework for Comparing Resolution Funding Options",
      "content": "- The paper provides a framework to weigh the relative advantages of different resolution funding options that could satisfy the international standard.\n- Emphasis on pre-positioned funding arrangements to avoid reliance on public ownership or bail-out funds during resolution."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Main Developments to Date",
      "content": "- The document presents the main developments to date concerning resolution funding arrangements and international standards since the Global Financial Crisis."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Advantages and Disadvantages of Different Options",
      "content": "- The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different resolution funding options, consistent with the standard’s allowance for significant flexibility in funding arrangements."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Publication and Metadata",
      "content": "- Authors: Oana M Croitoru, Marc C Dobler, Johan Molin\n- Date: August 16, 2018\n- Series: Technical Notes and Manuals No. 2018/001\n- Issue: 001\n- Volume: 2018\n- Pages: 28\n- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484371022.005\n- Stock No: TNMEA2018001\n- ISBN: 9781484371022\n- ISSN: 2075-8669\n- Subject: Expenditure, Revenue administration\n\nTechnical Guidance Note; views expressed are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the IMF, its Executive Board, or IMF management.\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- IMF Technical Notes and Manuals | Resolution Funding: Who Pays When Financial Institutions Fail?\n  - IMF Technical Notes and Manuals | Resolution Funding: Who Pays When Financial Institutions Fail? (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - IMF Technical Notes and Manuals | Resolution Funding: Who Pays When Financial Institutions Fail? (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/tnm/issues/2018/08/16/resolution-funding-who-pays-when-financial-institutions-fail-46124"
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    "Authors: Oana M Croitoru, Marc C Dobler, Johan Molin",
    "Published: August 16, 2018",
    "Series: Technical Notes and Manuals",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484371022.005",
    "A key element of the international reform agenda since the Global Financial Crisis has been to strengthen resolution regimes and make government bailouts the last, not first, resort.",
    "A new international standard prescribes a range of tools, powers, and funding arrangements needed to resolve “any financial institution that could be systemically significant or critical if it fails.”",
    "The standard recommends having resolution funding arrangements set up in advance, “so that authorities are not constrained to rely on public ownership or bail-out funds as a means of resolving firms.”",
    "The standard leaves open significant flexibility with respect to the arrangements that would provide the resources authorities will need to carry out effective resolution.",
    "This paper offers a framework for weighing the relative advantages of different resolution funding options that could meet the standard.",
    "The paper presents the main developments to date and discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different options.",
    "The paper provides a framework to weigh the relative advantages of different resolution funding options that could satisfy the international standard.",
    "Emphasis on pre-positioned funding arrangements to avoid reliance on public ownership or bail-out funds during resolution.",
    "The document presents the main developments to date concerning resolution funding arrangements and international standards since the Global Financial Crisis.",
    "The paper discusses the advantages and disadvantages of different resolution funding options, consistent with the standard’s allowance for significant flexibility in funding arrangements.",
    "Authors: Oana M Croitoru, Marc C Dobler, Johan Molin",
    "Date: August 16, 2018",
    "Series: Technical Notes and Manuals No. 2018/001",
    "Issue: 001",
    "Volume: 2018",
    "Pages: 28",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781484371022.005",
    "Stock No: TNMEA2018001",
    "ISBN: 9781484371022",
    "ISSN: 2075-8669",
    "Subject: Expenditure, Revenue administration",
    "**IMF Technical Notes and Manuals | Resolution Funding: Who Pays When Financial Institutions Fail?**"
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