{
  "title": "Can Budget Institutions Counteract Political Indiscipline?",
  "publication": "IMF Working Papers, May 1, 2006",
  "sourceUrl": "https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/can-budget-institutions-counteract-political-indiscipline-19141",
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  "summary": "The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities. We confirm this proposition for a group of new and potential members of the European Union, finding that politics dominates.",
  "sections": [
    {
      "heading": "Summary findings",
      "content": "- \"The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities.\"  \n- For a group of new and potential members of the European Union, the authors find that \"politics dominates.\"  \n- Contemporary democratic practices can increase budget deficits through:\n  - ideological preferences;\n  - more fragmented government coalitions; and\n  - higher voter participation.  \n- Long-term structural forces—triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules—have more ambiguous implications but \"also appear to increase budget pressures.\"  \n- The most robust finding: \"budget institutions—mechanisms and rules of the budget process—that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.\""
    },
    {
      "heading": "Analysis themes and mechanisms",
      "content": "- Political drivers of fiscal outcomes:\n  - Ideological preferences shape budget priorities.\n  - Government fragmentation (coalitional government) is associated with larger deficits.\n  - Voter turnout (voter turnover / higher voter participation) can increase budgetary pressures.\n- Structural forces:\n  - Ethnic fractionalization and representative electoral rules are long-term structural factors linked to fiscal pressures.\n  - Implications of structural forces are described as \"ambiguous\" but tending toward increased budget pressures in the authors' findings.\n- Institutional countermeasures:\n  - Budget institutions (rules and procedures of the budget process) function as checks and balances.\n  - These institutions retain significant value under undisciplined representative politics and unfavorable structural conditions."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Policy implications and recommendations (implicit in findings)",
      "content": "- Strengthen budget institutions—procedural rules and mechanisms that create checks and balances—to mitigate politically driven fiscal indiscipline.\n- Pay attention to political structure factors (government fragmentation, electoral rules) when designing fiscal rules and PFM reforms.\n- Recognize that higher voter participation and ideological competition can exacerbate deficits; institutional design should aim to anchor fiscal outcomes despite these democratic dynamics."
    },
    {
      "heading": "Scope, topics, and keywords",
      "content": "- Subject: Budget planning and preparation; Expenditure; Fiscal policy; Fiscal stance; Labor; Public debt; Public financial management (PFM); Unemployment rate.  \n- Keywords: Baltics; budget institutions; Budget planning and preparation; Central and Eastern Europe; coalitional government; Eastern Europe; electoral rules; ethnic fractionalization; finance minister; Fiscal policy; Fiscal stance; General government expenditure; government fragmentation; government ideology; institutions index; least squares; political economy; Unemployment rate; voter turnover; WP.\n\n---\n\n Content in this bundle\n\n- wp06123\n  - wp06123 (Markdown version){rel=\"alternate\" type=\"text/markdown\"}\n  - wp06123 (PDF){rel=\"external\" type=\"application/pdf\"}\n\n---\n\nSource: https://www.imf.org/en/publications/wp/issues/2016/12/31/can-budget-institutions-counteract-political-indiscipline-19141"
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    "Authors: Ashoka Mody, Stefania Fabrizio",
    "Published: May 1, 2006",
    "Series: IMF Working Papers",
    "DOI: https://doi.org/10.5089/9781451863833.001",
    "\"The budget is an expression of political rather than economic priorities.\"",
    "For a group of new and potential members of the European Union, the authors find that \"politics dominates.\"",
    "Contemporary democratic practices can increase budget deficits through:",
    "Long-term structural forces—triggered by societal divisions and representative electoral rules—have more ambiguous implications but \"also appear to increase budget pressures.\"",
    "The most robust finding: \"budget institutions—mechanisms and rules of the budget process—that create checks and balances have significant value even when the politics is representative but undisciplined, and when long-term structural forces are unfavorable.\"",
    "Political drivers of fiscal outcomes:",
    "Structural forces:",
    "Institutional countermeasures:",
    "Strengthen budget institutions—procedural rules and mechanisms that create checks and balances—to mitigate politically driven fiscal indiscipline.",
    "Pay attention to political structure factors (government fragmentation, electoral rules) when designing fiscal rules and PFM reforms.",
    "Recognize that higher voter participation and ideological competition can exacerbate deficits; institutional design should aim to anchor fiscal outcomes despite these democratic dynamics.",
    "Subject: Budget planning and preparation; Expenditure; Fiscal policy; Fiscal stance; Labor; Public debt; Public financial management (PFM); Unemployment rate.",
    "Keywords: Baltics; budget institutions; Budget planning and preparation; Central and Eastern Europe; coalitional government; Eastern Europe; electoral rules; ethnic fractionalization; finance minister; Fiscal policy; Fiscal stance; General government expenditure; government fragmentation; government ideology; institutions index; least squares; political economy; Unemployment rate; voter turnover; WP.",
    "**_wp06123**"
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