{
  "title": "Votingon the \"Optimal\" Size of Government",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, October 1, 2000",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/votingon-the-optimal-size-of-government-3826",
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  "summary": "Viewing fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes, the “economic model of politics” proposes a public choice approach, which does not rely on social welfare functions.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary of model and approach",
      "content": "- Views fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes.\n- Proposes the “economic model of politics”, a public choice approach that does not rely on social welfare functions.\n- Derives a country’s overall budget endogenously from the political behavior of individuals.\n- Explains electoral fluctuations on the basis of changes to individuals’ income and wealth.\n- Describes political behavior in terms of individuals’ decisions regarding votes, abstentions, and party membership.\n- Identifies a country’s wealth distribution as a crucial variable affecting economic stability and the government’s size relative to output."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key findings and implications",
      "content": "- The size of government relative to output can be explained endogenously within a public choice framework rather than imposed by a social welfare function.\n- Individual-level income and wealth changes generate observable electoral fluctuations and thus influence fiscal policy outcomes.\n- Political participation choices (voting, abstention, party membership) are central mechanisms linking household preferences to aggregate fiscal outcomes.\n- Wealth distribution is a central determinant of both economic stability and the equilibrium size of government."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Analytical focus and topics covered",
      "content": "- Capital income\n- Consumption\n- Expenditure\n- Income\n- Income tax systems"
    },
    {
      "heading": "Research and publication metadata (for reference in overlays)",
      "content": "- Working Paper by Jan-Peter Olters\n- Date: October 1, 2000\n\nJan-Peter Olters. \"Votingon the \"Optimal\" Size of Government\", IMF Working Papers 2000, 174 (2000), accessed 9/17/2026, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451858686.001\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- Voting on the \"Optimal\" Size of Government - WP/00/174\n  - Voting on the \"Optimal\" Size of Government - WP/00/174 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - Voting on the \"Optimal\" Size of Government - WP/00/174 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/30/votingon-the-optimal-size-of-government-3826"
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    "Authors: Jan-Peter Olters",
    "Published: October 1, 2000",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451858686.001",
    "Views fiscal policies as the outcome of democratically resolved conflicts of households over public goods and taxes.",
    "Proposes the “economic model of politics”, a public choice approach that does not rely on social welfare functions.",
    "Derives a country’s overall budget endogenously from the political behavior of individuals.",
    "Explains electoral fluctuations on the basis of changes to individuals’ income and wealth.",
    "Describes political behavior in terms of individuals’ decisions regarding votes, abstentions, and party membership.",
    "Identifies a country’s wealth distribution as a crucial variable affecting economic stability and the government’s size relative to output.",
    "The size of government relative to output can be explained endogenously within a public choice framework rather than imposed by a social welfare function.",
    "Individual-level income and wealth changes generate observable electoral fluctuations and thus influence fiscal policy outcomes.",
    "Political participation choices (voting, abstention, party membership) are central mechanisms linking household preferences to aggregate fiscal outcomes.",
    "Wealth distribution is a central determinant of both economic stability and the equilibrium size of government.",
    "Capital income",
    "Consumption",
    "Expenditure",
    "Income",
    "Income tax systems",
    "Working Paper by Jan-Peter Olters",
    "Date: October 1, 2000",
    "**Voting on the \"Optimal\" Size of Government - WP/00/174**"
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