{
  "title": "Internal Models, Subordinated Debt, and Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risk",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, September 1, 2002",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/internal-models-subordinated-debt-and-regulatory-capital-requirements-for-bank-credit-risk-15952",
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  "summary": "Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements. If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a manner",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary",
      "content": "- Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements.\n- If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a manner that limits both the probability of bank default and the expected loss on insured deposits, largely removing any safety net-related funding cost subsidy and the moral hazard incentives it creates.\n- Required equity capital can be estimated using a modified credit-VaR framework, and supervisors can use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key Findings",
      "content": "- Credit VaR estimates have shortcomings that render them unsuitable as the sole basis for regulatory capital requirements.\n- Requiring subordinated debt with a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default changes banks’ incentives for equity capital setting.\n- Properly designed subordinated debt requirements lead banks to limit:\n  - the probability of bank default, and\n  - the expected loss on insured deposits.\n- These limits largely remove safety net-related funding cost subsidies and the moral hazard incentives those subsidies create."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Policy Recommendations",
      "content": "- Require banks to issue subordinated debt that meets specified market-value and default-probability criteria.\n- Set regulatory equity capital requirements so banks internalize limits on both default probability and expected insured-deposit losses.\n- Use a modified credit-VaR framework to estimate required equity capital.\n- Enable supervisors to use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Methodology and Verification",
      "content": "- Required equity capital estimation: suggested via a modified credit-VaR framework.\n- Model verification: supervisors can rely on external credit ratings to indirectly verify internal model estimates."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Subject Areas and Keywords",
      "content": "- Subject: Banking; Credit; Credit risk; Debt financing; Deposit insurance; Econometric analysis; External debt; Financial institutions; Financial regulation and supervision; Money; Stocks; Vector autoregression\n- Keywords: bank default; bank investment incentive; bank liability; bank shareholder; capital allocation; capital requirement; Credit; Credit risk; credit VaR; Debt financing; debt issue; equity capital; funding debt; internal risk models; investment opportunity; market value; regulatory capital requirements; safety net; Stocks; subordinated debt; Vector autoregression; WP\n\nInternal Models, Subordinated Debt, and Regulatory Capital Requirements for Bank Credit Risk — Paul H. Kupiec\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp02157\n  - wp02157 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp02157 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/internal-models-subordinated-debt-and-regulatory-capital-requirements-for-bank-credit-risk-15952"
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    "Authors: Paul H. Kupiec",
    "Published: September 1, 2002",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451857504.001",
    "Shortcomings make credit VaR estimates an unsuitable basis for setting bank regulatory capital requirements.",
    "If, alternatively, banks are required to issue subordinated debt that has a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default, banks must set their equity capital in a manner that limits both the probability of bank default and the expected loss on insured deposits, largely removing any safety net-related funding cost subsidy and the moral hazard incentives it creates.",
    "Required equity capital can be estimated using a modified credit-VaR framework, and supervisors can use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates.",
    "Credit VaR estimates have shortcomings that render them unsuitable as the sole basis for regulatory capital requirements.",
    "Requiring subordinated debt with a minimum market value and maximum acceptable probability of default changes banks’ incentives for equity capital setting.",
    "Properly designed subordinated debt requirements lead banks to limit:",
    "These limits largely remove safety net-related funding cost subsidies and the moral hazard incentives those subsidies create.",
    "Require banks to issue subordinated debt that meets specified market-value and default-probability criteria.",
    "Set regulatory equity capital requirements so banks internalize limits on both default probability and expected insured-deposit losses.",
    "Use a modified credit-VaR framework to estimate required equity capital.",
    "Enable supervisors to use external credit ratings to indirectly verify the accuracy of bank internal model estimates.",
    "Required equity capital estimation: suggested via a modified credit-VaR framework.",
    "Model verification: supervisors can rely on external credit ratings to indirectly verify internal model estimates.",
    "Subject: Banking; Credit; Credit risk; Debt financing; Deposit insurance; Econometric analysis; External debt; Financial institutions; Financial regulation and supervision; Money; Stocks; Vector autoregression",
    "Keywords: bank default; bank investment incentive; bank liability; bank shareholder; capital allocation; capital requirement; Credit; Credit risk; credit VaR; Debt financing; debt issue; equity capital; funding debt; internal risk models; investment opportunity; market value; regulatory capital requirements; safety net; Stocks; subordinated debt; Vector autoregression; WP",
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