{
  "title": "Credibility of Policies Versus Credibility of Policymakers",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, May 1, 1994",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/credibility-of-policies-versus-credibility-of-policymakers-1247",
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  "summary": "Standard models of policy credibility, defined as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out, emphasize the preferences of the policymaker, and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary",
      "content": "- Standard models of policy credibility define credibility as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out and emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility.\n- Whether a policy is carried out will also reflect the state of the economy.\n- The paper presents a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high.\n- Main conclusion: if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods.\n- The authors test this implication on data for the interest rate differential between France and Germany and find support for the hypothesis."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Theoretical model and mechanisms",
      "content": "- Policymaker behavior:\n  - Maintains a fixed parity in good times.\n  - Devalues when the unemployment rate exceeds a critical threshold.\n- Credibility dynamics:\n  - Tough policies can signal toughness and raise credibility in standard models.\n  - When unemployment is persistent, a tough policy observed in one period can signal a higher likelihood of devaluation in later periods because the state (high unemployment) increases the probability the policymaker will abandon the parity.\n- Key concepts emphasized:\n  - No-devaluation rule\n  - Second period problem\n  - Objective function of the policymaker\n  - Policy instrument and policy stance"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Empirical test and evidence",
      "content": "- Data examined: interest rate differential between France and Germany.\n- Empirical finding: evidence supports the model implication that observing a tough policy in a given period may lower the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods when unemployment is persistent."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Subjects and keywords",
      "content": "- Subject: Inflation, Labor, Prices, Unemployment, Unemployment rate\n- Keywords: anti-inflationary policies increase, critical value, expansionary policy, government debt accumulation, Inflation, no-devaluation rule, objective function, policy convergence, policy credibility, policy instrument, policy stance, second period problem, tough government, Unemployment, Unemployment rate, WP\n\nIMF Working Papers. Publication details as listed above.\n\n---\n\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/credibility-of-policies-versus-credibility-of-policymakers-1247"
    }
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    "Authors: Paul R Masson, Allan Drazen",
    "Published: May 1, 1994",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451971811.001",
    "Standard models of policy credibility define credibility as the expectation that an announced policy will be carried out and emphasize the preferences of the policymaker and the role of tough policies in signalling toughness and raising credibility.",
    "Whether a policy is carried out will also reflect the state of the economy.",
    "The paper presents a model in which a policymaker maintains a fixed parity in good times, but devalues if the unemployment rate gets too high.",
    "Main conclusion: if there is persistence in unemployment, observing a tough policy in a given period may lower rather than raise the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods.",
    "The authors test this implication on data for the interest rate differential between France and Germany and find support for the hypothesis.",
    "Policymaker behavior:",
    "Credibility dynamics:",
    "Key concepts emphasized:",
    "Data examined: interest rate differential between France and Germany.",
    "Empirical finding: evidence supports the model implication that observing a tough policy in a given period may lower the credibility of a no-devaluation pledge in subsequent periods when unemployment is persistent.",
    "Subject: Inflation, Labor, Prices, Unemployment, Unemployment rate",
    "Keywords: anti-inflationary policies increase, critical value, expansionary policy, government debt accumulation, Inflation, no-devaluation rule, objective function, policy convergence, policy credibility, policy instrument, policy stance, second period problem, tough government, Unemployment, Unemployment rate, WP"
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