## Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean

_IMF Working Papers, March 1, 2003_

## Source details

**Canonical URL:** [Inflation Performance and Constitutional Central Bank Independence: Evidence From Latin America and the Caribbean](https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/inflation-performance-and-constitutional-central-bank-independence-evidence-from-latin-16282)

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## Bibliographic details
- Authors: Eva Gutierrez
- Published: March 1, 2003
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451847406.001

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### Summary and central finding
- The paper explores the relationship between the constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence and inflation performance.
- Empirical studies for developing countries have not found a relationship between central bank independence proxied by the "de jure" independence established in the central bank law, and inflation.
- The paper argues that the constitution is likely to be better enforced than ordinary statutes owing to its higher legal rank.
- Empirical analysis in a sample of Latin American and Caribbean countries finds that those countries that entrench the independence of the central bank in the constitution have a better inflation performance.

### Empirical approach and reasoning
- Comparative empirical analysis across Latin American and Caribbean countries.
- Key premise: constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence provides stronger legal protection than ordinary central bank laws ("de jure" independence), improving enforcement and outcomes.
- Focus contrasts constitutional provisions versus ordinary statutory provisions as determinants of inflation performance.

### Policy implications and interpretations
- Constitutional entrenchment of central bank independence may be a more effective institutional design for achieving better inflation performance in developing-country contexts.
- Suggests that reforms aimed at strengthening central bank independence may be more credible and durable if incorporated into the constitution rather than only in ordinary legislation.

### Key statistics and publication metadata
- Pages: 30
- Volume: 2003
- Issue: 053
- Series: Working Paper No. 2003/053
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451847406.001
- Stock No: WPIEA0532003
- ISBN: 9781451847406
- ISSN: 1018-5941
- Author: Eva Gutierrez
- Publication date: March 1, 2003
- Format noted on landing page: Chicago citation example includes access date "accessed 9/17/2026"

*IMF Working Paper No. 2003/053 — Eva Gutierrez, March 1, 2003*

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_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/inflation-performance-and-constitutional-central-bank-independence-evidence-from-latin-16282_