{
  "title": "A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, October 1, 2008",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/a-theory-of-international-crisis-lending-and-imf-conditionality-22371",
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  "summary": "We present a framework that clarifies the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and the conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Framework and central thesis",
      "content": "- Presents a framework clarifying the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise.\n- In the model, traditional conditionality:\n  - Commits country authorities to undertake crisis resolution efforts.\n  - Facilitates the return of private capital.\n  - Ensures repayment to the IMF."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Conditions for moral hazard",
      "content": "- Moral hazard can arise if:\n  - There are crisis externalities across countries (contagion).\n  - Country authorities discount crisis costs too much relative to the national social optimum.\n  - Or both contagion and excessive discounting occur simultaneously."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Role and types of conditionality",
      "content": "- Traditional conditionality focuses on crisis resolution commitments by country authorities.\n- The paper identifies \"ex ante\" conditionality as a mechanism to avoid IMF-induced moral hazard:\n  - IMF lending can be made conditional on crisis prevention efforts (\"ex ante\" conditionality)."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Key findings and implications",
      "content": "- Traditional conditionality can align country behavior with repayment and capital return objectives, but is not always sufficient to prevent moral hazard.\n- Externalities (contagion) and misalignment between private authorities' discounting of crisis costs and the national social optimum are central drivers of moral hazard risks.\n- Conditioning IMF lending on prevention (ex ante conditionality) provides a policy lever to mitigate moral hazard arising from these drivers."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Publication and metadata",
      "content": "- Authors: Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, Olivier D Jeanne\n- Date: October 1, 2008\n- Series: IMF Working Papers\n- Issue: 236\n- Volume: 2008\n- Pages: 33\n- DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001\n- ISBN: 9781451870947\n- ISSN: 1018-5941\n- Subjects: Crisis prevention, Crisis resolution, Financial crises, Moral hazard, Political economy\n- Keywords: IMF crisis lending, IMF lending, substitution effect, WP\n\nJeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, and Olivier D Jeanne. \"A Theory of International Crisis Lending and IMF Conditionality\", IMF Working Papers 2008, 236 (2008), accessed 9/12/2026, https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp08236 - References\n  - wp08236 - References (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp08236 - References (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/a-theory-of-international-crisis-lending-and-imf-conditionality-22371"
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    "Authors: Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, Olivier D Jeanne",
    "Published: October 1, 2008",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001",
    "Presents a framework clarifying the financial role of the IMF, the rationale for conditionality, and conditions under which IMF-induced moral hazard can arise.",
    "In the model, traditional conditionality:",
    "Moral hazard can arise if:",
    "Traditional conditionality focuses on crisis resolution commitments by country authorities.",
    "The paper identifies \"ex ante\" conditionality as a mechanism to avoid IMF-induced moral hazard:",
    "Traditional conditionality can align country behavior with repayment and capital return objectives, but is not always sufficient to prevent moral hazard.",
    "Externalities (contagion) and misalignment between private authorities' discounting of crisis costs and the national social optimum are central drivers of moral hazard risks.",
    "Conditioning IMF lending on prevention (ex ante conditionality) provides a policy lever to mitigate moral hazard arising from these drivers.",
    "Authors: Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Jonathan David Ostry, Olivier D Jeanne",
    "Date: October 1, 2008",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "Issue: 236",
    "Volume: 2008",
    "Pages: 33",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451870947.001",
    "ISBN: 9781451870947",
    "ISSN: 1018-5941",
    "Subjects: Crisis prevention, Crisis resolution, Financial crises, Moral hazard, Political economy",
    "Keywords: IMF crisis lending, IMF lending, substitution effect, WP",
    "**_wp08236 - References**"
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