## Institutionalized Corruption and the Kleptocratic State

_IMF Working Papers, July 1, 1999_

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## Bibliographic details
- Authors: Christian Harm, Joshua Charap
- Published: July 1, 1999
- Series: IMF Working Papers
- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451851496.001

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### Summary and core argument
- Corruption patterns are endogenous to political structures.
- Corruption can be systemic and planned rather than decentralized and coincidental.
- In an economic system without law or property rights, a kleptocratic state may arise as a predatory hierarchy from a state of pure anarchy.
- A dictator minimizes the probability of a palace revolution by creating a system of patronage and loyalty through corrupt bureaucracy.
- Competitive corruption patterns are associated with anarchy and weak dictators, while strong dictators implement a system of monopolistic corruption.
- Efforts at public sector reform may meet resistance in countries featuring such systemic corruption.

### Mechanisms, concepts, and keywords
- Mechanisms emphasized:
  - Patronage and loyalty created through corrupt bureaucracy to reduce palace revolution risk.
  - Transition from anarchy to predatory hierarchical state (kleptocratic state).
  - Distinction between competitive corruption (anarchy/weak dictators) and monopolistic corruption (strong dictators).
- Subject areas: Corruption, Crime, Labor, National accounts, Personal income, Public sector wages, Technology.
- Keywords provided exactly: anarchy, combat technology, Corruption, dictatorship, gang member, governance, government objective, interest group rent-seeking, maximization problem, palace revolution, Personal income, Public sector wages, rent-seeking activity, WP

### Policy implications and challenges
- Public sector reform efforts may face resistance in countries with systemic, institutionalized corruption.
- The paper implies that reform strategies must account for political-structural incentives that sustain patronage and loyalty systems.

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## Content in this bundle

- **Institutionalized Corporation and the Kleptocratic State - WP/99/91**
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_Source: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/institutionalized-corruption-and-the-kleptocratic-state-3152_